
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By HILAIRE BELLOC

HISTORY OF ENGLAND

MARIE ANTOINETTE

THE PATH TO ROME

THE BOOK OF THE BAYEUX TAPESTRY

ECONOMICS FOR YOUNG PEOPLE (PUBLISHED AS ECONOMICS FOR HELEN)

A History of England

A History of England

By

Hilaire Belloc

Volume II

Catholic England: II. The Early Middle Ages

A.D. 1066 to 1348

With Fifteen Maps



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PREFACE TO THE SECOND VOLUME

THIS second volume of my "History of England" deals with the early Middle Ages, which period, for this country, is best defined as lying between the Battle of Hastings and the Black Death. I deal here, therefore, with the generations in which mediæval civilization rose, in Britain as in every other province of Western Christendom, to its greatest height; the period which saw the transformation of architecture; the founding of universities, the beginnings of the literary vernacular languages and of Parliaments.

It was for England a period essentially French-speaking: a matter of nearly three hundred years, during the first century of which the French language was becoming more and more the one standard vernacular medium for the intercourse of all the governing class, down to at least the level of the wealthier freemen and of the merchants in the towns. Below this increasingly general speech the standard Anglo-Saxon of Alfred died out as a language for the daily use of those who counted in the state. Its disappearance in what may be called an "official" use is to be found less than a century after the Conquest: the entries in the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle of the XIIth century.

For a century more the use of French continues to spread, until it has reached pretty well everyone who

travels or writes or reads, or takes any part in the general life of society above that of the peasant. While it does so, however, a very large central belt between the mass of serfs and the clergy, freemen, and well-born above them, becomes bilingual; for the Anglo-Saxon dialects are feeling more and more the influence of French literature and speech, are simplifying, changing form, and probably coalescing.

In the last two generations before the Black Death, what we to-day call the English language is definitely forming below the upper stratum of French, which is still holding its own, but which is talked by many who presumably *thought* in what may already almost be called—in our modern sense of the term—"English."

As an accompaniment, though not as a result of this superficial phenomenon of language, are to be observed parallel things in all the more profound phenomena of culture. England during this time was part of one civilization, held within the religious unity of the Roman Communion; and England is but a section of a special area in this united Europe, an area which includes all Northern France as well. The gentry which governed between the Scottish highlands and the mountains of Auvergne were all of one sort and were the leaders of Europe, especially after the Crusades.

But there are three fairly distinct phases in this development, just as there are three fairly distinct phases in the contemporary development of language.

For a century and a half, that is, until the loss of Normandy, Maine, Anjou, etc., by the Plantagenets, a noble with civil and military command on the Continent or in this island was indifferent to either place. With some slight exception for the case of Brittany, the

count or earl of a district, any man possessed of many manors, connected his position with a feudal idea which had nothing national about it. William Marshall, who helped to save the Plantagenet dynasty, is indistinguishable from any other great lord on either side of the Channel in the general lines of his life; and the famous poem lately discovered (it may be in part his autobiography) is just such an one as might be found in Flanders or Poitou.

After John's loss of the northern Continental territory in 1204, the feudal class in England, its dependants, the clerical body with which it is associated, the chief merchants of the towns, while remaining in daily life what they had been and what the corresponding classes across the Channel were, no longer feel a lack of difference between their position and those of the Continentals. The revenue of the Plantagenet crown has fallen; its centre of gravity now lies wholly within Britain, and Gascony, the main possession overseas, is but a distant appendix. There was not yet the feeling of the nation against the foreigner in the mass of the gentry, and, of course, nothing of the kind in the very wealthy clique which was intriguing round about the Court and of which Simon de Montfort was the most notable figure; but there was a determination that the places and emoluments which derived ultimately from English sources should go to men such as Simon who held land by inheritance of the King in England. This increasing tendency to local feeling was enhanced through the resistance provoked by the new, vastly swollen, Papal taxation and by Provisions. Before the end of the XIIIth century a general popular tendency towards national feeling is clear.

The remaining long lifetime before the Black Death strengthens it still further, and the first victories of Edward III confirm it: but England is still a country whose cultivated speech, whose main institutions, whose building and all social habit are those of northern France, until half-way between A.D. 1300 and 1400.

It is with the Black Death in the middle of the XIVth century that this state of affairs prolonged over nearly three centuries, which took so deep a root in England that its effect has never been lost, came to a somewhat abrupt end. And that is why, in writing the history of England at least, one must make a clear division at the date of this catastrophe.

A generation after the Black Death England is talking English, a vernacular literature has arisen, there are distinct national characters in the national architecture, and within another lifetime a distinct national character in the governing class, save in its wealthiest members; and even there, within a century of the Black Death, all are of the new kind and alien to the civilization beyond the Channel. Meanwhile those institutions founded in the earlier period, and derived from Continental civilization, notably the Parliament and the organization of the Law Courts, begin, with the XVth century, to take on an unmistakably separate national character.

That the Black Death is thus the great line of cleavage in English mediæval history—a matter still subject to controversy—I will defend in my next volume. There are, in the present volume, other points opposed to the official history of our schools.

The most important of these are three:

First I maintain the thesis that the population at

the time of the Conquest, and indeed, throughout the early Middle Ages, was much larger than has generally been set down by our academic historians. I have, in the text, given my reasons for this conclusion.

Next I point out the fact (for it is not a theory) that the main institutions which took root in England during the Middle Ages were of Continental, and especially of Gallic, origin. Fantastic theory may attempt to connect them with some remote imaginary barbaric past in the forests of Germany; but there is no evidence. On the contrary, all the documentary evidence is the other way. Parliaments arise in the Pyrenees; the Hundred is a Merovingian institution, first found in a Merovingian document centuries before it appears as an English one; the Jury comes to us from across the Channel.

The assumption that such things are of savage origin, external to the Roman Empire, and especially to the Gauls and to the Gallic marches of the Ebro and the Rhine, has become, by a curious circular process of argument, so mixed up with patriotism that it is not easy to maintain the simple truth in the matter. A generation which was convinced that its ancestors all came over from the barbaric Germanies in small open boats cannot understand, or is angry to be told, that institutions many centuries later in date did not also come over from Germany in the same little craft. But history is history; it has but three bases: monument, document, and tradition; and in none of these is there a trace of the strange origins given to our institutions by the official academic historians of the last generation.

Lastly, I have maintained that the various rebellions of the wealthier feudal class in the early Middle

Ages were not to be confounded with the political movements of modern times. Magna Carta has nothing to do with that doctrine of substituting wealth for kingship which used to be called the Spirit of the Constitution, and is to-day oddly called Democracy. It is the rear-guard action of a declining feudal society, a registration of its precedents and privileges and of its efforts against excessive taxation. So long as the relics of feudal dues survived as the main sources of royal revenue, that record remained important. With the rise of Parliamentary grants the importance of Magna Carta disappeared, and its resurrection in the XVIIth century upon a totally false basis gave rise to an equally false modern legend that this document was at the basis of Whiggery.

But the feudal rebels of the Middle Ages were not Whigs. The Norman and other feudatories rising against William and his son, the feudal opposition to John, the feudal opposition to both Papal and royal taxation under Henry III, the attack on, deposition and murder of Edward II,—these had no relation to the glorious revolution of 1688 or the parlour politics of Macaulay. To use in connection with them the word "constitutional" is a gross and even ridiculous anachronism; as though one should take the Palace of John of Gaunt for the Savoy Hotel.

Sundry other smaller debatable points (such as the probability that Wycliffe's Bible has not survived) will be found in this volume. I shall be prepared to defend them when they are criticized, but I will not burden the text with detailed proof. In this I follow a method which I have already followed in my first volume, and shall continue through the remaining

three: that of giving the reader the main truths of history, without the confusion of manifold reference; reserving this for particular discussion elsewhere when it is needed.

H. Belloc.

King's Land, Shipley,
Horsham, *January, 1927.*

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1070. Final Conquest.
1085. Domesday Survey.
1087. Death of William I, Accession of William II.
1093. St. Anselm made Primate.
1100. Death of William II, Accession of Henry I.
1106. Battle of Tinchebrai.
1135. Death of Henry I, Accession of Stephen.
1154. Death of Stephen, Accession of Henry II.
1170. Murder of Becket.
1170. Landing of Strongbow in Ireland.
1189. Death of Henry II, Accession of Richard I.
1192. Capture of Richard I.
1199. Death of Richard I, Accession of John.
1204. Loss of Normandy.
1214. Battle of Bouvines.
1215. Magna Carta.
1217. Death of John, Accession of Henry III.
1242. Battle of Taillebourg.
1254. First Representatives in Parliament.
1264. Battle of Lewes.
1265. Battle of Evesham.
1272. Death of Henry III, Accession of Edward I.
1282. Conquest of Wales.
1298. Battle of Falkirk.
1307. Death of Edward I, Accession of Edward II.
1314. Battle of Bannockburn.
1322. Murder of Edward II, Accession of Edward III.
1337. Beginning of Hundred Years' War.
1346. Battle of Crécy.
1348. Black Death in England.

A History of England

CATHOLIC ENGLAND

INTRODUCTION TO THE MIDDLE AGES

CATHOLIC ENGLAND

INTRODUCTION TO THE MIDDLE AGES

As we saw in the previous volume of this history, there have been four great periods in the story of civilized European men.

First, the Roman Empire, which was Grecian as much as Roman; next the Dark Ages in which, through fatigue, that Empire declined, but during which its vital principle was preserved by the Catholic Church; third, the Middle Ages, in which things sprang to life again in a form of their own; fourth, that chaotic, uncertain, adventurous, vastly advancing modern time which, roaring out of the explosion of the Renaissance, the crash of the Reformation, has recently conquered so much of the material world and has yet suddenly sunk so steeply into its despairs.

We also saw that a good, though exceedingly rough, method for carrying in one's head the four periods, was in successive blocks of five hundred years.

From the conventional date of the Incarnation (probably some four years too late) to the year 500, the Græco-Roman civilization from which we all spring was supreme. It had already shown signs of fatigue halfway through that five hundred years, but it had been restored. Its Western half was losing its central control, somewhat before the end of that five hundred

years, and direct rule from Rome ceased gradually at the very end. Still, during all that time, whether in its full vigour or in its later decline, the ancient Græco-Roman civilization from which we spring, first Pagan, then converted to and baptized by the Catholic Church, at last just saved by that Church from complete dissolution, was the only note of Western society.

Men till the year five hundred (let us say) thought only in terms of the Roman Empire; were citizens of that Empire. Even those born outside its boundaries knew no other world save the Empire. They were eager to be members of it; they took all their ideas from it; they were proud to be soldiers under its orders and to accept its religion as a sort of honour.

Between the year five hundred and the year one thousand is the valley of Europe. The fatigue of civilization had done its full work, and that lapse of time may properly be called the Dark Ages. During its earlier half, the arts of men coarsened and their knowledge declined. In the midst of it (750–800) the great adventure of Charlemagne pulled up together the strings of society, and with his revived title of "Emperor," in a sense refounded the West; but his attempt brought no sufficient accession of material power nor any sufficient increase of culture. After the death of that great man (814) the simple things of primitive society asserted themselves in another form; the government of men fell into a number of little local lordships exercised hereditarily from father to son, grouping themselves in provinces greater or smaller and preserving the idea of areas—England, France, Germany—under Kings who were nominally heads of each, but themselves local hereditary lords, recognizing private war between the

petty chiefs, their right of coinage and of justice. A title of "Emperor" was preserved. The one principle of unity common to the whole of Western Christendom was the spiritual supremacy of the Roman See. Learning was painfully preserved as a mere tradition, the forms of art were repetitive and degraded. Only towards the end of that time, during the last two lifetimes or so, did there come a strong spiritual stirring, itself a reaction against the strangling of Europe by the tangle of the little local lordships into which society had fallen.

Meanwhile, what was left of the tradition of European civilization, maintained by the hierarchy and discipline of the Catholic Church and kept alive by its vision and doctrine, was subject to an almost mortal siege.

First there had come from the East the sweep of Islam (600–700), which, beginning as the heresy which introduced a childishly simplified set of Catholic dogmas to the outer people of the desert (it preserved of such dogmas, (1) A personal God, (2) the immortality of the soul, (3) judgment, and (4) the brotherhood of man—nothing more), charged over half the East of Christendom—Syria, Egypt, North Africa—and (alas!) even Spain itself.

The height of this flood almost reached the Loire; it was beaten back between that river and Poitiers (732).

Next came a sort of hornet swarm of desperate savage pirates from the Scandinavian North (750–900): men who, having just learned how to build boats in clumsy imitation of the Roman fashion, used their knowledge for the destruction of Roman land. They were not very numerous, but their rapidity, their ubiquity, their coming upon a civilization which had

lost nearly all its powers of resistance through losing its power of concentration, made them a peril of the most grievous kind. They all but destroyed the Christian civilization of Britain, they wounded till it almost bled to death the civilization of Northern Gaul.

To give one small but typical and critical example: until their time there had been facile access to the Northern Germanies over the Roman bridge at Cologne: these pirate invasions destroyed that bridge.

At the same time a new flood of wandering Mongol cavalry swept in from the East, more degraded than the Northern pirates and less teachable. They rode as far as Tournus in Burgundy. They were checked only in the heart of the Germanies.

I say, in the Dark Ages (500–1000) Europe was desperately resisting the pressure of an almost mortal siege. That siege Europe raised. Islam, for generations better equipped than were we, lost military cohesion from within and our people slowly began to push it back (850–1000) from the foot hills of the Pyrenees. The Mongols were held, their remnants in Hungary converted (about A.D. 1000), the pirate raids of the North were worn down; baptism and the Mass and written letters and order penetrated even to their distant shores.

By the XIIth century all Scandinavia was Catholic and organized in bishoprics.

It must not be thought that during this dual business of the Dark Ages—the decline of our powers before the time of Charlemagne; the triple challenge against our very existence after his death—our civilization became barbaric. It sank indeed. Its art became rudimentary. It lost initiative in all the crafts. But it sur-

vived. All through that time, the European mind was kept awake and alert upon the ultimate and most important subjects of human thought (the fate of man, his nature, his creation and his end—the Higher Powers), and all through that time it was held to be a duty, and thoroughly performed as a task, that the greatest works of antiquity and of the human spirit should be preserved, that copies should be made (upon the most enduring material) of the classics inherited from our Pagan foundation, as well as of the Christian Scriptures and of the teachings of the great Saints. The traditions of building, of weaving, of metal work, of writing and of all by which a culture survives, were maintained under a powerful discipline, of which the two great props were the hierarchy of the Church as a whole but especially the *monks*, organized everywhere under the original rules of St. Benedict, whose effect happily came at the very moment of the transition (500–600) between the ancient highly civilized days and the Dark Ages.

Not only had our culture in its essentials been heroically maintained under such a strain: it had also expanded. At the very beginning, Eastern England had been recaptured for civilization, between the years 600 and 700, by Roman and French missionaries. Ireland had been civilized in similar fashion, by the advent of the Catholic Church upon its Pagan culture, a century before. The outer German tribes, among whom the Roman advantages of the Rhineland had already begun to spread in Pagan times, were sufficiently welded into the civilization of Europe before this period was at an end (the Northern Pagan German "Saxons" forcibly converted by Charlemagne's western armies

(*c.* 800); nearly all German-speaking men Catholic by 900 or a little later). Scandinavia was converted largely through the English connection (900–1000); even what had been Mongol irruption (but already admixed with Western blood) came into line with the conversion of Hungary at the very end of the affair: our Roman culture spread eastward even to the nearby Slavs and created Poland.

But the Dark Ages still remained until, round about the turn of the year one thousand, a new spirit passed across the people of our blood.

No one can explain these profound and dark movements of the corporate mind. But of determining causes we may note the fact that Europe was now at last, by its own energies, released from pressure; it was advancing upon every side. It had moulded to its own image the Northern and the Eastern barbarians; to the south Islam, which it could not persuade, it was at least pressing back and, with each succeeding decade, Christian men rode further and further southward, across the desolate high plains of Castile.

The Norman State (that is, the second Lyonese, the old Roman province grouped round the lower Seine) produced a type of its own. A new vigour inspired the little muscular men of its territory, in whom some mixture of Scandinavian blood had upon the Gallic stock the effect of producing a third thing differing from either origin, but far nearer the rest of Northern France than to anything else. Between the years one thousand and one thousand one hundred (the XIth century), wherever the Norman was, in his own land, in England, in Sicily and South Italy, he began to administer, to measure, to regulate, build, and give laws.

But far more important than the example of the Norman State was the final and profound restoration of the Church undertaken in that time. The monastery of Cluny (already of some century's standing by the year 1000) had nourished this vision of ennobling the hierarchy, restoring the discipline, and reviving the inward life of Catholic society; of raising all the Church to its original ideal standards; of freeing it from the oppression of lay powers and of establishing it as the universal moderator and rule of Christian society.

These forces (and others more powerful which we cannot measure), working secretly and from above within the minds of men, produced that new, immensely vigorous creative growth which we call the Middle Ages.

I have said that the year one thousand was a convenient landmark. Everywhere, however, the salt of the new tide was tasted somewhat later than that date, and in England latest of all.

We cannot begin the true Middle Ages in England till the welter of personal ambition and avarice there, which was the last fruit of the Danish invasions and which culminated in Godwin and his sons, was put to a sudden end by the advent of William of Falaise the Bastard with his fifty thousand under Beachy Head, and it is from Hastings and the re-incorporation of this country into the full unity of the West that, for England, the Middle Ages begin.

They were to last, in changing but continuous form, from this date of 1066 until the first steps were taken towards the breach with Rome in 1527. Those four centuries and a half have a highly distinctive character throughout the West and particularly here in Britain.

That character may be described as follows:—

I

Ecclesiastical

As to the inmost spirit of society—the thing that forms all the rest—religion: the Catholic Church in the West was by this time set into its mature form.

It had originated (as we saw in the previous volume) in a very small but highly disciplined society suddenly appearing at the height of the old Pagan civilization. It had arisen (A.D. 29 or thereabouts—within a margin of error of two or three years either way) as a small group of men who asserted that they had received a certain Divine revelation from God actually present on earth Incarnate in a Man. They were witnesses of His resurrection from the dead, and had a mandate from Him to found a corporation at His order with peculiar rites and mysteries of its own and a body of new doctrine.

It had grown up as the "sister of the Roman Empire" (to quote the fine expression of Tertullian). It had remained, so long as the Roman Empire was vigorously ordered from its centres of Rome and Constantinople, governed in each district by its Bishops, who had above them the great Patriarchs of Antioch, of Jerusalem, of Alexandria, of Rome—later of Constantinople. All recognized a superior in the See of Peter, i.e. the Church of the diocese of Rome, which was regarded as having in a peculiar manner the guardianship of orthodoxy because it derived from the chief of the Apostles and from the great missionary St. Paul, both of whom had suffered for the Faith in the capital of the world.

When, in the West, direct rule from Rome broke

down—or rather direct rule from the Emperors—and when the local garrisons and their leaders had to take on the management of affairs, the unity of the Church survived. The Church was indeed the one great social fact of the time.

The idea of a civil power in the hands of the Emperor at Constantinople, in some way co-ordinate with the ecclesiastical power, was traditional and accepted; but as, in the West, central government got weaker and weaker, there was nothing left but the Church for a principle of unity. The Patriarchate of the West, the Bishopric of Rome, let go allegiance to Constantinople on account of the Emperor's persecution of those who venerated images. Charlemagne in the year 800 revived, as I have said, the name of Emperor and (in a very different form from its original) some vague substance of the Empire in the West. But the experiment did not last. Society was no longer sufficiently disciplined, united, and enlightened.

There followed, from about the middle of the IXth century (say 850) to nearly the end of the Xth (1000), an increasing breakdown of society, as we have seen in the account of the barbarian attack from the north-east and the superiority of Islam in the south and in the Mediterranean. There was a dense feudal undergrowth, choking the Church as it were—local lay powers appointing to spiritual office—and a breakdown in discipline: for instance, the slackness in the effect of the monastic ideal (which was also the general ideal of the Church) upon the lives of the clergy. The reform of which we have just spoken set out to cut down this mass of feudal undergrowth which was choking the life of Christendom. It had for its instrument what

had been called for centuries *the* Papacy,[1] i.e. the acknowledged and dominating superiority in the moral sphere of the See of Rome. The original primacy of this See was enhanced to a stronger and stronger executive power from a number of converging causes, the chief of which were the effect of time, the sanctity of long tradition, the awfulness of the original undisputed claim, the abandonment of the West to its own resources, and the fact that the Bishop of Rome was the only Patriarch of the West.

For of the highest practical effect in strengthening the Papacy was the necessity men were under in Western Christendom of attaching themselves to a rallying-point. Only with difficulty and by very hard fighting did our civilization in the West maintain itself at all against the pressure of its barbarian enemies upon the one side and the then more highly civilized Mohammedan enemy upon the other. In the East, where the pressure was also terrible, i.e. in the Greek-speaking part of Christendom, the rallying-point was the Emperor with his vast revenues, strictly organized Bureaucracy, strong professional army, and Imperial town of Constantinople. To the Emperor the Greek-speaking part of the Church fell more and more subject. But in the East there was by the end of the Dark Ages little territory left for rallying at all: Islam had swept the great Eastern Patriarchates and occupied them. All this tended to strengthen the growth of the Papal power in Rome.

[1] The title (which means "Father") originally applied to certain major bishops—or perhaps to all bishops vaguely. In the East it has spread to include all the priesthood. In the West it became early confined to the Primal See of Rome, after a transitional period in which it was decreasingly applied to the Greater Bishops.

But the material development, in executive detail, of that power depended upon something very different: it depended upon the sudden awakening of the West to a new and high civilization—the civilization of the Middle Ages. It was the experience of the Spanish reconquest, and its extension, the Crusades (1095 onwards), the earlier movement of reform in the Church proceeding from Cluny, the splendid personality of St. Gregory VII (known, before his election to the See of Rome, as Hildebrand), and, more than all these—from some mysterious source we cannot trace—a fresh spirit blowing over Europe like a spring wind which made the Dark Ages suddenly to blossom into all the manifestations of the new culture. Everywhere in the XIIth century (1100–1200) began new study, new curiosity, a research into the past, great new building on quite a new scale, in a new fashion—the pointed arch —an organization of law, and whatever produces a young, complete civilization.

In the heart of all this a rejuvenation of religion flamed, animating the whole. In worship, in doctrine, nothing new appeared; but a vivid enlivening of our spiritual inheritance from the past. For the celebration of the Mass vast shrines arose all over Europe; for the examination and defence of traditional doctrine a new establishment of schools and a whole novel university system rising therefrom; for the organization of Christian men in the expansion against Paganism and in the beating back of Islam, an ordered hierarchy of powers. There was a marriage between Reason and Faith,—by which two live the souls of men.

Therefore the note of that time was an exuberant vitality, the proofs of which are before us to-day in

record and in monument. The human face in sculpture, and human gesture too, from the XIIth to the XVth century, is more alive than it ever has been before or since; the variety of expression is more, its intensity far greater. The action of the human reason upon the most difficult and profound problems subjected to it reached a height it had never reached before, and has certainly never reached since. Philosophy in the XIIIth century attained its summit.

Though in the physical and mathematical sciences an advance had to be made from something nearly barbaric, yet that advance was more rapid than the world had yet seen or than it was to see again until the strange and unhappy development of our own time.

Meanwhile, the external side of what was the soul of Western Europe, the organization of religion, advanced prodigiously and perilously. If unity were to be preserved throughout the rapid growth of a new time, the coalescence of the small feudal lordships into the beginnings of great nations, it could only be preserved on condition that the central See of Rome should increase very largely its sphere of legal action and its revenues.

It did so: but, as I say, not without peril; and the momentum given to that expansion lasted on beyond the great shock of the Black Death; the vastly increasing revenues of the Papacy, its increase in legal action, continued on into the later Middle Ages after their original purpose had ceased.

I mean, that the demands for money, the exactions of the Holy See and the complexity, expense, and delays of those numerous ecclesiastical courts of which it was the last resort, continued to grow, long after any

social necessity for such growth had disappeared, and on into a time when such growth clashed more and more with the working of society.

Corruptions sprang up inevitably within that temporal scheme. The Papal Court reserved benefices to itself (by the system of "Provision"), to the loss and exasperation of lay presenters. It took wealth, in this way, out of the country not only from the ecclesiastical revenues of parish and prebend, but from whole Sees; and it levied heavy direct tolls as well; at first for spiritual, later for what were partly temporal objects, such as the struggle with Frederick II. The society of Christendom was subject to a heavy strain as the Middle Ages grew old, in the last 150 years, between the Black Death of the mid XIVth and the opening of the XVIth century. Yet those strains were not mortal. The body need not have been disrupted, nor the unity of Christendom destroyed. How it came so to be is for my fourth volume.

It must not be imagined that these four or five centuries of Catholic unity in the West and of the high development of civilization in one family were spiritually at peace.

I know not how many, even of the highest authorities, have spoken in this fashion; talking of the mediæval man (who reasoned more clearly than ever his posterity have done) as though he was a child accepting any tale.

Far from that. These ten to fifteen generations of our race between the Conquest and the Reformation were keenly active to argue, to doubt, to decide. At their very origin came the first serious attack upon the doctrine of the Eucharist, that is, of the transformation of the bread and wine into the Body and Blood of

Christ. Berengarius shook faith in that matter and Lanfranc of Bec (later William the Conqueror's Archbishop of Canterbury) was his great opponent. Within a lifetime, as the effect of the Crusades, Eastern perversions spread; naturalism (an inmost doubt upon the personality of God, and the thinking of the universe as of something blind) writhed up like a worm from the decay of Islam in Spain: indeed, Averröes pre-figures the essential atheism of Spinoza. Thus on the intellectual side, the claim of the intellect to judge kept its full rights during the Middle Ages; the questioning vigour of the mind was at work all the time, and with a far finer sense of first principles and of reason than has our sentimental scepticism of to-day. Yet unity was preserved and the soul of Europe was saved.

So much for the intellectual turbulence.

But there was a moral turbulence as well.

That worst enemy of true religion, lack of proportion, the exaggeration of particular virtues, necessarily appeared in the intense life of the time. The exaggeration of charity, the exaggeration of humility, the exaggeration of simplicity; the exaggeration of a sheaf of virtues together, which leads either to the Puritan heresies or to that less repulsive but intellectually baser heresy of the heart, a dissolution of all doctrine in a general goodwill towards men.

It was in the very centre of the Middle Ages, in the late XIIth century, that there broke out the greatest peril Christendom ever ran, the Albigensian disease. It was wholly Manichean—what to-day is called "Puritan" —destroying joy in life and falling through excess into the most degraded vices. Nor was it an opinion; it was an organized and rapidly conquering *Church*. It

very nearly became a political State and all but supplanted, in the core of our Western civilization, in Southern France, by mysteries, rites, a priesthood and bishoprics of its own, our native Catholic tradition. It would have succeeded (1190–1210) but for the violent armed reaction against it which at last destroyed it under the military talent of Simon de Montfort. But let no one forget that this agony of the Christian culture, this pass in which it came very near to perishing, took place in the heart of the Middle Ages, under the greatest and most powerful of Popes, Innocent III, and in what was the geographical centre of our culture, Gaul; that it was helped by a vast Christian army from Spain; that it all but succeeded; and that when we talk of the XIIIth century, the century of St. Louis and of the Parliaments and Universities and of the new Architecture, as the greatest of human periods (which it is), yet within its limits this tremendous conflict was included. England, intensely Catholic by nature and always peculiarly free from heresy, was spared. But all Europe was shaken.

The Middle Ages were, then, by no means a period of childlike, unquestioning Faith. During the Dark Ages, under the discipline of permanent pagan or Mohammedan aggression there was little spiritual dissent. But once the soul of Europe was released it used its new freedom to question, to doubt, to rebel. The Faith lived perilously though strongly.

The reader must also remember that not only was our mediæval Western civilization torn by perpetual spiritual conflict, doubt, denial, and organized opposition, but also, at its close, suffered from those strains of hardening and decay with accompanying age.

I have said that the Black Death, in the middle of the XIVth century (rather more than halfway from the Norman Conquest to the Reformation) was the turning-point. It killed off so many human beings as to undermine society. But before it took place the Papal See had already been captured by the French monarchy and transferred to Avignon, thereby greatly losing in moral power. Immediately after that arose the Great Schism, when the Papacy was claimed and held by two opposing Popes (each obeyed in his separate section of Christendom), and at last even by three. The great Councils of the Church that were summoned to reform abuses and restore the unity and the happy culture of Christian men failed. At the very end of the affair, when a single Papacy was restored, the summit to which all men looked, the Court of Rome, fell into the gravest abuses.

In all this period of intense activity, turmoil and yet unity preserved, under all this intense rather than fixed life of the Middle Ages, with their surging passion, directness and drive, England remained, as I have said, singularly free from spiritual disruption. The huge Albigensian wave never reached her shores: the Oriental corruptions proceeding from the Crusades, the dark horrors which had caused the ruin of the Templars, never poisoned the English air. Even at the outset of the Middle Ages, when in Northern France Berengarius had first challenged (timidly indeed) the full doctrine of the Real Presence, he had had no appreciable effect in England, and it was the man who was to be famous as the Archbishop of Canterbury who had refuted him. The Catholic spirit of the nation was as strong as its Catholic tradition was ancient and un-

broken. No part of Christendom had a more vivid sense of the Real Presence, a more robust orthodoxy, a more developed monastic system, a more tender devotion to the Mother of God than England. After the Black Death the movement of Wycliffe had some considerable effect on discipline, especially of discontent with the ecclesiastical government and the Papacy, not a little social effect, but hardly any doctrinal. His confused speculation upon the Eucharist, which he seems to have taken up as an after-thought and of which no man can make head or tail (he himself could not put it plainly), troubled our society not at all. But what English people had long been troubled by and now did begin to feel increasingly was an ill-ease from the mechanical pressure of the temporal organization of religion and the source of this lay mainly in its financial claims.

That reaction was in no way specially English, though there were reasons for its being acute in England. It had spread inevitably all over Europe ever since the expansion of the Papal revenue and the stricter local organization of ecclesiastical demands had developed as the whole culture of the Middle Ages developed. This irritation caused by this increasing financial pressure, already strong in the XIIIth century (1200–1300), acquired peculiar strength under the effect of the great schism of the XIVth. The effect of time, which will make of any impost, however naturally accepted in its origins, an intolerable burden at last, played its part here; but more important were the facts that Rome wanted more and more money, that this money was drained out of the country, that the local dues of secular and regular clergy became rigid and fossilized;

that the continual irritation was confused with the equally expanding necessities of secular government and the increasing revenue sought through old-fashioned feudal channels that were ill-suited to its supply; and worst of all, that the English Crown was not strong enough to protect the Church. Just when the fiscal pressure of Rome was growing, in the XIIIth century, England was weakened by a false foreign policy and by prolonged feudal rebellion; and in the XIVth, when the French monarchy had captured the Papacy, the English was again exhausted by foreign war ending in defeat, then by another rebellion and usurpation, and at last by the necessity of the Lancastrian usurper to find support wherever he could.

So, while in the mere point of heresy or spiritual disunion England was freer from any such tendency during the Middle Ages and up to the Reformation, than any part of the West, towards the end of the period, it suffered perhaps more than any other part of the West from perpetual, exasperating fiscal exaction on the part of the clerical organization, not only domestic but, what was more grievously felt in high quarters, from overseas.

The position of the Catholic Church here in England in particular, its machinery, and political position, during the four and a half centuries of the English Middle Ages, may be briefly summed up as follows:—

Its organization under twenty bishoprics remained unchanged, save that the bishop's see was in one or two cases transferred. The Church in Scotland was claimed at first as part of the English province, but this claim was resisted and finally defeated by the establishment of a separate metropolitan for Scotland

under Alexander III. The Church in Wales, which had long ago ceased to be separate, and had fallen into line with the rest of the Western Church, was theoretically subordinate to Canterbury throughout the period, and actually so after the end of the XIIIth century.

During the whole period of the English Middle Ages, the Bishops were not only spiritual heads of dioceses, but also great temporal magnates, actually feudal during all the earlier part, and still drawing their vast revenues in feudal terms up to the very end.

On the question of appointment to these Bishoprics (Investiture) it is very difficult to speak clearly. There were special theoretic rights of election, sometimes actually exercised; for instance, the election of the Archbishop of Canterbury by the monks of St. Augustine's. There was, underlying all, the theory of "free election"—the idea that the Church alone had right to deal with Church affairs. There was in practice the nomination of candidates to Sees by the King. There was, not only in theory but in practice, the historic power of the King to prevent the revenues of the See reaching a Bishop, and even of preventing a Bishop being installed in his See, unless the King approved.

At the beginning of the period the long-standing abuse of Lay Investiture was still taken for granted in England. William the Conqueror and his first successor used it as a matter of course. But this was the very moment of the great reform and the custom could not stand. Under Henry I a compromise was effected, the King giving the Symbols of the temporalities, but the Pope those of the spiritual power. Thence onward this compromise (in theory) stood; but in practice the

King was the permanent nominating power, the chief exception lying, especially in the later Middle Ages, with the competing Papal power which claimed to and did reserve Sees by *provisor*, that is, by nominating its own candidate, even if absentee. Against this statutes were passed, but only in part executed. The Papal power also claimed and exercised an ancient traditional right to nominate the successor of any prelate who might die in Rome; and, of course, it would frequently intervene in domestic discussions and impose one or other of the competing candidates, or a third of its own choice: Langton is an example.

In this as in almost every other department of mediæval life we must envisage all events under the light of two not contradictory, but conflicting, principles: *first*, everything of that age was minutely defined by custom and recorded legal right, and argued out by case and precedent; but *secondly*, the various departments into which such rights fell were perpetually overlapping, and especially the departments of lay and ecclesiastical government. That is why mediæval practice is continually in conflict with one or other of the existing theories, minute and detailed though the codification of such theories had become.

The parish organizations remained what they had always been for centuries, subject to the bishops; but here also the later Papacy claimed the right of Provision, as it had in the case of endowments to cathedral stalls and all other benefices.

The monastic system, already very widely extended in England before the Conquest, continued to increase in the numbers of its members and in the wealth of its endowments until that great dividing line, which

falls two-thirds of the way through the Middle Ages, the Black Death.

After that shock (mid XIVth century) there came a very heavy and permanent decline in numbers; but hardly in endowment; and this anomaly must always be borne in mind when we read of popular discontent, at the close of the Middle Ages, with this or that monastic exaction: e.g. the right of a particular monastery to the fees for local burials.

There was also naturally a decline in the numbers of new houses, partly because the saturation point had been reached, partly because the monastic institution arrived, before the end of the Middle Ages, at a stage of arrest. The great foundations were immensely wealthy—almost comparable to the bishoprics. The clergy of the monasteries and nunneries are to be distinguished from the other clergy by the term "regular," the word "secular" being used of the parish priests and of all clergy not belonging to any Order. All the Orders until the XIIIth century were but various branches of the original Benedictine foundation. In the XIIIth century two quite new Orders appeared, with a different spirit from the older ones: they were Mendicant and diffused, and were called the "Frères" in the French spoken by all educated Englishmen when they appeared: it is of this word that a later corruption, when English was established after the Black Death, made the word "Friars." These were founded with an original purpose of popular evangelization; one the Dominicans, by St. Dominic, a Spaniard of Calahorra, the other the Franciscans, by St. Francis, an Italian of Assisi.

When we use the word "clergy" of the Middle Ages,

we further mean not only the priests, but also a host of people in minor orders connected with the Church organization and counted as "clerks." It is important to remember this when reading of the quarrels between the Church and the State, especially of the independent jurisdiction claimed by the Church over its members.

It is very difficult to form an estimate of the proportion of the total clerical wealth to that of the whole country—even at the end of the process, when we have a computation made under Henry VIII. Popular rumour put it at one-third, which is probably too high. Modern calculation has put it probably too low, leaving out the fact that the clerical rents tended to be customary, where others had become competitive and that assessments were commonly below the real value. If we say one-fifth, or at the least more than one-sixth, we are probably not far out.[1] But the Church had that proportion of the *surplus* wealth only; it had much less of the total income of the nation. When we say that Church income of all kinds was a fifth of "the total," we do not mean the total wealth supporting the population, but the total of the *surplus* off the manors; that is, the total of dues, and demesne crops and rents, after allowing for the feeding, clothing, etc., of the mass of the population whose labour produced all the wealth.

It must be added for those many modern readers who have no acquaintance with the Catholic Church, that the religion of their forefathers in England, as throughout Christendom before the Reformation, being conceived of as essentially supernatural, was therefore (*a*) *sacerdotal*, (*b*) *sacramental*.

[1] For an average of the English Middle Ages. By their close it was higher, perhaps a fourth or slightly more.

Its great office was the Mass, wherein bread and wine, by consecration through a priest and no other, each became the Body and Blood of Christ. The faithful at will, but commonly at rare intervals, communicated by eating the bread and (at first) also drinking the wine of the Sacrament,[1] whereby, as their faith dictated, they consumed the Body and Blood of their Creator and Redeemer, Incarnate for man. The guilt of sin could only be wiped out by repentance for the same and a determination to avoid it; but there was a sacramental form, that of confession to a priest and his absolution, which was necessary to those who could obtain it, and perfected the difference between a sufficient and an insufficient sorrow. Marriage also was a sacrament, the foundation of which was the acceptation by each party of the other for *life*. Divorce was an idea abhorrent.[2] But use, awe, discipline, and in certain degree doctrine, demanded the sacerdotal presence and ceremony. In this connection *contract* of marriage, even between children, had binding value: in the case of minors upon the parents, in the case of adults, upon the principals. Further, certain degrees of relationship (pushed as the Middle Ages developed to an extreme) demanded special permission before a marriage could be undertaken without sin; and the relaxation of such rules (a relax-

[1] The Communion in the later Middle Ages became restricted almost everywhere in the West to one kind, the Bread. But the restriction came much later in some places than in others, so that a strong memory of Communion in both kinds (and a demand for its restoration) was found in such districts.

[2] As we shall see in Vol. IV, this Catholic dogma lasted long after the Reformation. Although questioned by the Reformers and even attacked in proposals of law it was not shaken in general opinion, and the first definite breach in it was only made with difficulty as late as 1669. To-day the idea of indissoluble marriage has disappeared outside the Catholic Church.

ation applicable in practice only to the very wealthiest people, among whom wardship was a necessary social practice) lay with the Pope. The annulment of marriage for a sufficient cause (as, that the parties were too nearly related and had not been granted formal permission to waive this bar; that the marriage had never been consummated; that it had been forced upon one of the two parties without consent) was logically practicable, lay with the ecclesiastical authorities, and in ultimate appeal, with the Court of Rome. It was a practice abused, and it is indeed abused to this day; but it was no contradiction at all with the doctrine of indissoluble true marriage, and in practice as in theory the Middle Ages felt the marriage tie between living people to be inviolable.

There were further sacraments. The priesthood was an awful function conveyed by a sacrament, and once conveyed, irrevocable. The confirmation of the young was a sacrament; the unction of the dying. It was of moment to be buried in consecrated ground, and with the rites of the Church: nor let it be forgotten that in the immemorial doctrine of Christendom the benefits of the sacrifice of the Mass apply to the dead as to the living. But in this also there was room for abuse, and there arose before the end of the Middle Ages (particularly in England) too great a diversion of ecclesiastical income towards the Masses which the rich had provided for themselves and therefore away from other uses[1]; although the whole fortune of a rich man spent in this way was and is of no service to him, unless

[1] Priests thus endowed were called "Chantry" Priests, having to "sing" (intone—French "chanter") the Masses. But we must not exaggerate. Though they were too many they were often put to other work; as, of education.

he die in grace, and although the least prayer of a beggar for the dead may count more before God than all the material legacies of the wealthy.

It was and is an integral part of the doctrinal system of this religion (universal in the West before the XVIth century, but to-day continued by Catholics alone) that the temporal punishment due to sin (not the guilt thereof, nor the eternal consequences of guilt) could be remitted (after due confession and absolution), by the sacerdotal, and especially the supreme sacerdotal, or Papal power. This also led to crying abuses before the end of the Middle Ages. For alms given as one condition of indulgence became easily confused with the purchase thereof; and the scandal arose of men acting and believing as though they were *buying* (with a commission to the agents) remission of the temporal consequences in the next world of wrong-doing in this; and the opportunity thus offered for the easy and rapid raising of money by ecclesiastical authority for its own purposes (as for instance, church building) was fatally tempting.

Lastly we must read into the whole story of the Church in the later Middle Ages—and particularly in the comparatively small and remote province of England—a gradual crystallization and hardening of usage, which was the chief apparent cause of the shipwreck of Christian unity at the end of them. The Papal power proceeded, from admitting occasional appeals, to inviting continuing appeals: from occasionally reserving distant benefices as pensions or rewards for real service done, to reserving more and more such benefices for any chance political or family object. Pluralism, the holding of more than one benefice at a

time, from an occasional monstrous abuse became taken for granted. Stigand at the time of the Conquest was a by-word because he held Winchester and Canterbury together. On the eve of the Reformation Wolsey, while already Archbishop of York, held Winchester as well, and then trafficked Winchester for Durham as a matter of course, as one might buy one stock and sell another; and Pope Julius II, within twenty years of the great upheaval, was Archbishop of one See and Bishop of four others, which he hardly visited but treated as mere items of revenue.

Again, the bad practice of reserving *in commendam* the revenues of a great monastic institution or episcopal see to enrich the cadet of some ruling family (while an agent was put in his place to do the actual clerical work) from small and evil beginnings increased prodigiously before the revolt against religion took place. In England, where so many of the later abuses were deplorably extended, this one was happily slight; but in Scotland it was rampant, as also in France[1]: a country which might, much more naturally than England, have fallen into heresy through indignation against the clerical enormities which tainted the close of the Middle Ages.

Further, it is most important in reading our Middle Ages to appreciate the truth that the bulk of the population were *not* assiduously devout, frequenters of the sacraments, or even of weekly Mass.

Religion was official and universally accepted: in that sense it applied to all daily life and language. But

[1] The family of Guise, in the height of the Reformation and on the eve of the Religious wars, made a cadet of theirs, a lad of 15, Archbishop of Rheims and Abbot of Cluny! "*In commendam*" it is true: i.e. not acting, only taking the revenues. But what a scandal!

its practice by individuals was often lax, sometimes lapsed over large areas. There were great communal outbursts of fervour. There were also long declines. You will find districts—e.g. Spanish Galicia under St. Elmo—which had to be re-evangelized.

We must, before closing this long passage upon the organization of religion in the Middle Ages as it affected England, mention the modification of the Papacy.

The first point to seize is that Western Christendom took the supreme spiritual rule of the See of Rome for granted. There was a certain clear, unquestioned definite function at work, the Papal spiritual monarchy. It exercised direct power over a vast organization of secular and regular clergy, in whom the old ideal and rule of celibacy had become universal, so that a priest, no matter what his irregularities, could not be married. This Papal power was no more regarded as an abuse, or as something external to society, than we to-day regard the police or the rates as an abuse or as something external to society; it was part and parcel of all men's thought, and was coincident with the conception of Christian unity, just as our acceptation of national powers in taxation and police is coincident with our conception of national unity.

Unless we grasp that elementary point we shall never understand the English Middle Ages. The Papacy was never conceived of as something alien or external. It was taken for granted as part of the normal arrangement of society.

But on that very account the function tended to exceed its due limits because universal acceptance of his authority left a Pope free to act without limit. Political questions peculiar to the temporal government

of the Papal See were mixed up with, and corrupted, the general Papal duty of spiritually governing the Church. There was constant and vigorous protest against such abuse, protest arising from the fiscal exactions which accompanied it. But the process was not modified in time, as it should have been, and at the very end of the process (1450–1500) the Pope, in his character of an Italian prince, rivalled, if he did not overshadow, the Pope in his character of the universal Father, in spiritual things, of mankind.

Throughout the period, ever since the stable and permanent reforms of St. Gregory VII (Hildebrand), in the late XIth century, election to the Papacy was made by a fixed machinery: by vote of the Cardinals of the Sacred College, themselves nominated by the Pope of the day and limited in number. This system was not an innovation; it was a regularization. The clergy of Rome had always formed the chief theoretical factor in the election of the Bishop of Rome, and the Cardinals were titular to the Roman Churches: they were the "hinges" (*Cardines* in Latin) or "working parts" of the old electoral machinery, and their distribution throughout Christendom made of the See of Rome in the Middle Ages a thing fixed openly upon a universal base.

Lastly, in the matter of doctrine and practice, England of the Middle Ages was singularly one. I have already twice emphasized that point: it must be repeated. England had never been affected by the doubts of the awakening mediæval culture; she never suffered from the Manichean (or as we now call it, Puritan) taint following upon the Crusades and coming in with the atmosphere of the East. The first movement in Lyons,

the later enormous Albigensian tumor, never corrupted England; there seemed to be something in the English which was disgusted by the Puritan temper. A violent social upheaval in which clerical revenues, and particularly the financial exactions of the Papacy, were confused in a common condemnation with temporal, fiscal oppression arose a hundred years and more before the Reformation; but it soon died out and left no enduring mark. The England of the Middle Ages was the longest united in Catholic doctrines and morals of all the provinces of Christendom.

II

Laical

The Lay social organization of the Middle Ages was much the same throughout the West—in Spain, France, England, and the Lowlands of Scotland, the Rhine Valley, Northern Italy. It began as plain, comprehensible, and working *Feudalism* (1000–1350). This passed through a crisis in the generation of the Black Death (1350–1400), i.e. the later XIVth century, and after rapid internal change, lasting more than a century (1400–1500), it entered—by the XVIth century—the modern phase of ownership, individual freedom, and contract.

The origin and character of Feudalism were as follows: The old high Pagan culture of the Mediterranean from which we all derive was based on the social doctrine of individual freedom. A man owned land and other property absolutely. He could dispose of it after his own death by will as he might feel inclined. He

could make contracts freely. And these rights were enforced by the organized power of the State, through the decisions of its magistrates and by the physical action of its organized armed force. *But these conceptions attached only to the free.* The mass of men were slaves. For them only a sort of tolerance allowed any accumulation of private possessions. In the fundamental theory of society which all men held (including the slaves themselves) the unfree could be bought and sold and all the product of their labour was at the disposal of their lords.

In the great transition between Pagan antiquity and Christendom, in the process which begins with the Edict of Milan and has no definite ending, but fades away into the Dark Ages, this highly civilized system, based upon slavery, was transformed; and the great agent of the transformation was, of course the Catholic Church. Omitting a great mass of subsidiary detail (the indefinitely long mortgaged tenures, the granting of land to veteran soldiers on condition of military service, etc., etc.), the general process was a transformation, very gradual, quite unconscious, of the slave into the *serf*. That which had been a Roman landed estate (in, say, the IIIrd century) in England or France or Spain or Italy, normally cultivated by slaves, and all its produce the full property of its owner, appeared at the end of the long change (by, say, the Xth century) in a very different form.

Its boundaries were still much the same and its area. The English village under Alfred or Athelstan was still in shape and structure the old Roman villa of five or six hundred years before. There was still the lord's house in the midst. There was still the obligation on

the part of the descendants of the old slaves (who were the mass of the population) to work for that lord. But the old Pagan chattel slavery, the taking it for granted that the bulk of men could be bought and sold in the mass as mere goods, had disappeared. Exceptional cases remained; but they had long ceased to be the basis of society.

What had become the basis of society long before the year 1000 was this: On each of these immemorial Roman estates, land was divided into the particular land of the lord (which was called in Britain the "inland") and the usually much larger "outland" proportion *which had become hereditarily attached, of right, to the descendants of the slaves.* These last (who came to be called *villani* from the Roman word villa, meaning an estate) cultivated the village fields for their profit in various parcels of different acreage and in succession from father to son: the family living upon the family holding.

It is most interesting to note that these holdings betrayed in their curious form the original slave labour; for a man did not as a rule cultivate one small, compact farm, but worked with his neighbours in co-operation. This village "outland" was divided, as to its arable portion, into three fields: one sown with cereals, one with legumes (beans commonly), and the third ploughed in fallow, to clean it and give it a rest. These three fields were divided up into small strips of something like half an acre (as a rule), and the serf's family "holding" (as it was termed) was a certain number of these strips, dispersed throughout the fields. Thus, after all the ploughing and sowing had been done co-operatively, a family "holding" in serfage had a certain set of these

strips—say 20 of them, amounting to 10 acres, or 40 amounting to 20 acres—and its produce for their wealth at the time of harvest. One family might have, all told, a number of strips which amounted to, say, 40 acres, another to only ten, another to no more than five. There was also the Waste of the Manor, common Pasturage and Wood. But though common the rights in it were minutely and exactly defined in every case: and destruction was strictly forbidden, as was encroachment. Further, the village would have a mill, "the Lord's Mill," to which all were bound to bring their grain to be ground.

The main holders were called *Villani* in the official Latin, "Villeins" in the vernacular; and a typical and most frequent Villein holding was 30 acres, i.e. 20 half-acre strips in each field. Below these were, in varying number, smaller men with less land: sometimes only a patch near their cottages: these were called "*Bordarii*" or "*Cottarii*."

It was not an egalitarian system. But every man, or rather, every family, had *some* land; and so long as the dues of that family to the lord of the *villa* were discharged, that family was secure in its holding from father to son for ever.[1] These dues took the form of forced labour upon the "inland" (or *demesne*), which was the particular property of the lord of the villa, the legal descendant of the old Roman landowner who had once been complete master of the whole of the village. This forced labour due from the serfs was, in theory,

[1] In legal theory the Serf was "At the will of his Lord," for the old Slave status inherited from Pagan Roman times lasted on in theory long after it had been modified and even disappeared in real life. In practice the villein of the English Middle Ages securely possessed his land.


1
Wood with Pannage for 50 many swine of village & Lord
Waste of the Manor or Common: With defined rights of use for Villagers & Lord
Freehold
FIELD B.
Wheat or Rye
Meadow with strictly defined private and common rights
FIELD A.
Beans
Freehold
Meadow of the Desmesne
Stream
FIELD C.
Fallow
Lord's Mill
Lord's Hall and Barn
Glebe
Church
Meadow with strictly defined private and common rights
LORD'S DESMESNE
Stream
Type of Manor
Type of portion of the Three great fields, cultivated in common, but the strips separately owned.
John a Freeholder
The Lord
William a Villain holding one Virgate of 30 acres.
Robert a holder of ¼ Virgate.
Others

MAP I

arbitrary and at the lord's will. But, in practice, it was very strictly limited by custom. Such and such a servile holding was bound to give so many days of the year, or so many hours of each week to the cultivation of the inland, as well as to the cultivation of its own holding. All the serfs had to gather the hay on the inland, and to look after the cattle in the inland, and so forth.

Thus every unit of mediæval society in England had a certain *Dominial Value* attached to it, i.e. it was worth so much to the lord of the villa (or Manor). It produced so many measures of wheat, of beans, of hay, of cattle, on the inland, by the labour of the serfs, and these had further to pay to their lord a certain small proportion of their own produce on the outland. A man or a corporation, being lord of the villa (later also called the "manor") of, say, Bignor, which estate comprised 5000 acres—2000 thereof arable—was "worth" to such man or corporation such and such an amount of agricultural goods; corn, pigs, milk, butter, cheese, bread, peas, wood, which was estimated at a total average money value, and set down as such in payments. It was "worth" a regular, fixed, and recorded income to its Lord.

There was, of course, great elasticity in the system. There were free men owning little compact bits within a ring fence and owing no servile labour to the lord of labour, but only "free" service, such as attending in arms when a force had to be levied. In some places there was a twofold, instead of a threefold, rotation of crops. In some rare cases, the village seems to have been its own lord; a little exceptional free unit, or rather, a community of men, unfree and serfs relative to the

community itself, but paying no dues to any man or corporation possessed of the inland. In the same way in England to-day, in the midst of our modern capitalism, you have the small craftsman. But just as to-day the normal type of society is the capitalist employing wage-earners, so in mediæval society, and especially in England, the normal type of society was the *villa* (or manor) cultivated by serfs, both as to its inland and as to the outland, and producing this surplus revenue for the lord—which "lord" might be an individual—a small local man with one manor or a big man with many manors, or the king—or corporation, a monastery, hospital, college, as the case might be.

Such a condition of affairs naturally put into the minds of all men the idea that land was "held" rather than owned, and, in contrast with the old Pagan civilization, from which that of the Dark Ages had gradually developed, men generally thought of all their possessions as consisting in a group of rights rather than in the actual possession of the soil.

A man said to himself, if he were a serf: "This is my land no doubt: but when I say 'my land,' I do not mean that I can buy or sell it, I mean that I have an hereditary right to the fruits of my labour thereupon, so long as I fulfil the conditions of my 'holding.'" That idea spread through all society. You were the lord of fifty manors or *villæ* scattered up and down the country. That gave you a right to the work of the serfs in those *villæ* upon your inland, and to dues from them upon their own outland as well. Though you talked of these fifty *villæ* as "my land," the words did not mean what they mean to-day, a proprietorship in the soil, but rather a proprietorship in dues, in


2
The King
These are the Greater Tenants in Chief who form the Feudal Council about The King.
Nearly all "Forest" Lands
Most Towns
Great Lay Barons
Great Ecclesiastical Barons
Lesser Tenants in Chief
Occasional small parcels of "Forest" Land
Some Towns
Mesne Lords
Some Towns
Individual Manors
The individual Lords of these Manors held under the King are the Lesser Tenants in Chief.
These Manors (exceedingly numerous) have each the King for their Lord and no Local Lord. The King is direct Lord of far more Manors than is any other man.

PLAN OF FEUDAL SOCIETY

labour and goods, payable from the products of that soil. Hence even the lord of fifty *villæ* thought of himself in regard to some superior, as the "holder" rather than the owner.

He would say: "These are my lands: these fifty *villæ*, of which twenty are in Sussex and thirty are in Kent: but I *hold* my twenty *villæ* in Sussex of the great noble de Braose; while as for those of Kent, I *hold* them of Bishop Odo."

This meant that the lord of the fifty *villæ*, big man though he was, did not feel, as the modern man feels, an independent ownership of property. He had to pay dues to his superior upon a set custom. Further, if he had a specific engagement with him (as had nearly all such men towards such superiors) called "homage" (which French word means "manning"; becoming the "man" of another; having sworn fealty, i.e. faithful duty to him),[1] then he must obey the summons of that superior to come with his own dependants of the free sort in arms for the purpose of fighting, and this was regulated very strictly in its turn by custom. So many days were due (commonly 40), not more. So many fighting men, so much armament.

Finally, the greater lords themselves held under a yet higher superior, the king. The king was himself private lord of many manors—far more than any one of his subjects—and also direct ruler and profit-taker over all that large area (in England a third of the total) called FOREST, i.e. "the land standing outside the

[1] The word "Feudal" comes from this. "Foi" (our "Faith")—a whole group of words all over the West descended from the Latin *Fides*, in its connotation of "loyalty towards," "admitting a bond with," "fulfilling obligation to" another.

manorial system": greater woods and heaths and mountains and certain other lands and all arable and inhabited enclosures therein. This "Forest" was imperial land under the Roman Empire and then royal under Mediæval Feudalism.

It is essential to understand this mediæval conception of the KING; the CROWN.

The mediæval king was the summit of an ideal feudal hierarchy in lay society, but he was *also* the incarnation of the whole community, a sacramental union: he was *also*, then, heir to that conception of direct absolute authority which came from far beyond Feudalism, which was the great inheritance of Imperial Rome.

As feudal overlord the king was one thing: as anointed Ruler another, and greater. The serf held of the lord, the lord of a greater lord, the greater lord of the king, but the king only of God. The conception of an awful personal authority in the State descended, of course, from the Roman Emperor. Of the many fundamental ideas bequeathed to our ancient civilization by that source from which we draw all our being, this conception has been among the most fruitful and the most creative: Monarchy. It was the very making, or rather, re-making of the Gallic state when the king in Paris was finally crowned King of France, just before the opening of the Middle Ages, just before the year 1000. The great feudal sovereigns of Normandy, of Flanders, of Brittany, and of Aquitaine did not use this title "King."[1] Though they had all the exercise of authority which a man can have within his own

[1] *Duke* (or *Count*) of Normandy and of Brittany, *Count* of Flanders or Anjou, *Duke* of Aquitaine. In Latin "*Comes*," "*Dux*," names inherited from general officers of Roman armies and administrators of Roman civil divisions.

boundaries, though they could, and did, issue money, grant charters, appoint to lay and clerical office, and, in general, exercise all the functions of an independent executive government, they admitted a feudal obligation to one of their own kind in Paris, who was "King" —even when his revenue and the extent of his land was less than the greater among themselves. It was this moral conception which permitted the king in Paris gradually to become the real master of all Gaul, and that Capetian Monarchy[1] presented a model which all the West followed.

In England, this function of kingship was exceedingly important, yet more often imperilled than elsewhere. It is of the very first moment, if we are to understand the English Middle Ages, to appreciate what it was, why it could be so strong and yet why it was so much imperilled, so continually and successfully rebelled against.

The great mark of English political history between the Conquest and the Reformation is the Government of England by a Person, a King. It is a Popular Monarchy. But it is a popular monarchy subject to repeated and often successful rebellion on a scale unknown elsewhere. Three prolonged civil wars, two usurpations, half a score of claimants, depositions, three murders of kings mark the course of fourteen reigns in less than four centuries. Why was this?

It was a question of scale under the feudal organization of society. England was too large to make a Feudal Province, too small to make a confederate Feudal Monarchy like France.

[1] So called from Hugh Capet, after whose crowning the succession was continuous and regular.

England, administrated and under the direct eye of its ultimate feudal overlord, the King of England, was larger than any one of the feudal provinces of France, the civilization of which it shared. But it was too small to be built up of such provinces which the king could play one against the other. It was small enough to be, when strongly administered, fully in one hand. It gradually became, therefore, as Feudalism died out, and as the modern conception of the state slowly emerged at the end of the Middle Ages, a highly centralized monarchy with all administration in the hands of one man—a government with a monopoly of artillery. And, but for Henry VIII's huge blunder on the Abbeys, it would have so remained. The English popular monarchy would have been stronger than the French and would have lasted to our own day. But, so long as even the relics of feudal society remained, the English feudal nobility, the lesser lords and their overlords, remained very powerful in the face of the Crown. They could and did levy armies. For the essence of Feudalism was the real political control of a rich man over the group of manors which he held.

In the case of the King of France, the territory nominally subject to him was so vast (at the end of the affair about five times the arable area of England with, it may be presumed, four or five times the population) that it was essentially a confederation. It took a month to march across the realm. Under the social conditions of the early and central Middle Ages effective physical control could not be exercised over a radius of more than a few days. The only other, and looser, bond was the moral tie to the overlord.

Even when the French King escheated a feudal

province and occupied it, he soon had to divide the over-large unit of royal Domain into appanages for his family.

The unbroken growth of French monarchical power, then, in the Middle Ages, was due to its originally *Federal* quality. This quality England was not on the scale to develop. Even with Scotland and Wales as separate Provinces their number would have been too few. But they could not be Feudal Provinces under the Crown for they had not grown up as such during the Dark Ages. They had been separate. And indeed it was this matter of *Scale* which prevented the Crown of England from controlling Scotland.

The lesser size of England, while it early gave a unity to the social structure, which France lacked (the English feudal nobles were never *full* local sovereigns of compact districts: they never had supreme courts of appeal or, as a permanent custom, local coinage), was yet large enough for the perpetual reappearance of resistance by the wealthy feudal class against their ultimate master the king. None the less, taking the thing as a whole, from the crowning of William the Conqueror, right through the Middle Ages and with a momentum which carried wreckage to the XVIIth century, the organ of government in England was a popular monarchy. Nor did this conception finally disappear until Charles I was put to death by the new governing classes and his son returned, no longer a true king but as their insufficiently salaried official.

To recapitulate: the lay society of England in the Middle Ages, as of the rest of Western Christendom, was feudal, i.e. a pyramid, based on the *serfs*—at least

nine-tenths of the population. The servile family worked on its own land and on its lord's, to whom it gave dues as well as labour, and thus produced the surplus agricultural values—the Manorial Incomes—which supported the wealthier classes and the Church. The lords of manors, drawing these surplus values of the village, were themselves either directly holding under the king, or grouped under greater lords of various degrees, and these, in their turn, were grouped under the king, who (in mere legal theory) was the ultimate sole absolute owner of the whole land: which land was "held" under him and sub-held and sub-held again till one came down to the serf, whose labour was the economic foundation of the whole concern.

It must be clearly understood that within this system the king himself, the great overlords, were also in their private capacity lords of individual manors. The king was the overlord of all those who directly held under him, but he was also the private lord of the manor in scores and hundreds of manors. He had the extra-manorial waste lands also—the forests and mountains—and in general, the public domain. Thus the de Braose, in Sussex, was overlord to lesser manorial lords (from whom our squires of to-day are descended), but he was also the private lord of many manors within his district and elsewhere. Yet he held of the king and the great proportion of forest in his division of Sussex held not of him but of the king direct.

Indeed, the whole system had originally arisen from the fact that a possessor of many manors had been approached by smaller men who had put themselves under his guardianship, and the king himself was, until the end of the Middle Ages, only that great manorial


ECCLESIASTICAL
An Abbey
A Bishoprick
Manors of which the Lord is a Bishop.
Manors of which the Lord holds of the Bishop.
Manors of which the Lord is the Abbey.
Manors of which the Lords are Ecclesiastic Foundations, Colleges, distant or Alien Abbeys, Hospitals etc.
LAY
F Forest: which means not wooded land nor even always uncultivated land, but land outside the Manorial System and directly under the King.
A Town: in early times treated mostly as a King's Manor. Later as a Corporation.
Manor of which the direct Lord is the King
Manor of which the Lord is directly under the King. Lesser Tenant in Chief.
Manor of which the Lord is a Great Lay Tenant in Chief or a Baron A.
Manor of which the Lord is a Great Lay Tenant in Chief or a Baron B.
Manor of which the Lord is an individual holder under A.
Manor of which the Lord is an individual holder under B.
F
F
F
A Typical Feudal District
with
Baron A and Baron B as principal Great Lords in the District.
3

MAP III

lord who was wealthier as a private man than anyone in the kingdom. (See plan facing page 42.)

This conception of the governing power as an *Owner* is an idea so unfamiliar to the modern Englishman that the reader of mediæval history must keep it perpetually in view. Until Henry VIII provoked the ruin of the Crown by confiscating the Church lands (which in his weakness he dissipated, thereby creating a new much wealthier class which ultimately destroyed the monarchy) the King of England was individually possessed of greater economic power by far than any subject.

Standing within this feudal lay agricultural society were the towns, inland and marine. These had, during the Dark Ages for the most part, been theoretically absorbed in the feudal system, and a town, whether a seaport or inland, had a lord or lords, just as a village had: only, instead of working upon the agricultural inland of that lord, they provided him with revenue. The inhabitants of the towns "held" their houses and yards and wharfs and the rest of it, in general and normally, of some lord: who was, more often than not, the king. Such town tenures paid a few services, but more generally money payments. After the Dark Ages, with the spring of the Middle Ages, some few already abroad in the XIth, more in the XIIth, and most of them in the XIIIth century, the towns of Northern Europe[1] acquired definite rights of local self-manage-

[1] The Southern cities—e.g. Toulouse—seem to have had an organized local government of their own unbroken from Roman times. The largest towns of the North—as London—must have maintained something of the kind. But the whole thing was connected with size and scale. It was the growth of municipal life in the early Middle Ages which led to the extension of the communal idea.

ment for a fixed sum payable to the king, who was usually their feudal superior; in other cases to the local lord, who might be their superior, or to the bishop or monastery, which might be their feudal superior. This somewhat anomalous position of the towns in the feudal system was of great influence upon the growth of representation, first on the Continent, later in England. But to that subject we will turn in a moment.

It must be emphasized that this feudal society which I have sketched had no police, no standing army, none of those powers of coercion now exercised with overwhelming strength against the individual by a modern government. It reposed, as do all societies, even our own to-day, upon a moral conception of how men should carry on. But whereas in modern times the way in which men carry on proceeds less and less from themselves and more and more from those centres (mainly financial) which have organized power over them through the police, the bureaucracy, and the armed forces, in the Middle Ages the moral conception of society was more powerful than its mechanism. Men fully obeyed what they thought they ought to obey. Rebellion was therefore easy whenever they believed that the moral rights in which they trusted had been abused. Therein resides what some would call the spirit of freedom and others the turbulence of that great time.

For instance, the executive could not tax. Regular dues were paid as of moral right from inferior to superior, just as we pay rent or pay our bills to-day, because men thought that society could only so live. But if the king required some exceptional revenue, as for a war, he could not demand it; he could only ask

for it. From that idea of free action proceeded, as we shall see in the course of this book, the representative system, called in the country of their birth "Fueros," later, in France "Estates," and much later, in England "parliaments." [1] This idea of *representation in the Council* arose in the Pyrenees and gradually extended throughout Western Christendom, although never reaching the Germanies, the temper of whose peoples seems unfitted for it.

This characteristic product of the Middle Ages, Representation, I will deal with in its own place when I come to its reaching England in the XIIIth century. But its nature should be grasped before any approach to the English Middle Ages is made, because the later and, to us, familiar use of its machinery as a political instrument of government may easily be misread into a time when such a use was unknown.

Representation came in through the king's necessity of finding more revenue than the feudal system could provide him with. That system afforded a regular and more or less fixed set of customary dues from free and noble tenants. Theoretically the king could, like

[1] The word "Parliament," on account of its modern English meaning (fixed since at least the XVth century and common in the XIVth), is very misleading when applied to the somewhat tardy beginnings of representation in England. It means no more than "an assembly for discussion," and was long used of a meeting of any kind so summoned by the king. The judicial aspect of the King's Council—which was for centuries much the most important—took on the name in France, and "Parliament" there came to mean the supreme judicial body—with rights of registration and protest against the Crown. While in England the word gradually became applied to the National Council in its legislative and administrative capacity, so that, at last, it came to mean the later organized Council of King, Lords and Commons combined. Thus the *word* grew to apply in the West to different *things*. The *thing* (a Council with representative elements) came to take on different names: in Spain *Fueros*, in Southern France *Estados*, in Northern *Etats*, in England *Parliament*.

any other lord, "Tallage"[1] his unfree and un-noble dependants: i.e. demand any proportion he liked of their available wealth. He could "Tallage" the serfs in his manors, the townsmen in his towns, the Jews who lent money under his licence, at will. In practice, of course, custom—and often recorded documents—limited him. So the feudal revenue on which was based all royal action in the later Dark Ages became quite insufficient with the rapid development of the Middle Ages. *Extra* revenue "Aids" extraordinary were needed: and these must be consented to. The first obvious thing to do under feudal ideas was to go to one's free and noble dependants—one's "men"—and ask them to "aid" their lord: and the place and time in which to do that was the Feudal Council. But (1) The mass of smaller direct tenants of the king could not attend the *Concilium*—or "Parlementum" of the king. Only the great Barons and Bishops could come. They might pledge their lesser colleagues all over the country, but it was not a satisfactory way of doing things *nor one which feudal opinion would accept when such new extraordinary "aids" became both heavy and repeated.* (2) The *Feudal Concilium* or "Parlement," as it was already often called, could not speak for the towns: and these were rapidly getting richer and more powerful as the rapid growth of the XIIth century continued to transform all Christendom.

A model for representation, and the idea of it, already existed in the councils of Monastic orders and of the clergy throughout Europe. As early as the year 1063 the little kingdom of Aragon, successfully advancing

[1] From "Tailler" the French for "to cut" (hence *tailor*). *Tally* is the same word—so is *entail* = limit.

against the Mohammedans of the Ebro valley, had summoned the first true representative elements to its *Concilium* or *Fuero* at Jaca: the burgesses sat therein. Within a lifetime it was meeting in the larger city of Huesca, reconquered from Islam. The principle was established and rapidly grew. The Southern French provinces adopted the idea. The lesser tenants of the Counts came through proxies from each bailiwick, the towns sent delegates, and these proxies and delegates sat in the Council of the Province with the Prelates. The representatives of the lower clergy and the Barons also appeared in person by summons: the "Estates" were formed. The idea spread northward.

Here, in England, *Scale* counted again. England was far larger than the Aragon of that day and even than the *Langue d'Oc* area which furnished the Estates of Toulouse. But it was not so large that separate councils should meet for separate provinces. The representative idea affected in England the National Council of one large united state.

The ecclesiastical synods had already adopted the device of representation for the lower clergy, but, in lay matters, it was not till the middle of the XIIIth century (1254) that the feudal *Concilium* of the English king had summoned to it representatives of the smaller gentry from each shire—a larger unit than the old French bailiwicks—to attend in grant of an aid. But they granted nothing. It was a flash in the pan. For the greater tenants of the Crown were for the most part rebellious, refusing aid, and the lesser ones—for whom the two knights of each shire mainly stood [1]—

[1] The reader should be acquainted with an interesting little effort of King John to copy the continental model forty years before, an incident long for-

eagerly took advantage of such protection to get out of helping their overlord.

The governing idea was still *Feudal.* The summons was sent in connection with a feudal levy of armed gentry to support the king. The two lesser nobles (knights) are asked to come to grant what is obviously a feudal *auxilium* (for the burgesses are not asked), which the king as overlord can only ask from his own men. But they are chosen in the local Court of Justice, the assembly of such as had pleas in the county, held by the king's officer for the king against his rebellious great Barons. There is already something general about them.

Ten years later (1264) Simon de Montfort—whose family had such ample experience of the long-established principle in Southern France—took the capital step of summoning to the Parliament (in the name of the king who was his prisoner) two burgesses from a select number of towns to support his party in the civil war, and the first *Concilium* with the triple (though, of course, partisan) representative elements of Clergy, Gentry and Burgesses to be held in England was assembled in 1265. The coming of the burgesses for the first time established an element of representation openly and as a principle in the English *Concilium.*

It took a long time for the institution to shake down into a settled form, but at the end of a lifetime, before the middle of the XIVth century, the regular meeting of King, Lords, and Commons, and of the clerical

---

gotten. It was in 1213, at All Souls, when he was in desperate straits, that he ordered the Sheriffs to send four men from each shire to a *Concilium* at Oxford. Nothing important seems to have happened there, for we hear nothing of it.

assemblies was assured. The old feudal *Concilium* of England had now permanently added to it a representative element for the granting of special taxes supplementary to the main feudal revenue; and the innovation at last took as firm root here as in Brittany or the Langue d'Oc, Aragon, Castile, or Guienne. There was even an occasional power of interference in administration on the part of the representative burgesses and gentry, by way of bargaining for an aid; and in course of time—before the end of the Middle Ages—enactments came to be regarded as solemn and enduring only if they had received the assent of all parties to what was now exclusively called "A Parliament"—that is the King, with his three "Estates" of Lords (the old Feudal Great Council), Clergy, and Commons [1] (the representative lesser gentry and burgesses); though the latter, of course, were, for general policy, at the will of those who summoned them or who dominated the government of the moment—save in matter of additional money aids, which were their special concern.

The mass of the nation had, of course, nothing to do with the new form of the *Concilium* as it gradually developed into Parliament during the later Middle Ages. The mass of the nation was composed of serfs very gradually turning into something like free peasants but never paying the feudal land taxes of the gentry or the new percentages on personal goods of freemen and burgesses of towns; only much later on were the then nearly emancipated serfs called on for a full tax.

[1] The clergy came to vote their taxes in their own assemblies, and at last, in England (somewhat before the Reformation) even—most unfortunately—to sit apart from the Burgesses and local gentry and cease to appear in Parliament.

Such men as had business in the Courts of the Counties, held mainly for judicial business but also used as a convenient assembly for choosing their representative knights, could only have a voice in that selection if they belonged to the small minority of freemen, and, on the top of that, were farmers of some position, with 50 to 80 acres of their own. But, as a fact, there was clearly no active selection, save by the official of the Government, the Sheriff: for not only do the writs specify that the Sheriff is to see to the quality of the knights, but those in power could always get what Commons they chose (so far as policy, apart from granting of money was concerned), as is proved by the submission of the Commons to the kings and the usurpers alternately throughout all the later Middle Ages.

Before leaving this period of the mediæval English Parliament it is important to remember that neither the word nor the institution played anything like the part which modern imagination ascribes to them. It is difficult not to read some savour of our more recent centuries into the past, but it is fatal to do so if one is to see things as they were. The Parliaments only belong to the later Middle Ages. Their representative element was quite subordinate. It did not initiate or control policy; foreign rivals of the English kings hardly took account of it, and, save for the discussion and obtaining of revenue, it played a rôle not much superior to registration of acts done by its superiors and the simulacrum of general assent thereto.

. . . . . .

Such was the general scheme of the feudal system in England and of its Conciliar method of government,

gradually admitting on the continental model a representative element, gradually emancipating its chief numerical element, the serfs, and turning them into peasants more and more independent; gradually affected by the growing anomalous element of the towns, profoundly shaken by the Black Death in the mid XIVth century (1350), rapidly decaying, passing into the form of modern society during the XVth (1400–1500); such was the dominion over men's minds of the feudal idea which, like all other living influences, was in full operation (850–950) before it was named or even consciously grasped by those subject to it, and which, like all such spiritual things, was still thought to be alive and was impressing its terms on law and society and even heresy [1] most vigorously, long after (1400–1500) life had really passed from it.

If the question be asked, "What was the most living epoch of the feudal system, what was the era during which it was most actively forming the political mind of Christendom?" the answer would be, "From the mid IXth century to the early XIVth—(850–1330)." If it be asked, "At what moment was it in the plenitude of its power as tested by the greatest independence of the small lord from his superior and of the great lord from his nominal supreme chief, the king?" the answer would be, "The XIth century (1000–1100) and most of the XIIth (1100–1160)." If it be asked over what space of time the feudal terms were regularly used and formed a necessary part of legal language, the answer is very different. You find such conscious regard of the feudal system hardly earlier than the end of the

[1] Wycliffe's quaint speculations on spiritual things are all in feudal terms of "tenure" and the rest.

Xth and the XIth century (980–1100), long after the principle itself had been acting on society with full vigour, and you find the verbal terms and rules of it continuing at least to the end of the Middle Ages (1500) and fossil relics of them in our own day (e.g. the term "free-hold").

It was, as I have said, the united system of the West, accepted universally in the Christian mind of the Spanish kingdoms, of the French king and his vassals and their dependants, and in the kingdoms of England and Scotland and of Germany and even in Italy. It was anomalous, however, in Ireland, introduced there by foreign invasion and destructive of native traditions, and on the whole a failure.

I have already noted a very important point of contrast, not in the nature of feudalism but in its scale, between England and France, and this I desire to emphasize again, because it is a point of contrast which has profoundly affected the political history of the two countries, and which has been much neglected. It explains as does nothing else the main features peculiar to English history between the Conquest and the Tudors. It is this: England was too small for the central kingly suzerain power to play feudal district against feudal district and absorb them one by one. It was too large (and also too fortunate) to become the vassal—though it very nearly did so become on two separate occasions (1216 and 1422)—of a Crown external to the Island.

The monarch at Paris, the Capetian, at first possessed of little active power, only admitted morally superior by the band of great district-rulers (who were practically independent of him), came to be at last an absolute

monarch through the absorption of these provinces by stepping into the shoes of the great local lords and through being the expected saviour of any lesser subject threatened by the power of a greater. But the monarch at Winchester or Westminster had no such position. He had not vaguely under him a vast Normandy, a distant Aquitaine, a remote Brittany. *His* vassals were always there, close at hand. It made him in the beginning more powerful in comparison with his feudal inferiors than was the French king, for those feudal inferiors in England could not act as independent potentates. They had not large enough districts or possessions in their power so to act. Yet in the long run this difference in scale made the English feudal monarchy weaker in the face of its vassals than the French. The feudal nobility pressed successfully upon it throughout the Middle Ages, hence the anarchy in the middle of the XIIth century, hence the feudal victory over the king in Magna Carta (1215), hence the Barons' Wars (1258–1265), hence, at the very end of the process, the Wars of the Roses (1450–1485). It sounds like a paradox, but it is true and essential to retain, that those very forces which made the English realm so much a unit and gave its central executive so many direct powers, yet forbad the growth in England during the Middle Ages of an absolute popular monarchy.

We shall see later one most interesting development of this truth—the very different stories of the representative institutions in the two countries. The idea of a representative body to speak for the taxpayers rose, as I have said, in the Pyrenees, Iberian, Gallic, and Basque. It spread to Southern France and came

northwards. It flourished exceedingly in the Provincial Parliaments of France; in the Langue d'Oc, in Brittany, in the greater part of the Kingdom. But on account of the scale upon which the French monarchy was built (at its largest extent from four to five times that of the English in area and population) a representative element in the king's Feudal Council was difficult to convene and abnormal to maintain. It was easy to convene and fairly normal to maintain in this country.

In a word, the realm of England might be compared in scale to one of the very largest Continental Provinces, but having this advantage over a mere Province, that it had become, and continued as, an independent kingdom.

. . . . . .

The feudal system had many subsidiary results, especially during its later phases, which render the life of the English Middle Ages strange in modern English eyes: for instance, Wardship. The overlord had legal guardianship of a minor left without natural guardians, as an orphan. *He could dispose of an heiress, so situated, in marriage.* Even in childhood he could pledge her to a marriage: it was an admitted and most lucrative custom.

Again, the feudal system created a mass of anomalies, because it arose on the soil of our old Roman Imperial system of society and law, which, as a background, never disappeared. There was a latent spiritual conflict between the two, working below men's conscious actions, all through the Feudal Period. For instance, the monarch was spiritually the heir of the Roman Imperial Monarchy: yet feudally he was but an over-

lord. He was—like the Roman monarch—the Community Incarnate: his universal character was sacramentally confirmed by ecclesiastical ceremonial and by outward symbol (especially of the Diadem—a use unbroken at least from Diocletian's day and earlier—and of Robes, Sceptre, and Orb). Yet the chief members of his subject realm were fellow nobles of whom he was but the chief. The castles were "his," but they were also "the Earl's" or "the Baron's" when an Earl or Baron held them for him; and many were—in men's minds—the castles of the subject rather than of the king.

Again the king, as the Community Incarnate, has under his immediate and uncontested control "the forests"—that is all the old Imperial "waste land"—mountains, fens, unfertile areas with their patches of arable. He is absolute over them. But that is an irritation to the great nobles. They jealously watch his rights, perpetually challenge his claim to this or that area as "forest," bind him down to fixed custom in dealing with "forest," make him abandon newly occupied "forest."

Again the feudal system intermixes with ecclesiastical relations. The Prelates are Barons as well as Bishops. A government desiring to protect itself "pays homage" to the Pope—makes the Pope its Feudal Superior; and thus at once affects men's minds with the feeling that to attack such a government is to challenge the supreme spiritual power in Christendom.

Again, the feudal system permits of strange and rapid revolutions in the political control of vast areas. The lord of a small district marries the heiress of a large one, and the two are at once merged. The mar-

riage is annulled—say on the plea of consanguinity—and the nearly formed great state breaks up again. Burgundy marries the heiress of Flanders and becomes from a great feudal dependency a formidable rival of the Paris kingship and newly establishes a middle-kingdom in the West. Or a tenure is declared feudally "forfeit" for some crime, and that is an excuse for the overlord's taking it over.

These sudden and most extensive changes in the areas of government did not greatly affect the domestic lives of the people as they would to-day: for private life in the Middle Ages was ordered by custom and local autonomy, not, as it is to-day, by an all-powerful state which can impose taxes at will and even new language upon its impotent subjects: but they created suddenly new recruiting fields and new sources of revenue. The Count of Anjou in 1140 ruled, gathered income from, and had military followers off, an area smaller than the Home Counties. Within fifty years his son controlled, through marriage and inheritance, an area more than twice the size of England. He had pounds where his father had had pence, and divisions where his father had had companies. Another twenty odd years and half of it was gone.

We must also visualize, as we read down the Middle Ages, the nature of warfare in a time in which armed struggle—commonly on a petty scale—was continuous. The noble class was mounted throughout (and many of its retainers), and armoured first with long shirts of iron links (mail—the French "Maille" or link) and steel caps (850–900 to, say, 1150–1200), the latter succeeded more and more by closed helmets protecting the face, while leg covering of mail was gradually added. With

the very end of the XIIIth century, plate appears added to the mail, in the XIVth it became common, and in the XVth universal. In all the earlier Middle Ages the attack is by mounted men of this type, either (most commonly) two bodies of such conflict in a *mêlée*, or when one deliberately stands on the defensive (as Harold at Hastings) it is dismounted.[1]

The completeness of the armour, perpetually changing and adapting itself to meet improved new developments in offensive weapons, made of the fully equipped rider a different tactical unit from the ordinary man on foot. He was a much more expensive person to produce, but when produced, was a far less vulnerable one. An exaggerated metaphor, very commonly repeated since 1916, has compared him to the tank in modern warfare. Of course there was nothing like the gulf between him and the footmen that there is between the tank and infantry in the open without artillery; but still there was a great difference, and this violent metaphor helps to explain it. Then again, these mounted, fully armed men had far more effect at close quarters. They could not only ride down infantry if they could get at them; over and above the shock (which the phrase "riding down" means) they were slashing from above with heavy swords, or thrusting with long lances against which what the infantrymen held could do little save in special circumstances.

Later in the Middle Ages good discipline, close formation, and, of course, in another set of considerations, the Welsh long bow, tended to change this. But even

[1] On which account many writers—misled by Freeman (who had not consulted the original authorities he quoted—notably William of Poitiers)—imagine that Harold had no cavalry!

the long bow could not stand up to the mounted man in equal numbers unless it had special circumstances to its advantage, a fairly numerous and well-trained body of experts, an open defensive position taken up at leisure, and at the choice of the defensive, and *immediate success*, for its supply was highly limited and was effective only for a few minutes of continuous fire.

Swarms of ill-armed foot accompanied the far more expensive mounted forces, but cavalry remained the great arm throughout the feudal period. The horse was the mark of armed rank (chivalry, chevalier, cavalier, caballero). It was challenged by trained infantry at the end of the age, but its supremacy was lowered by gunpowder. The mounted charge remained the chief form of shock up to the new use of field artillery developed by the French revolutionary generals and notably Napoleon; it was *a* chief form of shock down to our own time.

In following mediæval warfare, the modern reader must be struck by the perpetual recurrence of the castle-siege. And this is particularly the case in England, where the siege of a walled town is much rarer than it is on the Continent (particularly in France), partly because the proportion of walled towns to the total population was smaller, and partly because there was no set of local capitals here as there was abroad. This feature in the warfare between the Conquest and the appearance of siege artillery (1400–1500) has often misled historians. They will talk of such and such a captain (Louis of France, for instance) "wasting his time" in the siege of Dover Castle or of the younger Simon de Montfort "delaying" in front of Pevensey when his father needed him in the West.

The whole thing becomes explicable when we understand two things, first, the enormous strength of the permanently fortified defensive over field forces compared with later (and earlier) times, between the Xth and the XVth centuries (900–1400); secondly, the sharp distinction from the Xth to the middle of the XIVth centuries between the armed riding man and the mass of foot soldiery which I have described.

Also the forced marches this sort of heavy cavalry could do *in the midst of the conflict* were amazing. You get them over and over again in the story of mounted warfare. I need only allude to two: King John's swoop upon Mirebeau, which was at the prodigious rate of forty miles a day; and the Kenilworth raid and back in Prince Edward's last campaign against Simon de Montfort.

Now put these two things together, and you see what the castle meant.

A comparatively small body of men with stabled horses could hold it for a very long time, if it were properly provisioned, against immensely larger numbers. Château Gaillard held up a large army with a squadron or two behind its walls. You could not mask castles without a considerable deployment of forces, and as they were very numerous, such strategy would have quickly depleted your main body. It was not safe to leave them behind you, because the comparatively small number of men-at-arms which they contained, left free by your absence, could raid your communications and imperil your movements and, under feudal conditions, raise recruits against you.

Lastly, that dominating point in all warfare, but especially mediæval warfare, personality, comes in. You

had not downed a great feudal opponent until you had taken his castles. His prestige was not lost until he had lost his castles. A wavering populace could not be depended upon until you had in your hands the castles dotted throughout its district. A great feudal opponent having taken refuge in a castle, was still a formidable problem until his person was seized; and his person could not be seized until the castle was stormed or had surrendered. That is why throughout mediæval history the castle plays so large a part, and brings an element into warfare of which since the XVIth century we have known nothing, unless we assimilate it to the fortified town of the XVIIth, XVIIIth, and XIXth centuries.

Three further essential matters must be briefly dealt with before leaving this introduction: the mediæval value of money; the tendency throughout the English Middle Ages—or at least, from 1100 to at least 1450—for a great Western state—Anglo-French—to come into being; and the mediæval change of language in England.

First, then, as to that important point in connection with mediæval history, an appreciation of the *social meaning of the sums of money* mentioned during its course.

During the Dark Ages our remaining records allude to sums of money not infrequently, even in Britain. We have, for instance, the payments made to the Danes, the endowment taxes of the Papacy, etc.

But with the transition from the Dark to the Middle Ages, that is, after the Conquest, we come into quite another set of records where money is mentioned continually. Indeed, an index of individual statements recorded between the Conquest and the Reformation

in this country, would consist for by far the greater part of details of payments or receipts in money.

The general reader is struck at first sight by the apparent smallness of these sums. The English have retained to the present day most of their mediæval names for currency. We still talk of the pound, the shilling, the penny, the farthing, though we have dropped the groat (4d.) and the mark (13s. 4d.). Thinking as we do in terms of our modern currency, the sums mentioned in the Middle Ages seem to us so small as to be meaningless (e.g. wages of 2d. a day).

There are three elements which determine the social value of money at any time in a community:—

(*a*) The first, which is a foundation for the others, is *the average purchasing power of a given weight of gold.*

(*b*) The second is *the number of purchasable categories*, that is, the number of kinds of things or actions present in the community at that date, upon which money can be spent.

(*c*) The third is the size and standard of wealth of the community.

(*a*) The first of these, the purchasing power of gold, is impossible to determine with absolute accuracy and is difficult to arrive at even roughly, but one can at least get some general idea of it for any given time and place if one has a sufficient amount of evidence available. Were the same things consumed in several generations for many centuries, and in the same proportions, the problem would be simpler. Unfortunately, the demand for new things arises and for old things declines. The later generation largely demands a product unknown to an earlier one and the estimate is complicated by these changes in habit.

Thus, one of our great staple things against which to measure the value of money to-day is the so much weight of white bread made from wheaten flour; but in the Middle Ages the place of wheat was largely taken by rye. Again, to-day we use an enormous quantity of iron compared with what was used by a similar population on a similar area in those times. Take it bye and large, I think one may say that a just multiple for the mediæval currency, as contrasted with the modern currency before the Great War (in terms of which we still think), is a multiple of twenty. It is a rather larger multiple at the very end. The stock of gold and silver was diminishing all the time until the sudden economic revolution produced by the discovery of the New World and the exploitation of its gold and silver by the Spaniards. It is true that the same quantity of money present, the mere quantity of the precious metals (where these alone form the currency) is not the only deciding factor in prices, for one also has to consider their briskness in circulation. But, generally speaking, gold and silver were being very gradually used up during the Middle Ages and less rapidly replaced than they were worn down. Therefore an ounce weight of gold or of silver would upon the whole purchase less things at the time of the Conquest than it would in the reign of Henry VIII, just before the great change in prices began to appear through the pouring into Europe of the precious metals of America.

Anyhow, take *twenty*[1] as your rough multiple for

[1] The general estimate used to be far lower—10 or 12: but that was due to leaving out change in habits. Thus wheat was 50 per cent. dearer (on the whole) in the Middle Ages than it is to-day; but it was much less used. On the other hand, rye was 30 per cent. cheaper. Iron was enormously dearer: 8, 10, and even 12 times. But it was far less used than now. Meat was

the sums mentioned between the Conqueror and the Tudors and you will not be far wrong. Towards the end of the time you will be rather under-estimating the real value of the amounts you read of.

When you read of 1s., think of £1 as £1 was in 1913, before the Great War. When you read of £1, think of £20, and when you read of 1d., think of anything between eighteen pence and 2s. In doing so, by the way, it is well to remember that there were no small denominations. You will not read of anything less than a farthing and not often of anything less than 1d. It is as though we had nothing below 6d. pieces. Therefore, in smaller payments, you are dealing with round sums; and, as always happens where there are no small denominations, the least unit price of anything was rather too large.

When you hear of something in the Middle Ages costing one farthing, it is safe to consider, even in the early part of them, something like our own 5d. to 6d. before the War,[1] or say 10d. to-day.

(*b*) So much for the mediæval purchasing power of the pound, shilling, and penny. Now for the second

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much cheaper—often half as cheap: especially the staple pork; fish vastly cheaper, and beer also. Wool dearer—but much less used. Leather far cheaper. After a long and close examination you will come to 20 (at the most) for the beginning of the period and 20–24 for its close at the dissolution of the Monasteries.

[1] A very familiar example of the value of the currency at the end of the process before the flood of Spanish silver and gold, is the term used in the English New Testament where Our Lord delivers the parable of the Good Samaritan. The Good Samaritan gives the innkeeper "two pence" to look after the wounded man until he himself shall return, that is, in terms of our pre-war, 1913, currency, he left, say, 3s. 6d., with the local public-house for the food and bed of the sick man until he should return the next day; a sum which sounds sensible enough in our ears where the 2d. sounds ridiculous. We must remember that the English Bible is a deliberate piece of archaism.

factor: the amount of purchasable categories. This is unfortunately of a very vague and general nature, and we can only make a rough estimate.

Moreover, as we shall see, that estimate is subject to a peculiar qualification, but it may be very roughly put down as at least doubling the social value of the ounce of gold. Many would say far more than doubling it.

The qualification I allude to is the fact that the social value of money in a community where purchasable categories are few (as in the Middle Ages, or in some simple and remote modern district) differs from its value where they are many (as in a modern capital), by much more in the larger incomes than in the smaller. £2 a week to-day in London is much less in social value than £2 a week in a Balkan village; though the gold value of cloth and boots and food be much the same in both places. But £1000 a year in London is enormously less in social value than £1000 a year in such a village.

(*c*) Lastly, the standard and size of the community makes a difference in the social value of money, especially as the income considered rises. A small community, the poorest of whom have simple and few needs, creates a far higher social value for a given sum than is created by a large community with a higher standard of primary needs. The mediæval serf, foot soldier, labourer, groom needed and obtained plenty of food and drink (on the average: supply fluctuated

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using the terms of a whole lifetime before, for prices in England when the English Bible appeared under James I had already greatly changed from what they had been in the middle of the XVIth century, upon the translations of which time the Authorized Version is based.

wildly), but he needed only very little and exceedingly simple clothing; rough shelter in common sleeping rooms; rude huts of wood and clay and thatch for his housing. The richer people were far less rich compared with the poorest, and the very richest were vastly less rich than our millionaires, measured in terms of a labourer's daily support. William the Conqueror was far the richest man of his day in England, and his revenue had to support armies and navies, and a court and all the burden of the State, including a vast tale of pensions. Yet, measured in the daily support of an adult male it was not half our largest modern private fortunes.

One may sum up the thing in the most general terms by saying:—

When you read of a *shilling* in the Middle Ages think of it as commanding in average and commonly used commodities (especially staple food and drink) about a pound's worth of such necessaries in 1913, or say 35s. worth to-day (1926). When you hear of a shilling in the wages or support of the labourer, the common soldier and sailor, etc., think of it as meaning quite 45s. to-day. When you hear of £100 in the revenues of the rich, think of it meaning not £2000 in pre-war money, or, say, £3500 in to-day's, but more like £8000: and with very large sums increase the multiple. When Cromwell, or one of the Howards or the Cecils or the Seymours, in the break up of Mediæval England, looted a monastery hospital or college set down at £500 a year, it meant, to the world of their time, not what £10,000 a year means to-day, nor £20,000—but more like £50,000.

There remains to be described the constant tendency

in Mediæval England to form one State with France, and the story of the language which so closely follows that tendency and its gradual cessation.

As it is usually spoken of—attempts by the King of England to claim the Crown of France—the continued tendency towards the formation of an Anglo-French State in the Middle Ages is incomprehensible and absurd in modern ears. It was not that. It was the natural drift towards external and visible unity of a society in which the vocal, educated, governing part was everywhere much of the same sort; with the same French speech, the same social polity, and (of course) the same religion; closely intermarried, perpetually associating in monastic, military and literary activities. It was also the necessary gravitation towards unity of a feudal system in which all the chiefs were closely interlocked, in which reciprocal homage formed a complicated omnipresent network of bonds, in which wardship, dower, heritage, were all woven into one system—among the chiefs of society—from the Grampians to the Pyrenees.

From the moment that William of Normandy, vassal to the King of France, became King of England the problem was posed. Three times it was nearly solved by absorption from the one side or the other: when Louis of France was called into England by John's Barons; when Edward III discovered his military power to enforce what was a strong legal claim; when Henry V married Katherine of Valois and begat Henry VI of France and England. If the Capetian line or the Plantagenet had ended in an heiress before the Black Death, the united Anglo-French State of the West would have come into being.

It failed principally through the second point: the change in language. Until the generation of the Black Death, say 1350–70, all that counted in England spoke and thought in French. French culture and English were indistinguishable. After that social revolution the New English—virtually the same language as that which we speak to-day—became the general tongue of all that controlled English life. The opposing gentry at Crécy—and most of them at Poitiers—heard and knew each other's battle cries. The gentry opposed at Agincourt were foreigners one to the other: Henry V harangued his troops in English. He himself, perhaps, no longer thought in French; certainly his captains did not, and even as early as his father's time that usurper made his bid for the throne in an English speech. By the time that Joan charged at Patay the attacked and attackers were, in every rank, two separate nations: her effort was against garrisons palpably alien.

By the end of the Middle Ages the nations were fully and consciously formed—but the English had (again a matter largely of scale) achieved such a personality before any other people. They would never again have formed one people with the French. But all the West, the Northern and Southern French Provinces, the Italian States, the crowd of German ones, the Spanish kingdoms and Portugal, still formed, with England, Scotland, Ireland, Wales, and the distant Scandinavian peoples, one civilization: one world: for religion is the principle of a society, and they had all one religion.

That unity broke in the XVIth century, and from its ruins has arisen a Europe so divided as to be capable of self-destruction. But there are still apparent in

the West two camps: those who reject and those who maintain the ancient Catholic tradition of our race.

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All this is but the mechanism. The man who would understand the Middle Ages must appreciate much more: their vitality.

What may be meant by the words "higher" or "superior" in the contrast of various civilizations, no one can decide. But those who value life itself, the potential at which mankind acts, the strength of the will, the recognition of individual responsibilities and therefore of individual honour, will find no period in the history of our race, not even the greatest moments of Pagan antiquity, so thoroughly assauging that thirst of the European man for fullness of being, as those great centuries, the summit of which was the XIIIth.

Look at the faces which they carved out of stone; read the words which they wrote; contemplate their actions of aggression and of resistance; their contempt of pain, their intense passions—and you will say that compared with them we have gone to sleep.

Above all they had Vision; which some also call Illusion.

I

THE NORMAN FOUNDATION

1066–1154

88 Years

A. The Conqueror (21 years)
B. } The Conqueror's Sons { Rufus (under 13 years)
C. } { Henry (under 35 years)
D. The Feudal Riot (under 19 years)


Richard I (of Normandy).
Richard II
Emma = Ethelred, King of England = Ælfgifu
Richard III
Robert
Edward the Confessor, King of England
Edmund Ironside
William the Conqueror
Edward
Malcolm Canmore, King of Scots
St. Margaret of Scotland
Edgar Ætheling
Adela = Ct. of Blois
Robert (Duke of Normandy)
William Rufus
Henry I = Matilda
Mary = Eustace, Count of Boulogne
William Clito
Matilda = Geoffrey of Anjou, "Plantagenet"
Henry II, Plantagenet
Stephen (of Blois) (married to Matilda heiress of Boulogne)
Matilda = Stephen of Blois
Eustace (died uncrowned and before his father)

I

THE NORMAN FOUNDATION

(A) The Conqueror (Willam I)

(From the Battle of Hastings, October 14th, 1066, to his death, September 9th, 1087—Nearly 21 years)

It was at sunset of the 14th of October, 1066, that Harold's great force[1] on the ridge of Battle had finally gone to pieces before the still larger body of the attack. The fall of darkness baulked the pursuit of the dispersed fugitives, and what was left of the Duke's 50,000 —some quarter had fallen—searched the field with torches, set bivouacs for the night or pitched tents for their commanders.

William, when he sat down exhausted to his meat and wine after the nine hours' thunder of that day, knew that he had destroyed all effective opposition. He had won not only a battle but a campaign. He had now only to go forward and reap the fruit of his success.

[1] We do not know with any exactitude the numbers of the army in line under Harold at Hastings. But we know (*a*) that it stood up for nine hours to the repeated shock of 50,000 men, from one-fifth to one-quarter of them mounted; (*b*) that it held just on 1600 yards of line in the densest possible formation to stand such shocks—certainly not less than 15 ranks deep, more likely 20. It cannot have been less than 30,000—more likely 40,000 all told.

First Policy after Hastings.—What immediately followed upon the victory was not, properly speaking, a "conquest" at all. It was, in the eyes of the time, a decision (under a sort of ordeal by battle) which of two feudal chiefs had the right to the allegiance of the English feudal system and to act as King of England: a brother-in-law of the late King who had presumably sworn to forgo his claim, or a cousin to whom also the Crown had been promised and in whose favour his rival had sworn to withdraw. To the mind of the time the transition was not more violent in theory than is to the mind of our time the decision in a court of law between, let us say, an English-born claimant with doubtful titles to an estate and a Colonial claimant.

It is not one of conquest but of settlement.—If you could have stood in William's shoes, you would not have felt yourself, on the night after Hastings, the conqueror of a foreign country at all. You would have thought yourself the victor in a battle wherein God has defended his right to the inheritance of a realm, the court and many of the upper classes of which were men already of your own culture and the general society of which was (of course) on the same model as that of the rest of Europe. The Duke of Normandy thought that he would become the King of England by a fairly simple process when once he had got, as he could not fail to get, the assent of the great nobles and Bishops, and after that his position would be as normal and regular in England as in Normandy.

Some friction due to language.—But there were two obstacles to what seemed so obvious and easy a transition. In the first place there was the practical obstacle of language. It was one thing to have the

Court and the big people about him (including presumably Harold himself) talking French while the native educated language was an inherited Winchester form of Anglo-Saxon. It was one thing to have what had prevailed in Edward's days—a few high officials here and there in castles and offices, a couple of Bishops in their palaces, and for some years the Archbishop, in his state at Canterbury, talking French, while the mass of the gentry about them were talking the educated Anglo-Saxon of the day. It was quite another thing to have French everywhere in the mouths of grantees of land confiscated from those who had died in Harold's service, in the mouths of the garrison leaders and of troops up and down the country, in the monasteries and manorial halls, and everywhere unavoidable. French began to flood the country and friction was severe.

But this not fatal to peace.—This friction could have been got over, as it was got over in many feudal rearrangements of those days, before national feeling in our sense was known. Although this invasion of a foreign language inevitable to the presence of hundreds of administrators and thousands of soldiers and clerics was more sudden and on a larger scale than can be found anywhere else in the Europe of that day, still the thing in itself was not necessarily fatal to a peaceful transition, and William might have had no more to do had it not been for the second obstacle, which was far more formidable. This was the lack of discipline in his own army and following.

Lack of discipline in feudal armies the cause of the breakdown of the policy of settlement.—For this the great soldier must not himself be blamed. It was the necessary condition of his time. Indeed, as things

went in the XIth century, he had a better organization than anybody else. But the army, both in its feudal aspect and in its larger mercenary contingents, the nobles and their tenants, the leaders of hired bands and their men, were of an independence native to that primitive time, which was only just emerging from the darkness of the past ages. But lines of cleavage in any feudal force ran not laterally as they do to-day, separating class from class, but perpendicularly right down it, separating one lord's command from another's. The great noble followed his supreme overlord as a duty and also for gain: but under limitations. He was always liable to refuse service—at the risk of a struggle in which he might be victor, or which the overlord might shirk. The lesser nobles and small gentry were not quite as strong against this great lord as he was against the Duke. But still, these also could refuse obedience or act on their own. They ran a somewhat greater risk, but a risk often worth taking. The followers of these smaller gentry, again, hired men and summoned freeholders of the country side, were more tightly bound to their village chief than he to his noble superior. But their term of service was short, their right to pillage a general custom, and of strict military discipline in the modern, or old Roman, sense they had none.

They had enough military discipline to form a coherent force, to march rapidly to take up line, and so on; but under conditions other than those of marching and fighting, the organization was loose. The professional Greek army of the Eastern Empire, with its exact training and permanent discipline, noted this inchoate character in the fighting forces of Western

Christendom during the Dark and early Middle Ages, and wondered how they could be kept together.

In the larger mercenary contingent, William's discipline was easier to maintain. The organization was more or less at the will of the paymaster. On the other hand, the individual men who were of a different type from the rest of the force, only joined for short periods and joined on the understanding, then universal, that the thing was an adventure out of which they were to get what perquisites they could, apart from their pay.

The consequence of such a situation was immediate trouble between the army and the general population, and it was this trouble, growing prodigiously for nearly four years, which turned the affair into a real and violent conquest gravely affecting the history of the English.

Surrender of Dover.—Local attempts at resistance following on Hastings came to nothing. Romney, which was then the mouth of a large harbour, as Portsmouth is to-day, attacked some of the Norman ships, and suffered heavily from William as a consequence. The Castle of Dover, however, surrendered, to the great advantage of William, who was able to house a number of his sick there. He garrisoned and strengthened it. (But there was bad fighting and burning in the town —which William paid damages for.) Then having received reinforcements, and after the ready adhesion of Canterbury and a delay through illness, he began his march inland to take the Crown. We do not know with what force he advanced. Counting the reinforcements which had reached him, and deducting his wounded, sick, and shore garrisons, it may have been

30,000 men. It must have been a considerable force, because his circuitous march put him under the necessity of leaving castle garrisons behind him continually as he advanced. He was generally acknowledged. His long familiar claim was now accepted in the South. Winchester, the revenues and feudal control of which belonged to St. Edward's widow, Harold's sister, accepted him at once as Canterbury had done. Although there was a skirmish on the south bank of the Thames opposite London, William made no attempt to force the big place. His soldiers plundered, riding, some of them apparently as far as into Sussex, but the main march was continued south of the river, through Berkshire, to Wallingford, where he intended to cross. His object is clear enough. He was cutting and holding, one after another, the approaches to London from the South and from the West. He intended further to hold them from the North and from the East until he had isolated what might prove the worst, and was certainly the largest, centre of possible intrigue against him. The *Concilium* (or "Witan" as the old native name went), that is, a little group of very high nobles and Bishops, had met in London immediately after Hastings, and had been much divided. The ostensible victory therein was won by the faction which recognized, too late, the rightful claim of the boy Edgar, the heir to the Royal Line of Wessex—called in Anglo-Saxon "The Ætheling"—the Levy was put under the two great Earls of the Midlands and the North, Edwin and Morcar, and Stigand, the very doubtful Archbishop of Canterbury, may have been ostensibly the moving spirit of that decision: but he had a crooked mind. For even within this faction there went on that secret

intrigue inseparable from the pre-conquest oligarchy: the inheritance of the personal scramble for income which had marked the era of Godwin and his sons.

Surrender of the English *Concilium* or "Witan." William is crowned in Westminster Abbey, December 25th, 1066.—The old anarchy which had cursed England for nearly 100 years was still at work. Edwin and Morcar left London and went North. No one believed in their devotion to the cause of the "Ætheling." Stigand at once secured himself by going to Wallingford and swearing in to William. The governor of London, who had already been in secret correspondence with William, played only for keeping his job under the new king. That soldier continued his encirclement of the capital, and at some point which is probably Berkhamstead (it may have been somewhat further south, for the host is said to have seen London) the magnates gave way altogether. The newly chosen boy-king, the Archbishop of York, the saintly Bishop of Worcester, the Bishop of Hereford, possibly messengers from Edwin and Morcar, and certain of the greater London burgesses, offered the Crown. The Coronation was fixed for Christmas Day in Westminster Abbey. It was the occasion of yet another piece of indiscipline on the part of William's forces. There was pillaging, massacre, and the burning of houses outside the Abbey while the Duke was being crowned within. It was the repetition on a larger scale of what had happened at Dover immediately after the first victory.

He still attempts a peaceful settlement.—William, now anointed king and exercising all the profound moral authority which the Sacramental ceremony of Coronation conveyed in the XIth century, tried hard

to act as a modern general would have acted and to control the huge mass of his armed men to discipline. But the times did not permit more than orders uncertainly obeyed. So far as he himself could work out his policy of regarding the change in England as a simple transition from one feudal lord to another, he did so. He invited the nobility of England to meet him and to be confirmed in their possessions. They came in such numbers that they included many of the smaller gentry as well as the great overlords. He took great care to show honour to the boy Edgar, enriching him and treating him in a quite special fashion. He had, of course, to establish garrisons all over the land, and he must have prayed within himself that those garrisons would keep within bounds—but he must have feared for the result.

But some transfer of Lordships inevitable, especially among the highest.—Nor was it possible for him to avoid a minor social revolution. He had to reward his followers. In the very highest class of all—the men who held manors by the score and governed by the half county and county—there was widespread confiscation: a very sudden transfer of wealth. True, this did not affect the masses. That William should have the Port of Bosham or the Manor of Rodmell instead of Harold, that his half-brother Odo (the Bishop of Bayeux) or Braose or any such should be substituted for the magnates of the previous brief reign made very little difference to priest and freeman, and none at all to the serf—who was nearly everyone.

But there was a certain amount—how much we do not know, but largish—of dispossession among the local gentry. A small man taking the manorial dues of

only one village, even if he had not fought for Harold nor actively aided him, might lose his land or pay a heavy fine to retain it, on the ground that he had obeyed Harold. The heirs of the fallen were in the same case. The mass of freemen who had fought at Hastings in the same.

Though the first months after the victory were quiet, on the whole, William knew there was matter for trouble.

With the turn of the year his presence was needed in Normandy. He had to take advantage of his greatly increased prestige, and he had to show himself in his native dominion—always, in the absence of its chief, capable of civil war.

He visits Normandy, Lent of 1067.—He crossed over in March, 1067, from Pevensey, taking with him a great retinue of his new English nobles, including Edgar. Their wealth, their bearing, and their presence were astonishing and admired. He was received with enthusiasm. Yet that short absence was the beginning of the trouble. He had left behind him in England to govern in his absence his half-brother the Bishop of Bayeux, Odo. It was Odo who had to look after the communications with the Continent, and who administered from Kent. The interior he had left to Fitz-Osbern; his special seat was Hereford, of which county he had been given the Earldom.

Ill government of his lieutenants in England.—Neither of these men acted with wisdom. But even if William had been present himself he could not have prevented his garrison men's behaviour. They plundered, insulted, and even killed. There was no organized movement against them. There was increasing

anger, but it was not, as yet, formidable enough to make it worth the while of any great Prelate or noble to attempt rebellion. Local troubles began. A native great noble (whose name is uncertainly spelt—probably Copsi), whom William had continued in the government of Northumberland, was killed because he refused to break with the new régime. There was fighting in the West, where the Welsh mountaineers were always willing to lend a hand.

Disaffection of Kent.—In Kent there was a movement for calling in help from abroad against the Government of Odo. That same Count of Boulogne, who had fought at Hastings, lent himself to the insurrection; but it was a small affair and failed. By the time William got back to England there had been no movement upon a dangerous scale, but there was a spirit dangerous for him abroad. To think of it as a national spirit would be an absurd anachronism, but it was a feeling of irritation against the unfamiliar, provoked by the increasing changes in the country, and the danger was that it might give opportunity for feudal rebellion against the king.

Rising at Exeter.—A general movement.—Edgar flies to Scotland.—After William's return the town of Exeter challenged his full rights and stood a siege of nearly three weeks. The town did not rebel so much, it seems, against the claim of William to be king as against the stricter organization of society which he had brought with him and interference with local usage. It had maltreated a small number of Norman ships in its harbour. What it had bargained for had nothing to do with the return of the old dynasty, though Harold's Danish mother was the chief figure there, but

MAP IV

THE CONQUEST

immunity from direct government and presumably from new heavy taxation. For William had already been compelled to levy an exceptional sum of money to meet the heavy expenses of his military Government, and probably it was resistance to such impost which led, quite as much as the indiscipline of the soldiers, to what followed in the next year, 1068. Anyhow, the example of Exeter was an isolated one, and the king had a levy of Englishmen in the army which he led against it. After that success William sent for his wife and had her crowned at Winchester on Whitsunday. But he knew that the main work was still to be done, for the settlement of the first days after Hastings had been ruined. Edwin started a rebellion of his own in the North, the town of York rose; William marched there and easily stopped the trouble for the moment, but it was not finally settled. The sons of Harold, who had taken refuge in Ireland, were starting yet another movement in the West, helped by the Irish Chieftain Dermott, King of Leinster. Edgar himself, the rightful heir, was uncertain of his position. He tried to fly across the sea; was prevented by a storm and driven to Scotland, and there received by King Malcolm.

Ferment continues throughout 1068.—1068 was full of such days of ferment, but it was in the next year that the storm broke. It is 1069 which one may set down as the true year of Conquest, a business horrible in its details.

Reaches its crisis in January, 1069.—It was at the very beginning of the year, the end of January, that Durham rose against its local Norman commander. He had not been without warning, but he had less than 1000 men, and he outmarched himself in his haste to

reach the town. He was killed with all his command except two, who managed to escape. The immediate result was the rising in the North of York and Northumberland behind it, while Edgar Ætheling from Scotland joined in.

William was too quick for them. He marched north again, allowed his men to pillage York, set up Fitz-Osbern in command there, and perhaps thought that the task was over. It had only begun.

In June the sons of Harold came back to harry the West. Hardly were they beaten off when the crisis came with the appearance on the English coast of a large Danish fleet—the last serious challenge to William's power.

The risings of 1069 receive Danish support.—The really important point to grasp about this crisis of 1069—the third year after Hastings—is that it determined the duel between the old Danish sea power and the more civilized Continent of Europe.[1] For centuries, first as pagan pirates and then as Christian kings, the Danish masters of the Northern seas had taken it for granted that they could land and win in England; their position here made them a constant menace to the rest of Western Europe. They still thought that they were in something of this position, and that they could deal with William as they had dealt with Ethelred. Those who in England thought they had something to gain by rebelling against the new king had sent to Denmark two years before to suggest the expedition, and during all that interval the big armament was being got ready.

[1] There was one very serious final *threat* in 1085 of a great Danish attack: but it came to nothing.

The Danish fleet went down to the Straits of Dover and then sailed up the East coast, touching here and there, perhaps in hopes of starting local rebellions. By the opening of August they were in the Humber. There they were joined by a number of the native magnates, including young Edgar, marched on York, there totally destroyed the new garrison of 3000 men and began a serious campaign. William was hunting on the lower Severn, in the Royal Forest of Dean, when he got the news. He came up North with a much larger force than his enemies were prepared to meet. As he approached York they dispersed. One body stayed to try and hold the castle, whilst the Northumbrians went back beyond the Tyne, and the Danes to their fleet. It was thought that the Danes had taken a bribe. At any rate, they did no more fighting. While William was thus up North certain districts in the South broke out. The Cornish men tried to take the stronghold of Exeter; Shrewsbury was seized by insurgents and its castle besieged. There was fighting in Somerset and Stafford. William swerved back to the Midlands, imposed himself at Stafford, and came back North again after a delay at Pontefract due to the flooded river. He took and held York.

It was late in the year, and perhaps the North Country people thought that that business was over, but William had formed a terrible resolution. His main motive may have been to make further Danish invasion impossible, but he also wanted to impose terror lest he should lose the Crown which he had tried and failed to make popular by his early policy.

William ravages the North.—He kept his Christmas solemnly at York, and then in the worst of the

winter marched north by the eastern road, then back again south by the hills, and completely laid waste the country through which he passed.

Early days of 1070.—It is not easy to estimate from the land-records of a later day—17 years later–exactly what happened, and there have been modern attempts to belittle the tremendous chastisement. But the effect on contemporaries is clear, and it is better to believe them than to trust to modern guesswork. In mere deaths of men, women, and children flying from before the army and caught in the winter weather, there was an estimate of 100,000. Those who could have talked to eye-witnesses tell us that for nine years the land went out of cultivation, at least on the main line of march from York to Durham; for they, in their own time, more than a lifetime later, could still see the ruins on all sides. The desolation ran as far north as the Tyne.

His victory achieved at Chester (March, 1070).—William's victory over the rebels in the North was gained by the very large mercenary army which he had levied. It was due, therefore, to a superiority in revenue as well as to an inflexible will; and he led the same mercenary army, while it was still bitter winter weather, across the Pennines to Chester to confirm his grip upon the West. They half mutinied, but he still carried on.

William, for all his complete military success and ruthlessness, kept to his settled plan of ultimate conciliation. He received back into favour the very leaders who had begun the great northern revolt. He married his niece to the native noble who had defended York against him, Waltheof. He gave the command

of the Scottish border again to Cospatric who had revolted; he dealt in the same way with the Welsh border rebel, Edric of the Woods, "Silvaticus," "*le sauvage*," who is called in our modern histories, Edric the Wild. He ended the adventure by going south to Salisbury and there disbanding the army.

It was by this time the spring of 1070; the famous march through the snow with his half-mutinous army to Chester had been carried out in March. From that spring the Conquest of England dates. He had had no desire to undertake it; things had gone against his wishes. Finding will pitted against will, the violence of his own will flamed up and he imposed himself by terror. Having done so, it was inevitable that his future policy should turn more and more upon putting men of his own choice, and largely men from his own Duchy, into the great positions of the State. It was that which began the transformation of English society, and created, somewhat later, a state of affairs in which it looked as though French would gradually become the national tongue. It also sowed a seed which sprouted, not in William's time as yet, but before the end of the century, in his son's time: I mean the seed of an idea—the Anglo-French State: that policy which seems so strange now, which seemed so natural then, and which dreamt of combining all the nobility of the French-speaking West under one Crown.

That dream would, had it been realized, have changed the history of the world. It failed. There came in its place, hundreds of years later, a special antagonism between the two powers on which have turned the fortunes of Western Europe during more than 200 years of modern history.

There was one more bit of local fighting, hardly worthy of the name of rebellion (save for the adhesion of Morcar), but famous because it was picturesque, was enshrined in local verse, and has been the subject of modern romance.

Episode of Hereward.—There was at this time an adventurer, exiled long before the Conquest, a small Lincolnshire gentleman called Hereward. His father's land seems to have been (possibly) one of those estates forfeited, and passing to a Norman. He is said to have come back from exile, raised the freemen of his district, and driven the new man out. That exploit collected a band for him.

All this was before 1069. During that rebellion, Hereward had helped the Danes to sack Peterborough and burnt the Abbey. The matter was not at first treated by William as of anything but local importance. But Morcar and one or two of the original rebels joined the stockade which Hereward set up on the Isle of Ely in 1071, and the king went out to reduce it. It was finely defended, but its defence could have no permanent military effect. It could only have one end, and was on no scale worth remarking. After a first failure, a second causeway was thrown through the shallow water of the marshes for 2 miles, deeper channels were bridged. There was no need to storm the paling: as the causeway cut across to the patch of dry land Hereward fled and his followers surrendered.

Malcolm of Scotland does homage, 1072.—That was over before the end of 1071. There was only one thing now left to do, and that was to make certain of the northern border. Malcolm of Scotland (who had perpetually been aiding the rebels, and receiving exiles

in his northern kingdom) had to be dealt with. He had already married Edgar the Ætheling's sister, Margaret—the Saint Margaret of Scottish history—but he had perpetually raided into England. In 1072 William went right up north to the Tay itself with a great force: demanded and obtained feudal homage from Malcolm.

It was not the first connection between the northern mountains and the English Crown, it was not the first public affirmation of unity in the island—that old Roman unity of Britain which men have not quite forgotten—(though Rome had never permanently held the Scottish Highlands), but it was the first *definite feudal bond* established between the English Crown as Overlord and the Scottish as Vassal, and it was fixed just at the moment when feudal custom had crystallized into unquestioned public law. Hence the claim of one English monarch after another to the suzerainty of Scotland. How that claim was perpetually affirmed, frequently accepted, and always ultimately repudiated by force of arms, is the whole story of English and Scottish relations during the Middle Ages. It was always there, even after the worst English failures, ready to be revived, and just when it seemed to have been forgotten at last, in the full new life of the Renaissance, just when the two nations seemed to have become quite separate entities with contradictory alliances and divergent paths, more than four and a half centuries after William's achievement—the turn of the tide towards unity began again with the unexpected accident of Flodden. The Reformation made the issue certain.

Norman effect in Scotland.—Malcolm's marriage to St. Margaret, William's expedition as far as Aber-

nethy, and Malcolm's surrender there and feudal oath to William as overlord, were political events that marked a great social change among the Scots.

Their own society was now increasingly stamped with the French culture. The proportion of French speech was always much less than in England, but it affected the greater lords. Feudal ideas were admitted, not only in the homage due to William, but in the relations of the higher nobility with their king. It was the Gaelic-speaking mountaineers from whom the beginnings of the separate nationhood had come. Malcolm Canmore, who thus began a national dynasty, was a chief of theirs. They retained their old British speech, and were the nucleus of the kingdom that was already launched. A Highland people and a Highland dynasty began the preponderance of the lowlands north of the Border: but that preponderance was due, not to the racial character of the Angle-speaking peasantry of South-east Scotland (all the south-west still spoke Gaelic), but to the flooding in of the universal French usages from England near by. The cultural centre of gravity shifted south under Malcolm Canmore.

He, and especially his wife, St. Margaret, also brought the Scottish Church into line with the rest of civilization. It took a hundred years. There was, of course, no discussion of doctrine: the Mass, the Sacraments, the whole body of dogma, was the same before and after the reform. The new policy affected only what may be called the politics of religion: but it was fundamental. It meant an organized hierarchy, a common knowledge of Europe, and a strict bond with the universal Church. This entry of Scotland, ecclesiastical and lay, into the life of the European Middle

Ages may be called the last example of William's great personal effect upon the West.

Politically, William was now secure in his possession. He was at the term of the full vigour of his life —some 45 years of age (he had won Hastings at a little under 40). He had been supported throughout such a career by a singularly fortunate marriage, to which he was devoted and completely faithful. It is, I think, Matilda of Flanders who best explains that creative and successful life of his, its enormous accomplishment. We must see him at this summit of his time a man short, rather bald, round headed, clean shaven, very vigorous, perpetually in the saddle; of strong judgment but temper almost as strong, with long purpose, and tenacious will and the appetite for order of his race. There is much that is Roman about him.

His religion was very firm. He shrank, though fully of his time in the cruelty of his punishments, from taking any human life by process of law, or indeed anywhere save in battle. He expiated the irregularity of his marriage by the building of those two mighty shrines at Caen. He was devout all his life long to God and the Mother of God. He stands, at the fountain-head of English history renewed and at the gate of the Middle Ages, a presence more distinct, more single, more impressive than any of the great line of his successors which ended at Bosworth. He was the original of them all.

He had fifteen more years to live (Malcolm's surrender dates from 1072); but those fifteen years were no more than the consolidation of his power. They saw the last heir of the Wessex line, poor Edgar, after further adventures, suing for a final reception in Nor-

mandy, obtaining an excellent income and permanent lodging at Court; and at last, but after William's death, taking part in the First Crusade. They saw unrest and even rebellion among certain of his own Norman Barons in England during his absence abroad (in 1075)—a rebellion which Waltheof joined, and through which he lost his life. They saw a commotion (in 1076) at Durham, easy to suppress. They saw, at the very end of his life, the rebellion for a moment of his eldest son in Normandy, and even a personal conflict between them; but soon a reconciliation. They saw a successful expedition into Wales, and a quarrel between him and his powerful brother Odo.

But there is nothing in the further political events of the Conqueror's reign which largely affects the history of England. One may say that Malcolm's swearing fealty was the last big thing. But two matters not exactly political stand out as of especial moment, to the understanding of the time and its future.

First, the ecclesiastical policy of William; secondly, the Great Survey, which was completed just before his death, and from which, in spite of its obscurities, we learn so much of the time.

Ecclesiastical policy of the Conqueror.—I will describe these two things, tell of the great soldier's death, and conclude by some view of what his victory had made of England; of the essential change in English affairs produced by the Conquest, and the character of the still divided society, which was thus launched upon its great career through the Middle Ages.

In the matter of William's dealings with the Church, we must always remember that his accession corresponded to the moment when the new religious energies

of which Cluny monastery had been the source were beginning to bear fruit. The invasion of the Church, old freedom by local feudal powers, the slackness of discipline (notably in the marriage and concubinage of the secular clergy), were diseases due to the rising of innumerable local hereditary rulers, to the weakness of central rule, and to the consequent isolation and corruption of separate districts. The new movement which brought back to bodily life the primal, indefeasible, but now blurred idea of a strict Christian unity, was nearing its height in the decade 1060–70, but had not yet reached it.

This Reform, this Resurrection, universal to Christendom, and forever to be associated with the great name of St. Gregory VII (Hildebrand), is by far the most important motive of all that followed Hastings in English ecclesiastical life.

But there was a local political side as well to William's actions. The result of that drastic conquest which William had not first intended, had the effect of transforming the *personnel* of the hierarchy, and in time of the principal abbacies as well, not only into a body of men generally associated with the new movement in Christendom, but into a body particularly associated with Normandy and with William himself. Posts passed mainly into the hands of French-speaking magnates, for the most part connected with William's own Duchy in one way or another.

It must not be imagined that William in this was pursuing a deliberate policy of plantation. In the first place, the ecclesiastical provinces of that day had no pronounced national tint. The bulk of the hierarchy in the XIth century were, in North France, north-

ern Frenchmen; in German-speaking countries, German-speaking—and so on. But it was not a principle. Exceptions, even on a large scale, did not shock opinion in any way. Nations in the modern sense did not exist; the Church was universal; and if the regions of the Church tended to be somewhat regional, that was due to the direct necessities of the situation. The parish priests would naturally be of the same race and language as their parishioners, and they had to be in touch with their bishops; the rulers of the various districts, England, Normandy, Flanders, naturally chose for succession to a bishopric men under their own political command. There was no preponderating feeling on the subject. Godwin's faction, for instance, at the height of his quarrel with Edward the Confessor's Norman connections, put French-speaking bishops from Lorraine into English Sees. The expulsion of the Norman Archbishop of Canterbury, William of Jumièges, had not been the expulsion of a foreigner, but of a member of an opposing political faction.

Nevertheless, it is true that the bishoprics of Anglo-Saxon-speaking Britain had been for centuries filled in a very homogeneous way with natives, that the country was separated by the sea from the rest of Western Christendom, that even in the height of Charlemagne's power it could not be regarded directly as part of his universal dominion, that it was harassed by a perpetual raiding: all these things contributed to separate that unit. Therefore when the Anglo-Saxon-speaking and native-born bishops were, after 1070, repeatedly replaced by men French-speaking and born on the Continent, the ultimate effect of the change was great, and it was a powerful cause of that transition from the pre-

Conquest state of affairs to the early mediæval state of affairs when England was not only governed by a French-speaking upper class, but when French rapidly extended lower and lower throughout the population, and when England felt herself to be intimately part of Western civilization, and in particular closely bound up with Northern France: so much so that the ideal of a common realm persisted for 300 years, and that the attempt to unite the French and English crowns was, as I have said, made over and over again.

William had been moved in great degree, no doubt, by the recent heavy fighting and the necessity of actual conquest (of which the year 1069 had been the crisis), to fill bishoprics with men whom he could understand and who were of his own kind, but it was also and perhaps more a necessity of the moment. All that fighting had led to considerable confiscation, to larger garrisons, to the distribution of local government into the hands of French-speaking men from overseas. The feudal higher society in England was in 1070 by way of becoming French, and the bishops would have been an anomaly in that society if they had not been French-speaking also. We must also remember in reading of a bishopric during the early Middle Ages—one may say, pretty well up to the Black Death—that it was not only a spiritual function, but a very important political and economic function as well. The English bishops—especially in the earlier Middle Ages—were great feudal lords, controlling vast feudal incomes and land-areas: in some cases (Durham, in England, for instance) they were the civil as well as the ecclesiastical governors of the whole district. When you gave a man a bishopric you did not only give him a province

of ecclesiastical administration; you made him a great lord, with large revenues at his command, and therefore the power of opposition and rebellion. You made him one of that small company of feudal magnates which then dominated all society.

Lastly (and I think the most important point), the Church in England had become in some considerable degree isolated before the Conquest. Although the period was the height of the great Cluniac revival and reform throughout Europe, there was, as it were, a different level in culture, and especially in ecclesiastical culture, between the Continent and England prior to Hastings. That battle broke down the barrier, and it was inevitable that the flood should pour in.

Already, in the year after his victory, the See of Dorchester having fallen vacant through death, William appointed to it Rémi of Fécamp; three years later, in 1070, came the chief step: the appointment to Canterbury of Lanfranc.

The English Dioceses had tended, in the ceaseless confusion of Scandinavian invasion, to get out of touch with the mass of Christendom: a great man like St. Dunstan would bring them into line again, a local rebellion or civil commotion would reintroduce licence. Edward the Confessor had done well, nominating men of higher continental culture to not a few Sees—an act consonant with the new European tone of the Court—though Godwin's rebellion partly reintroduced the servants of his clique and undid much of the advantage gained.

Again, there remained some relics of an old half-barbaric state of affairs in which many a bishopric was rather that of a district than of a city in the true

Roman tradition. Hence insignificant villages for Sees (like Elmham for East Anglia, Selsea for Sussex, and Dorchester[1] for the Midlands).

The New Hierarchy.—All this insufficiency William ended. And for that purpose William had asked the Pope to send over legates. There came three, including a Swiss Bishop who had already come with the same duties in Edward's time, by name Ermenfrid. They held councils, and Stigand was deposed. His position had already been irregular, for Godwin's faction had nominated him after ousting the canonical Archbishop of Canterbury, and he also uncanonically held two Sees at once, Winchester as well as Canterbury. Pluralism was not yet the admitted abuse which it became later, when it formed one of the subsidiary causes of the Reformation upheaval. The Bishop of Worcester, Wulfstan, was spared. He was a man very famous throughout the European Church, respected for his holiness, strict in the government of his See, at a time when most of the English dioceses were slack. But even he was thought by his contemporaries to owe his immunity less to his great European reputation than to the friendship of Ermenfrid, who had stopped with him when he came to England last, years before.

The great Lanfranc.—Much the greatest name in the new hierarchy was that of the new Archbishop Lanfranc. He was a Lombard Italian from Pavia. He had taught law there, come up North, and had lived in Normandy for the better part of his life. He was already advanced in years, certainly well over 50

[1] Dorchester was probably still a town when made a Bishopric in the VIIth century. The Roman road which here crosses the Thames either still had, or till recently had had, its bridge in use.

and perhaps over 60 years of age. It was nearly 30 years since he had given up his public position in Normandy to take religion in the then unimportant Abbey of Bec. But his Abbot made him continue teaching. Twenty years later, two or three years before Hastings, William had put him at the head of the great Abbey he had just founded at Caen, the Abbey of St. Stephen. And now, in 1070, he was translated, rather against his will, to Canterbury itself.

He was the most illustrious of all the clergymen in the North. He had been the orthodox protagonist in that first great quarrel upon the Real Presence in the Sacrament which Berengarius had raised in Northern Gaul. He was doctrinally in the full tide of that Hildebrandine movement which was restoring the Church throughout the West. He was also heart and soul with it as to the restoration to discipline—for instance, in its insistence on celibacy in priests, in its reform of other abuses, and particularly of every kind of feudal abuse. But it is not so certain that he either understood or sympathized with the increase of centralization in the government of the Church. He was much less pronounced than Anselm in that matter. He was at least as much attached to his feudal superior and friend and protector William as, in a political sense, to the Holy See. And I think one ought to ascribe it to Lanfranc, as much as to any other cause, that during the remainder of William's life the full Hildebrandine programme was not carried out in England. William had made it clear that no Papal bull could enter the island without his leave; nor even of two Papal claimants one rather than the other be recognized by the English clergy without his leave. It was a policy

which in William's position of absolute control could be carried into effect and not left theoretic. Gregory VII wrote to Lanfranc in a tone of complaint more than once. Lanfranc makes no direct opposition, but one can trace a tone of fencing in his reply. At any rate, he will not set himself against the civil power.

Influence of Lanfranc.—All this must be remembered in order to understand the very great influence Lanfranc exercised, not only to the right as an ecclesiastic of the new Reform, but to the left as a statesman upon whom the new dynasty of England could repose.

Lanfranc also set the example for that material revolution, the rebuilding of the great churches, which is one of the principal marks of the change in England following upon Hastings. He rebuilt Canterbury. He did not raise, of course, the magnificent cathedral which we see to-day, but his work still stands in the foundations of it and up to a certain height of the walls.

To the end of the reign, that is, for 17 years, this great man had an influence in the State second only to his king's, and, as we shall see, it was he who determined the succession.

After the bishoprics, the great abbacies came to be filled up in the same way, and after them the lower abbacies in their turn. Part of this movement had begun before the changes in the bishoprics. For instance, Peterborough had gone to Turold at the end of 1069 by the death of the old Abbot Brand (perhaps Hereward's uncle). But the principal changes came after 1070, as might be expected. But here also it was not a putting in of new *nationals*, but of men within William's personal experience. For instance, the very

great monastery of Croyland was dispossessed of its native abbot and given to another Englishman—Ingulph—but that other Englishman had been a follower of William's for many years. William had found him at Edward the Confessor's court, and taken him as secretary; and after long pilgrimages and the taking of religion in a Norman monastery, he found himself thus at the head of the great English foundation. He had strong native sympathies, but he must by this time have been a man who spoke French habitually and on all official occasions.

Further political action in the Church[1] there was none while William reigned. His strength, the support of Lanfranc, the comparative earliness of the date—all these things made a marking of time. The quarrel of Investitures broke out upon the Continent, and especially between the Papacy and the Empire. It was the touchstone of the Hildebrandian movement. It was the chief point in the revival of the ancient claim of the hierarchy of the Church to form an independent society governing itself apart from the civil power: the point that a bishop should be *Invested* with his effective powers in a state, not by the civil government but by the ecclesiastical. It was not allowed while William lived to affect this country. William named his bishops at his own discretion, gave them the ring and the crozier, that is, the symbols not only of their tem-

[1] Within the clerical body, apart from its relations with the Church, the Cluniac Reform insisted on defining, making universal, and of constant practice the old ideal of *celibacy* for the ordained priest. St. Gregory VII's councils, immediately on his accession (1073), insisted on it, and Lanfranc and the Hierarchy of England were, of course, in line. At Winchester (in 1078) all clerical marriages were forbidden for the future, priests who happened to be married being exempted from dismissing their wives.

poral and feudal tenures but also of their *spiritual* office.

The two British provinces of the Western Church[1] stood thus in a somewhat anomalous but peaceful position till William's death. It is not without interest to speculate what would have happened if St. Gregory VII had challenged the Conqueror on the point of investitures. He did not do so. He even made a special temporary exception, giving privilege to the Conqueror to appoint the higher clergy. He let the thing bide its time. But his successor pressed it upon the Conqueror's son.

There was one reform in connection with the Church which should be noted. The bishop's jurisdiction was separated from the civil jurisdiction of the shire. The Church courts were made independent of, and distinct from, the king's courts. That again was, as it were, a necessity of the moment. It was not a foreign innovation upsetting an English custom. It was a modern thing catching up a more primitive. The bishop had sat in the county court to try ecclesiastical cases side by side with the sheriff in Anglo-Saxon England; but then, so had he done in Normandy. Men living at the moment of Hastings could still remember the time when the Archbishop of Rouen sat side by side with the Duke's official in the local court. What had caused the separation, somewhat before the Conquest, upon the Continent, was the growing complexity of social life and the increasing insistence upon the independence and autonomy of the Church through the Cluniac reform. There was nothing foreign in the in-

[1] The old vague and unsettled dispute between York and Canterbury was settled at this time to the advantage of the latter by Papal decree.

troduction by William of this rule in England. The wonder rather was that, even in the slack anarchic period of Danes and half Danes before the Conquest, the change should not already have been introduced.

The Domesday Survey.—I have said that next to the change in the Church the outstanding thing of the remainder of the reign was the great fiscal survey which came later to be called Domesday.

It was the Christmas of 1085: the king summoned a *Concilium* at Gloucester, and there ordered a piece of work which has proved of the utmost value to history. The passion for organization and symmetrical law which characterizes the French—and particularly the Normans—was in evidence in all the latter had accomplished at home in Normandy. It was now to be exemplified here, in England.

The decision was taken to make a complete survey of the king's income, to check it at its sources, to make certain that the assessments upon which it was levied were adequate, and to establish a record with which future modifications might be compared.

We must not think of the king's income at this date as a national revenue. We are only just emerging into the Middle, out of the Dark, Ages. Things are still personal and domestic. The ruling idea of that generation, and of many a succeeding one, was that the king, though supreme over the community, and in a sense personifying the community, was yet an individual with great revenues of his own, out of which he must undertake whatever expenses his duties involved. The king, as a rich man, was but the head of a feudal hierarchy, and normally any addition to

this quasi-private income of his could only be a feudal *aide*, as the French word went; that is, in modern English, a "help": something exceptional and particular to a particular occasion. Under feudal ideas the king, like any other great noble, had a right to expect such boons from those who owed him personal loyalty by tenure of land under him, and three classic occasions are always quoted: the ransom of his body, the marriage of his eldest daughter, the knighting of his eldest son. But of course further *aides* came to be more and more frequently asked for as the civilization of the Middle Ages developed, because the expenses of the king increased with the higher organization of the State, and were soon greater than his old customary income could meet—especially when he had to levy a foreign war on any considerable scale.

But the idea that everything beyond the king's customary income was a free gift from his dependents which they could discuss, limit, and even, theoretically, refuse, remained right on to modern times, that is, to the XVIth century. It was of this tradition in its last lingering form that the squires and big merchants, newly enriched out of Church spoil, took advantage when they gradually substituted aristocratic for monarchic government, between the advent of the Cecils to power in 1558 and the beheading of Charles I in 1649.

It was this theory (of moneys other than feudal income being a "grant" to the king), twisted out of all recognition, which gave the Parliamentarians of the early XVIIth century a technical claim to refuse revenue at will, and thus to assume practical control of government; nor was it till the XIXth century that the

old Roman system fully returned: I mean the practice under which we all now live that a tax is imposed by authority at any arbitrary rate authority may choose, and is to be exacted from the payer without troubling whether he care to pay or no.

Now what was in feudal times the king's customary income?

All over Christendom the head of any feudal system had four sources of income, apart from occasional *auxilia* or *aides*, to wit: (1) private manorial income; (2) feudal dues; (3) forensic revenue; and (4) moneys from forests, towns, Jews—units outside the feudal system.

(1) He had the profits off his land (using the word "his" in the sense given on an earlier page, that is, the manors of which he was private lord).

(2) He had the customary receipts from economic units outside, and anomalous to, the feudal agricultural manorial system (the forests, the towns not under an abbot, bishop, or noble), and the Jews. He had the customary dues payable to him by his *Tenantes in Capite*, "Tenanz à chef" (of which the later English translation is "Tenants in Chief"), that is, those whose land was directly dependent upon the king's overlordship. For instance, if the king had in a particular district a manor of 5000 acres of arable, pasture and wood with 1000 acres in demesne, the 1000 acres he administered directly. He had a bailiff over it; a fixed number of serfs had by fixed custom to work so many days a year upon that land (leaving on those days their own work on their own land to be looked after by their and others' families). Within the agricultural year this labour had produced so much wheat, honey, cheese, butter, etc., which, whether directly consumed or sold,

formed an item of the king's income. On the remaining 4000, which was serf and freehold land, he had dues. Suppose, next door to this manor there were manors making up 15,000 acres held of the king as to 10,000 by one Roger of Meaux, and as to the other 5,000 by Henry of Selham; then, though the 10,000 and the 5000 acres were the lordships of Roger and of Henry respectively—though, that is, in the sense described above, these parcels were "their" land, yet they owed customary dues to the king as their lord: and the most important of these customary dues consisted in a death duty on the passage of the land by inheritance, which death duty was at the rate of about 5 per cent (to put it in modern terms), or one year's income.

(3) He had the fines and payments made into his courts of law.

(4) He had the customary dues from those who lived on his forests (and the produce of such forests), from his towns, from the Jewry.

To these four main sources of feudal income enjoyed by the head of the feudal hierarchy in every Christian community, the King of England added an exceptional fifth source peculiar to this country: the old Danegeld.

In course of time this tax, which had fallen nominally upon every freeholder of land, had (as such things always do) become both distorted and fossilized. There were all sorts of exceptions: privileged land that paid nothing or paid much less than the average, and so forth.

After the convulsion of the Conquest, it was important to know exactly how things stood, and further,

after the ill-regulated feudalism of the Danish struggle, it was of first-rate importance to get a proper survey and set an organization at work.

It was with this object that the great inquiry was determined.

Legati were sent out to each county, and these held inquiries with regard to each hundred—for the hundred was still and for long after a living administrative unity.[1] The new machinery introduced for this inquiry was of great consequence to English history, for it imported the principle of the Jury (the "batch of sworn men"), which had appeared long before under the kings of France of the Dark Ages, which the Normans were therefore familiar with and which they now brought into England. The king's *Legati* summoned the priests, the headman, and six villagers from each village, and upon their *sworn* testimony established a record of how much arable land there was, how much pasture, how much wood, and (much more important than anything else) *how the land was held:* so many "villein" units, so many "cottar," etc., etc.

Of these inquisitions, a certain number taken in the County of Cambridge have luckily been preserved. The rest appear to have perished.

When the *Legati* had finished their work (not without friction) in the year 1086, hundred by hundred, the results were rearranged under the heads of tenants-in-chief, that is, as we have seen, men or corporations holding directly of the king; the object being, of course, to have a ready method of ascertaining what feudal dues each of the tenants-in-chief ought to pay to the

[1] The origin of the Hundred, an institution already at least a century old in England and much older in Gaul, I describe on p. 149–50.

king's income, and what amount of arable land lay subject to Danegeld.

Unfortunately, we have to-day only a most imperfect knowledge of the meaning of the terms which we find in this great Register drawn up in the year 1086. We do not even know what is meant by the term of principal use in the matter, *valet*, that is, "is worth." We read of every place out of many thousand places mentioned (just under twenty thousand) that it was "worth" so much in the time of King Edward, and now, twenty years later, was "worth" so much more or less; but nobody is really quite sure what that word "worth" means: whether it means the full manorial surplus value, or some conventional value, or what. In the same way, we do not know why some things are mentioned and others not, except upon the general principle that the only thing the inquiry is concerned with is the king's income.

For instance, we know that nothing like all the people in England are mentioned under the various headings of "free men" and "villeins" and "slaves" and "borderers" and "cottagers" and the rest of it. But we do not know upon what principle some are mentioned and some are left out.

We further know that these numbers refer to units of assessment, not to real people; but what exactly the relation was between the two we cannot tell.

It is somewhat as though scholars a thousand years hence, when the whole economic structure of society had changed, should come across the one surviving inventory of a modern millionaire's sources of income. They would not be certain what was meant by the word "share," and doubtful, perhaps, as to whether

it were not equivalent to the word "profits"; or, again, whether the "value" of a share meant its par value or its value at the moment in the market.

We may imagine what a mess future commentators, thus doubtful of the simplest terms, would make of their calculations, and indeed Domesday has led to a welter of contradictory—and often impossible—estimates. There are scores of elaborate and detailed studies on it, each more confused than the last. But the document is none the less a very useful piece of evidence from which *some* general information can be gained, and within rough limits, on one or two matters essential to history.

When the inquisition was finished and the results rearranged, the whole was written down, probably in full form with several copies, and in abbreviated form as well. By a most fortunate accident two such documents have been preserved to our own time, and have been popularly called, from at least as early as a century after the inquisition, Domesday Book. It consists in two very different parts; a detailed list of the three Eastern Counties, a more summary list of the rest of England to the extent of thirty-one counties, making in all thirty-four (no mention of London or Winchester and certain other towns). Rutland was not then a county, Durham and Northumberland are left out, so are Cumberland and Westmorland, which were not under direct rule. The manuscripts thus remaining to us under this famous title are probably contemporary, that is, dating from 1087; but even if they are a little later they are certainly nearly contemporary, and, as I have said, in spite of our ignorance and the necessity of doubtful guesswork upon

most of what they have to tell us, in some things they do give us positive information. They give us an *inferior limit* for the size of towns (not *less* than so many separate divisions which must *at least* have one house each and most of them probably more); they give us a *very rough* guide, but still a guide, to the proportion of the various classes of the population, free and unfree, and, most fortunately, we have the best information of all upon the amount of *arable land*. It forms the strongest of many converging proofs for our estimate of population at the time of the Conquest, and an estimate of population is the first necessary basis for the proper understanding of any part of history.

Population of England at the Conquest. More than 4, less than 6 millions.—What was the population of England within its present boundaries in the time of the Conqueror? Certainly more than four million, probably more than five; unlikely to be as much as six million, though it might even be that: hardly more in any case.

The usual estimate given is much less, and you may read in almost any one of a hundred textbooks, the conventionally repeated figure of two million or a little less; but that is a great error.

The proofs of so important a statement are necessary, and though they are more convincing in proportion to their detail, even the most general are sufficient.

That mediæval England should support some four to five million souls or rather more is *probable* from a number of considerations, each of which confirms the rest: the number of county towns, the armed levies, the revenue, the number of separate village communities, the comparison of its area with contemporary

continental areas on which modern scholarship has made estimates of population, and even (though this is but a vague guide) the number of its monastic institutions, bishoprics, and beneficed clergy. But the strongest—and indeed conclusive—proof lies in the amount of arable land. Allowing for omitted areas (arable in forests and in the unmentioned counties) and for all absented under the heading descriptive of "waste" (exempted), the ploughlands of 1086 would come to somewhat more than 100,000.

Now, what is a "ploughland"?

Though we cannot give an exact area (it may have varied with the soil), we can give one within rough limits. A Domesday ploughland was not more than 120, can only rarely have been less than 80 acres[1]—of which, as a rule, two-thirds would be under crop in any one year. We can check this in a number of ways, the best of which is a comparison with modern arable areas. Thus Sussex has to-day about 235 thousand arable acres—and about 3000 Domesday ploughlands (=78 acres to the ploughland).

We may take it, then, that Mediæval England had yearly certainly not less than 5½ but hardly more than 8 million acres under crop every year.

Now the methods of agriculture changed very little indeed during the period, and on into the XVIIth century. The great change did not come till the

[1] A *Hide* may originally have been 120 acres. The "Virgate" unit of ¼ (1 yoke out of 4 yokes to the plough team) was commonly 30 acres. The Scotch "plough gate," as cited by Professor Rait, was, even at the end of its survival, 104 acres. The actual cultivation done by one plough (with the narrower modern furrow) is from 40 to 60 acres—but we "cut" far more than the Middle Ages did, that is, replough. There are accurately worked out crop acreages per plough in a restricted district of the next century, and they give from less than 60 to over 80, to which add a third for fallow.

XVIIIth. We know that in the XVIIth century there was easily supported one soul to the cropped acre (and just before the repeal of the corn laws, *two*), and that is the least one could expect. We know what the Middle Ages sowed to the acre: of wheat, 2 bushels (we should rather sow 2½). We know from "Le Dite de husbonderie" that a surplus of thrice the sowing, after gleaning, trodden corn, reserve for seed, and tailings had been allowed for, meant disastrous loss, and from the "Ceo est Hosebonderie," that *fivefold* was the "customary," i.e. an inferior limit. We also have late Norman statistics showing that the difference between the harvest per hectare under the immemorial traditions of that province and the modern methods which revolutionized them somewhat later than English agriculture was revolutionized, is almost exactly 50 per cent. Now if we compare all these pieces of evidence, they all support each other. Unless Mediæval England—which did not export food—amused itself by working hard to produce a large surplus, which it then threw away, Mediæval England fed at least five million souls; nor is there anything startling or unlikely about these figures, as there sometimes is about equally definitely known facts of remote history (e.g. Harold's forced march on Hastings: 58 miles in 48 hours)

How then did the absurdly insufficient estimate of only *two* million (or less) arise?

Simply by the error of taking the Domesday we have for a census, whereas it is nothing of the sort, but a *fiscal* inquiry, naming, not all persons, but a certain set of economic units. The number of those units, free tenures, noble tenures, servile tenures, and of town tenures, allowing for omitted counties and places, is

about 300,000. Call them heads of families (which they are not) instead of tenures (which they are), say that *all* are included (which is certainly not the case),[1] allow a generous six to the household, and you get 1,800,000. That is how the thing is done—and the official historian ought to be ashamed of it. But the fixed idea for "progress" and the mania for desiring everything in the past to be less than what succeeded it, will account for almost any folly.

The truth is that an agricultural England will support at least five to six millions of people, and that, allowing for passing drops in the average from famines, plagues, and exceptionally severe wars, it is not generally to be regarded as having a population much smaller than that in historic times.

. . . . . .

Death of William, September 9th, 1087.—The Conqueror's death came in connection with that standing quarrel between the Duchy and its Paris overlord and king, which colours all our history for seven reigns.

William, raiding the Vexin in the summer of 1087 (July), burnt Mantes. During the sack his mount stumbled: its rider, unwieldily fat, was thrown violently against the pommel of the saddle and badly injured.

[1] I could fill 50 pages with examples—let these suffice. In all Sussex Domesday gives how many Priests? *Three*—and no more! In all Shropshire there are 92 mills. And how many millers? *One;* of widows exactly *two*. In Bosham 8 mills—and no miller at all! In Shrewsbury city there are "252 houses and as many Burgesses paying gold." Then you learn something more: "193 Burgesses *not* paying gold." And nothing about the people who weren't burgesses. So on by dozens and hundreds of examples. How anyone can have taken Domesday Book for a census in the face of its entries is difficult to understand. One might as well take Bradshaw's railway guide for a complete gazetteer of Britain.

He went back to Rouen to linger a few weeks and to die.

He showed no reluctance to be gone. His wife, to whom his whole life had been devoted from his nineteenth year, was long dead. His faith was secure, and the rebellion of his eldest son had permanently saddened his mind. He dictated with a firm mind, upon his death-bed, the disposition of his inheritance, desiring his favourite (and filial) second son, William, to succeed to England. He may have expressed some contrition, perhaps for the violent seizure of that crown, perhaps for his ruthlessness in the suppression of rebellion. He recommended himself fervently to the Mother of God, that She should intercede for him with her Son, was shriven, communicated, and died.

It was the 9th of September, and he was either ending, or had just ended, his sixtieth year.

(B) William II (Rufus)

(From the Conqueror's death, September 9th, 1087, to his own, August 2nd, 1100—Nearly 13 years)

In the first generations of the Middle Ages—while the simplicity of their predecessors still lingered—the personality of a ruler was supreme. It is therefore important to grasp the appearance and temper of William's second son.

The Conqueror's inheritance.—To Robert, the eldest, had been left Normandy to rule. He had been solemnly invested with the Duchy as long before as the year of Hastings: but that was to ensure succession, not to give immediate rule. The young man wanted the revenues and power. His father had withheld

them, and there had been a ceaseless quarrel from 1074 till the Conqueror's death. But Robert was left the Duchy. Henry, the youngest, was given the large fortune of 5000 pounds weight of silver—a purchasing value of nearly £200,000 of our money, with a social value, then, of more like a million now. But no "appanage": no revenue from or rule over a portion of land, other than private manors and town taxes of his own. To William was apportioned England. It is characteristic of that early date, before the mediæval civilization had crystallized, that this separation of William's dominions should seem natural. The force of things undid it. There was a perpetual tendency to re-union, as we shall see in the younger William's own reign, but it is noteworthy that personal, domestic ideas still so much outweighed the idea of the State that the separate endowment of sons should seem more important than the maintenance of one dominion.

It is William, then, the second son, who occupies, after the Conqueror's death, the stage of Norman England. What was he in that autumn of 1087?

Character of William II.—In person we must see a young man not yet thirty, short, bull-necked, with the flaming congested face which gave him his nickname, "The Red," and strange diverse eyes.

In soul he was thoroughly, degradedly, unnaturally vicious, and rejoiced in the company of others almost as vicious and often baser than himself. Also, he was quick, determined and intelligent. Also, he was pious to his father's memory: putting up in Caen a splendid tomb (which 500 years later the Huguenots wantonly wrecked, scattering the bones as well). Also, he was

MAP V

THE CONQUEROR'S INHERITANCE

brave. Also, he was half atheist, with a strong vein of superstition: an inexplicable son for such a mother to have borne to such a father.

Of himself, apart from his critical position, he would attract—in contrast with the glorious sanctity of St. Anselm—the attention of those years.

But apart from that, in the Norman century, which founded Mediæval England, the reign of William Rufus —a period of thirteen years—makes a clear division. It does so from the king's remarkable (and repulsive) character; from the dates between which it falls; from its brevity; but most of all from its position in the religious history of Europe—for it coincided with the coming to England of the great quarrel of *Investiture*, and with that earthquake, the first Crusade, which was to transform our society.

In character William was exceptional in his family, unique in the line of English kings by his ardent mixture of vicious, degrading corruption and extreme promptitude, vigour and judgment. Men who unite effeminate perversion with military energy and brain are always strangely remarkable, and seem thereby more common than they are. They are very rare. The accident of finding such an one at the head of a great government is much rarer.

In the dates of his short power he further marks a distinct chapter, because they form the transition during which the men of the older time before Hastings were passing, and the tradition of that time weakening: it stood to the time before Hastings as the vastly increasing industrial America of the McKinley days stood to the Civil War, or as my generation in modern Europe stands to the memory of Papal Rome and the

second French Empire and the world before the Suez Canal. Men who were administrating and commanding in St. Edward's simple and confused England were grown old—many were dead—before this second William's reign ended.

But even if his life had been longer or his character less marked, his government would be chiefly important because it came at the moment when a novel resurrection of spiritual power was informing all Europe: the new vigour of that creative force which had stirred a generation before, and whose origin and first progress was coincident with his father's life: the spirit that made the Middle Ages.

. . . . . .

The thirteen years, then, are of one uninterrupted sort: but they have two sides, very distinct, which must be dealt with separately: the *political*, simple enough in that it is a steady accretion of power in William and of strength and organization in the new State; the *ecclesiastical*, which is almost all contained in the quarrel upon the Investiture.

The Political.—William had stood, at the death of his father, a doubtful claimant to the throne of England alone, and that only through the expression of the Conqueror's personal desire, because he was the eldest after Robert (and Robert had Normandy of right), and because Henry was too young. The Rufus, then, began with a *chance* of England only. He died the master of England, Normandy and Maine, and admitted overlord of Scotland. The achievement was due, in the main, to the nature of the time, with its fullness of a rising civilization throughout the West

and a consequent growth of political units: but its rapidity and thoroughness were the work of the king himself, his quick decision, his tenacity, and his tireless energy.

Lanfranc supports William Rufus.—The first step was due to Lanfranc, to whom the Conqueror had addressed a letter recommending Rufus' claim and given it to Rufus himself to present. The man was in Toucques[1] when messengers reached him with the news of his father's death. He crossed the Channel at once before his elder brother Robert had moved. The Archbishop received him and—a little doubtfully (for he had been his tutor and knew and suspected his nature)—supported him for his father's sake; but not till he had made him swear to govern by the laws. The great Council was summoned, Lanfranc lent in it to Rufus the strength of the hierarchy. William was elected and crowned. It was September the 26th. Only just over the fortnight since the Conqueror's death.

The first Feudal Rebellion, 1088.—This rather hazardous stroke was insular. The candidature of Rufus stood for a central rule in England and for the good of England being first considered by its government, not the good of Normandy. It stood for England as a separate thing—the very spirit of the Conqueror who had cherished a dual capacity: to be exceptionally independent in the island—challenging all political power beyond the Channel—and to make England one. The continuity of that idea was certainly in Lanfranc's mind, and the mass of the men who counted in England, old owners and new—the powerful organization of

[1] Opposite where Deauville now stands.

the Church behind them—supported it. But this sound statesmanship had two opponents, a person and an interest. The person was Odo of Bayeux, the military bishop, the Conqueror's half-brother: the interest was that of great nobles who expected greater local power (and therefore greater wealth) from a distant, continental government, who found it more convenient[1] to hold Norman and English estates under one head. Odo was a consistent enemy of Lanfranc and his pupil Rufus: of the great lords a minority would follow him in his support of Robert. They held their hand through the winter; with the opening of the season, at Easter, 1088, the Rebellion broke out. Odo held Pevensey castle to await Robert's landing, Eustace of Boulogne held Rochester; sundry of the magnates scattered throughout the country rose. But the governing sense and power were with Lanfranc and the king —and Robert was too slow. The local rebellions of the Bishop of Durham,[2] in his half-royal palatinate, of the Bigods in Norfolk, of Grantmesnel in Leicester, at Worcester, etc., did not or could not concentrate. The native English, freemen and smaller manorial lords, were summoned in large general levies, and appear to have responded with enthusiasm—for kingship

[1] And also cheaper. The feudal demands single instead of double. Thus a man holding in the Cotentin and in Devon would have had to pay feudal dues to William should he require ransome, and again to Robert in the same case. With Robert as sole lord he paid but once. The election of William separating England from Normandy lowered the value of all double tenures as compared with William the Conqueror's time.

[2] There are two accounts. One, that this Prelate (a Norman from Bayeux, a monk as his father had been from the Monastery of *St. Carilef*—to-day *St. Calais*) was got into trouble by others; the other, that he rose of his own initiative. He was certainly a man of great spiritual authority and learning —but hated as well as loved.

was always popular as against aristocracy in Catholic England. Pevensey was carried, Eustace of Boulogne, holding Rochester, was compelled to treat, Odo and certain with him were compelled to cross the Channel; others were reconciled. The estates of the exiles fell to the king, and the position of Rufus twelve months after his crowning, as the fighting season of 1088 closed, was assured.

William II aims at holding Normandy.—From that position he proceeded to undermine his brother's hold on Normandy, and gradually to make himself master there also.

Robert was not a weak man—none of the Conqueror's and Matilda's blood could be that; nor was he unworthy—but he was careless and soon indebted. It took two years for William to lay the foundations of his policy, four more to achieve it, and the whole depended upon a judicious use of money. The kingship of England had now attached to it a very large revenue. It owned directly more than a tenth, though less than a fifth, of the manors, all the forests (of course) and mines; it had a high proportion of the fees and tolls, and criminal fines, and it took direct feudal reliefs from the whole land, including the temporalities of the Church. It had the Danegeld still, and it could (and did) add irregularly to this by the sale of lucrative offices. The King of England had become the richest individual in Western Europe.

The suppressed rebellion proved what the new kingship was—the note of unparalleled personal control which was exceptional in that Europe of innumerable lordships; but it also betrayed the menace to that control: the revived claim of the Church throughout the

West to autonomy, independent of feudal provinces and realms and their rulers. The great struggle was not to come till Anselm's time, five years hence, but the first note was sounded now, in 1088. The rebel Chief Minister, the Bishop of Durham, summoned to trial for misfealty in Rufus' court at Salisbury (on All Souls' Day, 1088), pleaded privilege: "No layman can try a Bishop!" He denied the power of the king to depose a Bishop—even for rebellion; *he appealed to Rome*—and claimed the right to go thither overseas.

Lanfranc stood (hesitatingly) by the old feudal law of two hundred years' growth, and that Royal claim—strengthened by feudal overlordship—which was already being challenged by the hierarchy throughout the West. He maintained that the *lands* of Durham were held as a lay fief is held, and that its holder was subject (for these) as a mere baron to his lord. But William of St. Calais stood out for the ancient canonical rights. He would be tried only by Bishops as a Bishop—and he would appeal to Rome. They took his lands and let him go. He stopped short of Rome in Normandy, took service with Robert, and bided his time.

Death of Lanfranc, 1089.—On May 28th, 1089, Lanfranc died and the reign at once took on a new character: the character of a man violently energetic, repulsive—intelligent, indeed, and not despised, but abhorred.

At his right hand, his pimp perhaps, his extortioner certainly, now sat Ranulf Flambard, a man from Bayeux long at the Conqueror's court. He served all the wickedness of Rufus, but in particular he played upon his greed. He farmed the revenues of the Abbeys and Bishoprics kept vacant; he stretched to abnormal

uncustomary limits the levies of taxes on the freemen and nobles; he used the courts as a mint for fines and exactions. He filled a private treasury of his own, acting as receiver for the king, and he was willing to accept all hatred and ignominy for the wealth he made in the king's service. There is a remarkable parallel between Ranulf's function and the position of the money-lender Thomas Cromwell under Henry VIII, more than four centuries on.

While these abominations, private and public, were being thus let loose in England, William began his designs on Normandy.

Effort to seize Normandy, 1090.—It was in his Easter court of 1090 that he first proposed war against his brother. The episodes in his very gradual occupation of the Duchy are vividly illustrative of the time, for they show the uncertain, highly personal feudalism of the late Xth and XIth centuries, half-barbaric, but already merging into the beginnings of statesmanship. Two spirits, passion and cunning, here met in conflict: you have the brothers Henry, William and Robert, engaging in struggle and competition and renunciation almost as boys might in a game. You have none the less a certain long purpose at work: the Norman King desiring one realm of Normandy and England.

Character of Robert of Normandy.—Robert, the elder brother, had—save for his indolence—all the good qualities of the fighter. He had also the particular qualities of the *Knight*[1]—but lacked the one most

[1] The reader should be familiar with the ambiguity of this word "Knight," by which was translated late in the Middle Ages (when the English language was forming) the French term *Chevalier*. Because all nobles fought mounted,

essential for government. His great sin had been rebellion against his father. But his father had been harsh. He was exceptionally generous, brave, adventurous; of sufficient religion; healthy in mind and soul —but he lacked tenacity. Henry, the young man of twenty-three, had more purpose. He had purchased from Robert the lordship of the Cotentin, and was, though a vassal, a rival. It was with money also that William principally intervened. Normandy had no population alien to its lords on which its duke could rely for support against the great feudatories. It had no system of strong and special bond between the freeholders and lesser lords and the head of the Duchy. It had less scattering of family manors than that which the Conqueror had arranged in England: for in Normandy the manorial tenures had arisen naturally in the Dark Ages; in England most of them had been regranted—as to the higher lordships at least—in a few years and of set purpose, with ample opportunity

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and because most of the other mounted men were dependents of nobles, therefore did the idea of a mounted man suggest a noble, and, from that, an ideal which a nobleman—a manorial lord—should conform to. Hence "Chevalier" and "Chevalerie." It is in full use by the year 1000 or so. The Anglo-Saxon word "Cnihta," originally "a lad" then "a servant"—a "follower"—was used to translate "*Miles*." Later on—a century or so—it translates the word "Chevalier" and suggests the ideal above mentioned. Oddly enough, when the English language was finally formed (later XIVth century—1350–1400) the French word for a French-imported social idea was dropped (at a moment when such a vast number of French words for native things helped to make up the new tongue: e.g. "Host," for the general levy of freemen; "Judge" for Dooms-man) and the local dialect word, formerly of a different connection, took its place, and the "Chevalier" becomes a "Knight." Meanwhile, on a different line of development, the word expressed a legal, exact, defined, political, social and military unit: a fully armed mounted man to be furnished by every so-much of tenure accountable for each such unit. Thus even a Bishop would be accountable, on his lands or "temporalities," for so many "Knight's fees," the later translation of the old Latin term and the French.

for a deliberate policy of preventing (save in border districts, such as Durham, Cheshire and Shropshire) quasi-independent islands of feudal power. The great feudatories, the Barons, had each in Normandy his local sway and subjects. Those of the Picard border opened their castles to William's garrison for a bribe. That was the first step. Next he proposed (in 1091) alliance with Robert against Henry, marched into the Cotentin, stripped Henry of his lordship and himself held St. Michael's Mount and Cherbourg as his booty. Then—a fine piece of feudal simplicity!—the three brothers crossed over to England together in the late summer, and lived in amity awhile at the English court. An equally personal piece of simplicity at the same time had restored William of St. Calais to Durham: the palatine Bishopric which was a bulwark against the Scots' invasions.

One such invasion was checked in the autumn of the year 1091, and Malcolm, the King of Scots, swore fealty. The following year the border was secured by the occupation of Carlisle and the planting of a resident English garrison and serfs on its land. Malcolm next attempted (1093) a stroke against Northumberland, and was killed. The vicious reign of Rufus left England the important legacy of a formed frontier to the North.

The Ecclesiastical.—But on these domestic things a far greater European thing impended.

We have seen how the great quarrel of Investitures had left Britain on one side—in a backwater, as it were, unheeded, or hardly heeded, by the main tide. The active beneficence of the great clerical reform had indeed spread over all England in a flood with the new kingship of the Conqueror and the Norman organ-

ization, but the main issue was not joined in this country till a shock forced it to the front.

The pre-occupation of the whole Church was with the main struggle between the Popes and the German kings.

By one of those strange accidents which the Dark Ages bred, and the consequences of which the Middle Ages inherited as anomalies, was the transmission of the name, and of the vague, fantastic, but still awful tradition of "Emperor," *not* to such a man as might naturally have continued it on the soil and in the full traditions of the old Roman Empire in the West (a king of France or of England—or of Aragon or Castile), but to the King of Germany: the Latin term which had been given by the Romans to that frontier belt of the Empire (along the Lower Scheldt and Meuse, all the left bank of the Rhine and Upper Danube) where the people spoke Teutonic dialects. In the Dark Ages, Irish missionaries and armies mainly Gallic had brought into civilization a further belt beyond the Rhine—even as far as the Elbe. When Charlemagne revived for a moment the name and some memories of one actual empire in the West and assumed its chief title, he started a visionary institution which survived him the more tenaciously because it *was* visionary—with no body and therefore not to be killed.[1] His dominions fell into three inheritances: Western, Middle and Eastern. Two only survived, and, oddly enough, it was the Eastern, though it included the far less civil-

[1] The ghost gave up the ghost in 1809 when the then ruler of Austria at the bidding of his French revolutionary conquerors abandoned the title for ever. I am almost ashamed to repeat such a well-worn tag as Voltaire's, but its wit must excuse its triteness: "The Holy Roman Empire: not an Empire, not Roman, not Holy."

ized new strip beyond the Rhine, which became associated with the title "Emperor." A succession of German-speaking eastern sovereigns, who reposed, of course, upon the old Roman civilization of the Rhine valley, but some of whom sprang from the still half-barbarous North and East (Saxony as it was then called) had the title and tried with varying success to exercise the vague powers of "Emperor." It included a sort of suzerainty over Italian states and cities and French-speaking districts and Provençal as well—even as far as the Rhone and well beyond the Vosges: that was no more than a loose feudal bond, but the essential was that the visionary term "Emperor" stood side by side with the very real term "Pope." The man elected Emperor (theoretically anyone was eligible throughout Christendom, as to the Papacy) was not Emperor till the Pope had crowned him. But he, on his side, once crowned, claimed powers to order Christian society at large. These claims had no effect outside his feudal boundaries, and only varying effect (diminishing) beyond the Alps and the Vosges. *But they included direct interference with the Papacy:* its elections, its conduct. Hence a conflict, from the moment when Otto I captured the Papacy a little before the year 1000, onwards. The real thing was bound to destroy the make-believe. The Saxon Emperors had not kept the Papacy in bondage a lifetime when Hildebrand, the Tuscan, with all the momentum of the Cluniac tradition behind him, began to urge its freedom. By the time of Rufus it was half accomplished. For another century the struggle raged. In a century and a half it was decided, the victory of the Pope complete and the Emperor conquered.

The quarrel of the Investitures.—This conflict between Emperor and Pope was first engaged on the point of which had power to appoint to high clerical office—to Bishoprics and Abbacies. The fact that it was a German who was the Pope's principal opponent drew energy away from the West and the North. France remained full of unsettled abuses.[1] England, beyond, was better ordered through the new central kingship, but had not felt a draught of the swirl away from feudal control. The same power which gave order helped this immunity; the startling new power of the Norman kingship in England stunned, as it were, and halted even Rome. It was but a postponement. The clash was bound to come, and it came through the enormities of Rufus.

After he had thus befouled England with his vices and raised all moral opinion against him; after he had kept Canterbury vacant four years, in order to enjoy its revenues, a sudden and strange illness changed the course of his reign. It befell him in the West of England, at Alvestone near Gloucester in the Lent of 1093. His atheism forsook him under the strain. He attempted repentance. He would fill the See, and that, of course, with Anselm. There was no other.

Anselm was at this moment the greatest man in Europe: for it was a moment when revered saintliness of his sort stood as high in men's minds as does wealth to-day. He had been born sixty years before—in 1033—of small nobles under the Italian Alps, in the

[1] As late as 1079 an Archbishop of Narbonne, whose family had bought the See for him (from the lay power) while he was still a child (he reigned 63 years!), was selling manors out of it and buying another Bishopric (Urzel) for his brother.

French-speaking Vale of Aosta; his mother from beyond the hills. His childhood was full of grace not without quaintness, his early manhood of intelligence. It was he who began the renewal of Philosophy in Europe, and who reads him now? He will be read again soon.

He had gone northward. He had learnt at Avranches in Lanfranc's school. He had become, at thirty (just before the Conquest), Prior of Bec, at forty-five Abbot. He had visited Lanfranc at Canterbury, and was already marked then. The Conqueror had sent to him as he lay dying and he stood beside the grave at Caen into which they lowered his master.

Now he was called for the Archbishopric.

Accession of St. Anselm to the See of Canterbury, 1093.—The old man—he was old at sixty—could not bear the burden. It was forced upon him by public demand. *He accepted Investiture of the King.* He took —or had thrust into his hand—the Pastoral Staff, the symbol of his office, the gift of the king as Feudal Superior and Patron of the See, of its Barony in lands *and* of its spiritual powers. Before the end of the year—on December 4th—he was consecrated. And immediately the struggle between such a saint and such a court began. William felt to the marrow the peril in which lay that strange local absolutism he had inherited. The freedom of the Church, its restoration, was now in the air of Europe. It challenged the centralized island power of the Conqueror's son.

Yet it was not with him, but, after his death, with his brother Henry that the final issue was to be closed. In the half-dozen years that were left him to live, Rufus had only friction with the saint, grumbling at

an inevitable retreat. He complained of, and refused, the customary gift on accession (Anselm had offered 500 lbs. of silver); he jibed at restoring such manors of the See as he had sold off illegally during the vacancy —he even tried to prevent Anselm from going to Rome for the Pallium. He had to yield at each step, but he felt the plenitude of the new power slipping from him, and he contested everything.

St. Anselm's support of the Papacy.—First he objected that the Papacy was in dispute—an Anti-Pope, Clement, claiming against Urban II. Not but what he would certainly have yielded to Urban. France and Normandy accepted Urban. Urban was the lawful Pope beyond doubt, and Clement but a puppet of the German king. But Rufus desired to reserve this card; to retain his non-interference as an asset for bargaining. His father would have no Pope acknowledged in England save by his leave. But Anselm resisted. He vehemently objected his oath taken to Urban, the undoubted rights of Urban, and incidentally delivered one of the greatest passages upon the Petrine authority that has dignified the history of England, full as that history is of the theme.[1]

Especially did he uphold the clear principle that the universal Church could not suffer the restrictions of a particular ruler in a particular province. No local king in Christendom had right to dictate to the general Church in matters ecclesiastical. The king desired to declare the Archbishop deposed and "withdraw the staff and ring," half attempting it, but, in the face of

[1] "*Ego ad Summum Pastorem et Principem Omnium, ego ad Magni Consilii Angelum curram . . . Tu es Petrus.*" "I fly to the Chief Pastor, to the Leader of us all; to the Angel of Great Counsel . . . Thou art Peter."

public opinion, and even of his court, dared not. He demanded a decision in his favour from the Bishops—who refused; though flattering the king with a promise to withdraw support from their Head.

William, finding a frontal attack impossible and the deposition of Anselm not to be obtained, tried to turn the position by secret action of his own. It was secret action which weakened him somewhat. It gave away something of his father's island capture of supreme unmodified power; but he hoped to save the substance of it. That secret action consisted in *himself* sending messengers probably to Urban with the commission of a bargain. He would recognize Urban if Urban would depose Anselm. The Roman Court outmanœuvred him easily. It sent a delegate of its own—William, Cardinal and Bishop of Albano—who came to England *with the Pallium* (going through Canterbury without seeing Anselm), spoke fairly to the king, obtained public recognition of Urban as Pope throughout the kingdom—and then refused to accede to the demand for Anselm's deposition. He refused as a matter of course to give the Pallium to the king for bestowal. He brought it to Canterbury himself and laid it on the altar of the Cathedral during a solemn ceremonial, at the end of which Anselm assumed it. One point only he conceded: that Papal Legates should not be named for England without consent of the king.

In that first round of the long struggle the new Norman absolutism was, in the main, defeated.

Origin of the First Crusade, May, 1095.—The moment was for Europe as a whole one of those decisive dates on which its growth turns: it was the preaching of the first, the greatest, of the Crusades. The cere-

mony of the Pallium took place on the 27th of May, 1095.[1] In November met that great Council in Clermont of Auvergne, when Urban, himself of Champagne, preached the march on Jerusalem.

It was a quarter of a century since the Turk had captured Jerusalem, and hampered that increasing pilgrimage to the Holy Places which Islam had hitherto allowed. It was four years since the Emperor of the East had fallen prisoner to them and all Asia Minor had been lost and given over to the Mohammedan. But in the West the long and hopeless battle for the reconquest of Spain had begun to triumph: Toledo had been held for a generation. The time was ripe, for that Spanish war in which all the chivalry of all peoples had joined now bore its fruit, and the yet unsettled duel between Europe and the East entered its chief encounter. But England had no part in it.

In the reign of William and the fortunes of this country, so great a year meant no more than a dynastic intrigue. For a year—1094—Robert had suffered a desultory war at his brother William's aggression: again, chiefly fought with money. It was the reason of Flambard's famous raid upon the "Viaticum," that is, the journey-money, of the host; 20,000 of a national levy gathered at Hastings with 10s. (say £20) a man for upkeep, were sent home, and the money retained for the king. He used it—and other sums—to buy off the King of France whom Robert had summoned in aid as his overlord.

[1] Eadmer has it "Quarto Ides Junii" (June 10th), the fourth Sunday after Pentecost. But Poole argues that the dates throughout this passage are a fortnight earlier, through a blunder of Eadmer making it April 8th in 1095 whereas it fell on March 25th. The matter is doubtful.

Robert pawns to William the revenues of Normandy.—But neither these expedients nor the occupation of castles by bribery, put Normandy into William's hands. What did that was the preaching of the great Crusade. Robert took the Cross, and to raise his army for the Holy Places, granted the revenues and therefore the government of Normandy to the Rufus for three years—at a sum of £6666 = 10,000 marks, which one may call 150,000 in purchasing value, half a million at least in social value of money in our day. The money was raised by a special tax on the land of England.

William took over the central part of Normandy and returned to England by Easter, 1097. He renewed his struggle with Anselm. His excuse was an expedition into Wales, where, he said, the Archbishop's contingent of knights was insufficient; on which plea he summoned the Archbishop to Oxford, who judging, very justly, that no trial of him in the king's court was worth holding, his condemnation being assured, refused to reply to the summons, but replied by appearing at court (at Whitsun) with yet another appeal to be allowed to go to Rome to plead for Papal action against the ruin of religion in England.

The king's vices, the favoured corruption of the secular clergy, the spoliation of the Church's patrimony, compelled him to that appeal. He repeated it in August, 1097; again in early October, claiming it this time as a right. He was told that if he went, William would receive the Archbishopric into his own hands and use its revenues as income of his own. Anselm, in the middle of the month, went further, and said he would go with leave or without: "In the cause of Holy

Christendom—for it is written, Obey God rather than man."

It was the breaking point, and a test for the claim of the Crown to complete control over every subject in every aspect, even the head of the "Ecclesia Anglicana," the English Province of the Universal Church. There was opposition to Anselm from the Bishops, and at last almost violence. He maintained steadfastly, "Who reverences Peter reverences Christ." A lord at the king's side shouted: "Ho! Be off to Peter and the Pope, it troubles us not." Anselm: "What is in reserve for you, God knows; He is my help, if He will."

Anselm leaves England, 1097.—The king warned him, "If you go, take no provision." He said, "I have horse-gear and furnishing of my own. If you refuse that, I go naked and afoot; but I go." William, caught in the awe of that threat, said he meant nothing so extreme, yielded and named the eleventh day, the 26th of October, as that on which he should be at Dover to sail. Anselm answered, "My Lord, I go." He lifted his right hand, and as he signed the cross, the king bowed to the blessing. He went out and the two never met again. So ended that memorable interview. On the appointed 26th he was at Dover. He was kept here a fortnight by adverse winds. On the 8th of November, his baggage having been first searched by the king's servants, before a commissioner, to make sure that he collected no train, the saint sailed, and after the rise and fall of a gale, reached Wissant.

The king seized the Primate's Barony, the goods and the revenues of Canterbury, and some days later himself crossed over to finish the rounding off of Nor-

man frontiers and claim the Vexin once more against the King of Paris—a desultory war. Nothing came of it. Far off in Italy Anselm would have resigned the title to Canterbury, where he could not act, and of whose hopeless burden his great age was weary; so he prayed Urban, but Urban refused. Rufus abounded more and more in depravity; shocking Europe, founding an evil legend against himself which endures to this day. Anselm pleaded against his excommunication—fearing perhaps a blame of personal motive.

The remaining few months are little filled. The great figure of Anselm shone at the Council of Bari. Rufus, to whom the Pope had written, replied that he had a right to seize the goods of Canterbury, and "marvelled with no small astonishment that it should have ever occurred to him to protest." Anselm, after the Lateran Council in the spring of 1099, went back to Lyons. On June 29th Urban died. William had thirteen months to live.

In that brief space his ambition had a glimpse of what later was to fall to the men of his line, to his niece's son; for the great Duchy of Aquitaine was nearly passed to him as Normandy had been. Nothing came of it. He lived to put his brute Flambard into the princely bishopric of Durham.

Death of William Rufus, August 2, 1100.—On August 1st, 1100, he was hunting near Brockenhurst in the New Forest. One in the meet said to him, "Where will you keep this Christmas?" With a vision of Aquitaine and of lordship over all Western France which still haunted him, William answered, "At Poitiers." But he was to keep no Christmas. The very morrow, August 2nd, a Thursday, after he had breakfasted

early, he rode out again after the deer with his company, his younger brother Henry among them, in the New Forest. An arrow shot, none knew by whom,[1] but perhaps in such vengeance as his like excited, struck him as though in error, and he fell dead, suddenly, at once, unshriven.

(C) Henry I

(From August 2nd, 1100, to December 1st, 1135—Over 35 years)

The significance of Henry I's reign to English history lies in its length and its ruler's character combined.

Character of Henry's reign.—The moment at which he came, his own character, gave these thirty-five years an effect they otherwise could not have had; but it was the unusually prolonged continuity of one government—and that one strong and popular—which made of this active lifetime a firm settlement and ensured the permanence of the Conqueror's creation—the new Kingdom of England.

Had not Rufus died prematurely the thing would have cracked. There might, indeed, have been a vast Anglo-French realm set up by the early XIIth century; but England would hardly have held on. Rufus was too much hated and too excessive, as well as too vile, in that age when the personality of the king was nearly everything.

Had Henry himself died young the Feudal Anarchy,

[1] Tyrrel (Tirel), son of a Picard Lord (of Poix) and companion in vices to William, was suggested; he fled oversea to his home in France. But even in full safety and where the King's name was execrated, he continued to maintain his innocence.

always on the watch, and a peculiar menace to a realm upon the English scale (too small, I repeat, for the stable federation of several great provinces, nearly too large for one centre under the primitive conditions of those times), would have swamped all; as it so nearly swamped all after his death. But, as it was, the thirty-five years of Henry proved a sufficient time for a certain number of new officials to be trained: for the Court to which they were attached to become more complex and better organized as an instrument of government: for a second generation of Norman and other French Barons settled in England to grow accustomed to the continued mastery of their overlord: for the French civilization to penetrate gradually down into the lower ranks of the gentry and to consolidate their body.

The French influence gains in his reign.—This effect of Henry's long reign it is most important to grasp. We must remember how those thirty-five years stood to the date of the Conquest. When Henry took the Crown many men who had fought as youngsters at Hastings were still living: many who had known the Conqueror in his vigour, and had been settled by him upon English land, were still in active life. By the time Henry died, nearly seventy years had passed since Hastings. Hardly a human being present on the field of Hastings survived. Very few living men could even so much as remember the news of the battle. No original Conquest grantee of feudal land in England remained: only their heirs were on the soil. The living and moving generation of 1135 was to the action at Hastings, as our generation is to the Indian Mutiny.

Further, it was the generation which came into the

first full effect of the Crusades. Jerusalem was taken a year before Henry's accession. The perpetual new intercourse between Constantinople and the West, the new and vast expanse of Western Christendom in horizon and experience coincided with his reign. The first ogive had appeared before his death, as had the first great gatherings of scholars in Paris and Bologna; the first stirrings of that prodigious birth, the mediæval Philosophy (Abelard was the younger contemporary of Henry and survived him by seven years). Averroes was a growing lad before Henry died.

If the Middle Ages be compared to a tide of which the high flood was the late XIIIth century, then the Conqueror's day was that first hour in which the current is perceived and the creeks begin to fill; but Henry's day was that second hour in which the sea begins to race in and to urge, to float stranded craft, and to quicken all the pool.

Character and presence of Henry I.—In appearance the man was striking. He was in his thirty-third year, short and broad-shouldered like all his race, with black hair falling over a large forehead, thus rendered majestically low. He contrasted with the last king strongly also in temper and in acquirements. He was methodical, eager, rapid in action, ceaseless in travel, steady-eyed and mild-eyed, full of forethought; quite free from the horrors of vice which had spread from Rufus like a plague; healthy in body and soul; passionate in his numerous affairs with women; a man hungry for work. He loved the rapid and exact despatch of business. He could grasp many things at once—which is the supreme quality in any soldier who has to govern in the field or at home; and he delighted in many interests—a

hater (though a user in others) of specialization. Thus he was curious to collect a menagerie which he kept at Woodstock,[1] and gazed there on camels and porcupines. He loved the foundation of new houses, lay and religious; he was a builder. We owe the great pile of Reading to him as we owe its destruction to his namesake 400 years later. He made himself exceptional in book-learning, though that was no necessary part of his trade nor particularly useful or valuable, let alone consonant to the position he held—any more than it would be consonant to one of those international financiers who govern the world to-day to excel as a painter. He probably—a prodigious thing for a man in such an office at such a time—could read some Greek. Latin, of course, he had, as all such men had; but *he* had it fluently. He was, it seems, at pains to learn the local dialects and the still faintly surviving literary, official, Anglo-Saxon tongue; and this he acquired, presumably in order that he might speak personally with the lesser men who as yet had no French: for it was part of that "bridge" character which I have ascribed to his reign, that the French language was still only in its first stages of spreading, and probably had not yet become the common speech of the majority of the smaller gentry. Another generation was needed for that; nor was it, perhaps, until after the turn of the year 1200 that French became (what it remained until the Black

[1] Woodstock comes frequently into this reign and the next two. It was a royal castle and habitation, a private manor of the king's until long after the breakdown of the English monarchy in the XVIIth century. After Blenheim the new aristocracy took it from the Crown and gave it on a nominal tenure to their colleague John Churchill, and Blenheim Park is, roughly, the old Desmesne. The original building has gone. Its site is a knoll just at the end of the bridge over the lake.

Death) the general medium in which all that was vocal and united in England talked and thought.

His schooling at Abingdon Monastery, which he always loved, had borne abundant fruit.

He remembered an early prophecy, and was determined to be king indeed. He was English born (probably at Selby), long familiar to the Island, and the only son of the Conqueror come to him after the Conquest of England.

All was in his favour. He was present near Winchester at the critical instant. He had himself been hunting in the New Forest on that day when Rufus fell dead. He rode straight from the hunting party to Winchester and claimed the treasure.

Henry's seizure of the treasure and throne, August 2, 1100.—William of Breteuil, its guardian, refused it. "Robert," he said, "is the first born," and also (a more forcible plea) they had sworn fealty to Robert.

A crowd gathered with armed nobles among them, their weight was thrown in the scale for Henry, and William of Breteuil gave way—Henry had already put his hand upon the hilt of his sword and all but drawn it.

Charter of Henry I.—This was on the Thursday, August 2nd, 1100. What followed showed the man as he was to be during all the rest of his life. On the morrow, the Friday, he had himself declared king by such great men as were at hand, and acted at once as king, appointing a bishop to Winchester, which William had deliberately kept vacant for 2½ years. The next day, the Saturday, he rode to London—an astonishing push of 72 miles. On the Sunday he had himself anointed and crowned at Westminster. The

whole thing was done at a gallop. In the same twenty-four hours he had drawn up and issued that great feudal, but also monarchic, Charter which was used for a reference and origin throughout the Middle Ages in England. It was destined as a document to support the unity and continuity of the realm, but also to give a lever, perpetually, for the later feudal revolts. Yet the terms of that parchment were only a repetition of tradition: that the Church should be free (i.e. to govern itself): feudal dues customary and no more: that he would keep all the precedents of local customs, "King Edward's laws." One thing about this document is worthy of notice: that side by side with mere custom a general feudal text, a written instrument of permanent application, was now brought into existence. For the rest it was but a repetition of immemorial usage throughout the West; for instance, the clause saying that all lesser lords must treat their tenants as rightly as the king treated his: that goes back to the very origins of Feudalism under Charles the Bald in France more than two centuries before.

This document, not Magna Carta, which was but a copy and amplification of it, is the original record of feudal monarchy in England: its limits and dues.

And here I must digress to reiterate what it is so essential to retain throughout our reading of all the English Middle Ages: the peculiar mark of *Scale* which distinguished England from every other realm of mediæval Europe.

Character of English Feudalism.—The great feudal lord was here as everywhere much more master of his dependent land and men than the king was of him; but the king was more directly master, in theory at

least, of the feudal lord in England than any *king* abroad was of *his* feudal lords. He stood to, say, the Palatine Earl of Chester, in spite of the latter's quasi-royal isolation—having his own courts and later his own parliament—much as the Count of Flanders stood to Boulogne. He was direct master, and still more was he direct master of the earls of counties and the tenants-in-chief. The King of France—or Germany—was in no such direct relation, *save in his own particular district.* The King of England was an immediate feudal power over England as the Count of Toulouse was over the Langue d'Oc, or the Duke of Brittany over his province. Yet he was also *king*, and therefore answerable to no superior, and responsible for all the community.

Hence the friction between the English King and so many feudal lords in contact with him, and the perpetual outbreak of rebellion; but hence also the earlier concentration of royal power in England than in France.

And this character came from the fact that the King of England proceeded from the Duke of Normandy. He had the same direct contact with his subjects as upon the Continent a great feudal lord had but the French King had not. He was to everyone in England as the Count of Anjou was to everyone in Anjou, but as the King of Castile was *not* to everyone in Castile. No other king in Europe had, theoretically, the *whole* realm to administer. All other realms were more or less federal.

Henry also began at once to put things in order. He stabilized and reformed the currency, he organized standard weights and measures, he did all things which

the Norman did everywhere. Especially did he determine to end anarchy in the matter of the Church, imprisoning Flambard. He filled the vacant abbacies and bishoprics, and, supreme step, he sent for Anselm.

Recall of St. Anselm, 1101.—That great soul was praying in the huge granite fortress church of the Chaise Dieu on its high mountain summit in Auvergne, when messengers came to him from Canterbury and from Bec saying that the tyrant was dead. He moved northward towards England. At Cluny, behind the Burgundian Vineyard, Henry's letters reached him. Two days before Michaelmas (1101) he landed at Dover, a few days later he met Henry at Salisbury—and at once the only great issue of the time, the issue of *Investiture*, arose.

Henry asked Anselm to accept the archbishopric from him and to do homage for it, as Anselm's predecessors had done to the king's predecessors. Anselm refused, saying "that he adhered to the Lateran decisions" (that is, to the claim of canonical election by Churchmen of Churchmen to Church office, and the *Investiture* of Churchmen with the signs of office by the Church, and not by the lay power). If Henry would accept the Church's decision herein there would be a firm peace between them. Otherwise it would be neither serviceable nor decent for him to remain in England. Anselm had, in his exile, been present at the councils where these principles were solemnly and finally reaffirmed.

Renewed quarrel of Investitures.—We must grasp the issue for Henry. Though all Europe had been ringing all his life with the struggle between the Popes and the German Kings on this one matter, yet Henry

had strong precedent to fall back upon. In England the feudal anomaly of lay investiture, of a layman, the king, having the custom in England not only to name a bishop or a great abbot but to create his spiritual function by giving him the symbols of it (and, of course, the right to give him his material property as bishop), had custom behind it of at least 200 years. It had not been touched. The Pope had made a special exception in his reforms for the sake of the Conqueror personally. But throughout the universal Church, and in Anselm, there had now arisen the fixed determination to restore the age-long tradition of Christian things: the thousand years'-old claim, going back to the roots of all our institutions, that the hierarchy was not meant to be the creation of the civil power: that the Faith could not live, but would only ossify, if its machinery fell to the management of the State: the feeling of *Sanctity* in all things clerical which made of lay investiture something blasphemous. All that was at work, a mastering group of connected ideas.

Growing reform of the Church.—As against such a spirit, now on the verge of triumph throughout the West, a mere two centuries of abuse (which had grown up under protest and had long been shaken throughout the rest of Europe) counted for nothing. A freedom felt to be essential to the life of the Faith must be restored.

But Henry's plea was strong. The clerical claim, imposed without adaption to existing institutions, was ominous of revolution. If indeed *no* feudal bond remained over the Church lands, not only would the hierarchy be independent of the Crown altogether politically, but a great mass of royal revenue was imper-

illed through the loss of *all* feudal control over it: and this was true not only of revenue but recruitment of armed power.

This thing had to end in victory to one side or the other, and did end in a real victory for the king, as we shall see. But verbal compromise was necessary before that could be settled.

Henry's crux was severe. All Europe was moving for the restoration of the Church's freedom. If he quarrelled with Anselm all the mind of the time was against him (and he had the example of Rufus to warn him). Robert was back in Normandy from the Crusades, and if Anselm went over to him, Robert could certainly be king; he was the eldest; he was Henry's lord as well—homage was due to him for Norman holdings. On the other hand, to lose full feudal control of the very large Church lands (and that was what the claims seemed logically to menace) was to imperil—in the language of the day—"half his kingdom," that is, a very large proportion of his income in money and strength in armed levies; and to have a strong economic power possibly opposed to himself or his heirs in some more or less immediate future.

He temporized. He called a truce of nine months—till the Easter of 1101.

Henry's Saxon marriage and crowning of his new queen, March, 1101.—Next he married. It was his choice and not merely some calculation that made him seek Matilda,[1] the daughter of the Scotch King Malcolm and of St. Margaret, Edgar Ætheling's niece, thus of the Wessex house.[2] Whether there was an ele-

[1] She had also, as a child, been called Edith.

[2] See Genealogical Table, page 70.

ment of policy as well, there was at any rate a political effect—for the girl's mother was herself the daughter of Edward, Edmund Ironside's son; and—what counted most in the eyes of Europe by far—she was great-granddaughter and direct heiress of the famous but unfortunate Ethelred.

The volumes of bad history which have been written upon this matter, treating XIIth century England as though it were modern and national, must not, in our disgust with it, blind us to the considerable political effect of such a marriage. To regard it as a daring alliance between the hated invader and the conquered but proud and angry nation is the wildest nonsense. The young woman belonged to that high cosmopolitan clique whose common language was French and whose culture and manner were throughout the same. She had been brought up wholly in England under the new, ordered, kingship (in the Convent of Wilton, where her aunt Christina, her mother's sister, was abbess), and Henry's guardianship. Her sister, Mary, married Eustace of Boulogne, and she herself had already been sought in marriage by Alan of Brittany, and then by William de Guarrenne, the great Norman noble.

But she was of the old Wessex line, and it counted. Henry's as yet insecure title and the feudal unrest which was not only normal at the origin of a reign, but taken for granted as a sort of necessity, naturally took any opportunity of belittling the king, and we have a joke recorded against him—that some of the court called him "Godric" and his wife "Godgifu" on their marriage; it is a jest of no particular significance, obvious enough.

But the alliance was a thing perfectly in tune with Henry's rank, race and time, when men certainly did not think of themselves as belonging to this nation or that, nor even, mainly, as belonging to this speech or that; but primarily as belonging to this feudal group or that. What was important was the suggestion that Henry could not marry the heiress of the West Saxon line because she was in care of a convent and might be thought to have taken the veil. St. Anselm examined the whole evidence in Council at Lambeth, and decided that she had not. He married them himself, and on March 11th crowned them in Westminster Abbey.

Feudal Rebellion of 1101.—With the spring and the fighting season of 1101 the regular feature of a new Norman reign, the feudal rebellion, began. Flambard escaped from the Tower in February and saw Robert in Normandy, and with that flight begins the long struggle between the brothers, Robert, the legitimate heir, and Henry of England.

Before entering upon that, we must remark that to follow this very important formative period of Henry I it is necessary to keep separate the three main activities of the reign: the development of administration, the Church settlement, and the acquisition of Normandy; to which must be added an outline of the accidents which left the succession doubtful and ultimately led to the great but short-lived Angevin Empire.

Growth of Norman political institutions under Henry I.—The era of Henry I is the time in which the chief new institutions of Mediæval England were founded. Of the details we know very little, and, remarkable as the man's own character was, we must be careful not to exaggerate its effect in this depart-

ment. What was of more effect than his character was, as I have said, the length and continuity of his rule, and as that rule fell at a moment when all Western Europe was taking on its great new growth, administration would have shared in that growth whoever had been on the throne; it would have grown as architecture and all other social functions were growing in that vigorous youth of the Middle Ages. We have very little documentary evidence (though one piece of first class value —the Pipe Roll of 1131).

The Curia Regis.—But we have the main lines of what happened, and this was the beginning of the regular administrative framework, men chosen from the clerical order and from the lesser gentry were trained and used for continuous administrative work; the income of the king was worked out in its least details, and closely exacted; the central machine from which all was to spread took on an organized form. This central machine was the King's "Court," in the technical and specialized sense of the word "Court," the *Curia Regis*. It may be generally and roughly (though not perhaps quite accurately) described as a special function of the old feudal *Concilium*. It was not exactly a committee of the *Concilium*, for it included great numbers who had no part as feudatories under the king, and who were only officials. It also excluded the great mass of the *Concilium*, most of the greater tenants in chief were not regular and permanent members of the *Curia* in its daily action, and the mass of lesser tenants-in-chief were hardly in touch with it at all save as suitors or if summoned. There was probably only an accidental identity between individuals used by the king for administration and individuals who happened

to hold of him small portions of feudal land, or who happened to hold of him clerical temporalities.

Political terms were still very elastic, for society, though rapidly evolving, was still primitive. The old feudal *Concilium* was indeed clearly defined, for it was all those who held feudally in chief of the king; these were known and registered. But in practice even the *Concilium* was simply a group of those great barons and prelates who happened to be present after being personally summoned, and the *Curia* was not even as well defined as that.

When someone was cited, for instance, to reply for treason against the king, or for failure in feudal duties to the king, he was cited before the "King's Court," and if he was a magnate, that meant in practice the *Concilium*, or rather the more important members of it, gathered to try their peer, and having associated with them certain functionaries of the king, legal, fiscal and registral. But when the emissaries from the *Curia Regis* were sent to visit the county courts as justices acting for the royal power in judicial matters they were not part of the *Concilium*, even though one or another individual of them might be, in another capacity, a feudal tenant-in-chief.

It is from the *Curia* of Henry I that all the judicial and fiscal institutions of England descend; but as yet its functions were, of course, embryonic. The justices did not regularly visit (so far as we know, and judging by probabilities) the county courts. They came from time to time to judge in those courts, in the place of the king, great issues: or to keep an occasional eye on the sheriffs. Especially it may be presumed that they were sent to deal with actions concerning

large tenures of land. Very strict record was kept of all that was done, especially of all judgments recorded in the *Curia* or by the travelling justices; and there are other signs of strict organization beginning; but it was only beginning.

None of this was, of course, complete innovation. The mass of judicial and administrative work was still confined to the simple courts of the shire and the hundred, though these were, it is believed, fallen into some decay, and owed their re-invigoration and establishment to the Norman kings.

Anyone who wishes to understand what his forefathers of the early Middle Ages were and how they lived must begin by getting rid of a number of modern guesses, or rather unsupported affirmations, one of the worst of which concerns the conduct of these little provincial assemblies.

The courts held by the sheriff in the counties twice a year, and those held in each hundred once a month, have been talked of as though they were modern democratic assemblies. All manner of nonsense has thus been read into them, which the plain records quite fail to support. These gatherings were nothing more and nothing less than courts of justice over which presided a strictly royal officer, the sheriff, who was named from above by the king, and of whose popular election there could no more be any question in those days than there could be to-day of the popular election of the Chief Commissioner of Police in London. Certain towns could by special charter—and later—get leave for their governing body (usually a privileged clique) to elect a judicial officer. But that was quite exceptional. The people who came to the court of county

or hundred were either compelled to go there by the public authority—that is, by the king's official—because they were accused of some wrong-doing, or they were people who had been summoned to go there because there was a dispute against them by other claimants (e.g. as to the possession of a piece of land), and it was dealt with in the court of the county in which the disputed property or right was held. There would also be compelled to come those who might be useful for giving evidence upon the matter.

That was all the shire court was, and that was all the hundred court was.

One may, if one likes, amuse oneself with a guess that it was but the relic of an older democratic assembly; but there is no evidence for that, and no possible historical basis.

As a great many people would naturally have to come, especially to the shire courts, where a good deal of judicial business had to be transacted (not only in connection with claims and misdeeds, but also in connection with the payment of royal dues to the sheriff), it became later a convenient place in which to transact other business. Thus, a century on, when local men were wanted at the king's headquarters to give evidence on the resources of their district or on the public feeling thereof, the sheriff was asked to pick some reputable gentlemen out of the county court or to get the people in the county court to choose them. It may be remarked in passing that the regular presence in the county courts of all the free people in the county would have been physically impossible, and that the mere idea of such a gathering is ridiculous. And the same is true of the hundred court.

The mass of the English people, serfs from time immemorial, had nothing to do with these affairs—save as occasional witnesses to custom. *Their* matters were dealt with in the little courts of each manor.

Having said so much as to the character of these local upper and lower courts of justice, which were at the same time convenient for the promulgation of orders, for the collection of royal money, etc., we ought to note an interesting date: the date 1108.[1]

It is not interesting because the thing which happened was of any magnitude or counted much in the national life. But it is interesting as an origin.

The Norman institution of delegation.—In that year the king ordered that when the village lord or his agent could not come to a local court in person to answer on some plea or some point at issue, the court should summon the Steward of the village (who was called the reeve[2]) and four serfs to give evidence and to speak for the general knowledge of the community upon the point, e.g. the nature of a particular bit of land, the rights of the lord in a particular mill, etc. This sending exceptionally for the Lord's Steward and four serfs when their lord was unable to go to give evidence is marked by the phrase "*assint pro omnibus*,"

[1] The document is not earlier than 1108 nor later than 1118.

[2] The origin of this word "reeve" is obscure. It dates right back into the early Anglo-Saxon. Some think it connected with a German word "graf"—degraded from the much earlier official Latin "Gravitas" used of an official rank, as so many words used by the Germans of the early Dark Ages were adopted from the official Roman world; but there is no proof. By the time it is commonly used it means a governor of any kind. The man appointed to govern a town was the town reeve; a port, the port reeve; a shire, the shire reeve—of which we have made "sheriff." The word is still familiar in our country-sides, e.g. a wood-reeve is the man who looks after the woods of a landowner. With the Lord's Steward (Reeve) came also the Parish Priest.

i.e. "let them be present in the place of all." In other words, the headman and the four serfs whom he was thus summoned to bring along with him to bear witness to local custom on the particular point in dispute, were regarded as standing for all the rest of the community and voicing the general experience of the village on the matter. Therein lay the particular quality of the innovation. Though the device was invented only on a minor matter, though the men came reluctantly, with no trace of what is called "democratic feeling," acting under orders and subject to smart fines if they failed to go, only summoned exceptionally when their lord could not appear, this little deputation is the first introduction in civil affairs of the idea of representation in this country. It had, of course, long been known on the Continent, even in lay matters, and longer still in Church matters; but it here modestly appears for the first time as a regular feature in English history: deriving in its turn from the *occasional* and *exceptional* summoning of small sworn deputations to give evidence: that Gallic custom which we have seen the Conqueror using in the Domesday survey.

As to the hundred, I have already dealt with it in a few words of a note on Domesday, but it is worth saying something more about it here, now that we are dealing with the stricter organization introduced by the Conqueror's son.

The hundred is a local division of land subordinate to the county, and apparently of arbitrary size, some such divisions being quite small and others very large. It was, like all our other traceable institutions, of Roman origin, and appears first upon the Continent.

Origin of the "Centena" or "Hundred."—It first

appears in the charters of the French early Merovingian kings. Its name derives from the jurisdiction of a Roman official of the lower Empire, the *centenarius*, from whose title after many generations the official name of the district he governed was formed—like *comitatus*, a county, from the much earlier *comes*, the high Roman official who governed the extent of a county. The name *centenarius* is in its origin military and of the Roman army, for we know that in the later age of Rome it replaced the older *centurio*, the captain of a hundred. But of course by the time it appears in England (not earlier than A.D. 959), the origins were long forgotten, and it merely stood for an official subdivision of governed territory of which the Roman name had been translated into the vernacular "hundred." The division bore various names indeed in various districts throughout Western Christendom. It spreads as far north as Iceland. In the North of England it is called a Wapentake; in Wales, a Cantred; but under all its names it is the same idea deriving from the same Roman origin, or a copy of that origin.[1]

The mass of the law was still a mixture of old local customs with local differences of ordeal and scales of compensation, and with three main provinces of custom for Wessex, Mercia, and the north-east or Danelaw; while the Conquest was still so recent that the new baronage claimed the special customs they had brought over from Normandy and other parts of Northern France.

[1] Guesses have been made connecting the Hundred with the custom of primitive tribes (as in Latium, early barbaric Germany, etc.) to divide warriors or families into tens of hundreds. But these guesses are fantastic. There are no connecting links for centuries, whereas the descent from the "Centena," the administrative area of a "*Centenarius*," is documented and proved.

Even the sending of justices on travel (later called "*in eyre*," which means in errancy, the French word "*errant*"—moving about, wandering) had precedent under the Conqueror himself, especially for getting local information—as in the case of the Domesday survey. With the long reign of Henry it was to extend very slowly, and by and by to substitute the general law proceeding from the king for the local customs, at least, in major matters.

Revenue of Henry I's day.—It is further clear that the fiscal system was specially developed in this reign. The sources from which the royal income came (it was now somewhat over £60,000[1] a year, i.e. a little larger probably than under the Conqueror) had not as yet been added to. The headquarters of the system were at Winchester. Accounts (for which the sheriffs were responsible as collectors of dues, and the exactitude of which was carefully tested) were settled at Winchester twice a year: Easter and Michaelmas. And the Norman term exchequer was of course the common title of the court, the place and the transaction.[2] It was already possessed of two functions, carried on in two separate rooms, before officials called "the barons of the exchequer"; all of them administrators and including the justices: much the same people as were deciding most of the judicial work of the *Curia*.

[1] A social value of some millions to-day. The bare livelihood of say 50,000 hearths in a population of something under a million hearths. Much as though to-day a simple central administration of a simple England were vested in a very rich man with a private income of £3 a week × 5 per cent. of the families in the kingdom = some £75,000,000. But it was a much larger proportion of the total annual income of the country than a budget of £75,000,000 would be to-day.

[2] The word means "Chess board," from the table in black and white marble squares at Rouen.

The sheriffs paid in the amounts due from each county into one side of the exchequer, and the accounts were checked and put on record in the other. It is characteristic of the growing times that money payments were encouraged, payments in kind discouraged; that on account of the uncertainty of the coinage, its getting adulterated, clipped, and defaced, payment was only accepted after assaying the whole by weight and by fire; and it is also characteristic of the period that the recognition of the towns as corporations for the purposes of payment—their being granted a "farm" of so much each, which the collectors of the town were to raise as they could, but for which the authorities of the town were accountable to the King—was becoming a custom. Before the end of the reign at least two towns, London and Lincoln, made their accounts to the exchequer direct without the intermediary of a sheriff, and London had even the fiscal management of all Middlesex. It was probably with the idea of security and certainty in payment, quite as much as with the idea of political advantage in playing the townsmen against the feudal power, that in this reign the sums required of them were moderate and even occasionally reduced, and in some cases whole categories of payment eliminated. There is a somewhat detailed charter to London belonging to the period, and documentary evidence of the Communal, presumably traditional, form of town government in London.

The whole scheme of these activities of the *Curia Regis*, the "King's (Special) Court," mainly fiscal in character, partly administrative, is still rudimentary under Henry I, but does already exist, and all the future develops from it.

Henry's ecclesiastical policy.—In judging the clerical question there are two things to be kept in mind: first that the great Hildebrandine or Cluniac ideal of a completely independent Church living as an autonomous body within the various feudal realms and town communities of Western Christendom, was not and could not be fully realized. No ideal ever is.

This ideal of an independent Church was, as I have repeatedly pointed out, no innovation; it was the revival and confirmation of an ancient tradition, and the growth in the executive power of the Papacy which accompanied it was a necessary instrument to such revival and confirmation.

It had the greater strength from this fact: that the old united Empire in which Charlemagne was lay master as universal as the Latin Church itself, was gone in practice; and that *local* kings could not stand in the same relation of a Church united and co-extensive with all the civilization of which they were but provincial rulers.

The second point is no less important. The great moral and disciplinary change or Reformation (including, and necessarily continued by, the growth of Papal executive power, revenue, and administrative action throughout Europe) was the major result of the whole affair. The moral side of the clerical claim in the struggle was always attacking: for all, including kings, admitted its ultimate general principles. In practice the other side, that of the lay government, was always upon the defensive, and uncertain of itself.

What happened in the long run to the contest between the ideal of an independent Church and the ideal of strong, personal, in the end *national* lay govern-

ment, was a division. The Church imposed its discipline on its members, its universality, its liturgy and definitions, its property. The lay power appointed to benefices and created churches more and more national.

But it would have been perhaps better for Christendom if it had been possible for the contest to be maintained alive and in simple form. It was the gradual compromise—and the peace at the close of it—which led to corruptions at the end of the Middle Ages, to exasperations against them, and at last to the explosion in which the unity of Christendom was shattered.

The failure of the Hildebrandine ideal to realize itself fully is best seen in the matter of investitures. The compromise which was arrived at left the substance of investiture to bishoprics and the great royal abbeys with the civil power.

It could hardly be otherwise, the bishops and great abbots being, as they were, feudatories in a feudal state: that is, lords with revenue-producing lands, owing, further, armed men for service.

It was all but impossible for the theory of wholly free clerical election to clerical posts to achieve regular and universal practice. We find many examples, until the very end of the mediæval period, of such free elections; but the great bulk of appointments to bishopric and abbey came from the lay ruler of each realm.

On the other hand, the Papal power in particular, and the clerical power in general, wins the main battle. The lay theory that appeals to Rome should be restricted or even forbidden, and should be possible only under licence, in practice does not work; on the con-

trary, such appeals increase and become universal. In practice the Church becomes a universal society, jurisdictions throughout which and appeals throughout which belong to its own centre and not to local lay powers: not even to local councils or metropolitans in the ultimate resort. And as for the general legislation of the Church, its discipline, its canons, the workings of its courts in matters certainly spiritual, and in temporal matters which partake of the spiritual (wills, questions of marriage, etc.), that is equally universal. Statutes made to control this universal Church action (as, for instance, the later statutes of Provisors and of Præmunire) did not consistently and effectually, still less invariably, affect the working of society. It is the other way about. They are exceptional and sporadic in their action, while the Church government, centralized in Rome and common to all Christendom, is the rule and the object present to men's experience and to their way of thinking of society.

Under Henry I the question of investitures and that of the now universal enforcement of celibacy upon priests are the two test examples. In the matter of major investitures the Crown certainly won; in the other matter, and in sundry side issues connected with the investiture quarrel, the Crown abandoned the struggle or conformed its executive action in line with the Church.

St. Anselm, a much greater European figure than the king was, is the protagonist of the Church throughout. Modern attempts have been made to diminish his rôle, and certainly he kept himself strictly to legal positions, and was never extravagant nor even enthusiastic in the pursuit of extreme solutions; but he was

quite firm, and his policy is quite clear. He stands out for the ideal of an autonomous Church, and it is equally clear that Henry is only upon the defensive against what were to him dangerous innovations due to that ideal. He does not combat the ideal of an autonomous Church common to all Christendom; no man of the XIIth century *could* combat such an ideal any more than a man of our time could combat the ideal of free international finance. But he tries to check it in action, because he dreads its effect on revenue and domestic government.

Attempt at a settlement of the investitures quarrel through mission of St. Anselm.—It was at Henry's suggestion that St. Anselm went off to try and get a settlement of the whole matter at Rome. That was only done after a very long exchange of correspondence between the Holy See and England. We must remember that the real quarrel, the big issue, the main battle, was between the Papacy and the Empire; and underlying it was the great conflict, not to be finally settled for a century and a half, as to whether the Empire or the Church were to decay. The English dispute was subsidiary, and it was important for the Bishop of Rome to have English support against the King of Germany.

The new Norman realm of England was an asset to the Papacy. St. Gregory VII himself had, as we have seen, made a special exception of William the Conqueror, waiving the claim to free Church election in favour of the king; and he still wanted to use such an ally as Henry, especially as a marriage between Henry's daughter and the Emperor may already have been spoken of, though the child was only three years

old.[1] Henry on his side was not a man to break into a quarrel about anything he did not think essential. The Church in England was essential to him, and that Church was now so strongly organized under the Papacy that the Papacy was essential to him also as a political force. But the traditional royal claim to nominate or, rather, to create a bishop was very vigorously defended. The Archbishop of York, Gerard, who was a politician before he was anything else, and who felt a natural rivalry to Canterbury, pushed it to the fullest length. The king had a right to rule State and Church together. The Pope's power was usurped: unwarranted. Never did that freedom of discussion in which the Middle Ages are in such marked contrast with our own police-ridden day show more vigorously.

The Government's fight to continue "making bishops" was hard fought. A custom with six generations behind it and with all the practical organization of society behind it as well, was not easy to destroy.

Nor was it destroyed. After interminable negotiations, including a painful journey taken by the old Saint to Rome at the special request of the king in 1106, and that followed by a sort of honourable exile until he should be willing to accept Henry's claim; after a threat of excommunication made against Henry by the Pope (a threat which was never carried into effect), there came the famous compromise, which was

[1] This daughter, Matilda, born in 1102, was taken through the ceremony of marriage with the Emperor in 1110, then trained in her Royal functions (and the German language) till she was nubile, when he re-solemnized the marriage and lived with her till his death in 1125.

in reality no compromise at all. It was victory for the lay power.

Compromise in favour of the Crown, August 15, 1106.—The aged Anselm came north for the last time, and met his sovereign in the Abbey of Bec, his old home, in that deep Norman valley of the Risle between its woods. They agreed; the cleric receiving his temporalities was to do homage like any other baron; but the Ring and the Staff, as emblems of spiritual power, the king forwent. What had happened was that the Crown stood very nearly as it had before, save on a point of principle, which was not without its moral importance as a symbol, but had no political effect. The King of England would still in practice nominate to the vacant English sees, and the territorial revenues of the Church were received under the same feudal conditions, binding it economically to the State, as had held since long before any man could remember.

Some years later, the much greater, parallel, business between the Papacy and the Empire was settled upon similar lines, and one may fairly say that the great battle so long waged by the hierarchy and its chief was lost. The ideal of a completely autonomous Church standing in the midst of Europe, independent of the local civil rulers and even of the nominally supreme Emperor, had failed and was never to be realized. The Papacy was to break the Empire; the Church was to remain a self-governing body; it was to be far more universal than any institution known before or since in Europe—at least, than any institution arisen in the West since the end of the fifth century. It was to give a corporate life to all Christendom from beyond the Vistula to the Atlantic, and from the

Straits of Gibraltar to the Frozen Sea; but it was not to become what St. Gregory VII had so intensely desired, his vision, a wholly unfettered society.

This compromise of Bec was made by the king and the Archbishop on the Assumption, August 15th, 1106, confirmed and enrolled in a great feudal *Concilium* held in London on August 1st, 1107, and shortly after the great Anselm died. Though this history is general and brief, a word on that death should be admitted, so much does it illuminate the Saint's character.

It was the Palm Sunday of 1109. He lay in the bare room of the monastery at Canterbury, still able to speak and to bless his spiritual children around him. One of them said: "Lord and Father, you go to keep this Easter court with your Lord." Who answered: "If He so will. But if He would only leave me among you a little while until I can solve the question of the origin of the soul of man, I should be grateful; for I doubt whether anyone else, when I am dead, can solve it."

Death of St. Anselm, April 20, A.D. 1109.—On the evening of the Tuesday of Holy Week, April 20th, they heard his breath coming slowly (as they chanted the Passion) and knew that he was about to die. He passed as it brightened into dawn.

Henry's conquest of Normandy.—The civil conquest of Normandy, which was Henry I's great work outside this island, was but one more example of the tendency to unification between the two separated parts of the northern French culture of the day, and in particular the tendency of the duchy to come under the rule of the Norman king overseas. And the reason that the tendency was for the King of England to

encroach on Normandy, rather than for the Duke of Normandy to encroach on England, was that the population, the revenue, and general resources of the King of England were so much larger than those of the Duke.

Character came into it somewhat. The lack of tenacity in Robert, his absence on the great Crusade (where he had made an admirable soldier), the looseness of the hold he kept upon inferiors, added to the final result. But the material advantage which clinched it was the far greater wealth and larger recruiting field of the English king.

When Henry and his brother had met at Alton in 1101, there may have been an understanding (two authorities mention it, including the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle*) that either should succeed the other dying without issue. But nothing came of it. It was hardly treated seriously. What was treated seriously, particularly by Henry, were those words in the understanding made at Alton that each should help the other in the repression of treason. It gave Henry his opportunity for interfering in the affairs of the Duchy (where there was constant rebellion against Robert), and for reproaching the Duke whenever he made terms with any man who had joined in rebellion against Henry in England.

There were other details which would crowd this page too much; a threat of detaining Robert if he landed again in England in 1103; the getting him to surrender the pension paid him; the obtaining by Henry of a Norman fief (Breteuil) for the husband of one of his natural daughters; his acquisition of the county of Evreux—and so forth.

By 1105, in spite of Henry's power growing in this fashion and his having direct or indirect lordship over so much of Norman soil, Robert pushed things to an open quarrel. His brother the king had the plea on his side that Robert helped his enemies, receiving rebels from England; and Henry had also that very strong asset, the support of the Norman Church. The far superior wealth of the English realm was used in raising mercenaries, and when the clash came the type of troops that could be gathered on the opposing sides was very different. Henry had masses of men from England properly trained, and he had hired further men from Maine and Anjou and Brittany. Robert had a few barons still faithful to him—mainly because they thought reconciliation with Henry impossible; for foot he had nothing but the rough militia of such Norman towns as he still commanded.

The decision came at Tinchebrai on September 28th, 1106, the fortieth anniversary of the day on the evening of which Henry's father had sailed in his great fleet of transports for the conquest of England.[1] It shows how little national feeling existed in those days that the victory of the Norman king over his Norman brother could be treated as a sort of amusing set-off against the victory at Battle half a lifetime before. Henry's victory was complete, and Robert himself fell into his brother's hands. He was never again allowed his liberty, dying at last a prisoner (a term that does not mean hardship, but only ward and loss of liberty, for he was treated with the respect and had the full provision of his rank) in the castle of Cardiff in 1134.

[1] It will be remembered from my first volume that Freeman puts the date wrong by 24 hours.

There is a charming tradition that he learnt Welsh, to write verses in it—about a tree.

Thence onwards Normandy is Henry's possession, and the crowns are joined. The whole weight of the organization which the Norman had successfully established in England from original Norman roots is thrown into creating a copy thereof—where imitation was needed—in Normandy itself.

The Union was of high historical importance. It prevented England sinking back into isolation, connected it with the great continental fiefs for nearly a century more, and this gave time for the new and full civilization to take root.

But Henry's position was not perfectly secure, for this reason—that Robert (who had married into the Hauteville family, the conquerors of South Italy) had a child, a baby, who had also come into Henry's ward and whom he gave to the Count of Arques, Robert's son-in-law, to look after. This baby, as he grew up, became the rallying-point of Norman disaffection. He was called " The Clito "—a term of which we do not know the meaning or origin—and from the time when the Norman barony had begun to recover from the effect of Tinchebrai, his claim is perpetually put forward. Indeed, the trouble begins when the boy was still a child, only five years after the decisive battle.

The rivalry of William Clito.—For in the year 1111 the Count of Arques took him to the court of the King of France, and the opportunity was too good for that overlord of Normandy to miss. It was a moment in the history of the French monarchy when it turned from being a thing of the later Dark and early Middle Ages, a thing purely feudal, only directly commanding,

taxing, and recruiting in its own restricted, personal, lordship, to something more: to aiming at real rule over the vassal provinces. There was war between the King of England as Duke of Normandy and his overlord at Paris. The Norman towns held fast to Henry and perhaps half his continental baronage; the other half were opposed. But with 1118 the tide turned. William, the heir of Henry (a vicious lad not sixteen), married the daughter of Anjou. Henry's own diplomacy had helped to separate the vassals which the King of France had used against him, and at Brenneville in the Vexin on August 20th, 1119, in a small but decisive action, the war ended favourably to the King of England.

It was in the year following, in 1120, towards the end of it, that the accident took place which upset all Henry's successful plans and made possible the anarchy which succeeded his death.

Drowning of Henry's only legitimate son and heir, William, November 25, 1120.—His only legitimate son and heir, the William just mentioned, was drowned in the wreck of the "White Ship" on November 25th, and the structure which the king had set up so painfully over so many years, and so well, was in ruins. There was no male heir to the throne of England save the Clito; there was no male heir save the Clito of the Conqueror's blood: and he was only son of the Conqueror's eldest son.

Anjou—since the marriage of his daughter had given no heir to the throne—gave another daughter to the Clito in marriage, still hoping to see a grandchild of his crowned at Westminster.

Consequent position of Henry's daughter, the Em-

press Matilda.—There remained for Henry only the name and possible use as an heiress of his only daughter, Matilda. But she was away in Germany, already six years married to the Emperor; there could be no question at the moment of his or her succeeding to the English throne. Henry married again (the daughter of the Duke of Lower Lorraine), but had no heir. The situation, of course, produced yet another rebellion (the Norman rebellion of 1123–1125), but Henry's son-in-law, the Emperor, bringing great forces to the Rhine, held the King of France from action—and incidentally provided that great rally of the chief vassals round the French Crown which was the starting-point of its coming power. The Papacy helped Henry by declaring void the marriage of the Clito, and for the third time, against the third of the great efforts made against him, Henry re-established strong and complete rule. And fortune also partly, but only partly, favoured him. When he was already firmly in the saddle again, his son-in-law, the Emperor Henry V, died—upon May 23rd, 1125. It was therefore possible now to put forward Matilda and to claim for her the throne of England and the Duchy of Normandy, as well as all the other lordships.

To the modern ear a claim of that sort sounds very different from what it did to the ears of a feudal baronage in the early XIIth century. The technical sovereignty of a woman was not unprecedented; but it was unprecedented on such a scale and quite unknown here and in Northern France. A woman could bring a lordship by marriage to her husband, or by blood to her son, but to rule it when all rule was a military matter was another thing; and to rule the great business

of England and Normandy with its now admitted claims of overlordship of Scotland and its undefined claims over Maine and its intermittent claims over Anjou, and its standing moral threat to the French crown itself, seemed impossible. Yet on the Christmas Day of the next year, 1126, the great Council of Nobles did homage to the Empress, promising she should be their "Lady"—the word queen was not used—and that other descendant of the Conqueror, a descendant in the same degree as her own (a grandchild, but a son of a daughter), Stephen, who had the counties of Boulogne in Flanders and of Mortain on the Western Norman marches, was present and swore fealty high among the list of peers.[1] Clito's name was still supported by the French court. The French king married him to his wife's half-sister, and Henry countered, in the same year, 1127, by a contract of marriage which was at first meant to do no more than to consolidate the attachment of Anjou to Normandy—an expansion already formidable enough to the overlord in Paris—but which in fact made possible the overwhelming power of a King of England, Henry's grandson (Henry II), less than thirty years later. For what Henry did was this: to balance Clito's marriage he espoused, and (in the summer of 1128) wedded his widowed daughter, the Empress Matilda—a woman then 25 years of age—

[1] See the general genealogy, page 70. The particular relation is thus—



to Geoffrey, the son and heir of Anjou: a boy of fifteen, and a violent boy.

Matilda married to Geoffrey Plantagenet, son of Anjou, 1128.—The marriage produced some disagreement. It was not popular with Henry's vassals; they had no desire to see the Angevin ruling over them as the husband of the lady to whom they had, not all of them sincerely, sworn allegiance. Yet it was solemnized, and almost at the same time the Clito was dead—dead of a wound received in the besieging of one of his rebellious cities in the county of Flanders, which the King of France had given him upon the extinction of the original line.

Birth of Henry of Anjou Plantagenet.—Though for some time no heir was born to Matilda,[1] Henry insisted on the barony of England renewing (in 1131) their oath to Matilda; and in the next year but one, 1133, a male child was born, and christened Henry. Thus did the future seem more secure, for when Matilda and her husband had passed, a direct male heir of Henry himself and of the Conqueror would be at the head of the new great feudal state astraddle of the narrow seas. But it was still true that, for the moment, the child was but a baby, and that either the ruler would be a woman, or that he would be her Angevin husband, of whom the greater barons thought as an equal and not as a superior, and whose fief they traditionally regarded as ground to be over-run.

Death of Henry I, December 2, 1135.—Things stood so, with no great security for what was to come, when Henry, now not far from 70 years of age, overwrought

[1] She could not bear her boy-husband—nor he her, with her vile temper and German training—and for a while they lived apart.

himself upon a hunting in the ducal forest of Lyons during the late winter of 1135, up on the hills east of the Seine, south of Rouen. There, in his hunting lodge, in the night between December 1st and December 2nd, 1135, he died.

(D) Stephen: or the Feudal Chaos

(From December 2nd, 1135, to October 24th, 1154—nearly 19 years)

How important the continuity of Henry I's reign was to England—the length of that single rule coupled with the tenacity of the King's character—is seen at once in the chaos which succeeded it when a ruler was lacking. But for that long rule, and the man who had directed it, the Conquest would have hardly held. At any rate, the newly established Anglo-French unit would have fallen into some other grouping, and all our history would have been altered.

For between the death of Henry and the growth to manhood of his grandson, Matilda's boy, there are nineteen years in which rule is disputed, in which there is therefore an anarchy of feudal levy against feudal levy, and a bewildering shifting of individual lords from one side to the other.

For Europe as a whole these nineteen years are splendid with the name of St. Bernard—the first figure in Christendom: the man who ruled the West from a cell like a cupboard. It was the moment of the unsuccessful but brilliant Second Crusade; what was much more, it was the moment when the risen body of Europe, which had already shown so much vigour after its sleep, was taking on its full functions; a mo-

ment of wide monastic expansion, of new building upon all sides; the introduction of a new aspect in building, the appearance of the pointed arch; the gathering of the great popular schools; it was the beginning of the mediæval Philosophy; it was the day of Abelard. Yet the feudal chaos weakens the rôle of England in that nineteen years, and the great Angevin time lags behind, comes later than, the main upspringing of Europe. Perhaps the harvest of the Angevins was the greater for that fallow.

The feudal chaos on Henry's death did not interrupt the new social life.—We must not exaggerate the effect of the feudal confusion of the disputed succession and the perpetual sieges and local fighting upon the general life of the English between 1135 and 1154. One vivid and horrible passage in the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle* at its close may well mislead judgment here. The England of those nineteen years was full of building as the Continent was, and even housed the new learning as the Continent did. And society upon the whole was happy; indeed, the foreigner noted the peculiar happiness in the English temper and even a peculiar gaiety, too great a lightness. Therefore in following as we must do the political welter of claim and counter-claim and alliance and counter-alliance among the land-masters of that time, we must remember that it was also the time in which the Cistercians were in the midst of their expansion, in which the first lecturers at Oxford began to gather their great crowds, and in which, towards the end, hardly a market town was without some vivid example of important new building.

Character of Matilda.—The feudal anarchy was

based upon this: that though all men had thus sworn allegiance to Matilda, there was no material basis for her reign. Her son was a baby only two years old. If she was herself to govern it was an ill: for she was a violent, arrogant woman, a breeder of quarrels, and not even as much respected as the strength of her temper might have made her to be. If it was her younger second husband, Geoffrey of Anjou, who was to lead (which he did not), then it meant that the great nobles of England and Normandy would be under an Angevin. Had the rival to Matilda been of a character comparable to that of her father, she would have had no moment of success, and perhaps her son would not have inherited.

Stephen of Blois takes advantage of her unpopularity in her own class.—There was not one, there were two, possible rivals—the brothers Theobald and Stephen, both of them sons of the rich and powerful count who had inherited and governed the region of Blois on the Loire, and who had married the Conqueror's daughter; the elder, Theobald, was now in his father's place, Count of Blois; the younger had married the heiress of the county of Boulogne, and was known as Stephen of Boulogne. Theobald was at first chosen by the barony, who had been with their king when he died in Normandy; Stephen had crossed the Channel in haste, and was bargaining with the wealthy men of London and with the bishops. For Matilda no one had moved.

She was as unpopular with the French barons of England as with her husband, and his inferiority rankled: for, important in the politics of Northern France and England as was the district he ruled (and

particularly in the politics of Normandy to which Anjou was the next quasi-independent neighbour, and foe when not a vassal), he had a much lower place in Europe (of course) than her former husband, the Emperor.

Origin of the great name "Plantagenet."—There is, by the way, with regard to this young and unsuitable husband of hers, a little point to be remembered, for it has put a great name into history. It pleased him to carry in his cap a sprig of broom, the *genesta* or "genêt" of Northern French. From this he got the nickname of "Broom-plant": "He of the Broom-plant": or (in his own language and that of all the gentry of the time in France and England, and a rapidly increasing number of the lesser English freemen as well), "Plante-à-genêt." That is where we got the word *Plantagenet*, which, take it all in all, is the greatest name attaching to the history of England.

That name, that family, ruled from father to son uninterruptedly for all but two and a half centuries, time enough surely to found in England such a traditional monarchy as might have been permanent. The Lancastrian usurpation broke the strict line of that golden chain, but the Lancastrians were Plantagenets; and it was not until Richard III went down at Bosworth that their crown fell and passed from that family for ever.

But to return to Matilda. The idea of a woman actually governing a feudal state—that is, keeping in order a number of petty kingdoms, each sovereign of which was perpetually fighting small battles with his neighbours and against whom the super-sovereign had perpetually to act in arms—was, to that generation,

unnatural to the point of being absurd: at any rate, in the North. More unnatural perhaps in connection with Normandy than in connection with England, but strongly out of place in both.

Matilda never crowned nor called Queen.—It is to be remarked that Matilda was never actually crowned—though she came very near to being so: and crowning and anointing were each as essential to the idea of kingship in that time as the gazetting of a person to an official post is essential to his due holding of it in our time. The person crowned and anointed was surrounded by the moral authority and by the executive idea—and mankind is ruled by ideas. The unanointed and uncrowned had never more than a claim. Moreover, the word "queen" was not used of Matilda, even in the brief moment of her success; she was still called—as in the homage scene of ten years before—only "lady" of the realm, no more. On the other hand, the mere fact that there was a strongly disputed succession at once gave the realities of feudalism—that is, the real power of local lords as against the moral power of the crown—their chance.

The nineteen years are a very confused passage of time if we take them as political history only. Their true importance in the story of England is their social history, which was the continuance of that rising tide of mediæval life, the new seedling universities, the great churches, the growth of all things through the Crusades. But even the confusion of their political history falls into some order if we appreciate two points, first, that the whole time was a *reign* of Stephen, crossed and shadowed throughout by the *claim* of Matilda; or, to put it the other way, the whole time was one in

which men admitted at the back of their minds the claim of Matilda as right, but thought of Stephen as the king.

Matilda's claim had two powerful moral backings: an oath twice taken most solemnly in the full feudal Council, and most solemnly, and as the head of all the barons, by the very man who was now supplanting her; and the fact that the idea of strict hereditary succession was in process of acceptance and definition precisely in her time. The period gets its character from the fact that Stephen was for most of the time wholly, and for all of it in part, actually king; but it was the ineradicable feeling people had about strict descent and the feudal oath which made it so easy for Matilda's son when the time came to take the throne. That is the first point to bear in mind if we are to understand this difficult passage.

Three episodes: (1) Stephen's rule, 1135–1141.—And the second is that the whole period falls fairly sharply into three contrasting episodes, all of which are marked by the influence of the Church. The first episode is the rule of Stephen, which lasts five and a half years and ends when Stephen quarrels with his brother, the powerful Bishop of Winchester, and, after civil war, gets taken in 1141.

(2) **Alternate rise and fall of Matilda's claim, 1141–1149.**—The second episode is Matilda's short-lived success followed by her being slowly pressed back into the West, and the later weakening of Stephen's position through his quarrel with the Church. That period lasts eight years, from 1141 till 1149.

(3) **Rise of Henry II, 1149–1154.**—The third episode is the coming to England of Matilda's son, Henry of

Anjou, in the year 1149, he being then sixteen and able to bear armour, and to take leadership under the ideas of the time, his second appearance in England in 1153, his gradual affirmation of his position, the death of Stephen's heir, his treaty with young Henry and his own death on October 25th, 1154.

In those three episodes, marked by the terminal years 1141, 1149 and 1154, we have an arrangement of three chapters which lend some form to what I have called the "nineteen years' chaos." It is a phrase which might justly be modified into "intermittent chaos," for though the validity of either claim was never acknowledged by *all* for any length of time, yet there was actual rule in patches interrupted only by the outbreak of fighting between the feudal nobles and their local levies of free tenants-by-armed-service and hired men.

In the absence of a strong and certain king, one force was permanent and dominant: that was the Church —in the concrete, the great bishoprics and their holders.

The Hildebrandine reform intended to give the Church (and was successful in giving the Church) a far stronger and renewed spiritual life; it also gave the Church, perhaps to its hurt, a greater political power. It was now more strongly disciplined—each province, England included, more fully in touch throughout Europe with all the others—than it had been a lifetime earlier. It could work together with more rapidity, it could use the moral force of awefulness attached to every clerical office—and particularly the Episcopal—no matter who were the holders of such office. Therefore it is that we shall see, all through this reign of

Stephen, the great bishops, and particularly Salisbury and Winchester, deciding power.

And here it is important to go back to the relationships of the man who had precariously captured the crown.

It will be remembered that among the lesser but important fiefs of the French monarchy, among the counties or districts ruled over in more or less sovereign fashion by their local lords, was the county surrounding the town of Blois, and the Count of Blois, though less in revenue and position, was—as holder of an independent fief under the French Crown—the feudal equal of very great vassals like Normandy and Flanders.

Importance of Stephen's brother Henry, Bishop of Winchester.—William the Conqueror had married his daughter Adela to the Count of Blois of the day, and the pair had four sons,—the eldest was dead, the eldest surviving one was Theobald, who at one brief moment was candidate for Normandy and England as eldest grandson of the Conqueror. The next was Stephen, with whom we are concerned. The last, Henry, had been put into the Church and given the very important See of Winchester. He was also, later, made Papal Legate in England. He commanded vast revenues, and his connections and character made him stronger even than his wealth and hierarchical position. There seems to have been a moment when he even thought of getting his See made metropolitan by the Pope, perhaps in lieu of Canterbury, or at least as a rival.

Supported by that brother, Stephen obtains the Crown.—Stephen, then, took the Crown of England, supported by this exceedingly powerful brother of his,

who was the unquestioned leader of the clerical body in the country. Stephen had married the heiress to the county of Boulogne, herself the daughter of St. Margaret of Scotland's daughter, and therefore the niece of Henry I's English wife. Boulogne was not a great fief like Blois, it did not hold of the King of France direct, nor was it very large. It held of the Count of Flanders, who in his turn held of the King of France. But the county of Boulogne was a little district which could be governed almost independently, it was rich, and it had the considerable advantage that it commanded the Straits.

The new king was popular, he was personally very brave, a regular northern French knight, generous, amenable. Everyone noted his bearing with equals and his great courtesy to inferiors, his good-heartedness and good fellowship. But his position compelled him, and perhaps to some extent his character as well, to weakening the monarchy. He gave promises that those who had probably encroached on, and wrongly held, certain portions of forests should not be troubled, and he actually forwent the old regular tax of Dane gold amounting to, say, a third of the old revenue. He was also compelled by his position to give largely out of his treasury—too largely; and he was further impoverished by having to depend largely upon mercenaries.

But the baronage at first were all loyal, and even the great Earl of Gloucester, who was the master of most of the Severn Valley (one of the last king's numerous illegitimate children, and therefore half-brother to Matilda), took the oath.

Stephen was careful to play his part. He buried

the late king with great pomp at Reading (January, 1136) and, immediately afterwards, added to the other concessions he had been compelled to give the extremely dangerous permission to build private castles. Moreover, it should be noted that the clergy (through whom he had got the support of the reigning Pope, Innocent II) joined the laity in adding a clause to their oath of fealty that it held only "as long as he kept his own word to them." No doubt that idea was implied in every feudal bond, but to underline it in this way was significant.

The Feudal chaos begins, 1136.—And what followed was the beginning of the chaos: immediately. First of all David, the King of Scotland, Matilda's uncle,[1] invaded the North; Stephen met him with a large force and checked him at Durham, so there was no bad fighting. But there was another piece of unavoidable concession weakness. David's heir, Henry, was allowed to do homage for Carlisle. He already had feudal dues from Huntingdon and Doncaster, but these had little military effect, while Carlisle was on the border. Then Wales rose. In Normandy there was ruthless civil war, Matilda's husband fighting for his claim, Stephen, who had done former homage for the Duchy to the King of France through his son and heir, Eustace, insufficiently supported by the towns, and the barons waging private war as opportunity served.

[1] St. Margaret

Henry I = Matilda — David

Matilda

Battle of Northallerton, August 22nd, 1138.—Then came further trouble in England: the King of Scotland crossed the border three times in 1138, harrying and burning and carrying people away into slavery. He was badly defeated, but by local English levies, not by Stephen, near Northallerton, in the middle of the summer, August 22nd. But the victory did not end the war, though he lost half his army of nearly 30,000 men, and by the next year, 1139, his heir was allowed to do homage for Northumberland.[1]

Just at that moment Stephen took an action for which he has been blamed as a blunder, but which I think it is more just to regard as inevitable. He determined to bring to order one of the great feudal bishops, Roger of Salisbury.

Stephen quarrels with the Bishops, 1139.—The higher ecclesiastical appointments—among the secular clergy at least—had deteriorated badly from the standard of Anselm and of Lanfranc before him. The tendency to give the very great revenues of a bishopric as endowment for the favourite or for the cadet of a great family had proved too strong. Roger of Salisbury was an example in point. He was a mere feudal baron, and a licentious and brutal one at that, and one

[1] The Battle of Northallerton has been called the "Battle of the Standard" because a great pole was set up as a symbol or rallying point upon a wagon with the banners of the Yorkshire Saints and of St. Peter, and the Sacrament in a silver pyx was at its summit set in a cross. The instance is a good example of the unity of Europe in those days. For the thing is almost exactly parallel to the corresponding battle outside Milan fought by the Lombard Italians when they destroyed the Germans of the Emperor. An Arabic historian notes a similar Pole-Standard in the Crusades.

It is worth remarking that two names, later famous, already appear in the host of Scotland at that date, Bruce and Balliol; they are both of course Norman names, their owners had fiefs in England and, for the matter of that, betrayed the King of Scotland on this occasion.

of his nephews was bishop of Lincoln, the other of Ely. All three held and garrisoned castles. If Stephen was to put any limit at all to the independence of his feudal barony, he was bound to tackle a case of that kind.

He acted with great promptitude, vigour and decision, arrested Roger and one of his nephews and demanded their castles, but Devizes was still held by the other nephew. Stephen took Roger beneath the walls of the castle, showed him half-starved, and said the starvation would go on until the victim's nephew surrendered the place.

At once the official body of the Church was up in arms. It was an intolerable outrage! No matter what the character of a bishop or what his feudal menace, he was a member of a Sacred Order, and all his colleagues formed one body with him. A synod was called, Stephen refused satisfaction. The synod was dissolved on September 1st, 1139; by the 30th Matilda had landed, for her chance had come; the Church was now on her side.

She stood a siege in Arundel Castle while her brother, the great Earl of Gloucester, renounced his allegiance to Stephen and held the West for her. Within Arundel Castle was the Queen Dowager, as well as Henry the First's second wife Alice. Stephen deliberately allowed both those ladies their freedom, and even gave Matilda escort to Bristol, where her brother had his headquarters.

Of the several reasons given for a move which seems at first inexplicable, surely the best is that which ascribes Stephen's action not to quixotic chivalry but to policy. With Matilda in the West, and with London supporting him, he might ultimately press forward

and hold the whole kingdom again. With Matilda standing a long siege in the East, and the chances of risings all over the East during his detention before Arundel, a man so insecure as Stephen would be in a worse posture than with his rival tied to a particular remote district on the Severn.

Stephen defeated at Lincoln, February 2nd, 1141.—The policy did not succeed. The new Archbishop of Canterbury, a Norman called Theobald from Thierceville, steadily supported Matilda, and Dover town and Castle, in the very heart of the East and the chief gate of the country, did the same. What resulted was a welter of private war all up and down England, which ended in a sharp accident after more than a year. One of Stephen's royal castles, that of Lincoln, had been surprised by that typical feudal baron Ranulf of Chester, who appeared on either side indifferently, fighting for loot. Stephen marched north to besiege it. Ranulf escaped through the lines, got to Robert of Gloucester in the West, brought him up with ten thousand men, and on Candlemas, February 2nd, 1141, the king's force besieging Lincoln Castle was destroyed and Stephen himself captured and kept a close prisoner, chained, in Bristol Castle.

That was the end of the first episode.

Matilda's failure as a ruler.—There followed a brief effort on the part of Matilda to make herself a ruler indeed. It was only possible because she had Stephen's brother Henry, the Bishop of Winchester, behind her, and the only reason she had him behind her was the quarrel which had broken out between Stephen and the clergy two years before. It is astonishing and true that this angry woman threw away

all the trumps in her hand. Her coronation was prepared, that same spring, but when Henry of Winchester, with all the moral force of his Legatine authority, was prepared to accept the resignation of Stephen, but asked that Stephen's heir Eustace should at least be confirmed in his hereditary fief of Boulogne, Matilda refused. She insulted the Londoners, she made everything as difficult for herself as possible. The Capital rose—that is the truest explanation of a confused incident—and she fled uncrowned to Oxford. Rallying there an army in which were Robert of Gloucester and the King of Scotland, she moved up to besiege the Legate in Winchester. He escaped, but his castle was pressed. The Legate himself rallied an army and for two weeks kept up the fight against Matilda's besieging force. Winchester was burnt, but as time went on it was clear that the general feeling was for Stephen. She despaired of victory, and in mid-September made off for the West. Robert, commanding her rearguard, was caught up and taken and all his force dispersed. By the end, therefore, of that one year, 1141—indeed by the autumn of it—the old situation was more or less restored: the East, London, and the mass of England still with Stephen, Matilda cooped up in the West.

By November 1st, All Saints, Robert of Gloucester was exchanged for Stephen, and then began the renewed ding-dong of feudal chaos and warfare, carried on for four years (at the beginning of which we have the famous episode of Matilda's escape from Oxford Castle in the snow).

Matilda leaves England, 1147.—What put an end to that particular chapter of anarchy was the death of

Robert. It was the result of a sickness into which he fell towards the end of 1146. Matilda despaired of victory, and in spite of the steadfast support she had personally from the archbishop, and the enduring sentiment in favour of the Conqueror's immediate heir in blood by primogeniture, she abandoned England.

But Stephen still at issue with the Church and insecure.—It might be thought that Stephen would therefore have gradually recovered complete power, but the disorder had gone too far for that; and every effort to master his enemies failed. By trying to prevent the Primate—Theobald, his enemy—from going to a great Papal Council at Rheims, he got his private land put under an interdict, that is, forbidden the usual offices of the Church. He thus lost the support of the Papacy (Innocent II was dead). He found the archbishop unwilling to crown his son and heir Eustace. He drove Theobald into exile again, and so got himself excommunicated (1151).

The whole thing looks like a mere bewildered wobble, but the real reason for the confusion of policy was a new, rising power, the advent of which in 1149 ends the second episode of the Civil War and introduces the final one.

The young Plantagenet appears on the scene, 1149.—Young Henry of Anjou had begun to appear. He had already, in the year 1149, gone to Carlisle to see his uncle the King of Scotland. But, a few months after the excommunication of Stephen, while all was still uncertain, young Henry's father died, and he became at eighteen the independent Count of Anjou, as he already was (by his father's grant during his lifetime) Duke of Normandy.

But he was upon the eve of a much greater thing.

Louis VII of France had married, years before, that heiress in whom the great line of the Dukes of Aquitaine ended. Aquitaine was a vast feudal state, vassal to the King of France, and suzerain to much the greater part of the territory lying between the Loire and the Pyrenees. It had claims of feudal superiority over the great county of Toulouse—a rich province to the south and east, and for the rest it left only a narrow strip of territory between its northern boundary and the River Loire.

Had Louis VII kept that dower and handed it on to a son of his and Eleanor's, the kingdom of France would have been three-quarters made, generations before it actually achieved unity. It could easily have outmatched the Angevin power. But the queen bore the king no son. Further, they were ill-matched: she hated his piety and he her debauch. It was really, however, the lack of an heir that settled the affair, and when Louis came back from the glorious disaster of the Second Crusade, both were agreed to have the marriage annulled (by the French clergy) upon the convenient plea of consanguinity.

Marriage of Henry Plantagenet to Eleanor, heiress of Aquitaine, May, 1152.—With her person Eleanor took away her great dower. Three weeks after the separation she was married (May, 1152) to the young Angevin, ten years her junior, and at a blow this boy of nineteen became the sovereign of far the most important united extent of territory in Europe. What it meant merely on the map the reader may see in the sketch facing page 188.

There was no resisting such a force; especially as

the Pope remained adamant and ordered the English bishops not to crown Stephen's son and heir, Eustace, no matter what pressure was put upon them.

Death of Eustace, Stephen's heir, August, 1153.—In 1153 young Henry crossed the Channel. His immediate force was small—less than four thousand men—but the threat of further levies, the knowledge of what the future would be, the now permanent throwing of the weight of the Church against Stephen, made the issue certain. The great feudatories of England began to approach the Angevin, and what put an end to all question was the death in the month of August of Eustace.

Stephen and Henry met, and at Winchester, on November 6th, 1153, the final terms were arranged.

Treaty of Winchester, November, 1153. Henry Plantagenet to succeed Stephen, who dies October 24th, 1154.—Henry was recognized as heir to the Crown, Stephen's personal manors were kept for his second son William (who had the Earldom of Surrey), but Henry was to be Counsellor to the King, and the barony were to do homage to him, reserving the rights of the king so long as he lived.

The truce and settlement lasted less than a year. On October 24th, 1154, Stephen died (Henry having gone back to Normandy). The anarchy which had died down with the advent of that young soldier could not rise again.

II

THE FIRST PLANTAGENETS

1154–1216

62 Years

A. Henry II, Till the Death of Becket
B. Henry II, After the Death of Becket
C. Richard I
D. John

EARLY PLANTAGENET OR ANGEVIN LINEAGE


The Empress *Matilda* daughter of King Henry I of England = Geoffrey, Count of Anjou (The "Plante-à-genêt")
HENRY II King of England (died 1189) = Eleanor, heiress to Aquitaine, that is, all Southern France
Henry = daughter of King of France (died before his father, 1183, without leaving a son)
Richard I ("Cœur de Lion"), King of England (acceded 1189, died, leaving no heir, 1199)
Geoffrey (died before his father, in 1186) = Constance heiress of Brittany
John King of England (acceded 1199, died 1216) = (1) The heiress of Robert of Gloucester, Matilda's supporter (2) Isabella of Angoulême
Matilda = Henry the Lion (of Saxony)
Eleanor
Arthur, Prince of Brittany. (Had claim, as son of elder son, against John. Born 1187, murdered 1203)
HENRY III King of England (born 1207, acceded 1216)
The Emperor *Otto IV*

II

THE FIRST PLANTAGENETS

(A) Henry II

Up to Becket's Death (October 25th, 1154, to December 29th, 1170 —over 16 Years)

The "Angevin episode" (that is, the reign of Henry II and his two sons, Richard and John) has two characters. It is the approach to the summit of the Middle Ages—the full flowering of the new schools, the new architecture, and the new popular institutions —a fully organized and united Christendom; and it is the near approach and recession from the experiment of a great Anglo-French realm which would have changed the story of the West. But for the murder of St. Thomas of Canterbury, that realm would have come into being. On account of his murder it failed.

Sudden new and great position of the Plantagenet in Western Europe.—It was a sudden and novel Feudal Grouping of all the Atlantic and Channel seaboard, the united rule of one man over more than half France, and the immediate threat of the Angevin dynasty replacing the Capetian as the leader of Western Europe: perhaps as kings over all between Burgundy and the Pyrenees. When Henry II inherited the throne of

England it was a revolution, though an interrupted revolution, in the political geography of Christendom.

The young man was already vassal to the King of France, for what were the virtually separate kingdoms of the West all the way down from the Channel to the Pyrenees (Normandy and Maine, Anjou, the divisions of Aquitaine), and he was to become indirectly the superior of Brittany as well. His feudal overlord, the King of France, was now far weaker than he; that is, possessed of a smaller recruiting field for armies, of a smaller revenue, of a less number of towns. The Capetian monarchy of Paris was for the first time pitted against a single great rival, a united feudal power still nominally holding of, but greater than, its own.

Hitherto the Capetian monarch had been the numerical superior of any one lord in Western Europe and the very real symbol of Gallic unity. He was the admitted centre and chief in the midst of great rulers (Normandy, Brittany, Flanders, Poitiers, etc.) who would not permanently make any stable alliance against him; whom, on the contrary, he would use very often one against the other. But now he had one rival house to meet: the Plantagenet. Its revenues, and resources of military power in men, were under one feudal command; and when to this were suddenly added the wealth, the population, and (what was more important) the independent kingship of England, they formed a whole which looked as though it was going to eat up its rival at Paris.

Might have produced an Anglo-French realm but for the murder of St. Thomas of Canterbury.—For sixteen years the issue lay doubtful. Then came that

THE ANGEVIN DOMINIONS

strange accident which changed all our history. At the very end of 1170, St. Thomas of Canterbury was murdered, and the chances of the Angevin were lost. It was the turning-point; the reign is sharply divided in two—the sixteen years up to the murder of the archbishop; the nineteen years that follow.

The reign falls naturally into two main periods; the first ending, the second beginning, with that one central event of St. Thomas' death, which was to be of such great moment not only to the story of England, and of France, but to all the relations between the Church and civil society. We have in this (1) the eight years at the opening of the reign, which preceded the very sudden transposition of Thomas à Becket from a purely lay position in which, though in minor orders, his whole interests and character were laical, to the priesthood and the Metropolitan See of England. We shall see how rapid the transformation was when we come to that moment, in the spring of 1162. Next we have (2) the succeeding eight and a half years which are filled with the great quarrel between Becket and the king, and which end in Becket's death at the very close, as I have said, of 1170.

After St. Thomas' death all changes, and we have a long nineteen years of struggle between Henry's declining power and the French Crown, ending in his personal defeat and death, a decline the early part of which is oddly coincident with the first attempts at a conquest or settlement of Ireland. For though that adventure hardly proceeded from the king himself, yet will it always be associated with the picture of his great position in Europe and even with his private ambition.

We approach the greatest moments of the Middle Ages.—The beginning of the great Plantagenet story is, of course, very much larger than the mere story of the king, or even than the capital incident and effect of Becket's death. It is the opening into full flower of the Middle Ages. It is the rapid brimming up of that flood of which I have spoken, which is to reach its summit in the next century. Henry lived to see the fall of Jerusalem and the call to the Third Crusade, and the fruit of what the Crusades did for the European mind. In the realm of ideas the generation contemporary with Henry II lived through something of that experience in exploration and change which the fathers of our own generation lived through during the great triumphs of physical science, back in the middle of the XIXth century. Even on the material side, that lifetime saw change and growth everywhere, the new building was changing the aspects of whole towns. It was a period when half the stonework of Western Europe rose up fresh and white to the eye.

It is on this account that the reign is filled with precedent in administration and the growth of law, an activity which early clashed with the admitted autonomy of the Church, and which, on the lay side, began the somewhat tardy but very thorough English legal development of the Middle Ages.

I. The First Eight Years

Peace imposed by young Henry II at his accession.—The first eight years of the reign passed happily and with little incident. The great energy of Henry had not yet procured him personal enemies, nor had yet

eaten inwards. He began by imposing that good peace which was the chief glory of any mediæval king. He razed the "adulterine" castles, i.e. the castles set up by private barons at their good pleasure during the feudal chaos of the immediate past[1]; he affirmed himself upon the Continent, making himself secure against a doubtful claim to Anjou by his younger brother, paying him off, and taking over the town of Nantes.

Presence and character of Henry Plantagenet.—At this opening of his great business of life Henry was a figure to be remembered. He was short, like nearly all the men of the Conqueror's blood, full-blooded, as they also all were; tending to be fat, as most of them were—but never becoming as unwieldy as his great-grandfather had become. He was well-read, actively curious in mind, with very strong memory, great powers of intrigue, and an astonishing reputation for falsehood, which his contemporaries bear witness to as though it were a sort of talent. Perhaps it was. He could speak well; and in policy he had not only tenacity, which he inherited certainly from his mother and grandfather rather than from the wild Angevin blood.[2] But that Angevin blood gave him paroxysms of passion which were like those of a lunatic. With that went an astonishing activity, in the saddle and on foot, and yet a curious sobriety in food and drink. It was a singular, most powerful, arresting personality, and all Europe

[1] They were in number—according to what size of building might be given the title of a "Castle"—from under 400 to over 1100.

[2] To account for that Angevin temper, the fever of which was in him and in all his sons, particularly in John, one must take as a cause or a symbol that ancestress, Melisand, who was a womanish dragon by night and a dragonish woman by day. I wish I could print here a picture of that fine modern statue in steel and ivory, showing her and her armoured husband clasped together. It is to-day, I believe, the property of Madame de Bearn.

wondered at it. In these first years of his it was not yet exaggerated.

See him moving feverishly about, restless in gesture, impatient, desiring quick Masses of his chaplains and short meals of his cooks: with scant tufts of red hair on a pate nearly bald, prominent but keen eyes, glancing everywhere, observant; ready for anger. Such was the Angevin.

The English Pope, Adrian IV.—He had in those first years very good luck. In the same days in which he was crowned king (December 19th, 1154) a certain Nicholas, born perhaps at Abbots Langley in Hertfordshire, the son of a small clerical official, early turned out of St. Albans for incapacity, living as a beggar student in Paris, oddly rising to an Abbacy in Provence, had been picked out by Pope Eugenius in the year 1146 to be made a cardinal. During the years which were the last four of Stephen's reign, he was travelling as Papal Legate in the Scandinavian kingdoms, and not much more than a fortnight before Henry's own coronation he had been unanimously chosen for Pope upon the death of Anastasius, Eugenius' successor. All England was proud of what had happened to this oddly adventurous Nicholas (who had somehow got the name of Brekespear, perhaps in the course of his early wanderings; perhaps from his father), and Pope Adrian IV was a real support to the young king during the four years in which their reigns overlapped (Adrian died in 1159).

That support has been exaggerated, from the singularity of the coincidence and from the isolated character of the one English papal reign; but it was real.

Entry of Thomas à Becket.—Two years later Thomas

à Becket enters upon the scene. He was an enormous man, a head and shoulders above Henry, and somewhat older; of strong will, great industry, and an intelligence powerful, somewhat sombre within, but expanding its energy in external gaiety. He was of very good middle class burgess birth. His father came from Thierceville in Normandy, had been a merchant in Rouen, and then came over to England and flourished (at first) as one of the London merchants. He was therefore—like Pope Adrian—English born, but—unlike Pope Adrian—of the French-speaking class now already extending well below the gentry. He was excellently trained in London itself, in the new schools at Oxford, and in that now acknowledged centre of European thought, the growing University of Paris. And in the course of his youth he had studied the newly discovered and newly taught Roman law at Bologna. He had become the right-hand man of the old Archbishop of Canterbury, Theobald—a neighbour of his father's, also from Thierceville—and the steady support which Theobald gave to Matilda's cause was put down to this young Thomas, upon whom had been bestowed, with other benefits, the Archdeaconry of Canterbury. That post gave him thus in early youth (he was not yet 30 years of age) an acquaintance with wealth[1] and great position.

These were not without their effect upon his character; and young as he was, he had twice been sent to the Court of Rome, probably to support Matilda's cause.

This was the man who became chancellor—that is,

[1] It was worth about £2000 a year in our money, say in the social values of that time, what £10,000 a year might be to-day.

the first minister and principal agent of the Crown—in the third year after Henry's accession, and by recommendation of the old archbishop, who had himself held that office and was just giving it up.

Thomas à Becket had been, on account of a slight superiority of age, a sort of tutor to the king while yet but prince. Now that he had become chancellor they were friends, intimate and familiar; and in spite of Henry's character the older man was more really governing all the vast Angevin territory than was the younger. He was immensely endowed; he evidently loved splendour and quite certainly he loved rule—for he felt his capacity to rule. He travelled in exaggerated magnificence, astonishing the French during one embassy, and all England throughout all those courtier years.

First move of the Plantagenet against the French Royal House, 1159.—Some months after Becket's taking over the Chancery, in 1159, the first move of the Angevin against the Capetian was made. Henry claimed the district of Toulouse. Now the Queen of France was the daughter of the last reigning Count of Toulouse; but *he* had had the fief as an independent government only through a financial transaction which was not certainly permanent; and the man who had touched the money and who had been the original Count was the Duke of Aquitaine, the dead father of Henry's Queen Eleanor. Thus both Henry and the French king, Louis VII, claimed Toulouse.

There was fighting between them in the South, Henry coming with a large mercenary army (the occasion of a new kind of tax, the *scutage*, of which more later), and in that fighting Becket joined with a large

troop. It was not decisive. The Angevin garrisoned Cahors and held it; but Toulouse he never held.

Death of Adrian IV, 1159.—The English Pope died in the same year, 1159. The Papacy was disputed on his death, and Alexander III was recognized in France and England against Victor, the Emperor's man, who had only received three votes. The point was of some importance, when we remember what was to follow in the way of Alexander's attitude towards the great coming quarrel between Henry and his Primate.

On April 13th, 1161, the old Archbishop of Canterbury, Becket's patron (and the chief supporter, perhaps, in all the West of Alexander III) died, and at once the rumour went about—because the man was so obviously the first in the kingdom—that Becket would be asked to take priest's orders and occupy the Metropolitan See. The king kept the revenues of the archbishopric for more than a year; then, in the May of 1162, he sent for Becket to come to him at Falaise (where he was holding his court), and told him that he must expect to be archbishop immediately.

Becket becomes Archbishop, 1162.—It is certain that Becket hesitated. The same thing has been said about scores and hundreds of preferments in the Dark and Middle Ages; it is part of the regular panegyric to say that the recipient of an honour was reluctant. Often this was true; for these men, as in the case of Anselm, were chosen precisely because they had such characters as would make nothing of title and dread the worldly complexity of a great political position. More often it was false. In Becket's case we may be certain that the reluctance was not only genuine, but

strong. And it is probably true that if Becket at last accepted, it was more from real devotion to the king than from listening to the Papal Legate who urged the same course.

The election, by the way, was a very good example of where reality lay in the matter of the investiture compromise. It was nominally carried out in the King's Chapel at Westminster on May 30th (where we now needs pass the ugly marble statues going to the main lobby between the House of Commons and the House of Lords) by a body of the monks of Canterbury, who were the only people legally entitled by the Church law to choose the archbishop. It was really, of course, a pure nomination of the king's; and Henry's heir was present to give the royal assent. The ex-chancellor was ordained priest, then and there, and on the morrow, the first Sunday after Pentecost, June 3rd, 1162,[1] he was consecrated to the throne of St. Augustine.

Very tall, still spare in figure, of long nose and feature, vehement, stammering at times but authoritative in voice, the new Archbishop turned to his changed life and duty.

Becket himself knew what was to come from this new place of his (seeing what character he had and what inflexibility he knew to be within him) in the way of conflict with his friend. The exalted Church of Hildebrand and the growing and more splendid laical State, were to clash, and he who had been like Henry's elder brother knew what the clash would be. He began by completely changing his life to a rigorous asceti-

[1] In memory of that date St. Thomas instituted in England the feast of Trinity Sunday, which later was imposed over all Europe.

cism. He proposed to resign the chancellorship, and he set out upon the new affair.

II. The Great Quarrel

Henry at this turn in his fortunes was in his twenty-ninth year; Becket probably just past his fortieth. There was a curious lull, lasting on into the summer of 1163, before the conflict which Becket had known would be inevitable first openly appeared. The pretext, or occasion, was an insult levelled at a priest by one of the king's justices, and a counter-insult returned.

Origin of the King's claim to criminal jurisdiction over clergy.—Some years earlier this priest, a canon of Bedford by name de Brois, had been convicted of manslaughter in his bishop's court. The king's justice, remembering this, had just called him a murderer, and de Brois had retorted with a corresponding insult. The clerical court had the offender whipped and deprived of his income, and suspended from his priestly functions for two years. If Henry had really only considered the particular case, that would have been enough satisfaction for the contempt of his judge; but he was considering much more: he was determined to extend the lay jurisdiction in criminal matters over the clergy. Hence the first general act of the drama. He summoned Becket and the bishops to Westminster on October 1st, 1163, and asked them to give up the clerical privilege. He asked them to promise, as being "his grandfather's customs," that any clerk condemned for a public crime in the spiritual courts should be handed over for sentence and punishment to his own (the king's) lay courts.

So the ball opened.

We must fully appreciate what this meant.

What a "Clericus" meant in the XIIth century.—In the first place, the word "clerk," "*clericus*," meant not a priest only, but anyone of that great number of men who had received orders in any degree; and the early mediæval civilization had a whole small nation of these in each country. For the mass of what we still call *clerical* work to-day was done by them; they were the trained writers, expositors, speakers, in the official language for all record and public acts of the time, which was Latin; they were the teachers in the schools, and formed nearly all the bureaucracy.

Next, we must appreciate what the exact position of such men was by custom; in other words, how far Henry's proposal was revolutionary. He called it "his grandfather's customs" because, at that time, he could make no appeal to change, save on precedent: in principle at least. But how far was he straining the precedent of the immediate past? And how far were his opponents, who appealed to Roman law and the spirit of a *remote* past, breaking with recent habit?

There had existed ever since the transformation of the Roman Empire in the Vth century spiritual courts side by side with the ordinary lay courts of justice. It is an idea which has become quite unfamiliar to the modern European mind; but it was taken for granted as part of the necessary furniture of society for more than a thousand years, and the fossil relics of it are to be found in our legal system to-day. [1]

[1] The reason, for instance, that Probate and Divorce came under the same judicial department in modern England, is the fact that both wills and marriage-cases once concerned the spiritual courts.

The idea was part and parcel of the Christianization of the Roman Empire, that is, of our native civilization, after its adoption of the Catholic faith.

It seemed normal and necessary that the Church should be self-governing: its Hierarchy and Priesthood judged only by their own body.

At first the process was simple; the man in holy orders was normally on the way to the priesthood (as he is to-day); he formed part of a theoretically self-governing religious society common to all Europe. He would be tried by the Church courts, especially for offences connected with his order and profession, as, for instance, simony; while the Church courts also dealt with wills, heresies, cases of nullity of marriage, and other points which were supposed specially to concern the spiritual side of life rather than the political. Further, ever since Justinian in the VIth century, if of two parties one was clerical, the case had to go to the bishop—though there was appeal to the lay imperial courts from the bishop's court.

The dual system was accepted, of course, in the convert areas as in the original Roman areas, and was as much taken for granted by the Englishmen and Normans and Angevins under the rule of Henry II, as the dual control of schoolmaster and parent is taken for granted by us to-day. It had more than 500 years behind it in its fulness; more than 700 years from its origins.[1]

New character of the Church courts after the study of Roman Law.—The Church courts were governed, as was the whole Church, by a body of law called the

[1] The right of a bishop to be tried by his fellow bishops and to exercise even criminal jurisdiction over his own clergy is as old as Constantine.

Canon Law; the word "canon" meaning nothing but "regulation according to a known rule."[1] In the Dark Ages definitions were vague. The Canon Law was fairly simple. The old Roman Law was not studied in its entirety; of Justinian's *Pandects* only certain extracts were known. But at the date of the great event we are now considering, the quarrel between Becket and the king, all the *Pandects* had been available for a matter of twenty-five years; and a short time before Henry's accession there had appeared the *Decretum* of Gratian, which was a codification of the Canon Law on the basis of Justinian. Already, therefore, the full assertion of a civil and spiritual, highly defined, dual system of law was ten years old in the schools and courts of Western Europe, the close definition of it on the old lines twenty-five years old, while the idea of a dual law in general, with plenty of precedents of cases and rules for the spiritual side, was immemorial.

One essential thing must not be forgotten. The Canon Law was universal; the Civil Law was local. The Canon Law was administered in the courts of men who were the most highly educated of their time, and all of whom were trained; the lay courts were tangled in a mass of differing local customs, especially of quaint traditions and popular testimony.

Economic aspect of the quarrel.—Another thing must be remembered. Finance. There was large chance money to be earned in both courts, and regular revenues

[1] The word "cannon" in firearms has the same derivation, the bore had to be made to an exact "regulation" gauge, and that is where the word came in. In the same way the Canon of a Cathedral or a Collegiate body meant originally a clerk professing a particular, clear rule and organized under that rule.

as well proceeding from fines and fees payable to the authorities in both. Therefore a strong economic motive was present. The lay side would be enriched, the clerical impoverished if Henry succeeded in his attempts.

Now a clash between the two was at this moment unavoidable, partly because the Canon Law was rapidly becoming highly systemized under the new teaching, more because the lay State was developing still more rapidly in wealth and culture with this opening of the Middle Ages; most of all because the word "clerk" had come to have a different and much more widely extended social meaning than it had borne in the simpler days of the past. It was no longer the simple priestly idea of an earlier age; it was the whole mass of people who by minor orders had entered into that great club or society of clergy in which the priests were already but a minority.

That was the novelty of position. The lay State could claim jurisdiction over *all* clerics on the plea that so many nominal clerics were now virtually laymen.

The most obvious point of contact and conflict between the two systems was criminal jurisdiction. Even under the high order of the Empire before the Dark Ages began, the limits were not exact, though in general one may say that the greater crimes, even of the clergy, were naturally punished by the State; at any rate, in the lower ranks of the sacred profession. But during the Dark Ages, not only had definition been lost, but there had been a growth in the power of spiritual jurisdiction as against lay jurisdiction. This had been going on, at any rate, since the time of Charlemagne, and that for the simple reason that lay juris-

diction belonged to comparatively small powers, local feudal lords, or at the best, overlords of provinces and realms; while spiritual jurisdiction covered the whole of society and inherited from the imperial idea itself.

Henry's peculiar strength for his attempted innovation.—Lastly, there were the two facts that Henry came nearest in all Europe to being an absolute monarch on something like an imperial scale. Germany had no such unity as had his dominions; the King of France was pressed by him, and less than he, in revenue and power, and only overlord of Flanders, Champagne, etc., not direct lord as Henry was of Anjou, Normandy, Maine, and all Aquitaine; the Spanish kingdoms were individually small. In the case of Henry, the Church had to deal with a real monarch, faintly recalling that old Roman lay power which had balanced the clerical centuries before.

On the top of that, England was an island, and Henry, as King of England—having England for his own demesne—could there secure himself against physical communication from that Church power which was universal in Western Christendom, and moved where it would over imaginary continental boundaries.

One might sum up and say that in this year 1163 the matter stood thus: the king thought that society could hardly continue if, with the vast new clerical body (including a mass of what we should to-day call laymen), crimes went unpunished by anything more severe than the customary effects of ecclesiastical discipline. He had for the claiming of clerics who had committed crimes, at any rate crimes of any magnitude, two things to go upon; a certain amount of vague, exceptional, rare, but striking precedent, and certain clear passages in

the newly discovered and studied body of Justinian's laws.

The Church's strength against him.—On the side of the Church was the feeling that the whole of the new enthusiastic reformation, which had already transformed Christendom, had been undertaken specially for the restoration of the Church's freedom within the State and of her rights of self-government. This claim of Henry to codify and define the king's old vague and protected rights, this proposed formal and universal sentencing and punishing by the king's court, and apart from the Church, of clerics who had committed crimes of *any* kind (for very great crimes were not particularly specified), meant the end of the Church's self-government—that is, her freedom—sooner or later; for it would be a mortal wounding of that freedom even there and then. Again, it would put that province of the universal Church which lay in England into a special, grossly inferior position to that which the Church Catholic held throughout Christendom.

But much the strongest argument on the Church's side, though the vaguest, was the instinct (a very sound one) that the real clash was between two principles, one of which must conquer. Either there was to be an independent Church ruling all the lives of Christian men in what all agreed to be the most important things; or there was to be a lay State wherein the Church would become at long last a mere sect—an opinion.

That vast quarrel is not decided to this day. It will re-arise, although those for whom I am writing these lines are unfamiliar with the very terms of it. There are contemporary societies in which the memory of the struggle is strong and the fear or certitude of

its revival is alive. It may sound exaggerated, but I believe it to be true, that the stand which Becket made against what was to the general spirit of the time an unpopular, arbitrary, and despotic innovation, ultimately destructive of the general unity of Europe and of popular tradition, retarded for more than 300 years the peril of spiritual disruption in Christendom. But for Becket Europe would have split in the XIIth century. He prevented that. He succeeded. But he would have not succeeded had it not been for the accident of his martyrdom—which had also unintentional political results to be examined later.

Henry's first move, autumn, 1163.—The phases of the process were these. After Henry had summoned the bishops to Westminster in the autumn of 1163, and had asked them to accept the vague phrase, "his grandfather's customs" (*especially* in the matter of clerks who had committed crimes), and that they had accepted, "saving their Order"—an equally elastic term—Saint Thomas distinguished himself by an attitude different from that of his inferiors and suffragans. The degree of his resistance is not clear. He was certainly thought to inspire the saving clause, "saving our Order," and the sequel shows that he was alone capable of prolonged resistance; but how far the words used could be interpreted as a partial yielding on this occasion may be disputed.

Now in doing this he embarrassed Pope Alexander, for that Pontiff depended upon the acknowledgment and support of the Kings of England and France. Germany and the Empire accepted the anti-Pope. Further, Alexander was not of Becket's temper. Becket was quite exceptional in Europe in that quality which

may be called heroism, obstinacy, constancy, or what you will and which determines the crises of social life. He was of that rare sort, which on such and such points, not many, are strictly immovable; yet he also had the emotional weakness of all intense men; it made him waver: it did but the more enhance his final fixity.

St. Thomas half gives way, December, 1163.—Before the end of the year, on December 3rd, St. Thomas had given a verbal promise in private which compromised him. Again, we do not quite know how far he went; but we do know that this action was due to a false impression (how conveyed, again we do not know) that the Pope had ordered him to yield under the pretext that the conflict was largely verbal, and that nothing serious could come of it, while something very serious might come of exasperating Henry in the full tide of his power.[1]

Council of Clarendon, January, 1164.—St. Thomas again yields.—The king acted immediately. On Saint Hilary's Day, January 13th, 1164, he called a council at Clarendon—the great Council of the Realm. There the archbishop again begged for the words "saving his Order," and Henry broke into a violent, open quarrel. Becket so far yielded that he promised, *without the saving clause*, a general adhesion to the customs.

Accepting the famous Constitutions of Clarendon, January, 1164.—But the word "customs" was still vague, and on January 26th (the day after Becket's ill-defined yielding—which itself had come twelve days

[1] The reader must be quite clear that the king already had a great advantage. A clerk having been degraded by his own courts lost his privileges, and for a second offence would automatically be tried in the King's Courts.

after the date of the summoning of the council) a definite document was drawn up, famous in history as The Constitutions of Clarendon. There were sixteen points, engrossed in three copies, and each was signed by the king, by the bishops, and by the thirty-seven barons of the great council. St. Thomas signed with the rest.

St. Thomas suffered great agony during this passage. "He had acted," he said, "under command; his lord" (i.e. the Pope) "had commanded him. . . . He had foresworn himself. . . ." He knew well enough that the thing had not ended there.

But is in great doubt and anguish.—It is very important to note this hesitation and trouble of mind; it helps to explain his future resistance and martyrdom much better than a simpler conduct would have done. It is exactly what the heroes and heroines of history have nearly always done. St. Peter did it; St. Joan did it; Thomas did it. The threats against the bishop (which had been violent and extending to the peril of death), the known embarrassment of the Pope, the lack of proportion between *his* view of the quarrel and the common view, the ambiguity between his instinct that the issue was clear cut and the fact that in actual precedent the issue was not clear cut: the contrast between a vague though very strong feeling that all the principles of the Church were at stake, and the definite legal fact that only certain specific innovations were demanded, limited in character—all these had caused St. Thomas to act as he did. He thoroughly revealed himself in that hesitation—but still more in his resistance.

Chief points of the Constitutions of Clarendon.—

The essential points of the famous sixteen articles were: (1) That the revenues of a see or a royal abbey or priory should be paid during vacancy to the king, and the new election held (*a*) in his chapel, (*b*) with his assent, (*c*) by the advice of such men as he might choose to summon; (2) that cases where either party was a cleric should *begin* in the king's courts, who should decide whether they should go to the ecclesiastical court or not; and (3) that if to the latter, then, in a criminal case, the convict should lose the benefit of clergy—that was a clean innovation, revolutionary in the eyes of the time; (4) that no tenant-in-chief of the king should be excommunicated or his lands put under interdict before application had been made to the Crown (this was to save revenue, and was not an innovation from the Crown's side, though always protested by the Church); (5) that no prelate or high cleric should go overseas without the king's permission (a custom since the Conqueror, also protested); lastly (6) that " appeals beyond the archbishop should go to the king's court and should not go further without the king's consent." Everybody thought that meant, almost certainly it did mean, the right to prevent, when the king might choose, appeals to Rome—even in ecclesiastical cases. But we ought to remark that the king did as a fact later protest that he only meant it to apply to civil cases. Of course, there would be no idea of stopping appeals to Rome save in exceptional cases, and perhaps Henry did not intend the power to apply to ecclesiastical cases at all. It would certainly have had an astonishing aspect in that age! Had it applied to ecclesiastical cases it would have been a violent revolution, somewhat comparable to the re-

cognition to-day by the State of the *legal* right of a trade union to forbid one of its members to sue, in cases it chose to declare privilege, in a court of law. There is the summary, and the gist, of the famous Constitutions of Clarendon.[1]

St. Thomas hardening against the new laical policy (autumn, 1164). The king puts pressure on him.—St. Thomas went back to Canterbury in that distress which only men capable of very great things can know, and which such men only know when they feel they have failed to fill the part assigned to them by the Higher Powers.

He thought himself unworthy to say Mass, and forbade himself that Office. He sent word to the Pope in full detail of all that had happened: he asked for absolution. He returned to Woodstock to see Henry and was refused an audience. He tried twice to set out by night for the French shore from Romney Haven,[2]

[1] It is noteworthy that they also proposed to forbid bishops the right to make the sons of serfs into clerks without a licence from the Lords of their Manors. That point is of real interest, because it shows that society was taking it for granted that the serf could be made into a clerk as a matter of course. The necessity for some check was obvious, because, though it did not matter to the Lord of the Manor when one of several sons of a serf was made a clerk, or for that matter left the village, it did matter to him that the servile tenure should continue; in other words, that the plot of land should be tilled; otherwise his revenue suffered. To allow the Church to take any villein at random who might go and ask to be given orders, without enquiring what his manorial duties were, would be to allow any owner of customary manorial rights to be despoiled. It is always important for the reader, especially for the English reader, for whom textbooks perpetually appear giving a wrong impression of the whole of mediæval society, to appreciate that servile tenure—compulsion of a villein to work on manorial land—was not at this time a personal bondage enforced as it had been against his ancestor the Roman chattel slave, but was merely the machinery for carrying on agricultural society. The essence of the servile character lay in the fact that the work had to be done, not that the individual was compelled to do it.

[2] What is now Romney level was still a sheet of water in the Middle Ages.

and was twice beaten back by the weather. In the early autumn of that year (1164) he was summoned before the *Curia* of the king, sent proctors only, pleaded illness. Three weeks later he was summoned (October 6th) before the full feudal great council at Northampton, and immediately (October 8th) Henry began a process of legal pressure intended to prove intolerable. Thomas was condemned by the council for contempt of court in failure to attend the earlier summons, fined the arbitrary and enormous sum of £500, badgered to refund money which he had spent as Chancellor upon public services, demanded to give account of all moneys received during his chancellorship years before, presented thereby with a bill for £30,000—a sum having no relation to reality in those days, the social equivalent of some millions in our own time.

It was manifest that all this was a kind of torture to compel his acquiescence. The bishops urged him to give way, and on October 13th, after these attacks had lasted less than a week, came the famous scene in which we get the breaking-point. Even on the eve of it he was on the point of begging for a reconciliation. But he mastered himself, and after his Mass suddenly appeared in the full court before Henry and the assembled barons, bearing his own great Cross of Office in his own hands before him.

There was wild commotion, the king left him alone with his clerks, went off to an upper room, and there broke into violent threats amongst his nobles, whilst the archbishop sat silent upon a bench in the hall below.

Becket openly adopts his new position.—When Henry came down it was with the bishops, for whom

Hilary of Chichester spoke, renouncing his obedience to Thomas, calling him perjured and threatening to appeal to Rome. After a spokesman of the lay barons (a private friend of his own, the Earl of Leicester) had bidden him "hear his sentence," Becket made a short speech, not without dignity, announced that he himself would appeal to the Pope, denied the right of the council to try him. As he went out he heard the cry "traitor"; he turned to resent it, then his very tall spare figure disappeared. The crowds of Northampton already gave evidence of the popular feeling in his favour as he left the castle, pressing round him in the streets. That evening he sent to ask leave of Henry that he might go out of the realm: but the king would not answer.

And leaves England, November 2nd, 1164.—Thomas, in the disguise of a monk, found his way south, took a ship from Sandwich on All Soul's Day, landed on the morrow at Gravelines, and thenceforward the conflict was European.

The French king seized the opportunity of weakening the Angevin, and befriended St. Thomas openly at Soissons. In December he met the Pope at Sens and offered him his ring by way of resignation, but Alexander would not let him give up the archbishopric. At the same time the Pope temporized, said that the Constitutions of Clarendon as a whole were unacceptable, but that six of the clauses were "tolerable"—and the exile continued. Becket took refuge in the Convent of Pontigny—Cistercian; Henry threatened to exile the Cistercians from England unless they turned him out. For year after year Henry held his own, no letter from Pope or Archbishop was allowed in England. A gen-

eral oath was administered preventing all free men of England from obeying any ecclesiastical censure against the king; and the archbishop, though in 1166 he went so far as to excommunicate certain counsellors of Henry's, stopped short of launching their sentence against the Crown itself.

One great change happened at that moment: Alexander had recovered a free hand. The anti-Pope had died in the course of 1166, and the rightful Pope was in possession of Rome. Henry made the false move of supporting the Emperor in giving his personal obedience to a new anti-Pope, but the English Church was too strong for him, he retracted and continued in negotiation. He asked for legates to come and discuss; but St. Thomas had already been made legate for England during his exile, and the Pope would not supplant him.

Attempts at reconciliation, 1169.—Early in 1169 a meeting took place at last between the two rivals: on January 6th, following a settlement between Henry and the King of France. He had already received a petition from St. Thomas; they met, but there was no full reconciliation. The phrase still stood, "Saving God's honour and my Order." On the second meeting at Montmartre in the autumn, though the main subject of quarrel was kept in the background, Henry refused the kiss of peace which would have sealed a reconciliation.

And, indeed, Thomas had already excommunicated those who had been put in use of the property of his see, and his suffragans who had betrayed him now held excommunication suspended over Henry's own head.

Opinion outraged by coronation of the heir at the hands of the Archbishop of York, Whitsun, 1170.—

The fatal year 1170 opened with a rumour which led to the last tragedy. The rumour was that of Henry's determination that his son and namesake, the younger Henry, should be crowned: the regular and necessary precaution of a king who would save his line. Only the Archbishop of Canterbury might crown an English sovereign. But the king sent for Roger of Pont L'Évêque (the personal enemy of Becket ever since the old days before his Chancellorship, and now Archbishop of York), and that man on Whit Sunday, June 14th, 1170, performed the ceremony with great pomp in Westminster Abbey—in spite of the Pope's prohibition and St. Thomas'.

Apparent reconciliation between Henry and St. Thomas, July 22nd, 1170.—It was a flagrant outrage,[1] and all felt it to be such: much as we should feel today if a European Government, already in bad odour with Europe for excessive policy, were to refuse admittance to an accredited ambassador, and publicly confer with some rival present in its capital. Nor would Henry have risked such a challenge to general opinion but for what he thought an urgent political necessity. It moved Alexander to definite action at last. He insisted on the return of St. Thomas to England, and threatened an interdict; and on July 22nd, after a meeting between the King of France and Henry at Fréteval,[2] a public reconciliation was made. Henry allowed the return, promised to restore the wealth of

[1] Henry used as a trick an old Papal dispensation that had been given him, allowing for Coronation by *any* bishop during the interval between Theobald's death and Becket's accession to the Primacy.

[2] Fréteval is on the upper Loir near Morée. You pass it on the right, going by railway from Vendome to Châteaudun. The ruin of the Castle still stands.

the see and to be guided by Thomas himself as to the amendment to be made for the outrageous coronation.

But there was long and perhaps deliberate delay, another interdict was threatened, the air was full of a new quarrel—but the permission for St. Thomas to return remained.

It happened that Pope Alexander had—before he had heard of the reconciliation—suspended the bishops who had crowned young Henry, and on September 16th he issued letters formally suspending them. Thomas, preparing to return to England, had those letters (which also condemned the Constitutions) with him. They solemnly named Roger of York and the Bishops of London and of Salisbury, whose supreme interest it was, therefore, to prevent service of the documents, and with that object, to take them from St. Thomas as he landed. These men sent a knight called Ranulph de Broc, one of the worst spoliators of the archbishop's lands, to seize St. Thomas and these papers upon his reaching the English port. St. Thomas heard of the plan in time and sent the papers forward by a private messenger. They were delivered to the culprits, who thus had formal notice served upon them and were caught.

It is probable or certain that St. Thomas intended such service. He has been blamed for mere imprudence; he has been more strongly accused of personal feeling; it seems rather a part of that burning and tenacious character that he was determined from the moment of his setting foot in England, to be armed with the full rights of the Metropolitan, and for it to be determined whether he ruled the English Church or no.

It was upon November 30th that the letters were served upon the three prelates who had betrayed their superior and the unity of the priestly order. On the same day Becket sailed from Wissant, and on the morrow, December 1st, he landed at Sandwich and went straight to Canterbury. To the demand for the withdrawal of the letters, he answered that he would spare Salisbury and London if they would swear to conform to the Pope's orders, but that Roger of York he would not absolve. They went overseas to appeal to the king.

Murder of St. Thomas of Canterbury, December 29th, 1170.—On Christmas day, St. Thomas solemnly excommunicated de Broc, who was still holding the archiepiscopal castle of Saltwood, and had filled it with turbulent and thieving followers. Upon Tuesday, December 29th, four knights who had heard some exclamation of the king[1] in his anger about knaves who kept no faith with their lord, and let him be made a laughing-stock by a priest, reached Saltwood, appeared before St. Thomas, and demanded the absolution of the bishops. We have their names: Hugh de Morville, William de Tracy, Reginald Fitzurse, and Richard le Breton.

St. Thomas refused. They left him after he had told them that the orders were the Pope's and that he would not disobey them. They came back with de Broc himself, pursued him into his cathedral, and, as he still refused, they murdered him. He fell where the north transept meets the choir, at the corner of the east wall.

[1] At Bures, near Bayeux. During the Christmas feast.

(B) Henry II

From the Murder of Becket till Henry's Death (December 29th, 1170, to July 6th, 1189—18½ Years)

Vast effect of this murder.—A huge noise arose throughout Europe. The air filled with doom. Miracles were worked at the tomb in Canterbury. Pilgrimage began. All Christendom stirred. Henry stood like a man awaiting some stroke from heaven. Men may to-day, and do, miss the magnitude of the affair; he, alive in that Europe of the XIIth century, did not miss it: it occupied all his spirit and that of every man who looked at him furtively as he passed.

He awaited sentence or action. None came. March he had thought the critical date, the sufficient delay; but March went by, the summer opened: and still the bolt did not fall. An interdict had been laid upon his French lands; his excuses had been listened to, not admitted. But he himself was still spared. There was not even, as yet, rebellion: through all that mass of disaffection the men whose corruptions he had punished, the freemen and feudatories whom he had ground by an exact tax, the lords in England of proud blood, jealous of his new officials, the lords in Aquitaine, a territory ill to hold, especially in the hills, might move on any day—for the moral basis on which feudal kingship reposed had suffered earthquake. Legates were to come to France—perhaps to judge him.

He preferred action—and distance from such an air. In a Great Council held at Argentan in mid-France during July, his expedition was decided. By early August he had landed in England, and a great fleet was

ordered to meet him at Milford Haven, whither he set out with his host to cross the sea to Ireland.

And at this point we must go back to explain by what accidents in the time immediately preceding St. Thomas' death such an invasion had been prepared.

The Invasion of Ireland

The invasion of Ireland.—Before the quarrel of Clarendon had turned to tragedy the great power whose rise and dreadful check we have been watching, the power of the Angevin, summed up in the personality of Henry II, meditated a further expansion: a colonization of Ireland, French-feudal in leadership, but backed wholly on England and Wales for its fighting power. The idea of making all the British islands one dominion had never wholly disappeared since Agricola had urged it. An expedition into Ireland had passed through the Conqueror's mind and through his son, Henry's.

In Henry II's own first days of rule the English Pope had been appealed to for a sanction—on the principal plea of bringing the Irish Church into line. But his nobles (and mother) opposed.

It was not he, the king, but a chance move of Norman-Welsh adventurers which began the affair—the year before Becket's death. But for that death perhaps the king would never have opened the age-long attempt to make Ireland and England one.

I say "attempt," because that great adventure failed. In a prolonged story of many centuries, first for one reason, then for another, the inclusion of Ireland into the general body of Feudalism, through effort directed from England, was never achieved. Upon the

contrary, the original bond of union between Ireland and our great united civilization, I mean the original conversion of Ireland in the transition from Paganism to the Dark Ages, and during the first triumph of the Catholic Church, has survived every effort to make of that country a portion of Britain. The effort to incorporate Ireland originally failed, because those who attempted it could not be, or were not, thorough; because the opportunities of economic development were less than they had imagined; because the differences between a society still primitive and the more highly developed feudal society of the West were greater than they had imagined: because the difficult crossing of the sea was not the crossing of the sea towards a place where the full experience of Europe could be felt coming in from other lands, but, upon the contrary, to an ultimate, distant place now long separate from the rest.

The first phase of the experiment broke down—to put it in the most general terms—because there was no sufficient motive, or, at any rate, no sufficient energy, for making it definitive.

Had there arisen in the Middle Ages some man in Britain, some ruling man, especially attracted by the Irish and by the spell of their land, as St. Patrick (an Englishman) had been, it would have been otherwise. But no such man appeared. Throughout the Middle Ages, therefore, the proposal to extend to Ireland what was common to France, Italy, Spain, the Rhine Valley and the rest, to extend to Ireland the social scheme general throughout the feudal civilization of the time, broke down. So far from imposing upon the Irish the system of the Occident as it had developed between

the Dark Ages and the Reformation, the attempt from England rather resulted in the digestion of the invaders by the original traditions of Erin; and they were transformed, in their descendants, into something new perhaps, but certainly Irish; not British, not Gallic, not of the united culture which occupied the remainder of Western Christendom; but still Irish; unique in quality. So they are to-day.

The foothold acquired in Ireland by the French feudal law, the French-speaking governing class and French order, was precarious. The Plantagenet XIIth century would come to hold only a small belt of the eastern sea-coast (with Dublin for centre); it even progressively lost what energy it had once possessed for transforming the interior, and, as the Middle Ages proceeded, Ireland became not more and more subject to the ideas of France or Britain, but more and more Irish; until, at the end of the affair, with the last years of the XVth century, with Henry VII upon the English throne, as a usurper with no secure tenure, the Irish had re-established their distinctive spirit over their own land more thoroughly, and over a greater area, than a century after the first appearance of the French-speaking gentry from England in their midst.

But the Renaissance and, later, the Reformation, wrought a great and disastrous change: great because siege artillery, the new armament of that epoch (from the beginning of the XVIth century onwards), gave a new strength to the English king, and soon after led, under his daughter Mary, to actual colonization: disastrous, because even that new power stumbled over the obstacle of religious hate.

Ireland in the Middle Ages was not anglicized: the

invaders became Irish.—With what the Reformation did to Ireland, my fourth volume must deal. But the point to seize upon in the relations between Ireland and the British Crown during the Middle Ages, between the reign of Henry II and that of Henry VIII, is that the attempt to incorporate Ireland into the general system of the West, with a French-speaking governing class, the feudal law and land system and all the rest of it, failed; and we must remember in all we read of the English Middle Ages that Ireland did not present a field of progressive expansion for the influence of the greater island to the east of it, nor what might be imagined the natural process of a gradual absorption by the Irish of the general civilization to which that greater island belonged; it rather presented the phenomenon of a highly original, external people transforming to its own image those who had come to them as enemies from overseas.

Unless we understand that, we cannot understand the vigour of the Irish resistance to the Reformation, of the Irish national survival, active and aggressive right into the XVIIth century, of the determination, in spite of massacre and wholesale dispossession, to re-arise, and after three or four generations, in our own time, recover a nationhood which had been driven under the surface.

If there had happened in Ireland what had happened in so many other parts of Europe—as, for instance, in Poland or in Hungary—a gradual infiltration of the mediæval feudal scheme and a gradual growth of unity under the subjection of one crown; if there had spread, very slowly, one general system of law and one social spirit proceeding from England, then the later history of Ireland would be inexplicable.

The time in which we live is filled with this idea of gradual and inevitable progress and unconscious accumulative change. On account of this philosophy, the problem of Ireland in English eyes has appeared insoluble. But if the student of that problem will only get it clearly in mind that Ireland did *not* become less and less Irish between the XIIth and the XVIth centuries, but, upon the contrary, during this mediæval period recovered its own and became once more all but independent, then the strength of the Irish resistance in the modern era, from the Reformation onwards, falls into perspective.

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Accidental character of first invasion.—The attempt at Angevin expansion over Ireland was not the action of brute conquest, nor even of an attempted dynastic expansion. It is essential to bear this in mind if we are to understand the process of the first infiltration. Of brute conquest the Middle Ages were incapable—save as against the non-Christian, the Pagan, or the Mohammedan. The mediæval Christian thought he had a right to push back and dispossess, or convert, the Pagan who threatened our civilization, the Mohammedan who proposed to destroy it and replace it by his own. But in all conflict within Christendom the mediæval Christian designing conquest put forward some *claim*.

Such claims were of course generally hypocritical, as are the claims of the modern commercial man in his rapacious attacks upon the property of others. The point is that they were subject to a general ethical and legal system, as are occasional modern things of the same sort. William of Normandy claimed under the

promise of Edward the Confessor and an oath of Harold. Edward III, two and a half centuries later, was to make the claim to the Crown of France under a very much better title. But everyone claimed under some title.

Now, the coming of the Angevin into Ireland, the coming of the French-speaking nobles and their French-speaking dependants, of their Welsh bowmen, and of their Anglo-Saxon-speaking lesser men (of these there must have been at first but few) into the Western Island, was in no way a conquest in its origins, still less a brute conquest. It was introduced normally and according to the ideas of the time.

The reason that it is of value to emphasize this is that it illustrates the truth that the failure in Ireland (most conspicuous of course since the Reformation) has been principally due to a lack of what Rossetti called "fundamental brainwork," that is, wrestling with the very depths of any problem. The Angevin coming to Ireland did not come as an enemy. He became an enemy. That is the point.

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Dermot of Leinster lands at Bristol for aid, August, 1166.—This was the process. That Irish society which the Angevin nobles found, subject to its own simple laws and most ancient customs, divided into a very great number of small kingdoms or chieftainships, had, in the year 1161, a High King, Murtogh, and under him admitting his vague authority was Dermot, the King of Leinster; Dermot admitted a High Kingship, as did the many other local rulers or chieftains, but they were the executives in their own small districts. In 1166 the High King mutilated a prisoner (himself a lesser

king or chieftain) whom yet another of the chieftains, and a man of national importance (the Bishop of Armagh) had promised to save. Murtogh, in that quarrel, was killed. A confused fighting followed, typical of the perpetual armed contests between these small local rulers, and Dermot, the ruler of Leinster, was driven out. He took ship at Wexford and landed in Bristol in August, 1166, by which time his private enemy, O'Conor, the chief rebel against the old High King, Murtogh, had been accepted as High King.

O'Conor had great gatherings in his own honour, and seemed to have a more splendid position than any predecessor for a long time past. But the office of High King over these very numerous little rulers was a misty one: it had no real executive power, and the now successful claimant was morally unstable in such a revolution.

Seeks Henry.—Who gives licence to his Barons to help Dermot.—Dermot of Leinster took refuge with Fitzharding, one of the wealthy shippers of Bristol, and was sent by him to find Henry II down in Aquitaine, where the Angevin king then was. He put his plaint before that greatest of the European princes at the moment, the man who controlled the better part of the West under one hand, and Henry put his name to documents which allowed any subject of his to help Dermot to the restoration of the lost kingdom of Leinster.

This was no arbitrary act. Dermot had in due form made homage and accepted Henry for overlord; and, in the world of that time, if you had done that you gave your overlord just as much right to be your superior on recovering your land through his aid as

to-day a man has the right to call himself the owner of your house if you, having a long lease of that house and having purchased the freehold, maintain the lease, but sell the freehold to such a new owner.

Dermot, the driven-out King of Leinster, naturally sought those subjects of Henry II who were best available for recovering his territory. Pembroke had good harbours, was right against the Irish coast, where also were the good southern harbours of Leinster; had he gone to the mountainous north of Wales, he could not claim Henry's subjects to aid him, for they would hardly admit the bond. But in Pembrokeshire he had to hand the end of that chain of French nobles who had built their castles westward from the Severn to the Irish Sea, along the southern Welsh coast. The Frenchman who was running Pembroke under these feudal conditions was Richard de Clare.[1]

The Franco-Welsh nobles land in Ireland, May, 1169.—Dermot offered him his daughter Eva in marriage and the succession after his death to the kingdom of Leinster. He was also supported by the sons of a Welsh Princess—once the mistress of Henry I, and mother of the great Robert of Gloucester—who had married a Frenchman, Gerald de Windsor. Her sons by this and other fathers came to be known later as the "Geraldines." They raised forces of Welsh-speaking men, Flemish settlers (who had been put in Pembroke by the French nobles) and themselves, the

[1] He was at this moment (1168–69) in middle life, tall, squeaky voiced, red, freckled, not much of a fighter but of great descent. All his father's life was devoted to Stephen (who had given him Pembroke), hence his ill-station with Henry II. He was descended straight from that first de Clare, the eldest bastard of the Norman Duke Richard the Fearless, and Count of Eu. His grandfather had had Tonbridge to hold after the Conquest.

Franco-Welsh nobles, leading, landed in May, 1169, upon the Irish coast (Dermot had preceded them and had been given back part of his old place—but not enough for him.)

De Clare (Strongbow) lands in Ireland, August, 1170.—It was a very small force which thus landed to support Dermot's full claim, but it was a force of a materially superior civilization with a new missile weapon, far stronger than anything in Irish hands, the Welsh bow—destined later to such feats in war—and the new type of mail-clad fighting gentry: far more secure than the undefended Irish native. Of such expert soldiers there were not 500, but the novelty of their armament was what counted. They took Wexford. Next year one of the Geraldines, Maurice, and another Frenchman, Legros, followed up the success, and in August, 1170, De Clare himself landed. Waterford was stormed. He married Dermot's daughter, according to the promise, and marched on Dublin.

The High King of Ireland tried to hold the mountains south of the town, and the Danish garrison to hold its walls. Both were defeated. It is possible that Dermot might have been made High King under the new Angevin lordship, but he died in 1171, and Richard de Clare became King of Leinster, strictly according to feudal treaty and feudal ideas. Had he not the Heiress of Leinster to wife?

Now here came in the first break between what had hitherto been a process normal according to the ideas of the time upon both sides; I mean a break between the feudal conception of political bonds upon the one side, the old tribal Irish society upon the other. The old Irish rule was that the nobles chose their king (and it

may be added that the "kingdom" was often no larger than Middlesex). There could be, according to Irish ideas, no question of absolute rigid right and ancestral inheritance to rule, especially through a woman, and least of all through marriage with a woman. But in the general civilization of Western Europe it was by this time universally admitted, taken for granted and part of common morals, that a man could so inherit. Henry II's own position was due to that rule.

A violent struggle followed (in which, by the way, the last attempt of the Scandinavians from overseas to support a Danish body in these islands—that holding Dublin—failed), but the superior organization and armament of the Angevin noble and his followers succeeded. Richard de Clare made good his hold upon Leinster, and held the ports of Dublin, Wexford, and Waterford.

De Clare's feudal right to the eastern seaboard of Ireland.—Such a process, legitimate according to all the feudal ideas of the time, was fundamental. It meant that, according to the judgment of the civilized men in Western Europe, Richard de Clare had a right to this seaboard of Ireland looking towards England, and was duly established there.

Henry II himself lands, October 17, 1171, and claims overlordship.—But still more important was what happened immediately after, when Henry himself —who had summoned de Clare—the great King of the West, landed at Waterford on October 17th, 1171, with a trained force of 500 mailed gentry, 4000 archers, and, in all, a considerable further army, to take up the overlordship of Ireland.

It was no extravagant claim; a great vassal of his

had achieved what was regarded by his contemporaries as a just position in the island. He, Henry, had, till the late turmoil of Becket's murder, held a most august position, revered throughout the Occident. He still represented that high civilization of the new Middle Ages, to which the Irish themselves could but look as to the natural ideal of their time; he had an old permission from the Pope, held in Ireland as throughout all the West, to be the supreme arbiter of morals.

Henry retains the ports.—It is not remarkable, therefore, that Richard de Clare's own claim to Leinster amply admitted the king's right to name him earl rather than king, and the king's keeping of Waterford, Dublin, and Wexford under his peculiar jurisdiction as ports. Nor is it remarkable that all the small Irish kings of Munster came in to do homage, and promised to pay tribute, and that the little kings of the neighbourhood to the north and west did the same, though it is true that the further north and west did not so come. The Church accepted the great Angevin lord. It accepted, as a matter of course, a letter from the Pope (in September, 1172) calling upon the hierarchy to assist the new régime. The Archbishop of Dublin, St. Laurence O'Toole, and the churchmen gathered for that purpose, had already accepted Henry's overlordship, and that king, who had gone back from Ireland in the spring of the same year, had left behind him a vicegerent who was not disputed.

The attempt at imposing feudal conditions on Ireland fails at its very origin.—There is the origin of what may be called the Irish experiment. But in its very origin, it went wrong.

But the High King of Ireland accepts Henry's general overlordship by the Treaty of Windsor, 1175.—The Angevin, working upon the feudal civilization which in his eyes and in that of all his surroundings was normal and unquestioned, granted land; that is, he rewarded his vicegerent (Hugh de Lacy) with the feudal dues of Meath. But Meath was in the hand of Irish chieftains, who had, indeed, done homage to Henry, but who knew nothing of feudal dues. In their minds doing homage to Henry meant that they had to pay a certain small tribute, but continued to look after their own dependants. But in feudal eyes, a king had the right to grant dues to his officer, which dues the Irish social system did not allow for. There was no room for both; and the intruder got rid of his native rivals (to him, rebels) by killing them. It was the first example of the clash between the immemorial tradition of Irish holding and the feudal system, and it left behind it a very evil memory. It must not be imagined that this clash resulted wholly in favour of the intruding power; still less that it resulted in the repudiation of the intruding power. After three years, in 1175, there was negotiated a regular instrument, the Treaty of Windsor. Under that, Rory O'Conor accepted Henry II of England, the Angevin, as overlord of Ireland—nor was any King of England called King of Ireland during the Middle Ages.[1] He accepted Henry's direct rule over the old Daneland, i.e. the strip of the coast with Dublin as its capital, over Meath, Leinster, and the ports of Wexford and Waterford. But Rory himself

[1] It is more than a question of words. The mediæval titles recognized Irish nationality. The first King of England to call himself *King* of Ireland was Henry VIII.

remained High King of Ireland, with the duty of paying a fixed, not exorbitant, tribute.

With this date, 1175, we get the first settlement in the strange anomalous affair which, for more than 700 years, has worked out its evil consequences, of which we hope to have seen the end in our day, but of the future of which we can say nothing.

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Meanwhile Henry, having spent thus in the remote island the months of most perilous strain, had made his peace with Europe and Rome.

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The king's relations with the Church after the murder of St. Thomas.—Henry II's submission at Avranches, Sunday, May 21st, 1172.—All the five months he had spent in Ireland—from mid-October, 1171, to the end of March, 1172—Henry had allowed no communication of ordinary commerce from England. He lay in dread of the sentence to be pronounced by the legates, and of hearing that he, whose name was now too famous throughout Europe, should be excommunicate by the Pope himself. But he got news that the pleas went in his favour—he had always insisted on his own innocence even in angry intention against St. Thomas. He got news also that his son plotted against him. Hence it was that he left Ireland as he did, precipitately on Easter night, dashed across England, and was in little Barfleur haven before men in France knew that he had sailed. Absolved on May 21st, he later[1] took oath upon the Gospels in Avranches of his innocence, before the Pope's legates and his barons he consented to maintain 200 knights in the Holy Land for a penance,

[1] September 27–28, in the Council of Avranches.

and foreswore any customs "hostile to the liberty" of the Church, and was absolved. It is probable—not certain—*that he privately offered homage for England to the Papal See.* He was absolved. But it was not till four years had passed (in a great Council at Northampton, in 1176) that the exact position on criminous clerks was settled. They were to be amenable to Church courts only (for the first offence), save in matter of a lay fee held by them or for breaking a forest law.

It seemed as though, by this solemn settlement of Avranches in May, 1172, the perilous moment was passed, and Henry's great power, which had reeled in the summer of 1171, after the archbishop's murder, was again secure. But it was never more the same. It was undermined.

But the Capetians, the royal House of France, are saved by St. Thomas's murder from their Angevin peril.—The period between Henry's reconciliation with the Papacy, May 21st, 1172, and his death, July 6th, 1189, is a long space of seventeen years, but it is one in which the political story is monotonous enough. It is one long feudal quarrel between the king and his sons with the Capetians in the background as the promoters or sustainers of the difficulties.

If you look at the thing in the largest aspect, it was simply this. The murder of Thomas à Becket had suddenly changed the whole balance to Western Europe. From the Plantagenet house being stronger than the Capetian, and quite possibly its successor as the feudal head of a great Anglo-French realm, it fell to be upon the defensive and the Capetian pressure against it, with many a setback and many a halt, continually

increased. In just over thirty years there was a complete turnover, and so far from the Plantagenet menacing the Capetian, so far from the over-powerful vassal ousting his overlord, it was the Capetian who drove the Plantagenet from Normandy and turned the future efforts of the French-speaking Kings of England abroad from the possession of a right to the engaging upon an adventure.

Henry began by obtaining not a little advantage from the position of retreat into which he had been forced by the bewildering and enormous commotion following on St. Thomas's death. He filled the See of Canterbury with a nominee of his own, Richard of Dover, and no questions asked. He took care to pick out a weak man, and a man who would never watch too closely the king's attempt to recover lost ground; and after Richard of Dover, he put in yet another nominee of the same sort, Baldwin, to the Primacy. But the trouble abroad was much more severe. The personal root of it was the character of Queen Eleanor, just as the political root was the new ambition of the French kings, and just as the mechanical cause was the very extent of those dominions—the same cause that helped to weaken the kingdom of Germany.

Queen Eleanor's quarrel with her husband.—Eleanor of Aquitaine quarrelled badly with her husband and she quarrelled with him through the very simple and personal motive, amply justified, of jealousy. In quarrelling with him she effected two things—first, she shook his hold upon Aquitaine, which had a vague but strong devotion to its ducal house, although the real strength of government in it lay with the lesser lords of its subdivisions. Next, she fostered the tendency,

always present under feudal conditions, of the sons to attempt to carve out a revenue for themselves, in spite of their fathers. There were four of these sons: in order of birth, Henry, Richard, Geoffrey, and John.

Effect of the appanages given to Henry's sons.—The Angevin dominion was so extended that it was almost mechanically necessary to provide appanages to divide the rule over it, and as the young men grew up they needed incomes, but open quarrel could have been avoided if the queen had willed. She willed the opposite. It began with the eldest son Henry's protesting against John, the younger son, being given castles in Anjou upon the occasion of an expected marriage which, as a fact, was never solemnized. Young Henry was heir to Anjou, and he protested. He went to the French Court, and his two brothers, Geoffrey and Richard, joined him there, backed by Eleanor. That was in the same year as the reconciliation with the Papacy, 1172.

Henry does penance at the tomb of St. Thomas, 1174.—In the next year, 1173, Henry was attacked from all sides. His son Geoffrey (who was now the feudal lord of Brittany, by his marriage with the heiress of that Duchy, an almost independent fief) led a rising in which Normandy was invaded. Many of the barons in England rose, even including the more generally loyal family of Beaumont which was connected with the Norman house of the Earls of Leicester. William the Lion, King of Scots, foraged across the border. If the war was chaotic, it was serious. Henry offered to his eldest son half the revenues of England, and Richard half of Aquitaine, but he had no need so to do. The support of his throne was stronger than he believed. He did public penance at St. Thomas's tomb in Canter-

bury in the next year, 1174, and in the autumn of the same year had a piece of luck which made a great difference for some years to come.

Capture of William the Lion, King of Scotland, 1174.—The King of Scotland, William the Lion, raiding in Northumberland, was surprised in a fog near Alnwick and taken prisoner to Henry.

The Treaty of Falaise nearly unites England and Scotland, August 10th, 1175.—The coalition against him thereafter fell for the moment. On August 10th of the next year, 1175, he compelled William the Lion to sign that Treaty of Falaise which made him no more than a feudal tenant of the King of England, and left the Scottish baronage under the feudal duty of doing personal homage to the King of England also. If it had held there would have been a union of the two crowns centuries before the Stuarts. But it did not, and it could not hold, for that reason of "scale," the geographical construction of the island, coupled with the rate of marching and travel in the Middle Ages to which I have so constantly alluded. English garrisons were even admitted into Edinburgh and Stirling with security for less important strongholds, and throughout Henry's reign he perpetually exercised royal power north of the border, actually accepting a plea in his own English courts from a tenant-in-chief whose lands were Scottish. In one thing only did William the Lion lay a foundation for one side of the national independence when he obtained from the Pope a declaration that the Church in Scotland was directly dependent upon the Holy See, and not under the jurisdiction of the Archbishop of York—a jurisdiction always claimed hitherto and even exercised.

The great coalition against Henry II beginning in 1173.—The great coalition of 1173 was the direct effect of St. Thomas's death, and the shaking, almost to overturn, of Henry's moral position in Europe. It had for its main nucleus of policy the replacing, as king in England, of Henry by his son—the younger Henry—but the motives had nothing to do with that lad and his irrelevant ambition. They were in flavour personal and domestic, in the main feudal allies (William of Scotland, the Count of Flanders), aggrandizement and enrichment at the expense of the Angevin realm; with Louis VII the unwavering Capetian aim—to become master of the vassal states in France and especially to break up the huge Angevin agglomeration. Louis' daughter was married to the younger Henry, who had escaped to his court at St. Denis; the family quarrel was a group surrounding Louis pitched against the isolated power of the English king.

Is weakened by papal support of the king.—Henry had acted with vigour. He had got the Norman bishops to threaten Eleanor with excommunication unless she returned to him: and when she returned, he had her kept prisoner. He had solemnly appealed to Pope Alexander, *as his new feudal lord,* to support him. He had raised a great force of mercenaries—homeless men, many from Brabant (whence all were called Brabantines)—and thus, in the end, he won this first bout.

After the collapse of the great Rebellion he endowed his sons with provinces. Geoffrey, of course, ruled because Brittany, whose heiress he had married, was quasi-independent. But Richard was not independent ruler of Aquitaine, though he did homage for it, and was

the duke of it in name, and though he successfully reduced rebellion there.

Richard compelled the main rebels of Aquitaine to surrender in Angoulême, and he pushed effective rule down to the Pyrenees, holding the whole place firmly right on till 1179.

It is to be noted that in all these years Richard was not only what all his class were in England and in France, a French noble, but a man living in Southern and Central France, and having all the experience of his early manhood there.

And ends in Henry maintaining his own up to 1180.—In 1180, Louis the VIIth of France died. There had been peace in the last five years between him and Henry, and a promise of alliance between the two houses through the marriage of Richard with Louis' daughter Alice, a betrothal which was to affect the whole of Richard's life when he was king, for, as we shall see, he repudiated it and married another woman.

But Henry's danger increased by accession to the French throne of Philip Augustus, 1180.—The significance of 1180 for English history is that to Louis VII succeeded the strong, secretive, cold, intelligent, exceedingly ambitious man known to history as Philip Augustus. Had not the King of England been now verging upon age—or aged at least for a man of that occupation and time (he was not yet fifty)—or had he been succeeded by an heir of similar character to himself in youth, Philip Augustus might not have achieved his ambition. As it was, he amply did so, and lived to seize with his armies Normandy itself from the Plantagenets, and Anjou, their place of birth.

Philip Augustus supports Henry's sons against

him.—His support of the quarrels of the younger Plantagenets between themselves, and of the sons against the father, was a very different thing from what Louis VII's had been. It was skilled, continuous, and thoughtful. The test was to come immediately, and against the background of the colossal, greater business of the loss of Palestine and the shaking of all Christendom, this duel, or rather wrestling, between the Capetians and the embarrassed Plantagenet house continues. It continues through these last years of Henry's reign; it continues through Richard; it continues to the reign of John, when it ends in a clean throw of the Plantagenet power and Philip reaching the Channel as lord.

Development of Angevin institutions and England.—It is to the period of comparative peace between the first rebellion against Henry and the second (in 1183) that belong the fixing of the developments in government which England shared with all Western Europe as the new civilization grew, but of which some took on a special local character, due to the compactness and isolation of the English realm as a *kingdom*, its unwieldy size as a *feudal unit*. The best date of origin for them is the Assize[1] of Clarendon in 1166, but it was followed by the great quarrel, and it is not till ten years later that the innovations became regular.

The Curia Regis: its triple form.—The most definite is the separation of the *Curia* into its three final functions: it had had its judicial function and its fiscal function already differentiated under the king's grand-

[1] "*Assize*" is simply the French for "a sitting." The special modern meaning is a restricted one. Thus "the *Assize* of Clarendon" does not mean a judicial court, it merely means a decision taken by the king "in Session" with his Council.

father; now—from about 1178 onwards—it is clearly organized in three departments: not three separate sets of men—the individuals might overlap—but three distinct uses. There is the Exchequer Court, or *revenue* side of the *Curia's* business: the taking and checking of all monies due to the king.[1] There is the select political *Curia*, a permanent council; the smallish body which constantly advises on, and deals with State affairs. There is a body of five justices called also *Curia*, but with the special title of "*in Banco*"—"the court sitting as on the bench"—which deals with judicial business alone. The names survive for things now utterly changed, for we have the Exchequer as a name, and King's Bench, and the Privy Council.

The *Curia* in all these three distinct characters moved with the "Court" in the general sense of that word; that is, with the king. It was still as simple (and unwieldy) as that.

Itinerant justices.—But the chance practice of occasionally sending out officials to try cases of peculiar importance to the king, to overlook local officers and their courts—a practice necessary and familiar in all Western civilization from its origins—now becomes organized and regular. "Circuits" were created. The king's justices were to make periodical and fixed visitations to the courts of the separate counties, to help the gradual supersession of the tangle of local custom by the king's law (which was inspired by the newly studied civil law of the ancient Empire), and to take over as their special business the *trial* of robberies and murders —though the discovery and presentment as presumably

[1] The Court moved with the king, but the Treasury was kept at Winchester till the next reign, when it was moved to Westminster.

guilty of the culprits still lay with the old local machinery of manor, hundred, and shire.

The jury.—The group of sworn gentlemen—or failing them, other freemen—who do this work of presenting suspected criminals from each hundred, the "Jurés," which is French for "batch of people sworn," is now in full working, and henceforward continues in its function.[1]

The machinery of evidence changes less quickly: it still inherits from the Dark Ages. In the Dark Ages there had re-arisen all over Christendom the barbaric conception of the "Ordeal." It was a mixture of magic and lot, inevitable to primitive society, which had not opportunities for collecting and minutely examining testimony.

The ordeal.—For instance, a man is found murdered: no one saw the deed, there is no direct witness to it. Circumstances point to William as the probable, more often the certain, culprit. What is to be done? It is repugnant to the free unsophisticated conscience to punish what may just possibly be an innocent man, on indirect evidence alone. On the other hand, to let crime dangerous to the community go unpunished in so many cases would destroy the community. He may be pressed to confess, and even made to suffer in order to extract a confession; but manifestly in proportion as the suffering is grievous the confession is worthless—unless it is accompanied by detail that can be verified and is thus conclusive.

[1] This institution (this taking of testimony from sworn people of a locality) was a very ancient one in France when it was brought into England by the Conqueror for enquiry on land. It is here, under Henry II, extended to criminal work.

The obvious remaining course is to subject the man who is so apparently (but not quite certainly) guilty to some severe test from which he may, by the interposition of higher powers, yet without miracle, go free —for the gods are just. Hence, all over the world in primitive society the Ordeal.

Here it took many forms, each called "the law (i.e. custom) of the land"[1]: commonly by fire or water, as plunging the hand into hot water, binding it, and seeing if it had healed in a given time: holding hot iron a moment and similarly awaiting healing—or the opposite; or by fighting with weapons.

As society gets more efficient for finding, collecting, examining, the appeal to chance becomes an anomaly, and as it codifies its ideas and makes multitudinous record, the appeal to unseen intervention is thought unreasonable.

But the Ordeal survived to a surprisingly late date; it was already growing repugnant to the XIIth century, but it was not condemned till the Lateran Council of 1215. In its noble form, "by battle," it continued, but as an exception.

There is a last point to note in the new judicial machinery: the special definition of three major civil cases which the King's Judges were henceforward to try. "*Novel Disseisin*"—which is the French of the day for "New" (in the sense of "unwarranted," "without the plea of custom"), "eviction from land." "*Mort d'ancestre*"—which is the same for "death of one to

[1] To be tried by "your peers *or* the law of the land," "*vel per legem terræ*," meant, as in Magna Carta, to be submitted to the judgment of those who would know most about you and would yet be concerned with your fate as being your equals: not to be degraded by the judgment of inferiors; *or* alternatively, to accept the Ordeal.

whom the claimant says he is legal heir"—this was used to protect the son or other direct heir of a tenure from encroachment by his overlord. And "*Darrein Presentment*," enquiring into disputes on advowsons. These were the three "*assizes*" in which the King's Justices stood to see feudal custom executed.

By Henry II's death all this now well-defined and considerable machinery of Royal Justice, Tax, and Executive was in full function, regular and established permanently; and though it was not his work in the sense of a personal creation, but only part of all the rising life of Europe, yet his industry and the length of his rule were both of service to its definition and taking firm root in England.

New taxes on moveables.—Changes, not so much in the amount as in the nature of the royal revenue, were also a mark of the reign, because it was a time when the social system was developing all over Europe, and in particular the simplicity of the old feudalism was becoming complicated with increasing commerce, a larger body of moveable goods present in society, and (much the largest factor) with the slow weakening of personal bonds and the growth of official ones. The king was taking money instead of armed service from the lesser lords and from the military tenants of the Church in quite the first years of his reign: by 1166 the principle of levying (as yet only for a quasi-religious object—Palestine, and by clerical, not lay, command) on *goods*—personal wealth as distinguished from land (and excepting the instruments of a trade)—had appeared. It was at first very small—a penny in the pound on total value in France and England. Later, on the fall of Jerusalem, a *tenth* (the so-called "Saladin

Tithe"). Within a lifetime it was to appear in lay use, first as an exception, soon as a rule.

It must not be imagined that the new taxes meant a larger proportion of the surplus wealth paid into the treasury. They were a change corresponding to the change in social structure. In older and simpler times the lord could "tallage," that is, call in a sum fixed by himself, at will (in theory), and the king, as a lord, could "tallage" towns (most of which were directly dependent on him) also (in theory) at will. In practice, as society became wealthier, more complex, more moving, all that had to be regularized, and especially in the case of the royal revenues. Hence the coming of taxes on moveables side by side with the old traditional and long-surviving feudal dues from tenure of land under the Crown.

The second and last great rebellion of Henry's sons against him, 1183.—The second rebellion against Henry II was a longer and much more revealing thing than the first. It was an affair all told of seven years: from the fighting season of 1183 to that of 1189; and it was more revealing because it showed more clearly the way in which St. Thomas's murder had shaken beyond repair the Angevin authority. The great clot of fiefs no longer held. Only moral authority kept a feudal federation in being, and the tragedy of Canterbury in 1170 had broken the moral authority of the king, not as a dry stick is snapped, but as a green plant is bent and bruised at the bending, so that it can never recover its elasticity and vigour again. The first rebellion of 1173 had been the immediate effect of the Becket drama; but too near it for it yet to have borne full fruit—and the king was forty and vigorous,

and Philip Augustus, though already astute, a boy of eighteen only. *Now*, Henry was just on fifty and ageing rapidly; his opponent was mature, nearing thirty—and the full effect of St. Thomas's death, the miracles, the incessant pilgrimages, the fame throughout Europe was at work.

The attempt, henceforward, to keep the Angevin Empire together was a desperate defensive, a losing side. It all but broke up in these later years of Henry: the third crusade (1189–93) gave it a respite under Richard—but the end of his reign (1194–99) was still a struggle to preserve it. It was lost under John (1204) in spite of that great soldier's diabolical energy and swiftness in action. It was already doomed, and St. Thomas was the cause.

Death of young Henry, 1183. Richard becomes heir.—Death of Geoffrey of Brittany, leaving a child, Arthur, rightful heir after Richard, 1186.—The second rebellion began after a quarrel and private war between the Princes—Henry the Younger, the heir, endowed with Anjou, crowned King of England to perpetuate the line, and clamouring to rule Normandy during his father's life; and Richard, endowed with Aquitaine. The third brother, Geoffrey, who had married the heiress of Brittany and was Count thereof, sided (for the moment) with the younger Henry. The lesser feudatories of Aquitaine, finding Richard thus embarrassed, rose. The disorder spread to the barony of Normandy and threatened that of England—all one society of nobles, of one speech, manner, and inter-wed—so that the King of England was compelled to intervene. It only led to a momentary coalition against him of Henry and Richard. In 1183 Henry the

Younger died. That made Richard heir—a young man of twenty-five, already famous for leadership and skill in arms. The youngest brother John, ten years younger and barely armed, was therefore designed for Aquitaine, but to Richard that meant only the title of heir to the Crown and no revenue. He refused and rebelled again. The king turned John—in command of forces—and Geoffrey against him, but fruitlessly. Richard remained master of the Southern French fiefs—with Poitou as well—and John was provided for by sending him to Ireland in nominal governorship of that precariously held strip of eastern seaboard which had now been garrisoned for some fourteen years. In 1186 Geoffrey of Brittany died, leaving a little son, Arthur, to inherit that almost independent land: the child who was to be played later against his uncle, John, and to die by his orders or at his hand.

Now Geoffrey's death seemed to leave the quarrels solved, with two of the three main quarrellers dead, John in Ireland, and only Richard remaining; his ageing father could leave him master in Aquitaine until, at his own death, he should have all.

But there was Philip Augustus—the only one of them all with a fixed plan, the destruction of Angevin power. His opportunity came.

Richard had been all these years, from childhood, affianced to Philip's sister Alice, whom he would not marry. Henry II proposed to Philip her marriage with John, and their being enfeoffed of Aquitaine. Philip at once told Richard, called it a secret treason of his father's, and proposed a common war to overthrow the king: Richard agreed.

The Battle of Hattin and fall of Jerusalem, July

4th, September 17th, 1187.—Immediate action was interrupted by enormous news. The Christian nobles of Palestine, with their army and the military orders, had been surprised in column of march under those twin peaks, the horns of Hattin, within an hour of the shores of Tiberias, and a walk of Nazareth. Saladin, the new Mohammedan leader, had butchered the prisoners, delighting to murder the noblest of them with his own hand. Jerusalem had fallen. The True Cross had been taken and had been dragged at a horse's tail through the streets of the city. All Europe reeled. It seemed that the quarrel of Angevin and Capetian and of son with father would grow insignificant. All took the Cross—even the Germans were stirred, and Barbarossa, the Emperor, already 64 years old, volunteered for the East, wherein he died. The Crusades, which had been an affair of the widespread French-speaking nobility for a century, became a universal duty—now that it was too late.

But though Richard was sincere and determined in his desire for the Crusade—and Philip also—though that immensely larger thing overshadowed their local, western intrigues, and though it was manifestly a peril to all our civilization that the chivalry of the West, from Lorraine to the Atlantic, should be held back from the Levantine journey by a large campaign in the Loire valley, though Henry II himself had taken the Cross, the pressure on him continued. There was a confused come and go. Cross fighting between Philip and Richard themselves, negotiations with Henry—but at last (the Crusade already delayed by two years!), in the summer of 1189, they combined and marched on the old king. They drove him out of Le Mans, his birth-

place; forced him back on Angers. On July 4th—he was already dying—Henry gave way. He had not the forces to meet such a combination. He met his son and his rival in the wooded Saumur country east of Tours, gave up Auvergne to the French Crown, admitted an indemnity, gave amnesty, and called Richard his heir.

Death of Henry II, July 6th, 1189.—He could hardly sit his horse. He turned him back to his great Castle of Chinon, close at hand, and there, on the day after the morrow, Thursday, July 6th, 1189, he died.

(C) Richard I

(*From July 6th, 1189, to April 6th, 1199—nearly 10 years*)

Character of the reign.—The reign of Richard I was so short, and the king himself so permanently absent from England and so little concerned with English affairs, that it has to be dealt with in a fashion different from any other reign in our history.

It came while the great change into the height of mediæval society was in full progress, it saw completed much that Henry II had begun in the organizing of our institutions upon the new mediæval model of all Christendom; it saw precedents established which were of the highest consequence to the future, and yet, in that day when the personality of the king was of capital importance, Richard had no part in the creation or confirmation of such things.

Deepening effect of French language on the country.—It was the moment when, now more than a century after the Conquest, French was reaching down into all

the free classes of society, and had already become the common medium of the lesser gentry, their households, and many of their dependants, most of the merchant class—the lesser not so familiar with it, the greater using it more and more, though it had yet to reach still wider areas of the national life in the next 150 years; but Richard, entirely French in every detail of his life, living nearly always in France (save when he was on crusade), thinking and acting wholly as a great French feudal noble, had less to do with this gradual transformation of speech than any king before or after him; for his personal adherents, and what may be called in the social, not the constitutional, sense his Court, was not an English but a continental thing. It was not held in England.

Popularity of Richard in England.—Yet he has impressed himself upon the English imagination more strongly than any other King of England during the Middle Ages, for he was by far the greatest of the Crusaders in the best known and most vivid, though least successful, of the three great Crusades—the last or third, undertaken for the recovery of Jerusalem and failing wholly in its object. He thus shone before the eyes of all Europe at a moment when the Crusade was the chief European event by far. His English subjects were immensely proud of him. His mere presence in England for a few weeks in the midst of his reign was sufficient to put an end at once to rebellion, and he has become, mostly legitimately, a national hero.[1]

[1] It is a pity that the effigy of him which modern Englishmen know best, the equestrian statue in front of the House of Lords at Westminster, should be cast in the mould of a Victorian English gentleman. It is misleading.

We have seen the part that he played during the later half of his father's life, and the perpetual rebellions against Henry II. It is the life not only of an adventurous French noble and knight perpetually active for wealth and glory combined, but also the life of a cadet endowed with an appanage: a cadet who even when he had become legitimate heir through the death of his elder brother was not certain of complete success.

His presence, health, and nature.—He was in his thirty-third year when he came to the throne: a man singularly different from what later legend, and particularly modern historical fiction, has made of him. He had very bad health, but he never let it interfere (save when he was actually prostrated) with the abnormal physical activity which he had inherited from his father, and from that violent mother of his, to whom, during all her life, he felt a closer attachment than had any of his brothers. He was so ill when he was starting out for the Third Crusade that men thought he could not survive it. His blood was poor, giving him boils and affections of the skin, and he breaks down badly once and again and yet again during the course of that tempestuous career. Yet when he was so ill he could not walk, during the siege of Acre, he had himself carried in a litter to the army and, propped up on his silken cushions, discharged a cross-bow as a sign that he was still fighting. He did not interrupt the war for a moment—though in a climate which was deadly during the height of summer to northern Frenchmen—and he won his greatest victory in Palestine on foot in full armour during the very height of that season.

He was as quick in mind as in body, and had those

concommitants of courage which we expect to find with it, but which we rarely do, generosity to equals and the ritual of arms. He was witty, lively in speech, not ordinarily cruel, though like all his people, often violent in revenge; a little better at calculation than one might expect from such a character, but no match for the long-inherited and cold intrigue of the great rival Capetian House, which all his lifetime long had aimed at breaking up the Angevin heritage, and five years after his death destroyed the European Empire he had inherited. One thing about him should be remembered, though it is but a detail: he not only loved song (and wrote verse himself), but he especially delighted in the profound Dorian mood, the Gregorian; and it was his pleasure to march up and down the central way of a great Church facing the altar; now striding backward, now forward, joining in the chant, and beating time with his hand.

Those who would know what he was like will not easily discover a sharp portrait. He was not as short as the greater part of his House, but he had the typical build of them, with bull neck and broad shoulders, and the head (as you may see from his tomb at Fontrevault) was that of the true Angevin, very broad and round, the eyes far apart and somewhat prominent: what we call a bullet head. For his body lies at Fontrevault, which is now very wrongly turned into a prison, and that heart of his which he was pleased to hear called "a lion's" (*Cœur-de-Lion* was his nickname before he died, and the right name for him for centuries) is at Rouen.

Such a reign (only four months of it spent in England for his Coronation, and another two months, five years later, to settle domestic troubles) can only be

treated by separating the king's actions abroad as a Crusader and a French noble, from the brief political, and much more important constitutional, story of what was happening here in England at home.

Economic effect of crusade on England.—The first part had very little to do with this country, save that the Third Crusade moved all Europe to its depths, England included,[1] and that Richard's adventures and ardour for eminence among his peers burdened England financially very heavily indeed, and that his ransom after captivity added financial experiment through a novel demand so heavy that it could not be, or was not, wholly met.

Richard's accession.—When he knew in Chinon that his father was dead, he came into the room where the body lay, and suffered the remorse which it was right he should suffer. Men said that the nostrils of the corpse bled when that son knelt beside him. He took immediate possession of the treasure, which was very large (rumour put it at the equivalent of a whole year of English full revenue, ordinary and extraordinary —something over £60,000),[2] was crowned Duke of Normandy in July, sailed for England in August, and was crowned at Westminster on September 3rd, 1189.

[1] England as a realm—the Norman nobility of it—had little to do with the Crusades. There was a slight movement of armed travel to them in the troubles under Stephen; but nothing comparable to the great tides of men surging out from France, nor even to the organized Norman body from Sicily and South Italy.

[2] For some reason never yet really discovered the Danegeld became less and less worth levying. The ordinary revenue of the Crown from this and other causes was apparently much less than it had been in the Conqueror's time and Henry I's (when £60,000 or so a year: say in modern gold value, two millions and a half, in social value then immensely more, was the figure). But it was supplemented by new forms of taxation, intended at first for exceptions but soon turned regular, which brought it up to the old level.



RICHARD'S DOMINIONS

MAP VII

He had his mother Eleanor released from the close guardianship in which Henry had kept her a prisoner, and made her regent (she was 65 years old). He spent that autumn and early winter in raising money by every possible device for his great expedition to the East. He took £3000 from his illegitimate half-brother Geoffrey for the Archbishopric of York. He took more than double that amount from William the Lion of Scotland in payment for a release from any feudal obligation save the general suzerainty admitted by Malcolm to the Conqueror. That is, he gave up the direct homage of the Scottish barons which his father had secured at Falaise. He did that very grave thing in any mediæval monarch—sold certain manors of the Crown; grave, because the personal endowment of the Crown was the very core of its strength and function, and to sell a manor was to impoverish the succession. By December 11th, 1189, he had landed at Calais, and his foreign adventure was begun.

Richard's crusade, 1191–2.—So far as English history is concerned, we need follow no more than its barest outline. He met the King of France, Philip Augustus, a man who contrasted with him in every way, a politic with long views and a vision of a great and united French monarchy. He took his time fighting and looting in Sicily and seizing Cyprus; quarrelled with Philip and finally repudiated that king's sister to whom we have seen that he had been so long engaged; affianced himself to Berengaria of Navarre (whom he took with him on his voyage and married), and at last—late enough—appeared before Acre, which the Christian host was besieging; it was already June 8th, 1191, two years since he had inherited.

In just over a month Acre fell, and the taking of that great Mohammedan stronghold might have been the beginning of a full Christian recovery of the Holy Land. The garrison was to be spared if Saladin would restore the True Cross, and a fixed number of his Christian prisoners by a given date, but Saladin broke his word, and the garrison was put to death by Richard's own order.[1] Saladin butchered his Christian captives as well: whether before or after is disputed.

This fall of Acre led to one incident necessary to remember. Leopold, the Duke of Austria, a powerful vassal of the Empire, had put his standard on a house claimed by one of Richard's knights. Richard hauled down the standard and had it thrown into the sewers, and Leopold went home full of revenge. Philip Augustus also went home in that summer, leaving a large force to fight on under the Duke of Burgundy; but Richard was the unquestioned head of everything, and the Saracens made a hero of him then and thereafter. He set out that August for the march on Jerusalem by way of Jaffa.

It was a slow advance in abominable heat with the countryside wasted and perpetual attacks from Saladin's light horsemen. Rations failed. The Christians were reduced to eating their horses. The high superiority of the European personnel against

[1] Our official history naturally blames Richard and excuses Saladin; for as there is a discrepancy between the Christian and the anti-Christian accounts of Saladin's shifts to escape giving up the True Cross, the temptation to accept the latter is too strong for it. I see no reason to disbelieve my own people in favour of theirs. Certainly the story of oriental dealing lends little probability to their versions, nor let us forget Saladin's abominable and cold-blooded massacre of the knights after Hattin—and his personal murder of the noblest, Lusignan, because he refused to deny the Christ.

the Oriental was seen in the hand-to-hand struggle at Arsuf, but the attack upon Jerusalem was never made. It would have changed the history of the world; for, as far as we can gather at this distance of time, it would have been successful.

It fails.—The host was at Beit-nuba, just north of Emmaus, one day's march from the walls. Saladin, his cruelties and his treacheries, had raised rebellions against him in that friable and shifting world of Islam. But the military orders advised against an assault. They had the longest experience of the place and climate, but they also felt jealous against the new reinforcements from Europe, and a fear lest their power should be superseded. At any rate, Richard turned back—to Saladin's immense surprise—negotiated a truce, and decided to return home.

He had too good reason: his inheritance was already imperilled. John was working to get the Crown. Philip Augustus was in collusion with John, and that is why the king determined to return: that, I think, counting all factors, is the real reason that we lost the Holy Sepulchre—for ever. It is still lost.

Once more his health had broken down, but he made his truce with Saladin—a truce of three years. He honestly intended to return, come back and recover the tomb of Our Lord, the very site of the Resurrection. But he never did. When he was well enough, on October 9th, 1192, he set sail from Acre for home. It was high time, if the Angevin inheritance was to count for more than the Holy Sepulchre and the True Cross. Philip was invading Normandy almost unchecked, John had done homage to him for the French fiefs, and even perhaps for England itself; it was only

the climax of a long affair in England which must now be described.

State of affairs in England during the king's absence in the East.—Two main forces had been at work in England during the absence of the king; the situation making for anarchy, in spite of Queen Eleanor's regency and the popular feeling for Richard. John, the younger brother, heavily endowed by Richard, was trying before his time to be king—though he did not use the name. He had Derby, which county he ruled without reference to the official central executive, and he had all the south-west in a block: Somerset and Dorset, Devon and Cornwall, the revenues of which he did not account for, and the courts of which he held as though he were monarch there. Against him was the Chancellor, the official representative of Richard, and a loyal though very odd one—William Longchamp, sometime servant of Richard and his brother Geoffrey, now Bishop of Ely and papal legate. He was an eccentric Frenchman of the North, of low birth (the grandfather had been a serf), with a little pinched face like a monkey, and a limp—but any amount of energy. It may be imagined what the feudal nobility thought of such a one, yet he kept his power fairly well; for it was legitimate, and in spite of the man's contempt (which he never concealed) for everything in the island, popular feeling, below the great nobles, was with the man who represented Richard. But John got the better of him, and he did it principally by striking a bargain with London to which he seems to have given a kind of Charter (though if he did it has been lost) in 1191—or, at any rate, a verbal promise. We know at least that there was to be

a mayor. On October 8th, 1191, in a big meeting in St. Paul's (then the largest church in Christendom), London declared against Longchamp. He surrendered his castles, tried to escape in disguise, and was gone. John was perhaps voted Regent, at any rate, he held great power, and it was after this episode that he was emboldened to make that homage to Philip Augustus of which I have spoken, and there was a definite understanding between them that John should supplant Richard. He was not without support from the baronage.

What exactly was the position of Arthur of Brittany —a child of five years? Richard called him heir. The Papacy supported him. The Capetian dynasty of France had set the example of primogeniture for all Europe. Arthur was the son and heir of Geoffrey, now dead, a brother older than John. But primogeniture, strictly the rule in a fief, was not absolutely the rule as yet (in men's minds) for a Crown, which needed still, in the general view, a man fit to lead armies.

At any rate, John passed over Arthur without a word, and the nobles of England did the same.

Capture (Dec., 1192) and imprisonment of King Richard (early 1193).—But everything was changed by tidings which reached the country at the beginning of 1193. Richard had intended to come back the straight way through France. He heard that Philip Augustus might intercept him, and took the odd determination to change ship, go up the Adriatic in disguise, and work his way through Germany, the territory of the Empire, in that fashion. On December 21st he was discovered in the dress of a kitchen servant in an inn near Vienna, and fell at once into the power

of his enemy Leopold, the Duke of Austria. Leopold sold him to the Emperor for a large percentage of the ransom. The Emperor told Philip at once what had happened. The Archbishop of Rouen, who was now Chief Justiciar of England, sent over envoys at once to find out the terms of Richard's release. He reported that the king was gay, making his warders drunk and at horse-play with them—and that the price of his release was a year's extreme revenue of all England—over £60,000. We have already seen what such a sum meant at that time. Richard did not actually get away until half as much again had been promised, *nor until he had done homage for England to the Empire*—an act of some moral effect at the time, but of no great future result. Philip and John did all they could to keep him in captivity, but he had the Papacy on his side, and the common sense of Europe which it represented.

Richard is released and lands in England, March 13th, 1194.—He was not set free, however, until March 2nd, 1194. He landed at Sandwich on the 13th, and at once England rallied to him completely. The last of John's castles (Nottingham) surrendered. He had himself re-crowned at Winchester on April 17th. London particularly had received him with an enthusiasm and pageant which profoundly impressed Europe, and the German gentry whom the Emperor had sent with him most of all.

He had made Hubert Walter (one of the East Anglian gentry—his mother was of the family of Valognes, and he himself probably born at Dereham) Archbishop and Chancellor. The man was capable, not very learned, somewhat spendthrift, a strong and efficient collector of taxes at that moment of ransom

when this was a peculiar recommendation. There is associated with his name a whole series of changes in political practice which are not, of course, due to his own initiative, but were the effect in England of a social development which was at work all over Western Christendom.

At the beginning of his power Hubert Walter granted the first regular charter of an English town we possess—that of Lincoln; granting control of its own fiscal arrangements, through its principal men. London, after the dangerous precedent of John, was refused. It remained subject in theory to arbitrary tallage by the Crown and because the richer men who had (in practice) the assessment thereof unduly burdened the poorer citizens, there was a rising. It was in this same four years of Hubert Walter's power (he lost his position in 1198, not as archbishop, of course, but as justiciar) that we find, for the first time, machinery appearing in the county courts for using such of the lesser gentry as might be present there in connection with suits before the sheriff; they were to be sworn for discharging certain local functions, notably assessment. It is an important beginning; because, out of these local squires, once they had come to be regularly used as helpers to the over-burdened royal officers, came their further functions of deputation to the central Executive, there to bear witness as to how much their countrysides could pay in the way of exceptional levies. Thence, ultimately, they went on to become a permanent representation of the shires in the Councils of the Crown, after the model establishing itself throughout Western Christendom. The process thus begun less than ten years before the end of the XIIth century reached its

final result exactly 100 years later, when the fully constituted Parliament of 1295 is assembled.

The taxes for his ransom.—The raising of Richard's ransom was attempted and partly broke down. The sum was too large. Theoretically, there was to be a 25 per cent. revenue tax on the income of free men, and the levy of a quarter of their moveables. On the clergy a quarter of their temporalities and a tenth of their spiritualities, two shillings on every plough land, twenty on every knight's fee, the wool of certain religious orders, etc. It would probably have been impossible to collect so large a sum at once in any case, though the Middle Ages always worked on what we call to-day a capital levy for abnormal expenditure (and indeed our modern custom—now cracking—of burdening posterity with permanent usury was unknown until well after the Reformation, of which it was a result). But apart from that there was bad corruption. John seems to have kept all the levies from his own districts. The tax-gatherers assessed corruptly, and much of the money gathered was kept back on the way. A proportion was paid, but only a proportion.

He returns to the Continent, May, 1194, to defend his possessions.—By May, 1194, Richard was back again on the Continent to defend his own. His presence was needed. His earnest desire to return to the Holy Land, profound and sincere, was never to be accomplished. The remaining five years of his life were one long struggle to keep the Angevin Empire intact in the face of countless internal difficulties, and the perpetual, though intermittent, pressure of Philip Augustus, King of France. But it must be admitted that Richard in this fighting remained, excellent soldier

though he was, a knight rather than a general. It was sporadic fighting, which partly accounts for its lack of plan. Nearly all war was still necessarily, in the main, the holding and reduction of castles, and this also accounts for the lack of strategic plan. But with all this, we must admit that the thing was very haphazard, each party striking now here, now there, as immediate necessity seemed to demand.

Normandy was wholeheartedly with Richard, except the always potentially rebellious larger tenants. But he was never secure. After a truce at the end of the year, 1195 was occupied in more fighting, under an understanding with the emperor, who aimed at putting France in vassalage. It was that understanding which made Philip break the truce. But in point of fact, the Empire left Richard to fight it out single-handed, and nothing was thoroughly settled.

Has difficulty in holding them against Philip Augustus.—In November, 1195, for instance, Philip was raiding right up on to the seacoast, burning houses in Dieppe and the shipping, much of it English, in the harbour; and close at hand Richard was besieging the castle of Arques.

The Papacy patched up a truce in 1196, which left the Angevin power badly shorn. Even Eu, near the seacoast, was left to be garrisoned by his enemy, and Arques itself; and in the centre he lost ground.

Builds Château Gaillard.—But these conventions were never treated as meant to be held. They were no more than a registration of the immediate result of each phase in such struggles, and it was in defiance of this last truce that the King of England began to build his great castle of Château Gaillard, on the Seine,

above les Andelys. In connection with that enterprise he quarrelled with the Archbishop of Rouen, who was Lord of the Island in the river just under the castle. He drove him out, and as a result the archbishop put Normandy under an interdict.

All these and a score of other details show the way in which the time was one of confusion and of a handicapped struggle for the man who had done so gloriously in that Palestine to which he could not return. He was already hard pressed. His brother after him was to be thrust out.

Has some success in 1198.—Fighting went on here and there throughout 1197. In 1198 things looked up somewhat for Richard. His homage done to the Empire more than five years before bore a chance fruit of prestige. He was summoned, on the death of the man who had held him prisoner, to vote, as a vassal, in the election of a new emperor. He would not go himself, but he threw all his weight into the scale in the Diet (which was held at Cologne) for his nephew Otto of Saxony. His action was of little effect on the future, for there was a double election and civil war, but this ability to affect an imperial election gave Richard and the Angevin house some advantage in men's eyes—for the moment: it was not to last.

In 1198 it looked as though things were going still better. Whole fiefs were hesitating whether they would not join against Paris. France, Toulouse and Brittany in particular (though Brittany itself was now an Angevin house), was fighting openly on the side of the Angevin king. But with all this, Richard was under the handicap of exhaustion, both of money and in men; and his inability to pay his mercenaries led to sack and

pillage and to a consequent increasing loss of support for their master. One of their brigand chiefs, a certain Mercadier (the name is variously spelled), was his principal support in the southern fighting—and the end came through a grotesquely personal accident, which is worth relating in brief detail, because it is illustrative of the way in which the fate of kingdoms was still domestic in character.

On the demesne of the Viscount of Limoges, Vidomar (vassal to Richard in feudal right, for the county of Limoges was vassal to, and a part of, the Duchy of Aquitaine), a peasant, working on this lord's land, had turned up with his plough a great set-piece of gold with a number of figures on it. Richard claimed the whole of it as treasure trove due the overlord. The Viscount of Limoges claimed a portion, and upon this trumpery issue hard local fighting began.

Its central incident was the siege of the castle of Chalus,[1] in the course of which a young man called Gourdon, one of the garrison, shot from a crossbow one of those square-headed bolts called "quarrels" at the king, as he rode under the walls. It struck him on the left shoulder and wounded him.

But is wounded and dies, April 6th, 1199.—The castle was taken by storm, the garrison hanged for robbers of their lord's treasure—all except Gourdon. The wound was unskilfully treated. It grew poisoned and killed the king. He had received it on March 26th,

[1] Chalus (the "*Casteluccium*," little castle, so-called from the original work in the lower town) is near the watershed in the hills, about 30 miles S.W. of Limoges: a small town. The Curtain Wall and Donjon Tower of this castle still stand on their steep low conical hill, and the Outer Ward beyond the river is intact. Tradition has preserved the spot where Richard fell.

1199. He died upon April 6th, in his forty-third year, not before rewarding with money the man who had shot him in fair fight, and ordering his release.

But when the king was dead his sister, Johanna of Toulouse, to whom the Captain of Mercenaries had sent his prisoner, had Gourdon flayed alive.

(D) John

(April 6th, 1199–October 19th, 1216—over 17 years)

Accession of John.—At the moment of Richard's death, John, the cadet and last survivor of Henry's sons, was a young man in his thirty-second or thirty-third year.[1] He inherited an imperilled estate: the too widespread Angevin dominion, with Brittany connected, with Normandy, Maine, Anjou, all Aquitaine to hold, had been held hardly and only under constant strain for now nearly thirty years. Yet he himself—and most of his contemporaries—still thought in terms of a solid continental Empire, of which England was but a dependant part. He was to live for seventeen years more, dying under fifty. Long before his death the whole scheme had disappeared, and the French kings of England were left masters of their kingdom alone, with no more than a distant southern remnant of their continental possessions to recall their origins.

This little space of time, therefore, marks the end of a long determining period, during which England had been essentially the appendage of a great continental house; an appendage which gave that house a wholly independent royalty and great revenue for the prosecu-

[1] We are not quite certain of the date of his birth. We only know that he was the youngest son of the famous Angevin marriage, and that he was born probably at the end of 1167, perhaps at the beginning of December that year.

tion of its schemes, but none the less an appendage, subordinate in the general plan of those who happened to be its monarchs, but who were in their chief interests and residence men of the Continent.

The effect of the loss of Normandy was dynastic, not national. England had been so long a part of one, partly French, dominion, that it was now permanently a province of Western feudal chivalry. The feudal society of England was henceforward strictly united to that great world which the Crusades had confirmed in its unity, from Antioch to Palermo, from Palermo to the Highland border of Scotland: one in daily habit, sports, meals, speech, arms.

The later emergence of England as a separate community in Christendom was a product of the Later Middle Ages, after 1350; of national monarchies appearing in Europe: of the weakened, riven and derided Papacy, of the Black Death and especially of one English national language after the Black Death.

The still later conception of England as a wholly independent isolated thing, was the product of the Reformation. But the phase of her history introduced by Ethelred's Norman marriage, by Edward the Confessor's Court, and fixed by Hastings, had, in John's day, become permanent.

Indeed the phase had lasted so long as to mould England finally. Between the Battle of Hastings and the final loss of Normandy there was the space of 140 years—two long lifetimes—a boy old enough to remember the news of Hastings could only at an exceptional age have survived to speak to a child who might again in very old age have lived to see the occupation of Normandy by the King of France.

It is the space of time which separates us from the last years of Dr. Johnson and Gibbon. It is the space of time which separates the Declaration of Independence from the outbreak of the Great War and the generation of the aeroplane from the days of the old flintlock and the wig.

Special unity of England and the Continent under John.—It is no wonder that after such a length of time the French or continental aspect of England had become the only familiar one, or that, had not Henry's misfortune left his son John an heritage of defeat, France and England should have been joined in one kingdom after little more delay. Of that kingdom England would have been but a province. The long space between the victory of the Conqueror and the loss of Normandy by a great-grandson's youngest child had sufficed to make the vocal part of the community in England French speaking. Its lawyers, its principal clerics, its gentry, already most of its greater merchants, were by the early XIIIth century a French-speaking body and a knowledge of French was percolating further and further down into the body of the people. Below them, the middle class of the towns, and more and more of the larger freemen in the country, were familiar with the tongue. The great majority still spoke the various local dialects of Anglo-Saxon origin; these already suffering some modification from the united French above them. But the old literary tongue of the Winchester Court, the common medium of all that governed England before Edward the Confessor, was dead.

Right on to that great turn of the tide in the Middle Ages, the Black Death—nearly as much later than John

as John was later than the Conquest—the spread of French speech continued: and so long as it continued, so long as the governing classes, all the directive expression of England, and more and more of the people below, were French speaking, an attempt at union between the two societies on either side of the Channel would be made, and was made, and once was nearly achieved. The memory of it lingered until long after the Black Death. It was actually registered—in theory—by the Coronation of Henry VI, more than 200 years after John. By that time England had lost its French, and had become wholly English speaking. Even the higher gentry then talked and thought in the language we use to-day. They had therefore largely differentiated from the gentry in lands across the Channel, and a recognizable, even strong, national feeling was apparent in both places well before the end of the XIVth century.

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We are dealing with an action the particulars of which cover only five years, and the crisis of which covers only the last of those five years. John came to the throne in the early months of 1199; he had lost Normandy by the summer of 1204, and the final crash did not come till the end of 1204 and the first half of 1205. The winding-up of the loss was completed by 1206.

In order to understand how the thing came about, we must comprehend as best we can, from somewhat contradictory record, the character of John himself.

Character of John.—The personality of a chief counted heavily in those days: days in which the freemen were a minority, the gentry—who had in-

dependent fighting power—were but a few thousands, and in which the masses of the populace were still half servile; in which political success depended upon constant war with comparatively small forces, and those forces immensely influenced by the nature of their leaders. John had all the good military qualities of his family. He was exceedingly energetic, he was a very good soldier, he had statesmanship; he was capable of continuous hard work—though only by spells. Also, like his father and his brother before him, he had come into power young, and, like his brother and his father before him, he had exercised civil government and had had experience in armed leadership before he was King of England.

With all this he ought to have been secure, save for the legacy of a realm loosened by the *sequelæ* of the Becket upheaval. What completed his ruin was a certain excess, latent or repressed in his father and brother, or but partially developed, but in John rampant. He suffered, like his father, from a violent and spasmodic temper, but, unlike his father, he never knew how to restrain it. He had the same sensuality, but he let it run riot to the detriment of all that his intelligence and political will had planned. He was more permanently and regularly cruel than any of his race—recalling to priest and people that half-legendary ancestress of his in the Dark Ages flying through the airs of the Loire Forests.

But these faults, detestable in him as a man, were not fatal to him as king, not even his occasional (and short) fits of indolence which were the counterpart of his enormous activities. What was chiefly fatal in him was a fine faculty for quarrelling. By this I do

MAP VIII

JOHN'S INHERITANCE

not mean a faculty for quarrelling such as we find in men who are merely bad tempered and touchy, though this is a bad enough obstacle to success. John was not of that kind at all. He was on a much bigger scale than that, for he was a Plantagenet. But he never paused to consider what the effect of his manner would be upon a man's affections for him. Indeed, he was indifferent to another man's affection, was even indifferent to, and wantonly challenged, the enmity of others continually for trifling personal causes; for the gratification of trifling personal whims.

In the same way, where much larger matters were concerned, he calculated very badly the moral effect which some action of his would have upon others. He roused indignation over and over again, because he was indifferent to it, as I have said, but also because he seemed incapable of understanding how indignation arises. He had no very great sense of his own rights, rather of his own power; and he was inhuman in his misconception of what others would feel with regard to *their* rights.

Such a man, pitted against the by no means sympathetic but tenacious and closely calculating character of Philip Augustus, was bound to lose, even if he had not inherited a breaking patrimony: and he did lose.

The factor of Brittany.—So much being said on this factor in the catastrophe, the character of John, the next two things we have to grasp are the positions of Arthur of Brittany and of a great Angevin noble called Guillaume des Roches (William of the Rocks).

Arthur was the son of that Geoffrey Plantagenet: the third son of Henry the II, the man who lies buried in front of the high altar of Notre Dame

in Paris. He had inherited from his late father the fief of Brittany, which fief, as we have seen, a marriage with its heiress, Constantia, had given to this same Geoffrey. Arthur was at this moment (spring of 1199) a little boy not quite twelve years old. By feudal rules he should have been king before John, as the son of John's elder brother, now dead thirteen years. But it is unhistorical to say that John definitely usurped the throne. The rule of succession was getting rapidly fixed in European feeling. It was almost universal. In another thirty years it had become unquestioned, but in 1200 there was still room for exception. The last king's wish was of effect: and John, who had been with Richard at his death, was probably named by him. At any rate, Richard had given up calling Arthur his heir.

Also the time was troublous and the Angevin Empire in peril. It needed a head. There was, further, a remaining, confused feeling that the eldest living male of a reigning family had the first right, that the son of mature age counted more than the grandson who was a child.

None the less, the problem required careful handling on account of a factor which is unknown to our textbooks, and that fact was the temper of the Breton people. They were a highly individual section of Northern France. Although only half of them spoke the old Celtic tongue (the eastern half spoke French), they had a strong sense of provincial and almost national unity, and while they took no particular interest in the idea of their little prince being King of England, they took an intense interest in his rights over Brittany, and in his personal safety and honour. On whichever

side Arthur was, there would be the mass of Breton feeling and armed Breton support, and Anjou was next door.

Guillaume des Roches and his position are quite easy to see. He was the most important fighting member of the Angevin nobility. His house might be compared to the Nevilles during the Wars of the Roses, and he himself to Warwick the King-maker.

Now the great feudal nobles, the great local lords, of a rank just below the counts and dukes of the main independent fiefs, the great tenants holding of the Duchy of Normandy, and the County of Anjou and the Duchy of Brittany, desired, as did for that matter their inferiors of gentle birth, right down to the smallest one-village lords, as much independence as they could get. They would follow a leader in any good pretext for further independence. A considerable soldier able to lead them and to express the local feeling of the nobility in what was not only the native land of the Plantagenets but the land which determined the power of a Norman prince over Brittany, was in a very favourable position on Richard's death. He had only to hold the balance as best he could between Philip Augustus and John; and his instrument in such a game was obviously little Arthur. So William des Roches began the game by throwing his weight on to Arthur's side.

John is crowned at Rouen, April 25th, 1199, and at Westminster, May 27th.—John had had himself crowned at Rouen on the 25th April, 1199, and had then come over to England and had himself crowned at Westminster on the 27th May.[1] Hubert Walter, the

[1] He shocked the world by refusing to communicate: as he had refused at Easter just before. So much for his religion. As for his energy he only

Archbishop of Canterbury, made the long speech necessary to a strongly protested and doubtful claim, calling the crown of England "elective"—as all crowns were always called when there was doubt and an uncertain claimant was on the spot. But Brittany, Anjou, and Maine were opposed.

Philip Augustus, now able to do what he could not do when Richard was alive because he now had before him a disputed succession, entered Normandy and overran (one may say conquered), in the course of 1199, Anjou and Maine. The Breton army of Arthur and his mother Constance came in from the West, met him at Le Mans, and there Arthur did homage to the King of France, who took him as his ward. But that made Philip too powerful in William des Roches' eyes, who shifted over. He handed over little Arthur (who was with him) and the town of Mans to John, and the shifting over was so violently against the King of France that he ceased to fight. John entered Angers and was crowned there on June 18th. Philip Augustus temporized. He not only made a peace[1] with John in August, but asked him over to Paris. John went there, and the comedy of a permanent reconciliation was played. Great feasts at court and acclamations of the King of England by the Parisian populace, and the rest of it.

He got back to London in May, 1201, but in that same year two things happened. Philip Augustus's wife died. That relieved his tension with the Papacy,

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landed at Shoreham on May 25th, yet had done the 50 miles to London in the saddle by the morrow, and was crowned the morning after the Ascension.

[1] It was the occasion of the marriage between Philip's son Louis and John's niece, Blanche of Castile. To that union was born St. Louis of France. It was not a disadvantageous peace. Philip got Evreux as his daughter-in-law's dowry and a "relief" of 20,000 marks for Normandy as well.

which had formed a good part of his troubles: for the Papacy had ordered him to take back a Danish wife whom he had sent away. More important, John successfully quarrelled with the lords of Aquitaine. He desired and obtained as wife (having got rid of his first one) the very young daughter of the Count of Angoulême. She was already pledged to the heir of Marche, one of the great Aquitainian nobility (a Lusignan). It was purely personal whim with no statecraft behind it at all, and it raised the South. The lords of Aquitaine appealed to Philip Augustus, the overlord of John and of all of them. Poitou in particular rose.

We must not exaggerate the effect of feudal theory in practice. In practice details more depended upon results of fighting than upon defined feudal bonds. But men live by social theories, and when this solemn appeal had been made, Philip Augustus had a strong moral basis on which to act. On Lady Day, in the year 1202, he held a court at Le Goulet, the very place where he had suffered the humiliation of making peace with John more than eighteen months before.

Philip Augustus summons John as his vassal to yield up Normandy, etc., to Arthur of Brittany, March 25th, 1202.—As his feudal superior, he summoned John to yield up to Arthur, the rightful heir, Normandy, Anjou, Maine, and now Poitou as well. At the end of the next month—April—solemn feudal sentence was delivered by the French barons acting as John's peers; they deposed him. It was only a form, but it was the initiation of the whole affair whereby the Plantagenets lost Northern France.

We must remember that Philip Augustus had at

this moment Arthur by his side. He was in possession of that asset, for John had let him go. He affianced Arthur, who was now fifteen, to his own little daughter of twelve years, and sent the young Count of Brittany back into his own land to act there with considerable force, while he himself, the King of France, marched up into Normandy. He swept the eastern part of that duchy right up to the sea, and began besieging the Castle of Arques just below Dieppe, though he was not strong enough to act in the Seine Valley. There happened again what had happened before when the King of France had become too powerful, Guillaume des Roches at once shifted over and supported John.

The result was that John had a free hand, and could march whither he would, south and west, without fear of interruption upon the flank of his march from the lords of Anjou.

At that moment (the summer of 1202) the old Dowager, Eleanor, held the Castle of Mirebeau, right away down in the Poitou country.

Capture of Arthur by John at Mirebeau, summer of 1202 (August 1st).—Since all this war was a war of personalities, a war of swarming French nobles fighting catch-as-catch can, it was important to those who supported the Boy-Count of Brittany, to get hold of the old lady, his grandmother. (I say old lady: she was at that time just eighty years of age.) Arthur, therefore, was taken down by the supporters of his claim to besiege the Dowager in Mirebeau Castle. They had taken all but the keep, wherein the fierce old southern woman refused to surrender, when John, now free to act through the turnover of William of the Rocks, came hurtling down with a small but sufficient force of mounted knights.

He managed by relays to ride 80 miles from Le Mans to Mirebeau in the forty-eight hours—an amazing feat for a whole column!

He surprised Arthur and caught and took him prisoner, and all his, packing even the knights of good family into tumbrels and carting them northward, to their huge complaint, for they said they were treated like cattle. John put Arthur into the very strong Castle of Falaise, the birthplace of the Conqueror.

It is not without a certain spiritual significance that the structure where William the Conqueror was born was also the structure where his great-grandson's son began the loss of Normandy.

The capture of Arthur had taken place on the 1st August, 1202. It was some time in the late summer or autumn, while Arthur was thus imprisoned in Falaise, that there took place the certainly historical episode of John's ordering him to be blinded, which Shakespeare has put into his play. But the important thing was not the proposed blinding of him; the important thing was that the Bretons (that people segregated as are the Welsh in this island) thought their young prince was being done to death.

The blinding or other mutilation of a man (or a boy) was not unknown to that time of savage violence and purely personal rule. Make an heir blind, or in any other way incapacitate him, and he would be unable to rule. That was the calculation. But what roused Brittany was the rumour of the young man's death. There passed a winter during which the subtle Philip Augustus wove his plots. John, when the Bretons rose, told them that Arthur was safe—which he still was—but he had taken his nephew to Rouen Castle and shut

him up there even more securely. So the Bretons were still all on the move, and Philip Augustus continued all that winter to scheme.

It was now quite clear: the Breton feeling against John—and the Angevin feeling, too, for that matter—turned the tide.

William of the Rocks was no longer arbiter in the quarrel. It had grown too violent since Arthur's capture. In future he could only swim with the tide.

On March 23rd, 1203, he signed a definite treaty with the King of France. From that moment all was up with John. The Bretons were roused. The chief fighting man of the Angevin lords had finally gone over to the Capetian power: the Plantagenet had no sufficient force left with which to act.

It is exceedingly important, at this crisis in the history of England, to see why it was that Normandy went by the board: why the Plantagenets lost control of that wide continental dominion which was their home, and to which (in their eyes) England had hitherto been no more than a stand-by and a basis for the title of "King."

They lost their hold because, in England as in Normandy, as in Anjou—everywhere—the great Barons, Lords of many manors, and Overlords of many one-manor men each, were masters of independent armies. Many Barons combined could equal and sometimes outweigh a king's direct lesser tenants in arms and the mercenaries a king could hire with his manifold revenues of Forest, Justice, and Aids.

They lost their hold because the feudal nobility was still (and for generations to come) the basis of all fighting forces, and the Plantagenets, through the folly of

John (through his personal folly), great soldier though he was, had lost first the lords of Aquitaine, then the hot and fiery and sullen populace of Brittany, lastly the lords of Anjou.

John is often blamed for being a wicked man. And so he was. He is blamed for being a foolish and slovenly man, which most certainly he was not. He was active in intelligence as in body. He is blamed for being an uncalculating man, which is not quite a just judgment, though nearly one. What he was was this: A man spasmodic as though statesmanship were a question of personal whims; subject to passion, and when blinded either by appetite or anger, or when opportunity for adventure occurred, shortening the range of his naturally good vision, and making no sufficient calculation for the future. That was John.

Defections from John to Philip.—The moment William of the Rocks (on March 23rd, 1203) had made his final treaty with the King of France, things went like a waterfall. A very powerful noble on the edges of Southern Normandy (the Lord of Alençon) joined the King of France. Next month early, war began. Anjou and Maine were occupied at once. John raided Brittany, but nothing came of it.

Pope Innocent III attempts to intervene.—In the height of the summer that great Pope, Innocent III, the moral master of all Europe, seeing before his eyes (as he thought) the two chief masters of Western Europe engaged in a mutually destructive struggle, not understanding that one was already master of the other, and, indeed, thinking much more of legal right than of the strength of either side (for Innocent III was above all a legist, a man of strict right), tried to separate

the combatants. He failed. He was told that the Pope had nothing to say to the feudal nobles of the French king—for the feudal nobles of the French king wholly supported their suzerain in this affair; nor must it be forgotten that every feudal movement in defence of the feudal claim or in favour of *disallowing* the feudal claim upon either side was very strongly mixed up with money.

The people who attacked or defended in a feudal quarrel were always considering what might be made out of either side financially. Philip Augustus was obviously winning, and all the feudalism of Northern France (and some of England) began to side with him.

The French king moves to dispossess John of Normandy, September, 1203.—Even into the autumn—even as late as the very end of October, 1203 (on the vigil of All Saints)—Pope Innocent tried to settle the quarrel, but neither the French king nor his followers would hear a word of it. They had already settled down before Château Gaillard, that great ruin (as it is nowadays) which overhangs the Lesser Andelys above the Seine. It was then very fresh and new. We have seen how Richard had built it not ten years before to block the way into Normandy. Philip Augustus was now before it with great forces. He must take it before he could march on to Rouen. All that winter, from September, 1203, till March, 1204, the large host of the King of Paris sat round Château Gaillard. It was defended by Roger de Lacey, and gave proof of what the power of the defensive fortress was in those days. For when it gave way only 200 men (or less) surrendered; all that was left of perhaps at the very most four times their number against a great army.

That, indeed, was the chief side of mediæval war. Mobility of strategy and of tactics occasionally effected a great victory, but normally the large armed forces were confronted by a small, almost impregnable defence. Till Château Gaillard was taken no French force could move up to Rouen by road or river.

While Château Gaillard was being besieged[1] something happened at Rouen which history has never yet decided.

It may be that documents will yet turn up or some further evidence whereby we can draw a reasonable conclusion; but up to now a certain decision is impossible.

Presumable murder by John of Arthur of Brittany, winter, 1203–4.—Arthur of Brittany disappeared. Was he murdered? I think one may answer that question without hesitation—yes, he was. Had he not been, it would have been to the overwhelming advantage of his uncle, the King of England, to produce him or to have had him sought for. He was a prisoner in Rouen. If he had escaped, John would at once have given notice. Nothing of the sort was done.

Had his uncle murdered him with his own hand? Of that there was no proof. He was the kind of man who might in a fit of passion have killed the unfortunate heir with his own hands. He was accused of it. Remember what kingship was in those days. It gave all power, all wealth, and the respect of fellow-men; all that men now achieve by trickery in money—since kingship is, for the moment, no more.

John was certainly capable of murdering in a fit of

[1] Probably. But the last date on which we are certain Arthur was alive is April 3rd, 1203.

folly and of violence. His contemporaries made, somewhat later, detailed accounts for Arthur's death. They are not to be trusted. At any rate, Arthur disappeared.

It was said until quite lately, and was part of official history, that John had been declared forfeit of Normandy and the rest, because of Arthur's murder. That was still believed when Lingard—the founder of all English history, and the man to whom all English historians turn for their references—wrote 100 years ago. It has been disproved in our own time. The sentence of feudal forfeiture against John took place, as I have said, in the spring of 1202, long before there was any talk of the murder.

Another point of particular importance (it is part of the general question why John failed) is this: Why was there no move made to save Normandy after the abortive effort up river of the Earl of Pembroke? That attempt had failed against the boom of boats across the Seine below Château Gaillard, while on land his men had been beaten back. Contemporaries only give us stories of John's amusing himself in idleness, but that is not an explanation.

He was a great soldier. He knew very well how to win battles. Why did he not try and save Château Gaillard? I think the answer is that he had not the men. The English lords would not fight for him sufficiently oversea, now that he seemed to have a losing cause. He had taxed England very heavily, and could no longer tax Anjou, Maine, Poitou, nor most of Normandy, so he was weak in mercenaries. In that very winter an English feudal levy had refused to embark with him. John had not the men.

It was mainly his own fault, a fault of character. But we must not blame him as a soldier. He had ruined his recruiting field, but if he could have got a sufficient army together he would have won back what he had lost.

Château Gaillard surrenders, March 6th, 1204.—On March 6th, 1204, Château Gaillard surrendered and the date may well be set down as a turning-point in the history of Western Europe. After that all Normandy slipped away. The Governor of Falaise surrendered voluntarily to the French Crown. Rouen capitulated under easy terms. By the opening of June, Normandy had gone. John made a descent on La Rochelle in the hope of saving Poitou; but he failed. All that was securely left to the Plantagenets beyond the Channel was the distant but productive land of Gascony. Its wine supplied their court and their gentry in England, and, indeed, the better part of their townspeople. It was strongly attached to the family. It was averse to the King of Paris. It remained a foothold of that ancient dominion, and was used as such continually throughout the Middle Ages to the last collapse of Plantagenet power within a lifetime of the Reformation. But effectual hold by the great Angevin house of that French Empire wherein England was to be but a province was gone.

John, now defeated, quarrels with the Pope.—Hardly had this enormous blow been delivered when another new quarrel appeared—trouble with Rome.

The Papacy had greatly increased in political power. The conquest of Constantinople at this very moment (1204) by French and Venetians had given the Latin rite something like universality. The effort

of the German emperors to control the Papacy was failing: within a lifetime it was to be ruined. By the Papacy had the great Albigensian peril to our civilization been challenged; by the Papacy, at this very moment, it was about to be overcome (Battle of Muret). Innocent III exercised a command stronger than any earlier or later Pope. The heavy fiscal demands, due to the final life and death struggle with the Empire, had not yet exasperated opinion. The Papal political power in John's day was unquestioned, obvious, necessary, and supreme as is that of finance to-day.

That a Pope could absolve from an oath, and therefore from feudal allegiance, was as much a commonplace as is to-day the taking of interest on international loans.

The occasion of John's quarrel with this overwhelming power was as follows:—

John had a favourite minister, de Grey, who was Bishop of Norwich and acted as his right hand. When the See of Canterbury became vacant (July, 1205), at the death of Archbishop Hubert, John desired the nomination of Grey to the post. It shows how far things had gone since the loss of Normandy. The King of England could not appoint to the Archbishopric of Canterbury; he could only beg. The old canonical right of election to the See lay with the monks attached to the cathedral. A portion of them privately chose their own sub-prior and sent him secretly to Rome to get their judgment confirmed.

Innocent III received John's request, and the claim of the monks' nominee. He gave a very just decision, quashing both elections, de Grey's because it was premature—John announcing it before the original

election had been disallowed; and the sub-prior's because it had been made in turbulence and uncanonically and secretly. These sentences were delivered just before Christmas, 1205. The representatives of the monks of Canterbury were present at the Papal court.

Stephen de Langton.—Innocent III decided again quite justly that the ordinary right of election lay with the monks. He left them free to act in their choice of a new candidate, but he gave them very strong advice that they should elect some one born in England, and preferably a man of distinction. There was, apparently, actually present when this advice was given, a cleric exactly corresponding to this description, and a most remarkable man. His name was Cardinal Stephen de Langton. He was the son it seems of one of the smaller lords of villages. At any rate, his father bore a territorial name (it has not been made certain which Langton he was Lord of), and he was early distinguished.

We do not know his age exactly at this moment, but he was close to the maturity of a great career. He was, of course, French-speaking, like all his class and sort (but it was a time when Latin was still a conversational language as well among his caste). He wrote French verse, which has been preserved; and he issued in that tongue the first charter not in Latin since the Conquest. He had acquired very great fame in the University of Paris, of which it is believed that he was Rector.

The Pope had given him a Cardinal's hat and called him to Rome, where he resided. He was far and away the most distinguished born subject of the King of

England then alive. The monks elected him with only one dissentient voice—but John refused him. He felt it unnatural that his own desires as King of England should be passed over.

The Pope was torn between two policies. He needed France as he did England to help him in the unceasing struggle with the Empire. But he had also to consider the claims of his supreme office. He did all he could to avoid a quarrel with John, but the king had misrepresented the monks' messengers, and would not answer the Pope's letter, so Stephen de Langton was consecrated by the Pope himself at Viterbo, after a long delay, on June 17th, 1207. The Pope still tried concessions, but John still refused, and said that Langton should never enter England as primate, and by the next year, 1208, the Pope took a very grave decision. He decided to lay England under an interdict in order to force the king's hand.

The interdict of 1208.—The interdict was (and is) a prohibition by ecclesiastical authority of all the normal functions of external religion in a given area, save those essentially necessary by the theory of the Church. Baptism could be administered under it, but with only the parent and god-parent present. Marriages were allowed only in the porch of the Church. The dying received the Sacraments. But the whole external movement of religion which was as much part of the life of the times as sports are to-day, ceased. The pressure on the king was therefore severe. But Europe had had not a few examples in the past of local interdicts successfully combated, and John kept firmly to his will.

He took the revenues of the Church into his own hands, and stood out for four years.

One unexpected effect was a large revenue for the Crown. Now, the whole meaning of the trouble in John's reign, culminating in the signing of the Magna Carta, and his well-armed reaction (which would have been successful but for his death), was money. He had to fight against the whole weight of the French king's revenue and forces on an insufficient "economic basis." He had to tax outrageously and quite beyond the tradition and custom which all men regarded, under the feudal system, as not only tradition and custom, but right. Now, thanks to the interdict, he was provided with ample means through the Church revenues (which he at once seized), and that without molesting any lay subject. It is no wonder that the wealthier classes, at any rate, supported him at first. It was at that very time that he made his most successful descent upon Ireland, that he got the Welsh Princes and King of Scotland to admit his suzerainty.

Not even excommunication coming at the end of the first year of the interdict moved him.

At last, in 1212, Innocent appealed to Philip Augustus to carry out the consequences of the excommunication, and depose the Plantagenet by force. The French king raised a large army, but John's navy was too much for him. It held the sea. Yet John, in the early part of 1213, began to waver.

It was the disaffection of the great nobles which shook him. They had repeatedly failed him as an armed force. He had become personally intensely unpopular with them, through those personal motives which counted so much in the Middle Ages. He had been abominably cruel in particular instances, and their outraged honour, as well as their indignation,

made them ready to rebel. But the overwhelming motive of barons and higher clergy alike, especially the See of Canterbury, was financial. The King of England, suddenly deprived of his Norman and Angevin revenues, and by that very fact compelled to find new and enormous sums if he would fight to recover them and subsidize allies, was driven to demand extraordinary aid after extraordinary aid, to squeeze all he could out of wardships (minorities and marriages of heiresses), clerical vacancies, and to begin a series of abnormal calls for money to which there seemed no end. The old feudal regular dues were swamped, and the feudal class, if the system continued, would be ruined—for they had no power to prevent their being bled save the moral power of tradition—the mediæval feeling of *sacredness* about old custom and the wickedness of exceeding it—and the material power of armed rebellion. There was a vicious circle. As they prepared to rise, the king was driven to hire mercenaries: which meant more arbitrary calls for money: which meant more feudatories joining the rebellious clique: which meant more mercenaries: which meant more taxes—and so on.

The barons and the higher clergy, that is, those on whom all society depended, were on the edge of civil war. In such a crux John determined to yield to the Pope.

The Pope was exceedingly anxious to build a golden bridge for his retreating enemy. We must remember all through this the way in which Innocent depended upon the Western powers for support in the main struggle of his life, which was not with John or Philip but with the Empire. He sent over Pandolph as his envoy,

and on May 13th, John signed conditions easy enough. He would admit Langton, release his prisoners, refund the clergy.

John, with support of his Barony, makes the Pope his feudal superior, May 15th, 1213.—Two days later, on May 15th, 1213, the king, acting on the advice of his barons, but also certainly on his own initiative, executed an excellent piece of diplomacy. He knew what the threat from France was, and the growing danger of rebellion within the island. He proposed to make himself the feudal vassal of the Holy See. The barons of England were eager for the step, because it gave them appeal from John's taxation to a feudal superior. John was prepared to use it as a shield against the ambition of the French king, who was already aiming at becoming feudal superior of England as he already was of Normandy, Maine, and Anjou.

There was plenty of precedent. It was a capital move in the diplomacy of the day; it was not yet ten years since Peter, King of Aragon, had done exactly the same thing; John's own father had done it; the Normans of South Italy had done it to their great advantage more than a century earlier. It put all the moral forces of the Papacy between you and your enemies. The Scotch were to do it far more drastically a century hence, not even calling themselves a "fief" of St. Peter's, but "his allodial land": that is, his freehold.

The token of the new feudal bond was to be a payment of 1000 marks (that is, two-thirds of £1000) a year—the equivalent to us to-day in purchasing power of, say, £20,000, or a little less. We shall see later how this payment fell first into arrears and was then disallowed.

Hardly had the Feudal Bond with Rome been registered than the astuteness of the barons in advising it became apparent.

For, just as there had been an unexpected effect attached to the beginning of the interdict, so there was an unexpected effect attached to this diplomatic move; and the great feudal nobles of England, who had supported it, knew well what they were about. From John, as their king, they had had no feudal appeal. Now that the Pope was his feudal superior, they could at once appeal to the Pope against John's inevitable but exceptional taxation. And we must date from this moment the beginning of the heavy pressure which they put upon the king, and which bore its fruit at Runnymede.

But Innocent was a legist, and in the strict legal theory of the time the king levying these very heavy taxes from his lords was within his rights, when needing extraordinary aid under extraordinary strain (and John certainly was *that*); though the excess of the amounts—especially as they had only resulted in the loss of Normandy—shocked the moral code of feudalism. Finding no help from the Pope, the barons, to avoid further financial levies, were thrown back on independent action, backed by the threat of rebellion.

Opposition to John and rôle of Cardinal Langton.—Stephen de Langton, now enthroned at Canterbury, took very seriously the great historic rôle of the English Primates, something peculiar in Europe, the guardian of morality and tradition against abuse in the realm. Being on the spot, he saw what Innocent could not see, and that was the imminence of civil war. The annoyance against John had spread far down in the feudal

classes, and included probably the greater merchants of the towns, certainly those of London: everyone who felt the weight of abnormal taxation. Moreover, the archbishop had not the Pope's political motives for sparing John. He acted as he thought best for the peace of the country of which he was now the spiritual head, and for the wealthy feudal class, of whom he was a chief member. To certain lay barons whom he had asked to attend a Church Council on the Assumption (August 25th) of 1213, barely five weeks after his admission by the king, Cardinal de Langton suggested the Charter of Henry I as a good basis for negotiating with John. All political morals in these days depended upon the idea of tradition, and took the form of an appeal to ancient custom. Here was a solemn public enactment more than 100 years old, one traditionally embodying customs which stretched even beyond the Conquest, and one almost entirely concerned with the reiteration of limits to Feudal Dues and other rights of an overlord. In other words, they had there a definite record of maximum levy, and of the traditional feudal rights of the great nobles against the king.

We shall quite misunderstand the time if we regard the progress of the rebellion as an uninterrupted and inevitable process. Now that John had the Pope behind him, and probably the mass of the populace, controlling a very large mercenary army, and knowing himself to be the excellent soldier that he was, he might well have affirmed the royal power. But a certain accident of history falling within twelve months ruined him. This accident, which was of lasting effect on English history, was the Battle of Bouvines.

In order to recover the French fiefs of his house he had formed a coalition against the King of France, and while he was attacking from the west, the Emperor with a vast army, mainly German but also Flemish, and with a contingent of English and Anglo-Normans under Salisbury, was to march on Paris from the east. The great French feudatories of the north-east, notably the Lord of Flanders, were in rebellion against Philip, and joined the alliance. If the Emperor should win his battle, John would recover all that he had lost, his revenues would double, and the trouble in England would be heard of no more.

Should the coalition defeat the French king, John would recover Normandy, Maine, Anjou, Poitou. His war expenses would cease. His revenue would double. The extra taxation of Baron, Bishop and Archbishop in England would come to an end, and with it their incipient rebellion.

Battle of Bouvines, July 27th, 1214.—The army of Philip Augustus met that of the English, Anglo-Normans, Germans and Flemings at the Bridge of Bouvines (it is a little village half a day's march south-east of Lille at the crossing of the Roman road over the little stream called the Marque); the French victory was complete, and it was this that ruined John's cause. Indeed, the action of Bouvines is one of the very important decisive battles of history. It made certain the hold of the Capetian house on France; it was the foundation of the growing power of the kings of Paris in the future; and it produced in England something which has been rather a landmark than a cause—Magna Carta.

Bouvines was fought on July 27th, 1214. In the

following Easter the great feudal nobles gathered their army at Stamford, and the country was on the eve of civil war. The archbishop was alarmed: he ceased at this moment to be merely a champion of his fellow nobles. His object was now rather the stability of the realm. He acted as negotiator not only for the rebels but also for the king, and though his sympathy was certainly with the strong demand of the feudal classes to be spared further excessive and uncustomary taxation, he stood between the opposing forces.

Consequent feudal rebellion in England.—The first fighting was an abortive attempt on the part of the rebels to seize Northampton Castle. Bedford they took without a blow, and while at Bedford they received an invitation from the great merchants of London—victims of the taxation themselves—promising them support. That was on May 23rd—a Saturday. They rode all night, and on the Sunday morning were within the open gates of the capital.

The richer men of London had chosen the day—and the church hour—carefully. For the populace, who cared nothing for the financial grievances of the rich, were naturally on the side of their King.

John, playing for time, signs the barons' demands (later incorporated as "Magna Carta") June 15th, 1215.—John was reduced to play for time; he accepted the barons' demands—quite certainly with no intention of yielding to them permanently—and on Monday, June 15th, put his seal to the requests presented to him on the meadow of Runnymede, just below Windsor. They seem later to have been drawn up in the form of that Charter afterwards called "The Great."

Since the XVIIth century, when its wording was

cynically twisted against the weakened and failing popular monarchy of the English people, such a legend has encrusted itself upon the two words "Magna Carta," that it seems a hopeless task to present the thing to modern readers soberly and simply, as it really was: but I will attempt the task.

The document drawn up on the basis of the articles of Runnymede was a solemn guaranty of feudal custom. Its general object, therefore, was to recite what the men of the day regarded as the prescriptive financial immunities of the noble class, and of the Churchlands, as against the new fiscal demands (and necessities) of English government, which novel fiscal necessities and consequent demands were partly due to the general new life vigorously organizing itself all over Christendom, but more, in England, to the sudden cutting off of the king's foreign revenue and the simultaneous heavy costs of intense armed effort to hold them. Its immediate and specific object was the guaranty of the great feudal incomes against the necessities of the king, and at the same time a guaranteeing of the great clerical incomes. He had also to observe strictly the feudal traditions in the matter of wardship, dowries, and the rest. Elaborate machinery was set up to compel his observance of such promises, and every precaution was taken which words could effect to bind a government of 1215 in the heart of a changing society rapidly increasing in wealth, to the framework of a far simpler and static time long past. It confirmed the use of the local smaller gentry for action in the local courts, giving evidence and helping to judge and to assess: it included in its protection against any new taxation—though in vague terms—the chief merchants ("Barons")

of London. It repeated the conventional phrase, as old as Feudalism itself, that as the king was bound to his barons, so were the barons to their under-lords.

Two passages which, later (when the thing was divided into clauses), were numbered Clause XII and Clause LXI, are the heart of the affair. The first, which was due to the exuberance of the victors and shocked the feeling of the time, was an outrageous claim that the king as Feudal Lord might not levy aids on his own liege men in his necessities, but must humbly ask what they might choose to give. The second was a setting up of elaborate machinery for controlling the Crown by a clique of barons. The first was dropped immediately after the brief triumph of the rebellion and never heard of again. The second failed, but afforded a precedent (which also failed) for the rebels against John's son a lifetime later.

For the rest it is no more than the attempt to fix decaying custom, especially in such matters as the right of a gentleman—including free-men—to be tried by his peers, not by inferiors in social rank, and the right to the customary ordeal of the locality. Both of these are aimed at the new and more efficient Royal Courts of Justice, superseding in part the local assemblies. In a word, Magna Carta is an attempt to crystallize and preserve a system which was just beginning to show signs of decay: Feudalism.

For a century, so long as Feudalism endured, it was to the fore and confirmed again and again. But as Parliaments with representation took the place of the old feudal councils, and as voted grants from all classes took the place of the old feudal aids, it turned fossil and was neglected, having lost its meaning.

The date of the king's definite act, the affixing of the seal, was, as I have said, June 15th, and John's signature was put to the document on the 18th.

And civil war begins.—Within ten days the whole position had become again quite unsound. The barons knew that John was prepared for a struggle in arms. Negotiations were repeated throughout the summer: with September began the stream of foreign mercenaries whom John was gathering to free himself from constraint; with October the civil war began in good earnest. The barons tried to hold Rochester; John mastered that castle with his hired army from overseas. But before the end of that siege, he had already heard that the Pope had annulled the Charter as obtained by violence. It was again as a legist and an exponent of the morals of the time that Innocent acted. He blamed the rebels for breaking the feudal bond, for not carrying their appeal to the supreme court of Christendom, and emphasized especially his own position as feudal superior, which they themselves had given him. He demanded that the barons' claims should be submitted to him, and promised that all grievances would be abolished when they had appeared in his court.

But the armed forces paid no more heed to Innocent than the King of France had done under similar pressure years before. The Pope ordered the archbishop to excommunicate those who disobeyed the Papal order. The archbishop got out of this upon the plea that the whole thing was a lay matter.

The issue was therefore now left to the result of armed conflict.

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To grasp the character of John completely, it is as important to follow his military genius as his political energy and his civilian vices, and to appreciate that genius it will be well to take in more detail this fine last campaign in which he so nearly recovered his personal rule over the opponents to whom the defeat of his allies at Bouvines had given their opportunity.

John's great campaign of 1215–1216.—John, at the opening of the campaign in late 1215, held—among a great number of other points—*the Line of the Thames*.

It is from this that we make our departure. It was this which formed the foundation of those later operations which, but for his death, would have seen him finally triumphant. This line was made up of five castles, which commanded every nodal[1] point upon the river, each within one long day's march of its neighbour, and therefore any pair of them controlling the river crossings between the two. These five castles were (1) The Tower of London, (2) Windsor, (3) Reading, (4) Wallingford and (5) Oxford. John also held the castle of Dover—a gate through which he could receive supply of any further armed men whom he should hire. He brought them in by the thousand, and began by recapturing Rochester Castle, which gave him full control of the main road from Dover to London. He proceeded to throw them into castle after castle until he was near to catching the whole rebel movement in a net of such fixed points.

The baronial levies, had he completed the process,

[1] Where two or more lines of travel and supply meet—such as two roads or more crossing, or a road and a river—you have a *nodal point* in strategy. To hold it gives you the opportunity of using the alternative ways for your own advance, retreat or supply, and correspondingly blocking your enemy's advance, retreat or supply.

would have been immobilized: unable to march because in any direction a royal garrison in a stronghold would have been within striking distance of their lines of supply.

The Opposition, in peril of defeat, offer the throne of England to the heir of France.—Before this first plan was fully successful the rebels countered it by purchasing that aid of the Scotch, which we have seen, the price being the cession to Scotland of the northern counties.[1] John re-countered by harrying the north more strongly than even the Conqueror had done, pushing right up to the Forth, and taking from the King of Scotland all appetite for annexing Northern England. It was when they were in this strategic situation, with their Scottish ally mated, and their own forces more and more immobilized by the growing network of John's castles, that the barons counter-recountered by inviting a foreign invasion, and promising the Crown of England to Prince Louis, heir to Philip Augustus and later himself King of France as Louis VIII.

It was a rude menace. It meant, to the barons at bay, a sudden accession of men in indefinite numbers, and to John, if he failed, not a new compromise like that of Magna Carta, but probably exile or death—and at least the loss of his throne.

Who accepts the kingdom at London, June 2nd, 1216.—Nothing could have suited Philip Augustus better. When the Pope's legate protested against attack on a Papal fief, there was only a simulacrum of hesitation. Already, at the end of February, a body

[1] In Magna Carta the rebels sold immunity to Wales and special privileges to Scotland, whose help they needed against the king, their overlord.

MAP IX

JOHN'S ENGLISH CAMPAIGN

of French knights had come up the Thames, and on May 16th Louis sailed from Calais with nearly 700 ships. A great part of this Armada was dispersed by a storm. But what remained was enough to menace John, though he was at the head of a considerable army near Dover. Louis rallied a considerable force, took Rochester, reached London on June 2nd, was given homage, and swore to govern according to the traditions of his new realm.

There are two historical errors to be avoided here. Of course, the idea that Louis was a "foreigner" in our modern sense of the word is nonsense. All the governing part of England, all barons and higher clergy who had called in Louis, were of exactly the same sort as he was, and as John was, in every social detail of speech, manner, dress, ideas—everything. On the other hand, the mass of lesser men must have been shocked at the proposal to outlaw the hereditary house. The "One-manor man," though French speaking and of French culture, already felt a local distinction between himself and the lords of another realm. The Pope, and probably the mass of the lower clergy, were with John.

But the rebels were very powerful, with all the weight of the French Crown behind them and much the greater part of the feudal levies of the island at their call.

At first it looked as though this great accession of strength to the rebellion was more than John could stand up to, especially as his mercenary and professional army was largely made up of men born under the French Crown. He went westward, abandoning all the south (except his garrison at Dover)—even Winchester, then Marlborough, then the line of the Severn itself,

giving up Worcester. John was thus pushed up against the Welsh hills—but he still had Dover, the main port of entry, and he still held the line of the Thames. This last checked any plan that Louis might make to move east and north, in order to make a full occupation of the country; and Dover, especially, in the hands of a Plantagenet garrison was a bad handicap.

Philip Augustus had said, "Take Dover first"—his advice had been neglected. But now Louis turned back, by August, 1216, to reduce Dover—and at once John moved.

Death of John, October 19th, 1216.—His garrison at Windsor was besieged, but held out. The line of the Thames stood firm, and Dover held out, too, under Hubert de Burgh, the saviour of the dynasty. Worcester was recovered. Then John struck suddenly east to cut off London—the mainstay of the rebels and of Louis—from the north. The Count of Nevers, who was besieging Windsor for Louis, caught the meaning of John's move the moment that great soldier had crossed the Thames at Wallingford. He raced John eastward, and John's better-trained army won: it got across the northern roads to London before the French could reach them. This march should have won the campaign. John, now sure that he could prevent French action northward from London, easily raised the siege of Lincoln. In early October he marched south on Lynn, making sure of that port; then an illness began, due, some said, to poison, others, to excess. He passed the Wash at the Welland (losing his baggage and some men in the tide), pushed on to Newark dying, and died there on the 19th of October.

III

ENGLAND DURING THE SUMMIT OF THE MIDDLE AGES

1216–1307

(91 Years)

A. Henry III, First Part
B. Henry III, Second Part
C. Edward I

III

ENGLAND DURING THE SUMMIT OF THE MIDDLE AGES

(A) Henry III, First Part

(October 19th, 1216, to May 1st, 1248—31½ years)

Character of the XIIIth century.—The XIIIth century is the summit of the Middle Ages. The rapid growth, the spring, of the late XIth and XIIth had reached its summer, and the lifetime which was at boyhood in the first third of that hundred years, which came to old age before its close, saw the happiest and the greatest moment of our race. It was the age in which we of Western Europe, who are the chiefs of the world, were most ourselves. The peril to all our civilization which the expansion of the Crusades had bred, the Albigensian cancer, had been desperately but successfully cut out. The extreme limit which the human reason may attain was reached by St. Thomas. The institutions native to our blood were at their height. The time was filled with such certitude and vision that it has left monuments still inspiring our misfortune, showing us what a country we might inhabit, but leaving us certain that its frontiers are forbidden and its entry lost.

The generation before, the younger contemporaries

of Henry II had seen the beginning of the great change: the Crusading march, tramping and sailing from west to east, from east to west, for nearly a century, and, returning with a vastly expanded sense of the world, had begun the transformation. Their grandsons achieved it. The universities were arising, that of Paris was already the famous intellectual centre of the North; Oxford was established; the Ogive with its revolution in the external appearance of the time had come. Vernacular French literature was in full vigour. Some efforts in the English dialects of the populace had appeared.

The two events which determined the character of the period 1200–1300 were the recovery of Spain and the expansion of Northern France. Jerusalem indeed was lost, as we have seen, but the vigour of the Crusading spirit continued. All the high plateaux of Spain had been, as it were, without a frontier between Mohammedan and Christian. They had been a broad belt raided from either side until the decisive victory of Navas in 1212, right down in the South, pretty well cleared the higher land. The Christian kingdoms had established themselves, and Islam was pushed back into this last corner of Europe.

As important, or perhaps more important, to the story of Europe was the Albigensian war and its result. We tend to see it out of proportion in this country, because England was so singularly free from heresy in any permanent form.[1] But any one considering Europe as a whole will see that the Albigensian move-

[1] But there were wandering heretics in Henry II's reign, and one sect, sixteen in number, landed in England during his time. They worshipped a black cat.

ment and its suppression between them determined the height of the Middle Ages.

The Albigensian movement was the rapid establishment of a culture within a culture, and the Albigensian culture was poison to ours. It was a religion, philosophy and method of life opposed to the traditional character of the civilization in the midst of which it grew with a foreign growth. It was Manichean: one of those Oriental influences upon the European mind which appear from time to time to poison us. It had its own full organization, its hierarchy, its sacraments, and was rapidly approaching the attainment of civil power as well.

The whole society of Southern France was filled with it, and the great Fief of Toulouse was governed after a fashion so sympathetic with the movement that in a generation the evil novelty would have had armed government on its side. Had that happened our civilization would have broken. It would have been even a greater affair than was, later, the Reformation; it would have been of an effect comparable to the early Mohammedan successes and their overwhelming of whole provinces.

A crusade was preached against it, and after heavy fighting it was crushed; but the armies which crushed it were armies of Northern Frenchmen, and the effect of its destruction was the expansion of Northern French rule over the South. Paris reached the Mediterranean.

Philip Augustus, by turning a Plantagenet out of Northern France, had made the Capetian Crown and power a new thing. This capture of the South vastly extended it. The success was due in particular to two men. To the Spaniard St. Dominic, who discovered

the moral weapon of a popular preaching order, and who initiated the Inquisition in order to cover the ground of the disease thoroughly and to extirpate it; and to a man whose genius was of the utmost consequence to Europe: a noble from the neighbourhood of Paris of the family of Amaury, by his Christian name Simon, taking his title from the Castle of Montfort, who discovered astonishing aptitude for command. It was the captaincy and the generalship of this man which, after his own death, achieved the final result, and brought the Capetian house into direct control of Southern Gaul.

From being immediate feudal masters of a district no larger than Wales, the kings of Paris became in a lifetime, by the forfeiture of Normandy, Maine, Anjou, by incursion into Poitou, disputing the central mountains, taking over Toulouse as the fruit of the Albigensian war, the direct governors of an area larger than England in acreage, and far larger in arable land, and therefore in population.

In the process the great leader Simon de Montfort (he was the fourth Simon of that title) became, from a local lord,[1] one of the very greatest feudal chiefs of his time. He stepped into the shoes of the men whom he defeated, his family came to command vast revenues, and were almost equivalent to the kings.

By his action in opening up the South and bringing Northern France into contact with it, there also came in that experimental institution of "*Representation*" which

[1] Montfort is a manor and small town about 25 miles west of Paris, not far from the Norman border. Its castle, of which the ruin still stands, is on a typical "Peninsula," a half-isolated, steep mound on the edge of the Forest of Rambouillet. The family, first found in the Dark Ages, married early into great fiefs of the Vexin and of Normandy, and was already of high standing in the late XIIth century.

was much later, after four centuries, to have so powerful an effect upon the political life of Europe. For it was the little local parliaments of the Pyrenees which set the model for an extension of their kind throughout Spain, Southern France, then England, and, last of all, Brittany.

In spite of the loss of Jerusalem, the expansion of Northern French effort and culture had yet another development—one that proved in the long run very evil—I mean the capture of Constantinople by the French soldiers acting with and for the Venetians in 1204. The wrongful seizure of the eastern capital is somewhat ironically known as the Fourth Crusade. It is to the honour of the great Simon that he refused to take part in that aggression. It made irreconcilable the quarrel between the Greek and the Latin rites. It wrongfully established a French dynasty upon the Imperial Throne of the East. It introduced the Latin Mass wrongfully among a people of Greek liturgy who had upheld the tradition of Christendom against Islam during 600 years. It presented the Western Church, organized under the Papacy, as the wanton enemy of the Eastern; and if we are still seeking unity in Christendom to-day, we principally owe its postponement to the crime and folly of the Fourth Crusade.

The whole of that time was full of so many new creations that a mere list of them would take more space than could be given here.

St. Dominic had not only been the moral force which recovered the South of France for religion, he had also been the founder of the first new great *popular* Order, and contemporary with him in a different spirit, the Italian counterpart of it rose from St. Francis of

Assisi. The Mendicant Orders, the Friars, had appeared.

But the time, filled with activity, is filled with conflict. It was the century wherein the Church, organized under the Papacy, fought to a finish its duel with the secular power exercised or claimed by those emperors to whom a strange accident of succession had given, though on the outer edge of Christendom and German in speech, the nominal headship of society. Their last representative, Frederick II, had abandoned the North: as an Italian threw down the last challenge to our religion: all but conquered through his vivid atheist genius: suddenly and dramatically failed.

There is the main European background upon which you may see the restricted and local interest of the Plantagenet troubles, the shifting, tangled quarrels between Henry III and his baronage, and the gradual change in the constitution of the English feudal great Council into what was to be a *Parliament* upon the general European model.

The highest moment of a culture cannot be maintained. With the XIVth century the simplicity of that spirit was lost, though its thirst for the satisfaction of the soul remained, and its outer forms of colour and of stone continued and perhaps enhanced—though they complicated—the tradition of beauty. The order of Europe suffered. The Papacy had triumphed over the unsubstantial claims of a half-imaginary Empire, and the Italian cities had conquered their northern oppressors. But Italy had sucked the Empire southward in the struggle, and the innumerable German lordships and cities and sees had fallen into anarchy. The very success of the Popes ruined their independ-

ence—they became, in residence at Avignon, no longer Roman, but a part of the French kings' polity, and in personality his men: a condition leading later to schism.

This change was still working evil to Christendom when, in the midst of the century, fell the tremendous blow of the Black Death. All the West reeled under it, and Europe was never more the same; but England in particular was changed, and the close of the Middle Ages in this country, the 150 years and more from the Pestilence to the eve of the Reformation, are in a different tone from all that had gone before. Yet was not the unity of Europe doomed by these later corruptions. It made shipwreck in the XVIth century, but it need not have made shipwreck. That disaster was no inevitable end of a certain process: it was the effect of men's evil wills.

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England politically confused in the mid XIIIth century.—It was unfortunate for England that the midst of that XIIIth century, which was, socially, so glorious in her, as in all other provinces of Christendom, was, politically, one long tale of revolution and weakness. That deplorable thing should not hide from us the largeness of the time. England shared in the magnitude of the moment. She was warmed by the fires of the new popular religious Orders, Dominican and Franciscan; she largely founded her own university life, and Oxford was a great name in Europe, following on Paris. Her building showed everywhere the might of that generation, at Westminster and Canterbury, at Lincoln—throughout the island. There came up North to her the strong popular air then blowing throughout all our culture; the townsmen gathering to order their own

governments, the guilds, the making of the "estates"—that is, of the transformed governing councils with their new great principle of representation for the mass of free laity and of clergy, side by side with the great lords—the growth of letters as well. But the front of the stage was held by a ceaseless wrangle of great men proceeding from the fierce inevitable fiscal quarrel which had flamed up under John, and which would not die down. This confusion among the leaders of society checked the full life of the island, and the fruit of the time was not gathered till the hubbub had died down. The majesty of the XIIIth century is in France under St. Louis, in Spain under St. Ferdinand, in the Papacy under Honorius, Gregory and Innocent. It does not completely shine here till the rule of Edward, after all these were dead.

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Two main facts of Henry III's reign. First, the breakdown of taxation.—To follow and to give some order to the confusion of Henry's long reign, it is necessary to read it in connection with two main facts: *First*, all its first thirty years and more, from his accession as a child to the fatal Gascon mission of his brother-in-law, Simon de Montfort, in his forty-first year, were bewildered by the exasperation of an exorbitant, irregular, intolerable, yet inevitable and therefore continual need for money in public affairs of government; and the necessarily slow growth of the machinery whereby such crying need should be regularized and met. It was the fruit and sequel of exactly the same thing under his father—due to the loss of revenue from the old French provinces, and the need of revenue in order to reconquer what had been rapt away, or, at

least, to hold what was left. To which must be added the new needs of government in a time when life was rapidly expanding and when the Crown was taking over more and more of the functions formerly in the hands of the barons.

Second, the Empire-Papacy duel and its financial consequences.—*Second:* The climax of the death-struggle between Pope and Emperor during those same thirty-one years, whereby the Papacy, on its side, was in as desperate a need for revenue if it were not to go under; whereby, therefore, a continual, increasing, intolerable demand for such revenue arose.

The pressure of royal taxation, the impossibility of meeting it on the old feudal basis, the consequent resistance of the great feudatories until the hardly imported machinery of Parliament was fully instituted and serviceable for granting new, non-feudal, aids—all this was aggravated by new, increasing, and often overwhelming Papal exactions from the clergy for support during the last and desperate struggle against the Empire.

This it was which bred a considerable clerical support for the barons' lay resistance and made it formidable.

All over Europe the strain was angrily resented. But here in England especially, because the country lay remote from the battlefield and had no direct issue in the result. Three great Popes in succession waged that war: Honorius III, a man cautious but determined: Gregory IX, a man very aged and fiery, and of a conquering temper; Innocent IV, a man of wide glance, a strong statesman, virile, tenacious, proud, the ultimate victor, and therefore a target for abuse. One

personality dominated the conflict, emperor throughout: Frederick II, "The Marvel of the World," standing in the old German claims, but himself thoroughly Italian: a genius of miraculous energy, of an atheist scepticism, of desperate achievement—and defeated at last. He was brother-in-law to the King of England, marrying Henry III's sister, John's daughter, Isabella. He was therefore also brother-in-law to Simon de Montfort, who three years later married another sister, Eleanor.

The two phases conclude in the same days. Frederick went down before the walls of Parma on February 18th, 1248; Simon de Montfort, the brother-in-law of the English king, was given his commission for Gascony on May 1st of that same year.

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Henry III's accession. At the moment of John's death the position was thus: A child just entering his tenth year was left heir to the Plantagenet line: Henry by name, the King Henry III of English history.

This child was, away in the West, on the Severn, hurriedly and informally crowned in makeshift fashion at Worcester with a plain circlet of gold. London, the capital, was in the hands of Louis of France, the son and heir of the Capetian, who was enthusiastically supported by the whole feudal rebellion, and by the merchants of the city. But John's great campaign was, in spite of his death, to secure the throne in the true Plantagenet line.

The feudal rebels propose a French king.—The feudal rebellion was not only prepared to hand over the kingdom to the Capetians, but to part with the whole northern territory of it to the King of Scotland as

the price for his support. It is a complete anachronism to consider the struggle as a national one. It was the struggle between a wealthy class which had been taxed beyond endurance and the Royal House which had taxed them, and the wealthy class, in their determination to go back to what they regarded as normal conditions, were perfectly ready to dismember the Plantagenet inheritance, to take a Capetian lord from overseas, and to merge the Crown of England in that of France.

The Pope saves the Plantagenet English monarchy. —In such a pass what saved the Plantagenet family, and the distinction of the English realm from the French, was the Papal action. It was the legate Gualo, sent over by Pope Honorius III to look after the child (in nominal feudal dependence upon him), who, backed by John's successes, saved the situation. A Council was held in Bristol only a fortnight after the crowning of the boy, and less than a month after the death of John. That Council was specially marked by the adhesion of the whole Church to the legitimate heir on the persuasion and orders of the Papal Legate.

The Charter was re-issued in a more reasonable form favourable to the Crown.[1] Not a few of the lately rebellious lords were persuaded to take the oath of allegiance, and the Papal Legate, Gualo, worked hard with the king's guardian, Pembroke—that old "William le Maréchal" of whom we have the lively record in verse—to break up the opposing camp.

[1] The clause, so offensive to all feudal morals, that the vassals should refuse at will aid to their suzerain in distress (Clause XII), was dropped for ever: as was, of course, the mere "war" clause of control over the Crown by a committee.

The greatest weapon he had, of course, was the open and intense support of the Plantagenet claim which proceeded personally from the Pope himself. He wrote to the baronial party protesting that, now John was dead, they had no ground of grievance; and it was through him and through the clergy that the nation as a whole swung round. That the populace had always been with the national line, there could be little doubt. They were naturally with John, even at the worst of his arbitrary and unfortunate rule, for what oppressed their masters was, if anything, a benefit to them. But now the wealthier class itself was turning. John's garrisoning of the castles was a decisive thing. Dover fell: but the main points held. One great noble after another went over to the little king's side. Before the end of the year Louis, though still stronger in the field, consented to a truce, and went oversea to get reinforcements; during his absence the breakaway from him grew stronger.

When the truce was over, in the spring of the next year, 1217, the legate gave to the Plantagenet forces the character of a Crusade. The army of Louis, still full of English mercenaries and freemen and, of course, of the Anglo-French barons, was also largely recruited from overseas, and that element was a moral weakness. He marched to Lincoln to take the castle there, since his effort must be entirely one of reducing John's garrisons.

The "Fair of Lincoln," May 19th, 1217.—It was at the end of April and the beginning of May that the legate's army began its operations. In the middle of the month it marched, with the Crusading Cross as a badge, and on the nineteenth of the month attacked Louis' army, besieging the castle. The Plantagenet

forces won a complete victory in the narrow streets of the city. It was rather a massacre than a battle, and the successful scrimmage came to be called "The Fair of Lincoln."

Naval victory of the Straits of Dover.—That one occasion decided the opposing claims. Louis was without sufficient armed forces. He could now count on little more than London. He sent for reinforcements, but the large fleet bringing them was caught by a small English naval force ordered by the Justiciar, Hubert de Burgh, John's old servant, now more and more powerful, and destroyed in the Straits of Dover. More than three-quarters of the French prince's ships were taken, with all their crews and armed men. That was on August 24th, 1217. Three weeks later, on September 11th, Louis gave way. He took a sum of money (equivalent to about £60,000 of ours to-day) as an advance, presumably for what he owed in England, renounced the fealty the barons had given him, and liberated his prisoners.

Struggle of Hubert de Burgh and Peter des Roches.—The Papal policy was triumphant: the little Plantagenet was restored to his inheritance. But there were still nine years between that date—the close of 1217—and Henry's majority. They were filled with nothing more important than a struggle between two wealthy men and their partisans for the advantage of controlling king and kingdom after. Hubert de Burgh, the Justiciar, had the political machine in his hands; Peter des Roches, the Bishop of Winchester, another trusted friend of King John, had the custody of the child and the growing power this gave. Above them both was the Papal Legate, Pandolf, who had succeeded Gualo.

It is due to him that the situation did not fall again into civil war. It is also due to him, and to the direct orders of the Pope, that the most practical means for preventing a second rebellion of the baronage was taken in the form of an order that no man should hold more than two of the royal castles. The particular quarrel between Hubert de Burgh and Des Roches ended in the victory of the first, and that in a popular fashion. A chance adventurer, not born within the island nor a natural subject of John, but enriched by John as a mercenary, held the castle of Bedford. He committed many crimes. There was a demand for his suppression, but Peter des Roches, as the protector of that faction, supported him. This put the moral feeling of the time for the moment on Hubert's side. The Justiciar took the castle in the middle of August, 1224, hanged the knights of the garrison and had it razed, and Des Roches went off on Crusade, deflected to Compostella. The effect of Bedford was the effect of a regular battle.

Henry III old enough to act.—Henry was now seventeen years old; and with his arrival at an age where he could lead an army and have his commands obeyed, the character of the reign changed.

The first tax not on land.—The first great Feudal Council held by him for purposes of general policy was in February, 1225. It was remarkable for the strict adhesion to the spirit of feudal tradition and taxation which had been the cause of Magna Carta. The king's tenants granted a fifteenth[1] (as it was called) of their

[1] It produced rather less than £60,000, about the livelihood of 60,000. Say two millions of our money, but in a country an eighth of ours in size and power. It is a date to be remembered: A.D. 1225. The first levy in England of a national tax on goods—property other than land. From that source

goods and chattels for the king's use in resisting a possible invasion, and Magna Carta (now long presented as two documents, one concerning ordinary feudal tenures, the other the forest law and known collectively as The Charters) was solemnly confirmed for the third time: it fossilized and was changed no more. In particular, the absurd clause giving the feudal vassals right to refuse aid to their feudal lord was ignominiously forgotten. But soon it was to be of no effect for another reason. The feudal aids were soon to be obsolete: regular non-feudal grants on general wealth were to take their place.

The standing claim to French fiefs.—Especially Poitou.—There was as yet no considerable action either from France or against France; but we must remember it was not twenty years since Philip Augustus had overrun Normandy. It was not eighteen years since John was still receiving considerable revenues from Poitou. It was therefore natural enough that the English Crown and its barony should expect a recovery of what had been for a century and a half the chief feudal possessions (and incomes) of the Plantagenets. Moreover, in the settlement which Prince Louis had made before abandoning the Crown to young Henry, he seems to have given some sort of promise that when he became King of France he would allow Henry to re-enter the feudal inheritance of his family

was to come (*a*) the remodelling of taxation, so that the feudal dues to the king off tenure of land ceased both to bear the full burden of the State and to be overstrained by it; (*b*) the necessity for copying the continental example and adding, at last, representatives from the mass of freeholders to the strict Feudal Council of tenants-in-chief which had been for centuries as the "*Concilium*" the coadjutor of the king in government. There had been a tithe on moveables for a *religious* purpose in 1188, the "Saladin Tithe." But it was universal to Christendom and not from lay government.

and to make allegiance for Normandy, Poitou, and Maine.

When Philip Augustus died (in 1223) the English king's guardian, and his Council, had demanded the fulfilment of the pledge. Louis VIII, now that he had succeeded, refused.

Accession of St. Louis of France.—Against him Henry could have done little. He sent his brother, Richard, who was little more than a child, out to Bordeaux, but with no sufficient force to act; and the Pope's Legate arranged an armistice. Before that armistice had expired, on November 8th, 1226, Louis VIII died in his turn, and the succeeding King of France was also a child. It was that Louis IX, the most famous of the Capetian line, who has been called since his death, St. Louis.

Character and person of Henry III.—Henry was now a man, and we must consider his character and its effect on his reign. As he was strict in religious observance and the victim of rebellion from the richer classes of his subjects, he is naturally made the worst of by our official histories, which treat all feudal rebellions as somehow Whig and laudable, all Catholic piety as contemptible and puerile. But we must not let this grossly unhistorical bias lead us into too great a sympathy for a man who did lack certain qualities necessary to such a difficult position as he filled: the inheritor of increasing fiscal necessity in a time when the old feudal money-levies had grown quite insufficient, when a regular way of supplementing them was only slowly coming into existence, and when all powerful men over thirty had fresh in their memories a striking victory over their last lord.

He was a man rather short, very strong, active, and brave. His face was against him: a puckered forehead, and one eye so affected that he could not fully open its lid. His mother, Isabella of Angoulême, was off: married as a widow to her originally affianced Lusignan. He was faithful to the woman he loved who was his wife, the daughter of Provence. He married her late—for a king: near his twenty-ninth year: was therefore somewhat too much managed by her. He was very loyal to the Papacy, which had secured him the throne, and himself good, he revered goodness in others. He was witty. He was courteous. He had excellent culture and an active love of beauty. It is to him, personally, that we owe Westminster Abbey. He was too imaginative for his post: too sanguine therefore upon difficult foreign schemes, and too ambitious in them. He was never ruthless—which he had need to be: but he had this defect, that he was not tenacious in his antagonisms. He made no long plans or followed them, and he would in no long space of years have friendship, quarrel and friendship again with the same man. When the experience of many such changes had confused his judgment he came too often to mistrust himself, and therefore to trust too much the chance opinion of others, and to yield too easily to strong verbal remonstrance. What was very dangerous for a man in his difficult position in a time when armed leadership was so important, he was not competent to lead in the field. For with all his bravery he could not "see country" nor grasp an opponent's move. He would attack with insufficient force, or, inversely, waste opportunity for rapid action. He has been accused of extravagance in personal expenditure,

as are all kings and queens who are compelled by their situation to spend a hundred-fold on public necessities what they do on their private ends. But with all these accidental defects as a chief, coupled with all these virtues as a man, his misfortune was much greater than he deserved, and the student of his life, if he be free from too violent a prejudice against religion, will rejoice that it lasted long enough to see him the master of so many enemies.

His difficult position.—No man, however unscrupulous, however far-seeing, could have avoided continued opposition in a society still feudal where the new conditions of his time compelled him to ask of the half-independent feudal lords of separate, personal armies, monies out of all proportion to their hereditary traditions of sacrifice, and to appeal to the same feudal class, now restricted in their interests to this country, for support in difficult—and, as it proved, unfortunate—continental policy.

Hubert de Burgh's supremacy.—The first years of his early manhood were dominated by Hubert de Burgh.[1] He pillaged the revenue wantonly, and the young king, too uncertain, suffered his excessive power and bullying. It was one of the experiences that weakened him in his dealings with others, and like all men who feel themselves dominated—especially young men—he had revolts. In that he again resembled Henry VIII, to whom I have compared him on the side of such weakness alone, of course; for Henry III was morally far superior. His virtue increased with years, whereas Henry VIII went to pieces.

[1] He was the same who had been commissioned by John to blind Prince Arthur. He had married John's repudiated wife.

The episode of Portsmouth, 1229.—One struggle is preserved in a story of 1229 (when the king was 22 years old). An important expedition was prepared for France. The Norman barons were in rebellion against their king at Paris. The elder of them could remember the time when the king at Westminster had been their lord. It was but fifteen years since Bouvines. All except the very young men had fresh in their minds conditions in which the Plantagenet might at any moment recover his heritage. The King of France was a child. The Regency (in the hands of his mother, Blanche of Castile, John's niece—a woman of power) was at issue with the great feudatories. There was rebellion everywhere. The moment was propitious for an attempt to restore the old dominion overseas.

But Hubert de Burgh's personal avarice wasted the opportunity. He stinted the provision of ships (although the amount offered was sufficient). When the army assembled at Portsmouth (Michaelmas, 1229) there was not enough transport, and the expedition had to be abandoned. It was not the only time he had thus ruined things by his avarice, and his young master is said, in his passion of disappointment, to have called him a "hoary traitor" (he was in his fifties), and drew his sword against him, accusing him of something not improbable, the taking of bribes from abroad.

The Chronicle of Matthew Paris.—The tale is in Matthew Paris, an untrustworthy authority,[1] who lies

[1] He was a monk of St. Albans and is the author (perhaps Parisian by his name) of the greater part of a Chronicle, the whole of which goes by his name. The earlier part is mostly copied from Wendover, and the latter part, from somewhat before his death to many years after it, is by an unknown hand. This portion, though terse, is trustworthy, and the description of the Battle of Evesham in it valuable. Much the most of the thing, coming from Matthew

to be picturesque or for a cause, and who is, like many lively and imaginative men, grossly inaccurate. But even if it is not true, it illustrates what men thought were the relations between the young king and the elderly and corrupt Justiciar who had indeed helped to save the Plantagenet dynasty, but who later, in the minority of John's heir, grossly abused his position.

Hubert de Burgh's demagogy.—That man's power lay in a combination of things. He had been at the head of all administration (for that is what "Justiciar" meant) since 1215. He had backing among the common people, for he was the figurehead during the crisis of the national monarchy on John's death. Channel sailors and shipmasters remembered him as author of their victory over Louis in the Straits of Dover, and were probably grateful at his pressing them as little as possible for service later. But undoubtedly his chief claim to such popular support as he had was his long and faithful service to King John. Such loyalty must always be put to his credit, and the poor were indifferent, as they always are, to a public servant's peculations at the expense of the Government. But in his own class he was a scandal. He ruined the next year's expedition to recover the French provinces (ships had to be got from abroad, and he divided the counsels in the field), and he sought by lax discipline in rule to increase his popularity.

The end of all this came in the riots of 1231 against a Papal Tithe.

Paris's own hand, is amusing and vivid, but violently partisan, and suffering from errors voluntary and involuntary. Like other clerics, he suffered, as a member of St. Albans, from the new Papal taxes, and is extravagantly anti-papal: a character which has given him great authority with our official historians.

The first large Papal exaction.—The date is important. It was the beginning of the acute phase in the death duel between the Emperor Frederick and the Church. Vast sums were needed by the Pope, Gregory IX—a man who, though old, was determined to see his cause triumph. He had against him all the resources of the monarch who was by far the greatest of his time, and to support him little beyond the resources of the imperilled Papal States. The issue was of vast consequence to Europe, for Frederick did not stand for an opposition to the Pope politically—as a sovereign or as a person. He stood against him spiritually as the type and supporter of a new and advancing scepticism, and the precursor of a change in all our society: the Pope was but the leader on the other side. But in this place we are concerned only with one local and comparatively small effect of that mighty struggle—the demands for money from England made by the Papacy, in its fight for life.

It was an innovation. It was nearly fifty years since a claim to levy such a special tax had been made—and rejected. Now it was renewed, and a *tenth* of clerical incomes was demanded. The laity refused.

There was naturally strong and, in places, violent opposition to such a novel and a heavy call. There were riots against the collectors, and in one case (at Dover) a death. But the king allowed the call. He was grateful to the Papacy for saving the Plantagenet dynasty in his childhood; he was anxious to avoid Papal interference in an election to Canterbury, and he naturally had a better sense of general European affairs even in that time of unity than the mass of his clergy.

The tithe was burdensome enough, and an in-

novation—always something with a savour of injustice to the Middle Ages. But what was much worse was the abuse of *provision*.

"Provisions."—*Provision* was a system whereby ecclesiastical authority, and particularly the Papal See, reserved a clerical post, with its endowments, to some person named, whether that person were resident or no. When the person named was not resident he paid a deputy to exercise his functions, and kept the balance of the revenues. If he lived out of the country wealth was drained from it abroad. What was worse, the Holy See, in its desperate need of money during the conflict with Frederick, took money for Provisions: that is, reserved a see, or other benefice, for a candidate who had helped the Papal cause with cash. It was undoubtedly a succour to religion in its peril: but it was Simony.

What caused most friction was the reserving of private livings: interference with the clerical patronage of the small local lords. One of them, Thwinge, formed later a secret association to resist, and there was burning of barns in the "provisioned" glebes, and so much success that the abuse was checked.

All this ferment Hubert de Burgh naturally winked at. He had all to gain and nothing to lose by showing sympathy with the natural grievances of lesser men at the expense of foreign policy. What was very grave, he almost certainly winked at the murder of a collector of the tithe.

Return of the Bishop of Winchester.—And fall of Hubert de Burgh.—At that moment, 1231, Peter des Roches, the Bishop of Winchester, returned with a high reputation from the Crusades. The king welcomed

him gladly. He stood for the policy of recovering the Plantagenet power, as did the Queen Mother, Isabella, re-married to Lusignan of Poitou. Had the baronage in England been wise they would have seen that the English king's recovery of his French fiefs would have relieved the inevitably increasing pressure of taxation in a restricted realm. But they saw only their immediate opportunities and vexations, and they welcomed—as a feudal baronage always did—the chance of rebellion. As Hubert had wasted the revenue—to his own personal enrichment and by deliberate slackness in government—the Bishop of Winchester urged Henry to act. He did so. De Burgh was accused and called to account: the treasury was given to the bishop's nephew, and with it the control of a great mass of local administration. And other posts were filled—too many of them—by men not holding of the king in England, but coming from the claimed Plantagenet lands abroad, though the office of Justiciar went to a subject of Henry's from home—but a small man, and with shorn powers. De Burgh failed utterly in his defence: all he could say to the just demand for accounts was that King John had promised him immunity. He was in part despoiled, hunted out of sanctuary, but his life spared.

The giving of so many posts, with their revenues, to men not holding of the king in England violently angered a strong minority of the feudal nobles: the most energetic of them being Richard le Marshall, who ruled in Pembroke as earl, and had control of the Southern Welsh marches, the son of that old regent and faithful friend of John who had protected Henry's minority; he not only raised civil war, he called in

the Welsh and Irish mercenaries to attack the king, and it was clear that the bulk of the great military tenants were at the best neutral. Henry's feudal power was failing him through the jealousy of his barons against the "*Alieni*," who were taking incomes which they regarded as the natural right of their class.

The meaning of "Foreigners" among XIIIth century barons.—So much in this long wrangle turns upon the words "Non de Regno Angliæ Nati," which we translate in modern English, "foreigners," that we must get quite clear the implications of the term.

What kind of man was it that was objected to, and whose presence was the excuse, and in some part the real cause, of the feudal discontents and rebellions under Henry III? More important, why was he objected to? Lastly, by what classes, and did those classes differ in their type of objection?

The "foreigner" was not objected to as people object to-day to what they call a foreigner. The word did not call up the idea of a person of alien speech and habits, certainly unfamiliar and probably offensive, comic at the best and hateful at the worst.

There was a certain friction between the populace of England and the populace of foreign countries on the occasions when they came in contact. It was nothing like the friction which we feel to-day, because they had a common religion, and, in the main, common social habits. But they had not the same language. There was at least as much friction on such occasions between, say, the English sailor of the Cinque Ports and the sailor from Picardy and Normandy as there was between, say, the English-speaking miners and the mass of Welsh-speaking ones in the collieries of South Wales

some years ago. But that had nothing to do with the rebellion of the French-speaking prelates and nobles who were indistinguishable from their fellows overseas.

What did weigh heavily with them was the *economic* results of "the foreigner" in office; and in this sense "foreigner" meant a man coming from some district abroad, but given here in England revenues which men, the natural-born subjects of the King of England, thought to be proper to their feudal station.

Nor is even this definition quite sufficient. What was resented was not so much a man's coming from outside England and getting a revenue within England, which nobles and great clerics holding naturally of the king should properly have enjoyed; it was rather their getting the revenue in a fashion which the social ideas of the time regarded as irregular.

For instance, there was no special objection to a Scottish lord—or a Scotch king for that matter—drawing his regular dues from a fief in England that he might happen to have inherited. Simon de Montfort himself was in a regular enough place (though not a natural-born subject of the king), because he had inherited the Earldom of Leicester. The great prelates holding of the Crown did not even mind men not native-born to the country occupying a great ecclesiastical place so long as there were not too many of them, and so long as they spent the revenue in the traditional fashion and to the advantage of the abbacy or the see. No mortal could have told you which was the alien and which was the native in that feudal class, which provoked and maintained all the troubles of Henry III's time. The speech and dress and manners of De Montfort himself, of Richard of Cornwall, of Richard le Marshall, of the

king, and of the Poitevin favourites before them, were all one, and even later, the king's wife, and her uncles, though of southern accent, were of that one class. You could no more pick them apart than you could pick apart a Sussex squire to-day from a Northumberland one in Northumberland. But when it came to giving places of great emolument and power to men who had not the general hereditary and native right to such posts, irritation arose, and much the larger factor in their irritation was the economic factor.

Three causes of exasperation: (1) The king's set were a "clique."—The thing was exasperated by three circumstances, all closely connected, because they were all in part attached to the king's own character. The first was the capriciousness with which the thing was done, and the cliquiness of it. The aliens were either men who had played upon the king's rather changeable feelings, and his occasional impulsive actions, or (later) they were people imposed by his wife and her family. There was no sufficient policy about it, and nothing which could excuse it as a necessary or explicable State action, though it had a natural cause in the king's international position.

(2) **Money was drained abroad.**—The second factor of exasperation, and very much more widespread, was the drain of money abroad, which was naturally confused in the general mind with the presence of the aliens, but which, such as it was, consisted mainly in the increasing exactions of the Roman See.

(3) **The fiscal system was out of date.—"The king should live of his own."**—The third circumstance was this—and it needs a particular attention. It is the point to which I have already alluded. The basis of

taxation was out of gear. The rapid development of society in the XIIIth century, the increase of categories of wealth, the increase of social activities of all kinds, was throwing a heavier and heavier burden upon the centres of government, clerical and lay. The Papal court and the king's court, even apart from their necessities of war, were more and more in need of money, just as the modern European State has been more and more in need of money during the industrial developments of the last century. To meet such demands there was nothing *regular* and *traditional* save the now quite insufficient feudal dues. Occasional "aids," as we have seen, were clamoured for, but they were always felt to be exceptional, so were the occasional taxes on goods. "The king should live of his own," said the feudal magnate of the time: thinking of the king as no more than a greater feudal lord. But, with the XIIIth century, the king was coming to mean the State: and the new State could not live on the private income of the king. With the granting of regular and fairly frequent supplements by a council to which a representative element had become common and traditional, when financial support thus came in accepted fashion from freemen on the land and townsmen in the changed society of the later XIIIth century, the strain was relieved.[1]

The violent civil war provoked by Robert le Marshall (Pembroke) on the Welsh marches, and the

[1] An excellent example of this state of affairs, a crystallized feudalism, and the new forms of taxation superseding it is the grant of 1225. A *general, non-feudal, exceptional* sum, assessed on all free property, is granted to the king (a fifteenth), but at the same time the king has to "confirm the Charters," that is, leave the great feudatories with the archbishop at their head, secure in their *feudal* incomes.

evident loss of feudal support, weakened the king. Ominously, Robert le Marshall had claimed, as a baron, to be immune from the king's regular justices and courts. His peers sympathized with him. But what decided Henry to reverse engines was the hostile attitude of the prelates, who, especially since the new necessities of the Pope in his fight with Frederick, saw no end to the money pressure; and especially the attitude of the See of Canterbury, on which such burdens always fell heavily. Their voices were made irresistible by the pronouncement of the new archbishop, a man whose sanctity was of supreme effect: Edmund Rich.

The succession in the Primacy of England should here be followed:—

The death of Innocent III, coming just before the death of John, had released the great Archbishop of Canterbury. He was free to return, and he did so. The remaining twelve years of his life had been well spent in a continual activity. It was presumably during this period that he committed to paper the few relics of his pen remaining to us of which I have spoken, especially the French verses and the quaint French sermon, based, not upon a text, but upon a French poem of his day, "The Lovely Alice."[1]

Those who wish to understand the time cannot do better than note that it was under the jurisdiction of this great man, the Cardinal de Langton, that what is perhaps the first burning of a man as a result of an ecclesiastical sentence took place. Langton had called

[1] It is one of the very few erroneous statements in Lingard (comparable to his use of the word "Senlac" which, as I pointed out, Freeman copied without acknowledgment) that he says of Stephen Langton, "His writings have perished." In Lingard's day the survival of the few we have was not known.

a Synod at Oxford in the year 1222. In this Synod a deacon, who had joined the Jewish people in order to marry into them, was handed over to the secular arm and condemned to the fire. It is not only the first example of a burning for heresy in England, but quite possibly the first example of capital punishment by the civil power for renegation of the common creed.

Death of Langton, 1228. St. Edmund, Archbishop, 1234.—Langton died just after young Henry assumed personal government, on July 9th, 1228. His immediate successor was a certain Richard of Wethershed; and after him, in 1234, St. Edmund, a man of a very different stamp from Cardinal de Langton, but I think one may say of equal eminence in the story of England: for Langton was no saint. He, like Langton, had studied in Paris and taught there; but he also took part in the rapidly growing University of Oxford. He was Prebendary at Salisbury when, after long disputes and vacancy, he was raised to the arch-episcopate in 1233, and consecrated on April 2nd, 1234.

It was an interesting appointment. He was English-born, from Abingdon, and quite possibly acquainted from childhood with the popular speech of his time, though his life and conversation were, of course, among French-speaking men: for he was of well-to-do parents in youth, and in maturity always among the educated. He was very holy. There is a lovely story of his meeting Our Lord in the person of a little child, walking in those meadows by Thames-side. His weight was therefore considerable in the opposition he made to the later demands for money from the Holy See, and in his protest against the king's keeping open benefices and endowments.

Death of St. Edmund, 1240.—He had only six and a half years of office, less tumultuous than the long rule of Langton, but not less impressive. He had not the strength to mix in the struggle between the nobles or to continue the fiscal struggle. His health compelled him to journey abroad, as also a desire to present at Rome his remonstrances against the fiscal demands of the *Curia*. He retired to Pontigny, in that monastery of Burgundy which had taken in St. Thomas, his great predecessor. A hot summer made him go for air to Soissy, where he died on November 16th, 1240, not more than 60 years of age.

You may see his shrine in Pontigny Abbey behind the High Altar.

The impression he had made by his character was very strong, and Innocent IV canonized him with the applause of all the English and French bishops less than six years after.

The king marries Eleanor of Provence, 1236.—Henry married late—not long before thirty—on January 14th, 1236. The delay was due to a certain characteristic hesitation, and his final choice was connected with that fixed determination to recover in full the Plantagenet lands: it was a task sacred with him by inheritance, and it accounts for most of the difficulties of his reign: had he succeeded how differently history would have been written! Thus it was that he married into the family which bounded the French king's land to the south-east—Provence—and made a counterpoise to the new acquisition of Toulouse and the Langue d'Oc by the French Crown as a result of the Albigensian war. The wife he took was Eleanor, the daughter of Raymond, who ruled all that square of

land from the Alps to the Mediterranean and held (nominally) of the Empire.

And marries his sister to the Emperor Frederick II, 1235.—Thus it was, also, that he had married his sister, the year before, 1235, to Frederick the Emperor, planning an alliance against the Capetian house, just as his father had done in the great scheme which broke down at Bouvines. And in this his mother Isabella, married to a great lord of Poitou, eagerly aided him. It was his misfortune that this great policy should be laid of necessity upon a King of England just when the King of France was most rapidly increasing in power. The Plantagenet revenue and recruiting field were cut down to England and Gascony just at the time when the Capetian revenue and recruiting field were expanded fourfold.

Wise action of the Papal Legate Cardinal Otho.—Henry's marriage led to new trouble, therefore, with his feudal rich and with the great prelates. He could not use Provence without pleasing Provence—and therefore he had to benefit certain personalities from Provence. The sums involved were small and the posts few, but the enmity of the chief fortunes in England (and therefore the chief taxpayers) was none the less for that, and Richard, the king's brother (and, so far, his heir), who had the title of Cornwall, voiced it. They could not bear to see the queen's uncle, William, Bishop-elect of Valence, prominent in the Council, and a legate, Cardinal Otho, wisely advised his departure (but enriched with the endowment of the See of Winchester). What made things worse was the queen mother's sending over sundry of her own people from Poitou, lest the new bride's influence should outweigh hers. Henry

went far in concession. He allowed his great barons to choose of their own free (and rebellious) will three of their number to be imposed upon his Council, and bargained for, instead of demanding, a moderate supplement of which the Government was in crying need. The feudal *Concilium* allowed him, speaking for themselves and the mass of freeholders, a thirtieth on moveables: it was not much more than £15,000—only a quarter of what the realm could find, when it was pressed—but it was grudged.[1]

Henry marries his sister to Simon de Montfort, April 12th, 1238.—In the next year, 1238, on April 12th, an act was committed which came, in time, to imperil the Plantagenet throne and nearly to wreck England. A powerful, determined man, Earl of Leicester by inheritance, some 30 years of age, kindly treated since very early manhood at Henry's court when he was almost a refugee, was secretly married, Henry himself being present, to the king's sister Eleanor. The thing was perhaps necessary. The two had probably already lived together as lovers. But it was fatal.

Character of Simon de Montfort.—We must understand Simon de Montfort. His great place in English history demands it. But it is not easy. Not only is there an absurd whig legend built up by official historians round his name—as of a sort of professional politician of the modern sort, big with "Democracy"—but there was a *contemporary* legend as well—such as often beclouds great men.

[1] It is an example of how all that was not a traditional feudal due was regarded as exceptional and suspicious, that, a few years later, in the immediate necessity of the French war, the great feudatories bitterly complain that not less than *four* percentages on moveables had been granted (a $\frac{1}{13}$th, a $\frac{1}{15}$th, a $\frac{1}{40}$th, and a $\frac{1}{30}$th) in the space of a whole twenty-six years!

He was the third son of a much greater man. His father was that Simon de Montfort who had saved Europe at Muret, founded the destruction of the Albigenses, and raised himself to the very height of the Western nobility. If you go out westward from Versailles by the main road about fourteen miles you come to the little town of Montfort l'Amaury and its castle ruins. Thence the family had arisen: small lords. They had enriched themselves by Norman marriages; chosen, at the partition under John, to go with the Capetians. But he was heir, by his mother, to Beaumont the Norman Earl of Leicester, and he was proud to use the title—though King John did not allow him his lands on this side of the sea. He was at the height of his fame when the rebellion against John was growing, and John believed that the barons in England meant to make de Montfort king.

Of his sons, it was the second living one, also called Simon, whom we here meet.

He owed everything to the Plantagenet. Henry had made him. His father was killed before Toulouse when he was probably about 10 years old, in 1218, and left him ill, or un-, provided: and he himself is our authority for the story of Henry's bounty. He was allowed to have Leicester, his inheritance—the claim to which his elder brother had given up to him. It was at last generously yielded by the occupying tenant of that emolument, but meanwhile Henry gave him a large income from his own purse. In 1231 his rights in the earldom were confirmed by the King of England. It was only after failing to make two rich marriages with elderly widows, that he was thus secretly married to a much younger widow, Henry's sister Eleanor, at

Westminster, in the king's private chapel. It is true she was vowed to celibacy (and the archbishop, St. Edmund, protested). It is true that Henry, in a later outburst, divulged his seduction of that lady and the necessity of covering her shame.[1] But neither cause was the reason of the storm the news provoked among "Li Baruns d'Engleterre"; *that* was due to so important a ward having been disposed of—with all the possible consequences to the succession!—without anyone knowing.

Simon made his peace by humiliating himself before the man most aggrieved, Henry's brother, Richard of Cornwall, still the heir. When Simon's first child was born, it was hailed as heir to the throne—that must not be forgotten in what followed. In a few months a true heir, later to be Edward I, was born; Simon to be godfather—but, by the churching, the king, now feeling sure, broke out against his brother-in-law and (as he says) drove him overseas. He returned later, fought for Henry in France, lived at court in no way a prominent antagonist; on the contrary, somewhat officially.

In 1240 he went off with Richard of Cornwall on Crusade, but they were both back in time for the last important event in this section of the reign—the campaign of Taillebourg in 1242.

The campaign of Taillebourg, 1242.—It was the climax in that long waiting game for the entry into the patrimony of the English kings—and it failed.

The occasion was Poitou. It was effectively under the Capetian Crown, and St. Louis, now a man of nearly

[1] We have only his word, that of a scrupulous and pious man. But we must note that the first child of the union was born just after nine months.

MAP X

HENRY III'S ATTEMPTED RECOVERY

twenty-seven and trained to arms, had made his brother Alphonso lord of it. But Henry had affirmed his claim by nominating his own brother, Richard of Cornwall, and Isabella, his mother, married as she was to a great Poitevin lord, thought it was possible to make that claim good. She made her Lusignan husband "defy" —that is, repudiate feudal allegiance to—Alphonso, and told Henry that if he came he would find ample local support.

The barony in England obstinately refused help. In a January *Concilium*[1] they urged, as an excuse, the existing truce with France, and made a great to-do about the sums they had paid in the past. Henry was crippled by such narrow action. But he set out none the less on May 9th from Portsmouth, with only 300 knights and such money as he could collect by private bargaining for the pay of troops on his arrival. He landed at Royan, at the mouth of the Garonne, in his own undisputed fief of Guienne.

Isabella had been right. He got ample local support as he marched north. By the time he reached the Charente at Taillebourg he was at the head of 20,000 men. But Louis—who, marching south from Chinon, reached the river at the same moment—had a vastly larger force drawn from an immensely larger territory—for *his* barony was now fully rallied to the Crown, while the Plantagenet lacked all the feudatories of England, except his brother Richard.

Saintes is two days' march from Royan, Taillebourg half a morning's march from Saintes. It is a little place

[1] The French word "Parlement," "a Discussion," is already being used as an equivalent for the Feudal "Concilium" of great tenants and Bishops. But of this later.

of less than a thousand people, its old castle still apparent, and possessing a main bridge across the Charente—a stream here impassable by troops for its depth, though narrow.

The engagement—on July 19th, a Saturday—took the form of Louis, superior in numbers though only using a part of his army, forcing the bridge at the head of his men. But the defence was maintained until a detached body, crossing the river lower down with boats, threatened to come up in the rear of Henry's command and surround it. Henry ordered a retreat to within the walls of Saintes.[1] But the difference of strength was too great, and the lords of the district were doubtful. Isabella's husband himself returned to St. Louis' allegiance. The French king tried to force Saintes, but failed. Henry, after two days, retreated, a long day's march to Pons, by the Roman road, and then on southward by stages to Blaye, on the Gironde below Bordeaux. He fortified Blaye as a bridgehead, then crossed, and put the wide estuary between his defeated troops and a possible French pursuit, which was not pressed. A truce ended the affair.[2] Henry remained in effective possession of Guienne and Gascony only.

The defeat of Taillebourg shakes Henry's position.—The effect of this unsuccessful campaign on his position in England when he returned in the autumn of 1243 was bad. And the next years were to be most perilous, because they were those in which the Papal need for money was suddenly and very heavily increased

[1] I prefer his own detailed account to the fantastic Matthew Paris.

[2] After 17 years of negotiation Henry formally renounced the French northern fiefs, Normandy, Poitou, Maine, Anjou, and did homage in Paris in 1259 for Guienne, Périgord, Querci and the Limousin.

by the last and most violent phase of the struggle-for-life with Frederick. Innocent IV had succeeded to the Papacy, and for year after year he was kept out of Italy by his enemy's success in arms, and cut off from revenue.

Papal exactions make it worse.—His demand for aid from the clergy was so reasonable—and so unavoidable—that it received the support of that man who is most prominent as a protester against abuses, Grossetête, the famous Bishop of Lincoln, as late as 1246. But continuation of an excessive effort breeds distaste, and before long Grossetête, with all the English Church, was protesting—and especially against the gross abuse of Provisions. The barons sent to the great Church Council, held at Lyons in 1245, to lay the grievance before Innocent. The king tried at first to check the drain of money—but hesitated. The nobles drove out the Pope's collector.

Abortive revolutionary effort of 1244 to deprive the king of his normal powers.—In the midst of such a strain Henry's own need of revenue was ill met. In 1244 a revolutionary effort was made to use his necessities as a lever for putting him under the control of his wealthier subjects, giving to a committee of theirs the power of summoning the great Council, and to the great Council the right of naming the king's own great officers—the Justiciar, the Chancellor and the Treasurer. Such was the feeling roused by financial pressure that Grossetête, the most revered of all men in England, supported this policy. Its appearance at so early a date is an indication of what was later to come.

But the king still had support. His brother Richard was getting nervous about the security of the dynasty if

he backed up the feudal disaffection. He had married (his first wife was dead) the queen's sister, and the sombre, powerful De Montfort stood by his brother-in-law the king. Abroad, Henry could still call himself the ally of that other brother-in-law, Frederick, the Emperor, who seemed to be all-powerful at last.

Defeat of Frederick II., 1248.—But with 1248 came the two things which were to introduce the final changes and the wars. On February 2nd, Candlemas, Frederick's army was destroyed before Parma: he died two years later. In May a step, apparently indifferent, was taken which was ultimately to put—most unexpectedly—the leadership of rebellion against the king into the strongest and most tenacious hands.

Appointment of Simon de Montfort to Gascony, 1248.—On May 1st, 1248, Simon de Montfort was sent out to govern Gascony.

(B) Henry III, Second Part

(May 1st, 1248, to November 16th, 1272—24½ years)

Gascony was in anarchy. The disaster of Taillebourg had wrecked authority in it. Simon de Montfort proposed to reduce it without mercy: it was a part of this strange man's arresting and too vivid character, that, being persuaded such and such a thing should be done, he did it without regard: utterly: forgetting all else that should be sanely remembered. He had behind him the towering military reputation of his great father, and was himself to deserve praise almost as high in the soldier's trade. He sailed thus for Gascony, ruthless, in his fortieth year.

Simon de Montfort in Gascony, 1248.—There he showed himself able but ferocious, and lit such a fire of resentment that he himself, though full of iron, quailed. He passed from Gascony to England, from England to Gascony: making the province a cowed hell while he was there, and impossible to hold each time he left. He had stipulated for seven years' free hand and control of all the revenues, but after three years the hatred of him had grown so alarming that he was called home and tried. He was acquitted. His fellow-barons stood by him. But he had cost vast sums, and his conduct had dug a pit between himself and his brother-in-law the king. At last he was recalled—having imperilled by his detested severity the last Plantagenet hold upon the Continent. He insisted on a large sum to compensate him for the loss of his government, having already cost Henry prodigious sums—lingered in France; saw Henry in person go to Gascony and remain there most of the year 1254, while Simon himself returned to England. Meanwhile great changes had come.

The Poitevin favours.—Grossetête.—Frederick, as we have seen, was gone—in 1250. Innocent was to die shortly—at the end of 1254. The Poitevin half-brother and half-sister of the king had been the one married to a great English earldom, the other given a great English bishopric. Such favours re-awoke the old quarrel against those "not born in the realm of England." The noble Grossetête of Lincoln was dead—he died in 1253. I must digress a moment upon that great name.

Grossetête was one of those fine, manly, quarrelling men, always challenging power: upon the whole just,

but loving conflict. Let no modern take comfort in him as a brother rebel against authority. He adored his own and his Order's. He mightily defended the pre-eminence of the Universal Church (and its churchmen—and its Head) against the lords of this world—but also of his bishopric against all within it—and its local rights as against the central ecclesiastical power—for all fighting men understand authority. He backed the new Mendicant Orders—but he defended the secular endowments. He rebukes the Pope—but for not being Papal enough—he has no doubts on the office, but he curses its temporal abuses, "thinking rather" (in the matter of Provisions) "of getting a living for one man than of the flock."

Grossetête, Bishop of Lincoln, was that one man of the English XIIIth century whom we can best single out to explain the feeling of the time. If you would really understand what the forces were that produced the rebellion of the barons, the strong monarchist reaction—which was victorious—and, indeed, the whole of that mid-XIIIth century which was in England a local turmoil, but took part in the great contemporary development of Christendom, study Grossetête.

The reason that following Grossetête is a sure guide is that the man was at once sincere and energetic. What the most active minds of his time thought right, he thought right; but he was also inflexible in doing that right, and he had no worldly motive either to disturb him or to spur him on, which is a great deal more than one can say of the other protagonists in the high quarrels of the time. Grossetête took his stand upon two ideas: one of unchangeable character, one contemporary and of the moment only. The con-

temporary or passing one was feudal tradition: customary maximum taxation not to be exceeded: the right to refuse to pay the Crown more than its customary dues. The unchanging and permanent one was the purity of religion.

He had much less to do with the first than with the second. But we know that he wholeheartedly sympathized with the men who struggled under Henry III (as they had struggled under his father) against the attempt to meet the growing financial needs of government on the unsufficient basis of the old feudal tenures and dues.

His action against "Provisions."—Grossetête saw in good time what it would have been well for Christendom if all the rulers of Christendom had seen as early as he did: that the official Church was crystallizing, and that under its legal system abuses were coming to be taken for granted, especially the twin abuses of pluralism and absenteeism. The Papal Court was necessarily and inevitably a source of both; like every other great authority of the time, it was needing more revenue, more economies. One obvious way of providing for pay and pension cheaply was by nominating to ecclesiastical benefices outside those within the Pope's direct gift as a temporal sovereign. So-and-so had a right to a pension or a livelihood. It could only be got by naming him to this, that, or the other endowed post in the Church—far off, as in England—which he would not really fill, but the duties of which he would delegate to others on a small stipend. In pure ecclesiastical legal theory, the thing was defensible logically. The Church was one throughout Europe. The Pope was its unquestioned head. But in social

practice this reservation of religious endowments was already a danger. Nearly 300 years were to pass before that danger, added to so many others, would become alarming; but in the fulness of time such interference was one of those exasperations which ultimately helped to the break-up of Christian unity.

Upon the principle of withstanding Papal "Provisions" of this kind, Grossetête was inflexible. He was made bishop of his native town of Lincoln in 1235. He remained a most vigorous administrator of the see for twenty-eight years. During the whole of that time he steadfastly refused to institute any pluralist (or even any clergy already employed and salaried by the State), in his courts or in his fiscal machinery. Upon one most famous occasion he refused to give a prebend in his church of Lincoln to the Pope's nephew Frederic of Louvain.[1] But he said that he was defending "the honour of our Holy Mother the Roman Church."

It must not be imagined, then, that this stand which Grossetête took was regarded as anti-ecclesiastical or even anti-clerical: all that is a modern reading of modern ideas into the time. On the contrary, he was a firm and even an excessive defender of the Papal power. But on that very account he detested its being turned to uses not consonant with its high nature, and it should be remembered that his unanswerable pleas in favour of the proper functioning of religious endowment had their effect (though unfortunately not with sufficient result) upon Innocent.

He visited the *Curia* twice, in 1245 and 1250, and in the latter year presented his famous memorial on the

[1] It is characteristic that this worthy is often called in our histories the Pope's grandson. Refuge is taken in the word "*nepos*."

perils of the Church, which the Pope caused to be read before the cardinals.

The best way to put it is to say that the Papacy's official attitude towards Grossetête was just what you see continually in the official attitude of reasonably good men in high office towards those whose principles they approve, though they fear the rigid application of such principles. It would have been well for the Church and for Europe if this great Englishman had been not only heard and revered, but followed.

. . . . . .

First appearance (in England) of Representation in the Central National Council, 1254.—While Henry was away in Gascony during this year, 1254, his wife and his brother were concerned once more to procure revenue. Once more the barons—the feudal class—protested. They would give an aid if Gascony were threatened with invasion from Spain, but they would only speak for themselves. In the past, as we have seen, the feudal Council, the great tenants-in-chief and the prelates, attending the king's court with political purpose of government (and especially of advising on the king's policy and hearing his financial needs), had spoken for the rest of the freemen of England. Although levies on movable goods had, for now more than half a century, been occasionally added to the normal feudal dues and aids, and also at other times asked for and not given, the mass who paid these levies did not assent to or deny them. The magnates spoke for the rest, whether in refusing or granting—and this was an anomaly: especially in this XIIIth century, the whole spirit of which was for discussion and autonomy,

in a Western Europe where the Representative Institution was already of long standing, elsewhere, and in a country like England, in close touch with the Southern French Pyrenean and North Spanish world, in which, as we shall see, representation was already long familiar.

Yet the lingering on of the feudal *Concilium*, or gathering of the king's feudal tenants, clerical and lay, as the organ for granting or resisting special and occasional calls for money was natural. For centuries the revenue of the Crown had been feudal and (if we except legal revenue and Danegeld) feudal only. It had had the revenues of its private lands, the profits of reliefs and wardships; and when the king needed more the only people he could go to (according to the ideas of the time) were his own tenants, that is, great lords and small who were bound by a personal bond to help him as their overlord. Being thus the one and only organ to grant or resist an aid, the *Concilium* went on with this function for some time after conditions had begun to change, and taxes to be occasionally levied on a system not feudal, and therefore outside their beat. But, apart from that there was the case of the small tenants-in-chief of the king, crowds of them, who could not attend the *Concilium*.

The beginning of the House of Commons, April 26th, 1254.—In this year, 1254, the local gentlemen, "Knights of the Shire," who had long been chosen by order of the sheriff out of the people present in the law courts of his county to assess, to receive, to present cases and testify to custom, who had been already twice asked to come to the centre of things and to deal with the king (in 1213 by John at Oxford, and in 1225 to

present grievances), were sent for to come to London as representing their fellows, and to grant an aid from the freemen and lesser tenants. They came (on April 26, 1254) to London for the second meeting of the Council. The thing was not noticed at the time as anything remarkable, but it has significance and interest to us, because it is the first tentative beginning of the House of Commons.

The clergy had long voted money by a form of representation. As yet the towns were not summoned.

Towns as yet not represented.—The towns had not yet sent representatives to the National Council, but the towns were bound to come in. You could not simply levy an arbitrary tallage on London or Bristol once tallage had become frequent and large. Assent was necessary here also, and ten years later their representatives are found side by side with the "Knights of the Shire," when extraordinary levies are asked of the great Council.

Three needs leading to representation.—An institution new to England was therefore arising to meet three difficulties: (1) The fact that the smaller tenants of the Crown could not be present in the feudal *Concilium* of the king, and therefore would not pay large and frequent sums merely arranged for by the magnates; (2) the fact that the old feudal regular dues were no longer sufficient, and quite another kind of revenue was now necessary—as what had been exceptional demands for aid were becoming regular; (3) the anomalous position of the towns. The remedy to these difficulties was to introduce into the feudal *Concilium* non-feudal elements; in other words, as you had broadened the basis of taxation, you had to bring in the quality of dis-

cussion and agreement by other than the feudal magnates.

The Pyrenean origin of representation in Christendom.—Representation practised in Aragon a century before.—It so happened that there existed already in a certain corner of the Continent of Europe, to wit, in the Pyrenees, a local institution which, under these conditions, was bound to be copied widely. This institution was the institution of representation. Why we find it first in the Pyrenees it would be difficult to say. Perhaps the cause was perpetual passage of Christendom to and fro in its early fight against Islam—vital ideas arose in that battlefield of Europe. Perhaps it was because the mountaineers had certain traditions of their own (the Basques have claimed to have had Councils with representation from the earliest times). There also came into it, of course, the effect of monasticism through a system in which separate houses of an Order would send normally two members, sometimes more, to a general meeting. At any rate, the plain historical fact is that you get this system of delegation to the Council in the Pyrenean country long before it appears anywhere else. Before the Norman Conquest took place in England was the traditional meeting at Jaca; later, in 1162, the first contemporary documentary record of representation appears; at Huesca. North of the mountains, the institution grew. Toulouse had it, and the Albigensian war brought it north. The elder de Montfort had assisted (his little son Simon with him) at the meeting of the "Estates" at Foix years before. The King of Paris, in the XIIth century, had summoned merchants to his Council to discuss fiscal affairs.

It spreads through the West.—It must not be imagined that this institution was deliberately set up in England by a conscious innovation. Rather it was "in the air" as the XIIIth century developed. Many of the Northern French nobles, other than the elder de Montfort, had come across it in full working during their great work against heretics in the South in the early part of that age. "Estates," as the system was called, were thoroughly familiar in France before they were heard of here.

In England the thing only took firm root in the next reign, under Edward I.—Strangely enough, this conception never spread to the Germanies. There seemed to be something in the German character unsuitable to the idea of representation—though the free towns sent delegates to the various diets sometimes. But, except for Germany, it became, in the course of 150 years, that is, by the middle of the XIVth century, the working rule of all the West, of the Lowlands, of the French provinces—even Brittany—of England and of Scotland, of the Spanish kingdoms. At first here in England we only had long separated tentative experiments which could not be called working representation. Later, during the reign of Edward I, at chance intervals, the thing became more and more familiar. At irregular intervals a couple of gentlemen from each shire, and of burgesses from each town, appeared occasionally at the Council when money was needed in some exceptional way. Then, later, under Edward II, you get the very important development of a tax granted after a statement of grievances; grievances mainly of the towns and of the smaller gentry; only after promise of redress do they give their assent. At last,

under Edward III, the Parliament of Lords, Clergy, and Commons becomes a regular institution. The *Concilium* had ceased to be, even in theory, let alone in the minds of men, the organ of feudal government. It has become a composite body with a representative element of clergy and laity side by side with the barons and perpetually summoned, not only for the granting of taxes, but for assenting to actions of State. It consists of (1) the great Feudal Tenants-in-Chief, as of old, i.e., Barons, Bishops, and great Abbots; (2) the Burgesses and Knights of the Shires, sitting together; and (3) the Clergy, also in representation assembled, as an order. And these were called "The Three Estates of the Realm."

Before leaving the small and confused origins of what was later to become of such paramount importance in England, we must warn ourselves against two misleading words; the one is "Parliament," the other is "Commons."

The word "Parliament."—Parliament is the form of spelling into which has ultimately settled the original French word "*Parlement*," which merely means "talking." Now that did not come to have a precise and technical meaning, the word was not confined to the formal assembly of estates of the realm, until quite late. We still have the word used occasionally for a Council round the king, with no county knights present nor any burgesses from the town, more than a hundred years after representation has become normal, and we find it before representation began.

Parlement was simply a familiar word which gradually came to be more and more used throughout the educated French-speaking classes of France and

England for the feudal council. It was not associated in the minds of those who used it with the necessary presence of new representative elements. It was only after many generations that it became restricted to describe "a feudal council of magnates to which are added representatives of the smaller country gentry and of the burgesses in the towns and of the clergy."

Parliament, in the sense of the Three Estates of the Realm supplanting the old feudal Council and necessary for all solemn business and assent to new laws, as the old feudal Council had been, does not exist solidly and permanently until the reign of Edward III. It need hardly be repeated here that the representative part, though essential to granting taxes and even necessary to the passing of a Statute, made no pretence to government until the breakdown of the Monarchy in the XVIIth century.

The word "Commons."—The other word one has to be careful of is "*li communz*," "The Commons." There is a modern confusion of the word with the idea of "common people." It has no such meaning. It is used in the Middle Ages in contrast with the idea of individuals. It is like our word "general," as distinguished from our word "particular." The word "commons" *was*, therefore, used sometimes of the mass of people, including the mass of the poor. Thus one would talk of a "rebellion of the commons." But "The Commons" in the Estates of the Realm did not mean that originally at all. It meant any body which had to be represented as a block in contrast with a body formed of individuals specially summoned. Thus the "Commons of Scotland" negotiating with Edward I means the smaller baronage for whom only delegates

could speak on account of their number. It is only gradually and late that it comes to have a special meaning, "member speaking for the mass of the community of freemen."

The great majority of the population, of course, the villeins, the people whose land was not free (or, if free, smaller than the average small farm of some 130 acres or so) were never represented.

There is one remark to be made before leaving the origins of this great English institution. The English Parliament differed somewhat from any one of its continental parallels just as each of these differed somewhat from the others.

Special characters of the English Parliament in which it differed from older and later ones abroad.— The burgesses and the smaller nobility sit together here as a rule (though not always at first). They sit apart in most cases abroad. The clergy act very separately here compared to the way in which they act in most places abroad. There are a host of other particular English points, such as every "Estate" can show, whether in Brittany, in Normandy, in Toulouse, in Navarre, or anywhere else, but by far the most important point of difference is this: The Parliament of England came to be a *national* Council surrounding the *king*, and the Council of a large realm. This national and royal Council is often summoned, and it always contains the representative element. The same is true of Navarre, Castile, Aragon. But the Crown of England was a more important Crown than the lesser kingships where exactly the same thing took place. And all the other *large* realms were federal. The Crown of France governed federally great provinces, most of

which each had their own parliaments. But the central parliament, "The States General" surrounding the king, was only rarely summoned. Once more, as with early feudalism, scale has its effect upon English history. The characteristic point about the English Council after the XIIIth century is that England was just about small enough for the *regular* institution to exist at the centre, and not to be merely provincial as in France, and yet large enough for such regular, frequently summoned Council to be of great note; the organ of a large European kingdom. That is the chief mark of the English Council or Parliament distinguishing it from the French "States General"—only summoned exceptionally and for a crisis—and from the other *regularly* summoned representative bodies of Europe which were attached only to lesser areas.

Opposition of Simon de Montfort, 1254.—Already in this assembly of 1254, with the king absent on the Gironde, his brother-in-law, Simon de Montfort, begins to appear as the enemy. The trial he had suffered for his ruthlessness in Gascony was a permanent memory with him and his anger would not die down. He opposed the granting of financial help to Henry.

When, next year, 1255, Henry attempted a really large piece of European policy, Simon did all he could to spoil it, and led the feudal opposition to such an expansion of power in the English Crown.

Henry III accepts the Crown of Sicily for his second son, Edmund Crouchback, 1254.—Richard of Cornwall elected Emperor of Germany and crowned King of the Romans.—The circumstances were these: The Papacy had won its great fight. Frederick was defeated and dead. The Empire—Germany—was in chaos. But

the Roman see was still in danger so long as Frederick's "Kingdom of Sicily" (that is, Sicily and South Italy) remained, or might fall under the domain of his descendants. Therefore the Pope desired a new dynasty there. Richard of Cornwall refused the offer. His brother, the king, accepted it for his younger son, Edmund Crouchback. But that meant money: about as much as one year's full yield of exceptional heavy taxation and half as much again. The barons refused. And the clergy refused a similar impost from the Pope. Without a grant Henry was powerless, but he still hoped for a continental opening. He had (in 1254) married his eldest son Edward, a boy now 15 years old, to the daughter of the King of Castile, and his brother Richard was elected (by a minority) to the Empire[1] and crowned splendidly in Aix-la-Chapelle (1257) with a willing nobility. The Plantagenet force in Europe (all ultimately directed against the growing ascendancy of the French Crown) might, at such a moment, have waxed very great. The capture of the Papacy by the king of Paris early in the next century and the consolidation of his power in Normandy, Poitou, Anjou, might have been arrested. Brittany might have been made independent of France.

The nobility oppose a strong foreign policy.—But Henry's nobility were most unwilling. Their whole mind was bent on avoiding further payments. An important Welsh expedition—starved of money—was made a grievance, as was a consequent Scots success in overthrowing those who were ruling, during a minority, in the English interest. They would not support the

[1] But always known as "King of Romans" only: i.e. not full Emperor, but Emperor-elect.

king and they blamed him for the results of their defection. Richard was absent, the heir, though now of fighting age, was of doubtful loyalty for the moment. At last they rose.

The Great Council was summoned. On April 28th it met stormily. Only three days after, Simon de Montfort, Earl of Leicester, joined with five others in a secret band to act: to seize power and transfer real government from the king, his own brother-in-law, to the nobles.

And appear in armed hostility under Simon de Montfort in the Council, May 2nd, 1258.—Simon thus comes forward to lead the revolution in his fiftieth year. Ascetic, a famous soldier, loving to feel some high mystic motive behind the most personal military—or even financial—act, violent in temper, exceedingly brave, still powerful in body, a passionate lover of the Catholic Faith, its sacraments, its liturgy; very proud of ancestry; easily confounding private or class advantage with a Cause; fanatical, therefore, and too careless of gratitude and even of pledged word, in a clique of seigneurs where all (and he, too), sought gain; where all (save he) continued to change sides bewilderingly, and where all were ready to sacrifice the strength of the English realm and the Plantagenet line to their baronial advantage, he alone deserved the fine title of Enthusiast.

It was May 2nd, 1258, that the first act of open hostility appeared.

Origin of "The Barons' Wars."—Upon this day, May 2nd, 1258, at Westminster began what our fathers called in general terms "The Barons' Wars," what modern pedantry has ridiculously spoken of as "A Constitutional Movement," and what may be exactly

described as a feudal revolution, at first successful, but finally crushed seven years after in the Battle of Evesham on August 4th, 1265.

It was the climax, but also the conclusion of the long struggle between feudal nobility and mediæval popular monarchy in England which had never really ceased since the Conquest: the opposing forces which had produced the anarchy of the mid-twelfth century and the violent civil war at the end of the reign of John.

But if this strange and intensely active turmoil which broke out in 1258 and was at last put down in 1265 is regarded as no more than an attempt of feudal nobles to be rid of Royal authority, the judgment will be insufficient.

Their true source is irritation against what is felt to be unjust because hitherto unusual taxation.—Those nobles[1] were indeed each playing his hand, but there was behind them a mixed volume of national discontent upon which whatever group of them were for the moment most active against the king (and the groups kept on shifting and changing) could rely. Simon de Montfort felt himself to be in some way, not so much the spokesman as the incarnation of the rebels, and at last an expiatory sacrifice for them. To pretend that this civil war was concerned with the modern (and among millions impracticable) ideal of government by the governed is nonsense. The slow transformation of the national Council from the strict gathering of feudal tenants which it had been a lifetime before, to the

[1] It will help the reader to appreciate what a close clique was involved in the great feudal rebellion if he has before him the opposite table of relationships. It might be indefinitely extended, for all the participants in the Barons' wars were "of the Family." But, elementary as it is, it is instructive.


William le Maréchal
King John = Isabella of Angoulême = Henri de Lusignan
All the Lusignan lot at Henry III's Court
Gilbert de Clare (died 1230)
(1) Isabella (2)
Count of Provence
Richard de Clare (died 1262)
Gilbert de Clare the younger (Simon's ally and later enemy)
Simon de Montfort = Eleanor
Richard of Cornwall = (elected Emperor King of Allemaine)
Sanchia of Provence
Henry III = Eleanor of Provence
Margaret = Louis IX of France (St. Louis)
Young Simon
Amauri
Henry of Allemaine
Prince Edward (later Edward I)
Edmund Crouch-back
Isabella = Frederick II (Emperor)

regular Parliament of a lifetime later, would have continued in any case, even if the government had been steady and regular and the whole nation in profound peace. It was as much a general European development of the time all over the West, in Spain, in France, and later on in England, as industrial capitalism was in the XIXth century, and that transformation was not one towards what people to-day call "democracy," it was simply a necessary substitution of a larger for a more particular body in grant of aid, that is, to assent to and define taxation.

And in no way democratic.—Again, it is a misconception to regard the changing ambitions of the king's brother-in-law and other magnates as in any way a popular movement. To talk of them as a *national* movement is more than a misconception, it is absurd. But they were undoubtedly based on a national discontent, but for which the rebellion would have had no chance even for the brief triumph it did obtain against the solidly established principle of popular monarchy which governed wholly the mind of the Middle Ages.

But based also on the giving of revenue to aliens.—The reason that the rebel leaders, and in particular de Montfort, were by many regarded as saviours, as the captains of a great cause, and (in the case of Simon) subject to sporadic worship after death, was fiscal. The objection to a few great men brought in from overseas by the king's court and given bishoprics and great places of government, was an objection to the loss of feudal income. The discontent, especially of the burgesses in the towns, and even of many of the smaller freeholders in the country, certainly of the greater

nobles, as a whole, was a financial discontent. Not only did they lose revenues to which they thought they had a right as "Lords of the Realm," not "*Aliens*," but they also feared an intolerable taxation, due to the foreign policy of the king.

And the novel financial needs and demands of the Pope.—This, in its turn, was quite rightly mixed up in everybody's mind with the particular temporal policy of the Papacy and its determination to be free of pressure from the last descendants of its old mortal enemy in the south of Italy. Apart from that, there was the now recurrent burden of the Pope's own exactions, and on the top of that again the horrible annoyance of Provisions, depriving the small lords of their family church livings and the large ones of Episcopal sees for their brothers and sons.

Discontent made worse by an agricultural bad season.—It so happened that immediately before the outbreak of revolution there had been an exceptionally bad harvest, pestilence amongst cattle, and, therefore, a great scarcity,[1] and in places famine.

After the winter of 1257-1258 the great mass of the *free* populace (of course a small minority of the whole people, but including the burgesses of the towns and particularly the great mass of the clergy) were ready to welcome anything that would relieve the fiscal pressure. The continual threat of unusual taxation was more than could be borne. Therefore it was, that immediately after the king had summoned this great Spring Council to Westminster at the end of April, 1258, he found his barons coming to his audience on May 2nd

[1] It sounds incredible but it is apparently true, that in some peculiar case wheat was sold at the modern equivalent of £10 the *sack!*

assembled: already armed. They had had the decency to ungird their sword-belts, but the king thought himself a prisoner and was. Bigod made himself their spokesman. They demanded that what was, by all the traditions and ideas of the time, the rightful power of the monarchy, should be ceded to a committee of their own wealthy set and of the bishops, to correct abuses.

The king yields to the rebellion, May, 1258.—The king gave way. The Pope was to be asked to change his demands on England in the matter of Sicily; and a Commission of Reform should be set up with twenty-four members, half taken from the Council, another half to be added by themselves when they should meet next month at Oxford.

"The Provisions of Oxford," June, 1258.—That great Council which met at Oxford in June was called, from the enormous suddenness and revolutionary character of its actions, "The Mad Parliament." The barons came with their military followers, the document known as "The Provisions of Oxford," which put the Crown in Commission, was drawn up, and the Committee of Reform was appointed. It included, nominally, an equal number of Henry's supporters and foes. It set up a complicated machinery by which each half of the Commission chose two from the other half, and these four should appoint fifteen to make a Council of State. But in the upshot it was the nominees of the king's enemies that had the mastery. It is characteristic of the moment that a man most typical of the "aliens" against whom there had been complaint, Boniface of Savoy, the man who had been put into the See of Canterbury itself merely because he was uncle of the queen, was, in this first stage, strongly opposed to the

king. Indeed, we see throughout the whole of the revolution a perpetual chopping and changing of leaders from one side to the other as personal interest demanded.

Henry and young Edward were compelled to swear to the Provisions. A feudal Crown was powerless when its great tenants refused support.

By which a baronial clique takes over the government.—The new rulers used the old machinery of the knights chosen from each shire to enquire into the injuries committed by the ruling power in their districts. They proposed annual accounts: they required that Councils should be held three times a year. Those Councils were, of course, packed Councils of their nominees. Even they could only act in conjunction with the new masters of the State; and these masters were the enormously rich feudal barons. Men such as de Clare, lord of those vast estates in the West which went with the title of Gloucester: son of Isabella, the Marshall's daughter.

There already appeared in this summer of 1258 a good deal of division between those who had thus recently seized power. But they remained in the saddle, and to confirm their power they asked the Pope to send them a Legate who should act with them.

The first real danger they had to meet was the proposed return of the king's brother, Richard, the Emperor-elect of Germany. He was on his way back to raise money from his estates. He was met at St. Omer and told that he might not land in England until he had taken an oath to accept the new state of affairs. Henry assented to that command of his rebels and Richard took the oath at Canterbury.

Quarrels among the rebels, 1259.—It was the next

year, 1259, that the first bad breach appeared between those who had conspired thus. They had enriched themselves heavily out of the royal revenues: they were prepared to quarrel, and in particular it was, of course, the king's brother-in-law de Montfort, the Earl of Leicester, whose preponderance and increase of wealth and following aroused jealousy. That jealousy took the form of a violent personal quarrel between him and Gloucester.

Discontent of the smaller gentry with the barons.—Then with the autumn of the year there appeared a new danger. The local knights who had been summoned to report put in a petition remarking that the new masters had been in unchecked power for nearly a year and a half, but that as yet no one had felt any benefit.

Some reforms, therefore, were set on foot of a sort which would be felt and recognized by the mass of the freemen and smaller gentry. Four knights were to be chosen in every county to watch the sheriff, and to report him to the Justiciary, they were even allowed to have a certain choice in presenting names for the office of sheriff. But the final choice did not lie with them.

The rebellion weakening by 1260.—These little experiments at relief were quite insufficient, and when it came to the spring of 1260, there had already begun a great revulsion of opinion. The oligarchy which had established itself was no longer popular and its internal quarrels were notorious.

A part of those internal quarrels, a perplexing one but easily explained by the changing personal interests of the magnates, was a change-over on the part of the Prince of Wales.

Fear that Simon de Montfort might bid for the

Crown.—We must remember in all this affair that there lay, not only openly expressed, but in everybody's mind the possibility of a deposition. De Montfort himself, with his Plantagenet marriage, may have nourished an ambition for the Crown of England, which his father had been offered: certainly young Edward, now 21, full of energy and ambition, might hope for it.

For the moment Edward was working with Leicester (de Montfort), although that leader had, for the moment, retired, leaving Gloucester to attempt a reconciliation with the king. It was not till the next year, 1261, but early in the year, that Henry thought the divisions within this small body of great men had reached a point when he could act. He did so: too suddenly; perhaps, on advice—for it was after a fashion hardly consonant with his quiet character.

Henry III relies on popular feeling to attempt a return to power, February, 1261.—He appeared before the Council on Candlemas Day (February 2nd), reproached the revolutionaries very justly with having failed to reform abuses and with having enriched themselves. He seized the treasure, shut the gates of London, required a personal oath from all the citizens, and issued a proclamation that the knights of the counties should come to the next Parliament armed. The Prince of Wales was abroad at the moment. The baronial party armed, in its turn, against the king, when Edward returning joined them.

The reader will be fatigued by this recital of perpetual criss-cross, intrigue and counter-intrigue, among the score of men who aimed at uncontrolled power, but it is necessary to set it down in order that one may appreciate how little there was of any genuine united

movement, and how much of individual cunning in their revolution. The only fixed principle in the whole affair was the strong, permanent tradition in the mind of the masses that after all the king was king, and what had been done against him, however strong the resentment against loss of revenue to aliens by the rich, and of excessive taxation by the clergy and the middle classes, was essentially illegal: a negation of the political morals of the day.

And is successful (1261).—Henry relied upon that feeling and was successful in his reliance. The opposition dwindled to a new group, the chiefs of which were Gloucester and Leicester now reconciled. The Pope relieved all parties from their oaths. The king, in that summer of 1261, took over the royal castles again, issued on August 16th a strong proclamation to the whole nation that he had resumed his full authority. He contrasted the security and peace of his long reign with the disturbances of the last three years and promised redress against any of the old abuses should they reappear.

But Simon opposes reconciliation.—There was an attempt at reconciliation—opposed by de Montfort—in the early part of 1262, but not before he and the faction had taken it upon them to summon three knights from every county south of the Trent as though they held royal power.

That was how things stood (confused enough in all conscience but inclining to an end of the revolution) in the first months of 1262.

And the revolution is kept alive.—But the revolution was not at an end, and could not be at an end until it had been decided under arms one way or another

whether the principle of popular monarchy should survive in England or no. What we have next to watch is that monarchy's trial under arms, its defeat, but its final victory.

De Clare, the great Earl of Gloucester, goes over to the king.—Already early in 1262 the divisions among the rebels had gone so far that even de Clare, of Gloucester, announced himself on the king's side. Simon stood out, and rather than submit said he would be off on crusade. On May 2nd, the anniversary of his humiliation of four years before, the king revoked "The Provisions of Oxford" in a public document, and seemed to be in full power again.

And dies (1262).—But his young son, on accession, refuses homage.—Henry went over in the autumn to France to visit St. Louis (he had lost the support of de Clare, Simon's rival and new enemy, by death in July) and de Montfort took advantage of his absence to re-cross the Channel and appear in England—on October 3rd. He got the support of Richard, the king's brother (a good example of the chop and change!), and the alliance of young de Clare—a boy of twenty, just come into these great estates of the West—and when Henry, on his return, demanded the swearing of allegiance (March, 1263) to himself *and his heir, Edward*, young de Clare refused the second oath.

And, with Simon de Montfort, breaks out into civil war (April 25th, 1263).—The rebel barons march on London.—Henry, a moment overcome, rallies an army.—There was an irregular assembly at Oxford without the king's leave. Young de Clare and the rest took arms. Simon led them, and on April 25th, 1263, the fighting began. They ravaged without mercy all who

would not join their party; they took, rapidly, the Western castles (Gloucester, Worcester, Bridgenorth) from the king's garrisons. They marched on London, and for a moment the King and Queen and Prince Edward were in peril. But Richard of Cornwall was driven back by the spectacle of armed rebellion to supporting his brother, and he negotiated with Simon as the latter approached the walls of London in June. The barons' army had already seized the channel ports and was master of all the South and South-East. Henry accepted—against his son's will—shameful terms for the moment: allowed the rebels to garrison his castles and revived "The Provisions of Oxford." But there was a strong reaction proceeding against the successful army, and, as before, the leaders were quarrelling. The king had accepted these terms late in July, and ratified them on September 9th. Yet by the next month—largely through Prince Edward's efforts—he had an army. He nearly captured de Montfort, by surprise. He was strong enough to threaten recovery or at any rate to make his enemies doubt their final victory.

And the whole quarrel on "The Provisions of Oxford" is put to the arbitration of St. Louis of France (end of 1263).—Simon de Montfort swears to accept St. Louis' award.—Therefore, by the end of the year 1263, they consented to arbitration—the King of France, St. Louis, the most respected figure of the day, was to hear the case, and decide for or against "The Provisions of Oxford," that is, the substitution of feudal for royal rule in England. Both parties bound themselves to accept the award, whatever it might be, and Simon de Montfort solemnly swore to support it.

MAP XI

THE BARONS' WARS

St. Louis summoned the parties to Amiens. Henry went. Simon excused himself—on the plea of a fall from a horse.

It is given against the revolution by the "Mise of Amiens" (January 23rd, 1264).—On January 23rd St. Louis gave the award in the solemn form known as the "Mise" (that is, the final judicial award) "of Amiens."

It declared the Provisions of Oxford annulled, as destroying the rights of the English Crown and harmful to the realm. The Pope confirmed the Mise. The Archbishop of Canterbury was to excommunicate all or any who perjured themselves by refusing to accept it.

Simon breaks his oath, refuses St. Louis' award and renews civil war with a considerable public support.—Simon acted at once, while Henry and Prince Edward were still away. He broke his oath without hesitation, made an arrangement with the Welsh to attack England, sent one son to get the Western castles and another to get those which cut off the South from Northern aid. Most men who counted refused to follow him in this open breach of faith, but he had considerable backing. There were town mobs who saw their opportunity, and there was more solid support from whole groups of the people: for instance, the Franciscans and a large section at least of the students of Oxford.

The two armies face each other near Lewes (May 12th, 1264).—He had the advantage of the start: the disadvantage of comparatively few experienced soldiers. Henry and Edward, returning, had an army ready by April. They took Simon's son—the younger Simon—and his force at Northampton. That opened the

North, and the Northern Barony supported the Crown. The bad news made Simon, who had been marching north to make a junction with his son, fall back on London. His supporters in that town got out of hand and massacred the Jews—since that was consonant with a popular programme—but there was no victory in that. He determined to reduce Rochester, which cut the road to Dover, but he failed. Henry and Edward's host marched past London to Tonbridge Castle, which they took, then down to the coast to get the support of the Cinque Ports in which they failed. On May 12th the army was at Lewes, and Simon, with a force probably smaller than the king's but very large, ill-trained, containing, among other elements, a mass of London militia, was at Fletching. There was negotiation on the 13th (which came to nothing).

Simon prayed all night: put the crosses of Crusaders on his army's clothing, and marched them out before dawn of Wednesday, the 14th of May, 1264, for the summit of the Downs, which lay against the sky due south of him.

And meet in the battle of Lewes.—Which is won by Simon de Montfort on Wednesday (May 14th, 1264).—Henry the king was lodged in the Cluniac Priory near the level. The grooms of Prince Edward and his Lusignan cousin were walking the horses on the turf outside Lewes Castle in the early morning light. They saw on the ridge to the west a battle line appearing and gave the alarm. It was late to arm, but all did so. Prince Edward was in front of the castle on the right. Richard, King of the Romans, in the centre, the king on the left: a very bad position for the line, with a sweep downhill over clean turf for their enemies and

not sufficient time to form. That is why they lost the battle. Simon knew what he was at when he secretly led up his force that morning to a position where it was just hidden by the ridge, on the high ground that dominated Lewes. Prince Edward and the Lusignan charged at once and broke the Londoners opposite them. They pursued along the Downs for four miles, capturing Simon's baggage in the rear and driving the militia like cattle. But when they reined round and returned they found that the other two portions of the royal army, Richard's and the king's, had broken, and that Simon de Montfort had the king cooped up in the Priory, and Richard of Allemaine, King of the Romans, cooped up in a mill: their troops were being hunted and slaughtered in the streets of the town. The barons of the king would not allow Prince Edward to continue the battle, as he desired to do. The young fellow had his division fresh enough, though the horses were blown with four miles of galloping and wheeling, and they had had a leisurely (too leisurely) return.

What seems to have decided the capitulation was Simon de Montfort's threat to kill his prisoner Richard of Germany, King of the Romans, the king's brother, and others, unless Henry surrendered.

The king capitulates under the "Mise of Lewes."—Popular feeling will not allow supersession of the king by a subject.—The terms of that surrender are known as the "Mise of Lewes"—negotiated by the friars of Lewes and putting forth a scheme to "manage" the public opinion of England, which this struggle had made a real thing, extending far beyond the little set of royal relatives and great lords which had been the only active factor in earlier attacks upon the Crown. The XIIIth

century was alive with free discussion everywhere, the towns had increased, the schools were enormous—the scholars' numbers at Oxford were the population of a large town—the proportion of "dead weight" of men indifferent (through servile status or ignorance) to the actions of their betters was less than it had ever been before, or was ever to be afterwards. That opinion, as I have repeated, largely supplied the attack on the novel and excessive fiscal exactions, Papal and Royal; in a less degree it sympathized with the complaint of the great men born tenants of the king against the taking of revenue by men not so born: for it associated this with the drainage away of local money.[1] Considerable bodies, strong by their cohesion, though certainly not a majority, supported Simon and his lot, even their taking up of arms, because that taking up of arms stood for less taxation. For instance in most towns the Earl of Leicester would count on getting a deputation to order from the trading class who would support him. But there was everywhere, of course, a conviction that the king should be king, a horror of treason, and an accepted, universal idea of the time that Monarchy was of right and attached to the blood royal inherited of elder birth. To see *that* supplanted by a subject was as intolerable to the England of 1264 as massacre would be to the England of 1925 or uncompensated confiscation of great wealth would have seemed to the England of 1870. Such disturbance of

[1] For instance, Boniface of Savoy, Archbishop of Canterbury, though a pillar of the party which resisted Papal and Royal pressure for money, a vigorous defender of the revenues of Canterbury, lived much of his life abroad: a part of these revenues therefore were, in the active experience of the men on the Canterbury estates and in the metropolitan town, going out of the realm.

political standards did not come till a hundred years later, after the Black Death and the corruption of the mediæval spirit.

Yet Simon is really in despotic control. His ruse to mask his power.—Simon (he was now, virtually, his own party—a single master of the moment, through control of the only large armed force) had, therefore, to dissemble, and the scheme arranged in the "Mise of Lewes," designed to make him *permanently* master, was apparently monarchic and regular. In the next Parliament the issues should be discussed and any not there settled were to go to arbitration.

He keeps Prince Edward, whom he fears, a close prisoner.—But the young man whom, from his energy and hereditary right to rule, was most feared, Edward the Prince, Simon kept a close prisoner in the Castle of Dover, with his cousin Henry, son of Richard, King of the Romans. That brother-in-law, a man of stronger will than the king, he also kept close prisoner far off in Kenilworth Castle; and how this seeming open field for debate in Council and by arbitration was used we shall see.

And governs by martial law in the king's name.—Meanwhile the great and stern soldier who was now so irregularly and by perjury true chief of the State, treated the king in public with all the submission due to the Crown. But every public act was his own: and those public acts were signed by a Great Seal which he himself had had made in the likeness of the king's and was attached to the parchments without consulting the Plantagenets. They all confirmed Simon's power. He sent a special man of his own into every county to supplant the Sheriff, to choose local gentry who would

support him in the next Parliament and to see to it strictly that everyone was disarmed.

In Parliament so summoned within six weeks of the battle—a Council of his own large faction—Simon created a new form of Government ordered to endure through all Henry's reign and his son Edward's after him. The power of choosing the Executive Council of the Realm was to be put into commission of three men whom the king was to nominate. The king—that is, Simon de Montfort—did nominate them at once most solemnly, and they turned out to be Simon de Montfort himself, the young de Clare, Earl of Gloucester, who was still under his spell, and the Bishop of Chichester, his chief adherent in the Church. These three set up a council of nine, their nominees, to act for de Montfort, and that Council (which is equivalent to saying Leicester himself) had *all* power—far more than Henry had ever had, or any king of England. Such is the invariable effect of revolution acting in the name—and with the sincere intention—of general, diffused, and popular rule.

A threat of invasion by the queen is stopped by the weather.—It was now high summer of 1264. Abroad the queen had gathered a large force in Flanders, with a fleet ready for its transport. Against it Simon summoned the whole armed force of England, township by township and tenant by tenant to Barham Downs. How many really came we are not sure: but the orders were very stringent. How willingly they would have fought to keep their Prince imprisoned and their new master in power was never put to the test. The wind blew from the north all that August and the queen's force was held. Simon himself cruised in the Straits

watching it. Her forces disbanded. The Papacy intervened, but its Legate[1] feared to cross the sea, and bishops reluctantly coming as summoned to Boulogne had the sentence of excommunication taken from them when they reached Dover again (October 23rd, 1264).

Difficulty of keeping Prince Edward a prisoner in the face of opinion.—Simon's peril, then, was not from without but from within. The continued imprisonment of Prince Edward did not fit in with what the mass of Englishmen still believed their Monarchy to be, and his release was demanded. It was answered that only a full Council, that is, a Parliament, could give so grave a decision, and the man who had all real power summoned that Parliament of his for the new year—to meet in London on the octave of St. Hilary—January 21st, 1265.

On December 14th, 1264, the writs were sent out.[2] Only twenty-three chief tenants were summoned, all sufficiently supporters of the Earl's party. The clergy, of course, he could not act on at will: all not actively hostile received their writs. The local gentry—two from each county—the original "Commons,"[3] he could be sure of, as the summoning power always could, for its officers in the county court would see to that: the knights were not keen to come, nor the suitors in the county court to send them: it was an expensive business and wearisome: an ordered thing of which the initiation was from above. But the occasion was

[1] It was the Cardinal of Sabina: himself to be Pope in a few weeks as Clement IV.

[2] The first batch: a second batch went out ten days later.

[3] One may now fairly call them "the Commons" as an institution, for it was already ten years since the knights of the shire had first come regularly into the Great Council.

famous for an innovation. Simon also sent out writs (which arrived, of course, as king's writs, with the Royal Seal, and in the name of the king) to the *towns*. Each was to send two burgesses or citizens, and of these also he could be sure.

The town representatives are summoned to the Great Council for the first time by Simon de Montfort, December 14th, 1264.—Parliament thus receives its last element.—It has generally been held that Simon added for his own political purposes this new element of townsmen to the Commons. It is certain that he had such a motive, and it was clearly to his advantage to have a large popular body gathered at his own direction. But it is equally certain that *any* government would have added the town element to Parliament without much greater delay: a belated step as it was, for the towns had always been present in the earlier Parliaments of Europe, in the South, on the model or in the spirit of which the English assembly grew. A much stronger reason for their presence than moral support from the lower part of such assemblies—which had very little to say as to policy—was the fiscal function they performed of voting exceptional levies of money: and it was no longer possible to do that in the XIIIth century with its communal spirit, its high public life, and its great increase in urban wealth, unless the towns were there to discuss and grant the aids.

And for the future includes Lords, Prelates, Knights of the Shires, Burgesses and Clergy.—From this time forward, then, from January 21st, 1265, though at that time not too regularly gathered and with packing of lay armed barons who were the real power, and the Crown in reality for the moment a cypher, all the factors of

this full Great Council or Parliament as it existed thoughout the remainder of the English Middle Ages are present—the king governing, and surrounded and counselled by his chief lay tenants summoned and his chief clerical tenants, the bishops and the chief abbots and priors: the presence also in a separate group of the lay commons—knights of the shire and burgesses, and of the representatives of the lower clergy.[1]

The close imprisonment of Prince Edward is relaxed.—It was impossible, with so large a body, to keep up the full convention, or mystification of complete real power in de Montfort's hands, coupled with the open acknowledgment of the national monarchy. It was, in particular, impossible for Simon to keep Prince Edward—from whom he rightly expected the main peril to his rule—in close captivity. It was conceded by the armed power which still held all in its grasp that the young man should be "free"—but only after a mass of castles had been put in pledge, oaths of subservience exacted, and the right to name his "counsellors" for him: who were, of course, his watchers, and in practice his keepers, since they could no longer be his jailors.

But, with all these restrictions, Edward was at least now as apparently and physically free as his father, in whose presence he moved and of whose court he formed a part. It was this small measure of liberty in him which ruined Simon's brief autocracy.

Young de Clare (Gloucester) opposes Simon's cause in the west (April, 1265).—There had already been

[1] The clergy came to vote their *money* contributions apart in convocation. But they are present in the Council so long as the real Parliament of the Middle Ages continues.

rebellions in the west against Simon's control of affairs, but put down, when young de Clare (Gloucester), alarmed by the arrest of a colleague, added, on April 19th, a very formidable opposition. He summoned the tenants of his vast estates near and beyond the lower Severn, set up the *king's* standard, and prepared revolt.

Simon hurried west to Hereford with the king and the prince. There was no fighting, however, for the moment. A sham peace was made—but de Montfort knew that with all the power of Gloucester leaving him his control of England was in jeopardy. Its loss was made certain by the escape of Edward.

Prince Edward escapes and is received by de Clare at Ludlow Castle.—That young man got leave to ride out for a breath beyond the walls of Hereford. It was difficult to deny him, since he was in theory and in the public eye free. His keepers rode out with him, of course, but a simple combination, prearranged, outwitted them. First, all afternoon, he ran races with his warders: and as each race ended with no attempt at evasion they grew accustomed to the sport. Meanwhile Mortimer, one of those border lords who were flying from Simon's power, hid in a wood with an armed band. On the approach of evening a man gave a signal from the distant sky line; Edward rode a last race—and this time Mortimer's men came out and intercepted the prince's few keepers. The heir was carried off willingly through the darkness, and next day met de Clare at Ludlow.

Simon's error on the direction taken by the Prince.—This was towards the end of the month of May, 1265. Simon lost time through thinking that Edward would

have gone westward, as a small band of royalists had landed in Pembroke. He ordered, therefore (on May 30th), an assembly of the Crown's tenants in arms at Worcester and at Gloucester, so as to concentrate eastward behind the supposed rising and pen it into the west against the sea. The error was unavoidable. He was not the last or the first great soldier to lose a campaign through a false move based on wrong news.

Prince Edward and young de Clare trap Simon behind the line of the Severn.—While Simon thus had the west in mind, Edward and de Clare were east of him. The town of Worcester received them gladly, and they at once seized the passages of the Severn, taking Gloucester by storm: it was Simon, in his turn, who was cut off and held, at Hereford, beyond the obstacle of the river: and with forces most insufficient —until (or if) reinforcement should either reach him or attack his foes from behind.

Reinforcement fails to reach him by June, 1265.— He was desperate. He got an ill-trained body of Welshmen together within a month—that is, during June—by setting Henry's seal to an abandonment of all English rights over Wales, and with that inferior body took up position at Newport. But nothing more reached him. Before the end of June Edward was attacking him and Simon went off into the heart of the Welsh mountains to hire, by treasure or promise, whatever rough forces he could.

His son, Simon the younger, is intercepted while marching up to help his father.—The general summons to concentrate (in the king's name) for Simon at Worcester, sent out immediately after Edward's escape, had been ill obeyed. But it reached Simon's son, the

younger Simon, while he was trying to take Pevensey Castle. He marched west at once to make junction with his father (sacking Winchester on the way) and was at Kenilworth by the end of July.

Edward left Worcester for a forced night march on the last day of the month and surprised his command, asleep outside the walls of Kenilworth, at sunrise on August 1st. Simon the younger escaped into the castle, but his relieving force was no longer in being.

On which account, though successful in crossing the Severn, Simon, in the battle of Evesham, Monday, 4th August, 1265, is totally defeated.—Killed in the action and the king set free.—On that same day de Montfort, with his elder son, Henry, a few thousand Welshmen, and some 400 gentlemen full armed—it was all the strength he had—managed to get across the Severn—at Kempsey. He marched on eastward during Saturday, August 2nd, to make his junction with his son, not knowing what had happened, and on August 3rd lay with his little mixed, uncertain command, and the king among it, encamped outside Evesham, to the north of the town in the long loop or peninsula of camping field which the Avon there holds in its winding. He expected at some time in the next morning to see his son's forces arriving over the hill to the north-east.

By Sunday, August 3rd, Edward was back in Worcester; finding what had happened he at once tried his men with one more night march (but many—drawn from the Severn line—must have been fresh) and, with de Clare, executed the following manœuvre[1]:—

[1] We have more than one account of this campaign and action. One of the best is in the Chronicle of Matthew Paris, and being from the last and most sober of the several pens (at least three) whence that work is compiled, it is trustworthy.


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20 Miles 30
Line of the Severn
Ludlow
Wigmore Castle
Kenilworth
R. Avon
Worcester
Evesham
Hereford
Gloucester
R. Usk
Newport
Bristol Channel
Bristol
R. Avon
Edward's escape & recruiting march
Track of Royalist Army
Track of De Montfort
Campaign of Evesham

By sunrise of Monday, August 4th, 1265, he was on the hills *north-east* of the peninsula, in the direction whence Simon the Younger would have been marching to join his father had his relieving force still existed. De Clare went right round to Simon's rear in the darkness and was ready, therefore, to cut off any attempt at retirement by the enemy, should Simon get early news of what was happening. But Simon got no such news: he suffered surprise.

When he first saw Edward's three columns topping the high ridge north and east of him he thought it was his son's force coming forward. When he discovered what it really was he prayed that God have mercy on their souls, for their bodies were Edward's. His only chance was a desperate attack before his enemy should be fully deployed. It failed against such superior numbers, and soon his little, ill-equipped command was surrounded. The gentlemen all fell, and of their wounded only ten survived. The Welsh levy was destroyed. King Henry, feeble now, and in their midst, was rescued by his own son. Simon himself, his tall figure swinging the sword in the midst of the ring, was one of the last to go down: he and Henry his son. He asked if there were quarter: heard the shout, "None for traitors!" and died. They buried his mangled body in Evesham Priory by the king's order.

Close of the rebellion.—With the great Earl went down all that good and evil for which he had lived. The rebellion still had great strength, but it was divided, and the energy of Edward succeeded everywhere. He recovered the Cinque Ports—always a mainstay of the Montfort attempt—storming Winchel-

sea. He met in personal combat and unhorsed a brigand leader in Buckingham, one of a number of such leaders of roving bands, and for two whole years gradually put down the divided and weakening resistance which so long a solution in the continuity of royal power had encouraged. The garrison of Kenilworth held out to all but the end of 1266, and was only subdued by famine after a six months' full siege. Its reduction was followed, in the course of 1267, by a peace with Llewellyn of Wales, who swore fealty.

All is over by 1267.—The last danger lay in young Simon's still resisting upon the Isle of Ely, where Hereward had resisted so many generations before. His fine obstinacy was made possible by a rebellion of de Clare's, who, in April, 1267, raised a force in London. At the approach of a siege (which had it come about would have been the only one ever attempted against the great town) he gave way, and by the late autumn, in a Parliament held at Marlborough (November 18th, 1267), a full pacification was made.

And the final settlement effected by Ottoboni, legate of Pope Clement IV, in 1268.—Prince Edward goes off on crusade, 1270.—The Pope—that same Clement IV who had been kept out of England as legate after Lewes—intervened actively for peace. He urged moderation in victory. He reproved the harshness of the first measures taken after Evesham. He sent his legate Ottoboni, who, in 1268, did more than any other individual to settle the great quarrel. At his hand Prince Edward received the Cross, in April, 1269. In 1270 the Charter of London was restored, the younger Simon pardoned, and Edward in that summer sailed with his cousin Henry, Richard's son, taking Gloucester

(de Clare) with him as a precaution, to join St. Louis' last crusade, the expedition in which that King of France died on Carthage Hill.

While he is absent Henry III dies at Westminster on November 16th, 1272.—The rest of the reign, with Edward absent, was happy in the absence of history. In March, 1271, Richard, King of the Romans, died: following his son—whose tragedy belongs rather to Edward's story. Eighteen months later, on November 16th, 1272, the king himself, old at fifty-seven, gentle, designed for peace and religion, worn out with the storm of his days, died at Westminster peacefully and holily. They buried him in that tomb of the Confessor's whence he had transferred the saint's bones to the shrine.

If you stand looking southward outside Westminster Hall, turning your back on the strange effigies of Disraeli and Peel and the rest, you have on your left and on your right, two very different things: the home of an institution and the material remains of a great church. The institution is the House of Commons. The building is Westminster Abbey. Each proceeds from the days of Henry III.

(C) Edward I

(November 16th, 1272, to July 7th, 1307. Nearly 35 years)

Accession of Edward I.—Prince Edward did not hear of his father's death until the very end of 1272. He was travelling through Sicily and Calabria and was oddly slow in returning to England. But that delay is proof of the security in which Henry had left the

realm. He had been proclaimed, of course, at once upon his father's death, and the years of his reign were dated from that very day.

He had reached the French crusading camp at Carthage on November 10th, 1270. St. Louis was already dead and the expedition futile.

Edward had gone over to Sicily and thence sent on his cousin Henry, the son of Richard, with messages to England through Italy. But the tragedy of the Montforts was not accomplished. Guy de Montfort had married into an Italian family. Simon's other remaining son, Simon the Younger, the same who had been surprised at Kenilworth and held out in Ely, was with his brother.

Henry of Allemaine, son of Richard, King of the Romans, is murdered by the younger Simon at Viterbo.—Henry stopped at Viterbo, where there was a Papal election proceeding, and went in one morning to hear Mass in the little church which still stands, not over much used nowadays, on the north of the market place. Mass was over, he was still on his knees, when he heard his name called loudly and, turning round, saw two young men all in mail and with drawn swords. They were Simon's sons, his cousins. He ran to the altar for safety, but they murdered him there, and with him a priest who tried to shield him; and that was the last scene of the Barons' Wars.

Prince Edward's year in the Holy Land (Autumn 1271 to Autumn 1272).—Edward went on to the Holy Land. He had only a thousand men, and with all his exertions at Acre—the last stronghold of our race and culture in Syria—he could rally no more than 7000. But a man of Richard Cœur de Lion's own blood stirred

imagination in the East. The new Mongol conquerors of Persia proposed an alliance with him against the Saracen.

He could do little—raid a convoy and get inland as far as Nazareth, but he stayed on till June, 1272, when, in Whitsun week, on Wednesday, the 17th, a Mohammedan Emir, under the pretence of friendship, stabbed him in his tent (as he lay sleeping in the afternoon heat) with a poisoned dagger. He recovered, signed a truce for ten years with the Sultan, and so sailed back to the West in the Autumn of 1272. It was after landing in Italy that he had the news of his father's death which I have mentioned.

Perhaps he enjoyed the great honours that were given him throughout the journey as a Crusader and as a sort of martyr to the dwindling Christian cause in the East; such honours naturally followed upon the story of his perils.

His journey home.—He stayed abroad throughout the whole of 1273, doing homage to Philip le Bel of France in Paris for the fiefs held under the French Crown—and it is worth noting that these were not specified. During the whole of his life and vigorous reign, Edward allowed the Plantagenet claim to the great northern fiefs to lie dormant. It was taken up, as we shall see, by his grandson; but he himself had apparently determined to concentrate, by a sort of reaction, upon what was now a more statesmanlike plan, and to make himself master of the British Islands, or at any rate of Great Britain as a whole, without wasting revenue and risking defeat in adventure against the French Crown.

Arrives in his kingdom, August 2nd, 1274, and is

crowned August 19th.—He did not get back to England until the summer of 1274, crossing on August 2nd, and was crowned, with his wife, Eleanor of Castile, on the 19th.

There are few reigns of which one can say that the accidental dates of the king's accession and death correspond to an epoch in the national history. But one can say it of Edward I.

His constant policy to unite Britain.—For Edward I had the integrity, the singleness of mind, and the strength of will, coupled with the bodily health which permitted him to be unapproached chief of the thirty-three years—1274–1307—through which he ruled; and he had, as I have said, a definite plan which appears quite clearly in all he did: to unite the island. He was determined to be the effective master of Wales, and at least feudal master of Scotland.

It was the moment when the kingdom of France was united under one head, and the example inspired Edward to make a united Britain.

In this there was no idea of brute conquest. Edward was the true feudal legist of his day, certain that he was acting on precedent and with justice. What destroyed his plan—not in his own lifetime but in that of his successors—was the small number of the divisions over which a central crown could rule in this island, and the distance and solidarity of one of them —Scotland.

Geographical causes of its failure after his death.—Over and over again in the history of England you find the conditions of English history dominated by English geography. Treated as a set of provinces, Britain had only three: the Scotch province, based upon the diffi-

culty of crossing the wild Border, and of subduing the Highlands; the Welsh province, based on the peculiar mountain conditions of its people (and their very different race); the English province, containing something like four times as much arable land, and, perhaps, four times as much population as the other two put together.

Under the conditions of the Middle Ages an imperial crown, such as that which the Capetian monarchy had achieved in France, could rely upon the broadness of its essentially federal base. It played class against class and province against province. That in Britain was impossible. So long as feudal conditions endured—and long after—a real unity of the whole island under the Crown at Westminster could not be *federally* achieved with only *three* provinces. A King of England, moreover, not holding Scotland directly could not hold it at all—it was too difficult to get at and too large to hold long directly under mediæval conditions: as a free province it had no equals against which it could be played in the game of division and rule. And the peculiar character of the British problem was symbolized by the fact that the old subsidiary names of "Duchy" or "County" did not apply—with their tradition of subservience. Wales had a prince: Scotland a king.

Yet Edward did achieve unity, in form at least, for a few years; and he gave outline and substance to an idea which, centuries later, triumphed.

The conditions of holding Wales.—Of the two tasks, the subjection of Wales was the easier and the less important. There had never been anything to prevent the holding of Wales by a disengaged and de-

termined British king since the development of the new mediæval civilization, save the lack of sustenance and the ruggedness of the country. What had prevented it so far was the dispersion of energy in other things which seemed more important, recurrent feudal rebellion at home or beyond the seas: the retention or recovery of the Norman and Angevin inheritance. The Welsh provinces had continually accepted the overlordship of the English king, and as perpetually revolted.

The succession of events in Edward's case is simple enough. The prince was a tall, vigorous man, thirty-six years old, determined on his object, and free from disturbance at home. Llewellyn, the chief prince in North Wales, hesitated to do fealty, made excuses, and, in practice, refused to come to court. The real reason of that was the permanent animosity existing between the Welsh mountaineers and the English of the plains, and the knowledge that in the past a practical independence of the mountains had been secured. Llewellyn's brother David, deprived of revenue by Llewellyn, joined the English side. Llewellyn made what was (at such a moment) a rather ridiculous alliance with the King of France, a paper thing; but, what was of more importance, he got all the principal men of the Northern mountains to promise resistance.

The first subjugation of North Wales, 1277.— Edward marched very late in the season of 1277. He did not get his feudal forces together in the marches (that is, on the upper Severn and the Dee) until midsummer. He then went forward along the coast, took Flint Castle and Rhuddlan Castle, held the sea with his fleet, occupied Anglesey; and by winter obtained

the submission of the Welshmen. He made hard terms, but they were not enforced. He proposed to annex the four Cantreds [1] between the Dee and the Conway, to make the Welshmen pay a rent for Anglesey and to do homage and to pay a large fine. The fine was remitted, so was the rent; and the king married Llewellyn to his ward, Montfort's daughter.

Its failure.—Because David had helped him against his brother, he did everything for David; made him a knight and gave him wide lands, and married him to an English heiress. But that was not enough to hold the chief. The old love of independence was as strong as ever in the mountains, and David shared it. It was nearly five years after the original campaign that the plan of rebellion developed. David took without warning Edward's Castle of Hawarden, and carried off his justiciary, Clifford, and murdered the garrison. Llewellyn besieged Edward's recently acquired castles of Flint and Rhuddlan, and the mountaineers poured down on to the English lowlands ravaging everywhere.

Reconquest of Wales, 1282.—Deaths of Llewellyn and David.—The thing was a surprise, and Edward's march was correspondingly delayed and his success doubtful. The rebellion had taken place a week before Easter, on March 22nd, 1282. The King of England did not recover Anglesey nor fully achieve his old plan of surrounding the mountains until the summer. There was a bad disaster in the breaking of a bridge of boats over the Menai Straits, and no true

[1] It was a Welsh term for the Latin *Centena*, the old local division of the Roman Empire, copied also in time outside its boundaries, which, as we have seen, was generally translated into English as "The Hundred."

conquest of the country. What ruined the Welsh resistance this time was not Edward's campaign so much as a thing which often determined events in the Middle Ages, especially the fate of irregular warfare of its wilder districts: a personal accident. Llewellyn, coming down south into Radnorshire, was surprised while he was watching the dispositions of an English force on the far side of the Wye at Bluit, and he was killed without battle. His head was sent to Edward. The moment that catastrophe was known in the mountains the chieftains began to capitulate. Llewellyn's death had taken place on December 11th, 1282, and by the summer of the next year, 1283, Edward was fully master. David was hunted down and captured, and put to the horrible death of a traitor.

Thence for twelve months onwards the King of England established himself in the new land, made county boundaries, brought in the English courts, built castles (notably Carnarvon), imposed as far as he could the Western culture upon a country which still held in most of its customs and laws to the traditions of a much earlier time. One may fairly put the spring of 1284 as a date for the final pacification of Wales. So was taken in one province.

The capture of Scotland.—There followed the Scottish adventure, more complicated in its sources, far less conclusive in its results, for here Edward was dealing with a problem of quite another sort: a national spirit already formed, a more considerable population, and what is more important than numbers, the presence, in the chief men, of a culture similar to that of England, deriving, like that of England, from the Norman impression of the XIth century—a form now

two centuries and a half old. With all that, remember, admittedly a *kingdom*. Now the word *king* in the Middle Ages had power. It stood for unity and independence of those administrated under it.

The Scottish episode of Edward the First's reign is so good an illustration of the legal feudalism of the late XIIIth century, and was of such consequence to the subsequent history of both countries, that it must be treated within one frame; although it was connected with and influenced by Edward's other activities in Europe.

What we should notice throughout is the way in which the king acted in tune with the moral code of the time, and by contrast we should also note the clash between the open, conscious, defined rules and the less conscious powerful new forces which were already coming up from below the surface of Christian society; the forces of nationalism.

If we read Edward's action in the light of the modern "religion of patriotism," it becomes at once odious and difficult to understand. Yet if we do not read into it what he himself never felt, the idea of nationality, the ultimate failure of his effort is inexplicable. If we read it in the light of that highly legal late XIIIth century, with its precise definitions and logical methods, we understand exactly how and why he went to work, but we do not understand why the conquest went to pieces after his death, for that was due to a power now at issue with feudalism: nationhood. It is precisely this growing strength of national feeling, at issue with the strict and openly defined codes of the time, which lends a major interest to this struggle.

The elements of the affair were these:—

For centuries there had been an ill-defined claim of superiority in the Crown of England over Scotland. The thing had its origins in the Roman Empire. It had been a mere name in the late Dark Ages. With the growth of feudalism it became a little clearer, though still very vague. One could not say that there was even a defined boundary between the two States until little more than a century before Edward's accession—it was only since the activities of Henry II that the Solway and the Tweed made a permanent line drawn between two realms.

Henry II, as we have seen, did obtain a precise feudal acknowledgment, but it was gained by force: it was got from a prisoner, as the reader has seen, in the Treaty of Falaise. But since that time the Kingdom of Scotland had become consolidated, enriched, and almost powerful—small as its population was—under the two Alexanders: second and third of that name. And the latter, who came to the Scottish throne as a child in 1249, just before the Barons' Wars in England, had made the unity of his nation more conscious of itself than ever by its victory over the Scandinavians at Largs in 1263. Three years later the King of Norway yielded up the Hebrides.

Death of Alexander III., 1286.—Scotland was one Body of itself, and taking its full part in the greatest century of the Middle Ages, when Alexander the Third died suddenly by a fall from a horse on March 16th, 1286. It was a great disaster for the now united Scottish people.

The Scottish succession after 1286.—Margaret the maid of Norway is his heir.—He was the end, and the greatest, of that long male line which stretched away

back to Malcolm Canmore and under which Scotland had received its organization and culture, of the Northern French type, from the Conquest onwards. I say "the end of the line," for all Alexander's children had died before him, and the only representative of that great family was his little granddaughter Margaret, a baby three years old.

Robert Bruce's claim.—This child was the daughter of Alexander's daughter, who had married King Eric the King of Norway, and died in 1284. This baby-heiress was called "The Maid of Norway," and by all the ideas of the time was quite clearly to be given the throne. Robert Bruce, acting on the old general principle that a man was needed to lead the army, and, therefore, to be king, tried to assert himself. His mother had been the niece of William the Lion, King of Scotland, the same who had sworn fealty to Henry II of England in the Treaty of Falaise; and William the Lion was the father of the second, the grandfather of the third, Alexander. But Bruce had no real claim at a time when the theory of feudal succession was already so carefully defined, and when already a vast mass of precedent and case law had tested it throughout our civilization. At any rate he had no success, but it was only because the little girl's legitimate succession had thus been imperilled by Bruce's claim that the Scottish people welcomed a plan which Edward of England immediately formed.

Edward's plan for uniting the Crown of England and Scotland by a marriage.—Edward I had been in negotiation with the King of Norway to contract his own son to little Margaret. It is true that in this way, if later on the marriage should be fruitful, England and

Scotland would have been under one king—and that was all Edward wanted. But it is important to understand that the Scottish feeling at the moment did not object to *that* sort of union: two free nations under one Crown. What it objected to was the loss of nationhood, and the position of inferiority to its southern neighbour; even though that inferiority were but a feudal term and left the practical exercise of national government intact.

The Pact of Salisbury, 1289.—He (probably) got Eric, King of Norway, to ask the Scots Regents (who at the order of the estates of the Scots realm had fully accepted his three-year-old baby as queen) to deal with Edward direct about the proposed marriage contract between the children, and in the autumn of 1289 there was a long, triple debate between the King of Norway's interests, the Scots delegate, and Edward in person, at Salisbury. It ended, on November 19th, in this solemn pact: Eric to send the little girl, now five years old, from Norway to England to be under Edward's care: Edward to hand her over to the Scots when he found it safe to do so, but *only after they had promised not to contract her in marriage save by his, Edward's, counsel.* In the vernacular form of the document as engrossed for recital in England, and common to the English and Scots gentry, lawyers, and the rest, the clause ran: "Que la bonne gent d'Ecosse avant qu'ils la reçoivent, faisent bonne sureté et suffisante au Roi d'Angleterre qu'ils ne la marieront, fors par son" (i.e. Edward's) "ordainement, volonté et misère." (I have partly modernized the spelling.)

The Treaty of Brigham, 1290.—Edward got the Papal Dispensation for the marriage contract between

the children (for they were cousins) and then met the Scots at Brigham on the Border, and on July 19th, 1290, a regular Treaty, *taking the form of a request coming freely from the Scots and accepted by Edward*,[1] ratified the affair. But it insisted that Scotland should remain a strictly separate and independent kingdom, and if there were no issue, that kingdom should descend to the right Scottish heir.

The maid of Norway dies.—We may be certain that a character such as Edward's would have kept the Treaty faithfully. But fate intervened. The child Margaret, the Maid of Norway, now in her seventh year, on the way over, died of the sea; she was so frail! They landed her in the Orkneys, where she rallied a little, but she fell back again, and on October 7th of that year, 1290, she was gone.

At once a great number of claims appeared—more than a dozen, but the two serious ones were Bruce's and Baliol's.

The claims of Bruce and Baliol to the throne.—Here it is important to understand two things—first why the overlordship of the King of England was for the first time solemnly allowed, and secondly what exactly their claims were.

Edward claims and is called in (1291) to arbitrate between them as overlord.—The overlordship of Edward at this moment (not the acceptance of him as a leader, but the definite acceptation of him as feudal overlord) was the act of that Scottish Baronage which

[1] The words of the original, in the vernacular of the Scots and English contracting parties, are "Guillaume et Robert . . . evêques de St. Andrée et de Glasgow, Jean Comyn et James Sénéchal d'Ecosse . . . que le mariage se fasse avons unaniment accordé et communement assenti." . . . "Donné à Brigham le Vendredi prochain après la fête St. Gregorie. . . ."

was for the most part closely mixed up with the French-speaking educated classes of England and the Continent. Each party was eager to have the strength of Edward I behind him, and each thought that he would win his case. It is worth noting that the representatives of the smaller [1] *tenants of the Crown* in Scotland had made some protest, but unfortunately we do not know in what terms. Anyhow, those who could legally speak for the realm of Scotland, that is, the Council, did at Norham on the Tweed, on the 2nd of June, 1291, fully and openly accept Edward's claim to adjudicate between the claimants, not as a casual arbitrator, but as their overlord. It is highly characteristic of Edward's own character and of the time (to the rules of which he, with his highly disciplined character, so strictly conformed) that every detail of legal procedure was observed. It is true he was with his army, but the claim was put forward in due form on May 11th; three weeks were given for due delay in reply, and Edward would not do justice until the expiration of the legal term had passed on the 1st of June. It was on the 2nd that the Bishop of Bath, who was Chancellor, announced that the claim had been allowed from lack of protest, and summoned the opponents.

Bruce accepted Edward as feudal overlord competent to decide the issue. His opponent, Baliol, though much more closely connected with the English realm, waited twenty-four hours, but on June 3rd gave his assent in turn. Then the Court sat in the

[1] Called "the Commons," or rather, in the language of the time, "Li Communz." It is very important to remember that the word "Commons" used technically of a conciliar assembly meant the mass of the lesser tenants of the Crown as distinguished from the greater tenants, who were summoned to the Council by name.

Church of Norham, on English soil with Edward presiding.

The nature of the two opposing claims.—Now, what were the opposing claims? They were these: both Bruce and Baliol descended directly from David, the younger brother of William the Lion, but both descended through women. David had had three daughters. A kingdom cannot be divided like a private estate, so the grandson (Hastings) of the youngest daughter could be, and ultimately was, left out of account.

Baliol has best right.—But, as between the descendants of the two elder daughters the matter was not so easy. Margaret was the eldest daughter of David, Isabella the second; Robert Bruce was the son of Isabella, but John Baliol was not the son of Margaret, he was only the grandson—as the genealogical table here appended will show.[1] He was not even the son



of her son, he was only the son of her daughter, Devorgild or Devorguilla. So what the Court had to decide was whether (as is now, and had then long been the established rule in most Western nations other than France) the descent, even through women, went strictly by primogeniture, or whether of two claimants, that one who was nearest to the common ancestor in *degree* of descent had priority over the one who was farthest. Being already the end of the XIIIth century, the justices of the day had, of course, to decide for the former contention, it was already (and is still) the general rule: the heir is of the elder branch, no matter in what degree. John Baliol was the great-grandson of David, while Bruce was the grandson. But Baliol's was the legitimate claim because he was descended from the elder daughter, and Bruce only from the younger.

The feudal court decides for Baliol but the Pope refuses to intervene, 1292.—The court was unanimous for the rights of the elder branch: Baliol. It had been a very long argument. Immediately after the meeting at Norham Edward had called the first session for August and to make his claim of overlordship real, he made the tenants-in-chief in Scotland do their fealty to him. It is worth noting that the Pope of the day, Nicholas IV, to whom the king appealed for confirmation of a position now undoubtedly legal, refused. He feared the loss of the particular rights of the See of Rome over the Church of Scotland which the Papacy had definitely long ago[1] supported against the vague claims of Canterbury and York.

The decision of the Pope, therefore, had a definite economic basis. There was danger of the *Curia* losing

[1] As long ago as 1188.

revenue, if, by admitting Edward as overlord of Scotland, it admitted the dependance of the Scottish Church on the English, and, therefore, its loss of direct dependance on Rome. The date of this Papal refusal is March, 1292. It did not destroy Edward's legal position under the feudal rules of the day. He came to Berwick, a Scottish town, in June; and on October 14th, thus appointed by the claimants as their overlord, he appeared before a combined Parliament[1] which was held in that place.

The Parliament of Berwick, English and Scottish combined, confirms Baliol as King of Scots, 1292.—There was a unanimous decision for Baliol on the date November 6th, 1292. Edward acted, as he always did, strictly by his word and by the law of the day. He handed over the royal castles of Scotland to Baliol, received his fealty from that noble as King of Scotland, who, further, rather more than a month later (just before the end of the year) did formal homage at Newcastle.

With the turn of the new year, 1293, Edward followed up his honourable engagement by openly abandoning his claims to Wardship and Marriage in the Kingdom of Scotland, retaining only the general rights due to an ultimate overlord.

The Scottish nation not agreed to accept Edward.—And Baliol follows them.—But the Scots were not content. No doubt those who had the legal right to speak for them had quite rightly accepted the overlordship of the English king. The heart of the nation did not accept it. It is difficult to say whether Baliol

[1] Not of course a full Parliament in our modern sense, only a combined general Council.

(who was much more of an Anglo-Frenchman than a Scotsman) was pushed or led, but he immediately began to show a desire to extend the very wide limits of his feudal power and to make his kingdom as independent as possible. Already, in that same first year of his reign, he was distinguishing between the personal tie of Liegeman binding him to Edward, and the rights of his subjects who were not so bound.

Meanwhile Edward had got entangled into a French quarrel which I will describe in its proper place. It gave the Scots their opportunity. They had in the interval seen a nearly successful rebellion by the Welsh and in the course of it an attempt by those mountaineers to call in the aid of France. The precedent was copied.

And makes an alliance with the Capetian against the Plantagenet, 1295.—On October 23rd, 1295, the first Franco-Scottish alliance was sealed, with the promise of a French army to be used against England if Edward should invade, and on Baliol's part a promise to invade England if Edward attacked France. It was a flagrant breach of feudal honour and law. Edward's reply was to summon Baliol to help him in his French campaign, to hand over border castles as security and to appear before his court at Newcastle in the March of the following year, 1296. Baliol refused.

Hence war (1296).—The forces were already gathered, the first blow was actually struck by the Scots, but Edward's armed power was far too great for them. He took Berwick by assault at the end of the month, sacked it and massacred, we are told, as many as seven thousand men. The Scots retaliated at Corbridge and burned the boys in the schools thereof. On April 5th Baliol "defied," that is, technically de-

MAP XIII

EDWARD I'S SCOTTISH CAMPAIGNS

nounced the feudal tie binding him to his overlord, and Edward's comment when he heard it was, in his own tongue: "Fol et Félon!" that is, "Oh! The mad dastard to his Lord."

It was all over pretty quickly. The attempt to check the English invasion at the regular munitioned place of first challenge on the east coast road, Dunbar (hence appearing in so many Anglo-Scottish campaigns) failed miserably. The towns were entered one after the other almost without resistance. Baliol surrendered, admitted Edward's right to forfeit Scotland to himself as overlord, later went out of the island, and by 1305 was dead, all this last conduct of his going to show that the initiative of the rebellion (for such it was, in the feudal conscience of the day) lay not with him but with his baronage.

And Edward's easy invasion, 1296.—The King of England went as far as Aberdeen and Elgin. He had all the fertile country in his hands, but even now he kept as strictly as ever to what he held to be justice: that famous motto on his tomb inspired him as it always did: "Pactum Serva": "Keep your word."

He took certain hostages and promised to release them when he should be at peace with France. That closed the fighting season of 1296. He put in one of his own nobles, De Warenne, as guardian of the kingdom; but he interfered with no customs, and all the prelates and barony and tenants of the Crown of Scotland swore fealty to him at Berwick once more.

But the Scottish nation was not with them.

William Wallace raises a guerilla war, 1297.—Wins Lundy Bridge.—A chance leader, the cadet of a small county family, one William Wallace, raised a guerilla war.

The moment chosen was one when Edward himself was abroad entangled in the struggle with France—the spring of 1297—but Wallace had no chance against the organized power of England at that moment. He was in the eyes of Edward, and of all Edward's barony, and of too many of his own countrymen, a mere irregular without definable object and not deserving support. Even treasonable. He did, indeed, get one great success: Warenne, having failed apparently to scout sufficiently, was caught with half his men across the narrow bridge of Lundy, by Stirling. Those who had crossed (some 5000) were surprised and cut to pieces (September 10th, 1297), but the thing was only a check, though Wallace now called himself "Guardian of the Kingdom and General of the Armies." Edward returned, having made peace in France, and Warenne had a large army ready at Berwick to await him, and with the early summer of 1298 marched into Scotland at the head of a very large force, nearly ninety thousand armed men.

But is completely defeated by Edward on his return, at Falkirk, 1298.—There was no resistance until Wallace, perhaps because he knew that Edward had been in some difficulties about supply, concentrated, and stood on the defensive near the town of Falkirk. He perhaps intended, with his inferiority, to do no more than harass what he believed to be the necessary retreat of Edward. At any rate, when the English attacked he stood upon the defensive. Wallace's army as a military force was destroyed, though he himself escaped (July 22nd, 1298).

But Edward abandons the north.—Wallace's calculation at Falkirk was right—save for defeat. Edward


14.
0 1 2 Miles 3
Strath Allan
Dunblane
Line of
Allan Water
foot of Hill Country
Abbey Rock
Bridge where Wallace cut off English Army
Castle Rock of STIRLING
Cambuskenneth Abbey
River Forth
Bannockburn Stream
Approximate site of the Battle of Bannockburn
St Ninans
Main Road
Line of Roman Road
Bannockburn Village
Road to England via Berwick
Sketch showing the capital importance of Stirling Castle & Bridge in Mediaeval Warfare. The whole North of Scotland was approached by this first crossing of the Forth at the point where the Hill Country begins in front of the Gap of Allan Water leading to the Highlands by Strath Allan.

MAP SHOWING IMPORTANCE OF STIRLING CASTLE AND BRIDGE

could not maintain his army. He provisioned the southern castles in the Lothians, but all that lay north of the Forth was abandoned. The Scots Council, within a year of Falkirk, laid siege to Stirling.

And loses Stirling.—The Scots appeal to the Pope (1299).—That key-point of Scotland fell. Edward's barony refused a winter campaign, and before the end of 1299 Stirling had surrendered. But meanwhile the Scottish lords had played that same trump card which, by this time, some generations had known: Henry II's card after Becket's murder more than a century past; John's card of a long lifetime before. They gave themselves unreservedly (on paper) to the Pope.

They call Scotland the Pope's private property.—It was done more vaguely—and more cleverly—than by formal deed. It may be that the unknown protest at Norham in 1291 had been a protest that Scotland was the Pope's own land. There may even have been an earlier appeal—the action of Nicholas IV when he refused to intervene on Edward's side in 1290 is some indication. Anyhow, now, in 1298 the regents of Scotland appealed to the Pope (Boniface VIII) claiming his arbitration (or defence) against the King of England, not only as the head-tribunal of Christendom, superior to either party (on which ground they were secure, for all men admitted that much) but on the extraordinary new plea that the Pope had jurisdiction over Scotland as his "*allodial land*"—that is, Scotland was his complete possession in temporal things, as a man's own farm, without a lord, is completely his own.

The basis of such an enormity was, no doubt, the fact that vague, distant, disputed, external belts of land were specially subject to be dealt with by the

Common Head of Christendom, but in this specific, feudal case enormity it was.

Boniface VIII accepts the enormous statement.—And calls on Edward to cease war and submit his claim (**June, 1299**).—Whether it was the revival and accentuation of an older statement, or something new, the appellants knew their man. Boniface the VIIIth, the Gætano, was the Pontiff who succeeded to the fresh results of the Papacy's triumph over the Empire. He reached, felt, and exercised the very extreme of political power in the Holy See, and pushed its claims to their furthest limit—and beyond. It was he, more than any other, who let loose, by exaggeration, the reaction which later led to the capture of the Papacy by the French kings, the long exile at Avignon, the subsequent great schism of the XIVth century. He eagerly accepted the Scots appeal, admitted its extraordinary grounds of action, wrote to Edward that his act seemed an aggression, and convoked him to plead his cause before the *Curia* within six months—affirming the Papal right to pronounce a final decision.

That "Minatory Bull" (*Bulla Minatoria*) was of June 27th, 1299—from Anagni. It was sent to the Archbishop of Canterbury, Winchelsea, to be delivered —but only after a long delay of many months. There were further delays due to the Scottish war. It was not till the end of August, 1300, that Edward received it and had it read, in a French translation, which the officers of his army could follow.

The Pope's letter is replied to by Edward (**1301**).—The reply was long delayed. Edward needed the Pope against France. First he summoned a Council at Lincoln a month later (in September, 1300) with Uni-

versity men of the Civil Law to give counsel. In February, 1301, there was drawn up an energetic protest—perhaps never delivered—by Edward's barony under their seals, that the Kings of England had never submitted their temporal rights to the ecclesiastical power, and in May, 1301, Edward sent the Pontiff a letter, not defiant, but explanatory, dating his rights over Scotland from the Old Testament days, through Brutus of Troy (the founder of London), Arthur, and others, down to more substantial precedents of history. The Scots envoy at Rome played up (in July, 1301), and mocked at Brutus of Troy. Scotland (says he) had its name from Scota, a Pharaoh of Egypt's daughter, who, after a passage through Ireland, had torn the North of Britain from the said Brutus of Troy. He also deigned to quote more modern instances.

And Boniface VIII's new embarrassments with France make him abandon the help of Scotland.—What stopped the extravagance was the King of France's huge quarrel with Boniface—who, by this time, had got half Europe on his hands. Under that pressure Boniface hesitated to add to his burdens. Before the end of 1303 he was dead: not before the French king's soldiers had laid hands on the old man and prepared all the exile and captivity of the Papacy that was to follow.

The French king also abandons the Scots.—And Edward works his will in the country during 1303.—Edward had made peace with France (May, 1303), recovered Guienne, contracted his son in marriage to Isabella, the daughter of the Capetian, the French king—who promised still to help the Scots, but, under the new conditions, refused to honour his word. In

general, Scotland was abandoned—by the French alliance, by the Papal claims, some time after fighting had been renewed. All that summer of 1303 the King of England's great host did what it willed with the country. It outflanked the key-point of Stirling (which the enemy held) by a ford and marched right up to Caithness; and on its return Edward stood in Dunfermline Abbey for the winter. There, in February, 1304, all the rebels (save Wallace) surrendered as to Edward their legal lord.

Stirling Castle still stood out and put up a magnificent defence under Oliphant—but it was relieved before the end of July—not without a fine example of generosity from Edward, who fought hard in person under its walls, and assured himself of the justice of his cause.

In one point and one only did Edward depart from the strict code of his time and endanger the integrity of his intense, precise soul.

Death of Wallace, August, 1305.—Wallace, who had never sworn allegiance, captured by surprise, was brought to London, hanged, beheaded, quartered—in August, 1305. Such a death made him immortal. He was as brave a man as ever fought.

But the apparently complete hold over Scotland was, at root, quite insecure. Almost any leader could, at almost any moment, raise a force to attempt the undoing of what was externally a complete feudal edifice, but lacked social motive from within.

Robert Bruce the younger.—Murders the Red Comyn in Dumfries, 1306.—Robert Bruce, now in his twenty-fourth year, the grandson of the original claimant against Baliol, had hesitated between the two parties, I mean between the ascendancy of Edward

and the various forms of national resistance. He and his family were typical of the Norman nobility, which was the least Scottish thing in Scotland; but the Crown was worth fighting for. He was at this moment—the moment of the complete pacification of Scotland—closely bound to Edward, who had generously excused him the death duties upon his inheritance, and had asked his advice on the settlement. Under conditions and for reasons that have never been made quite clear, Bruce murdered the Red Comyn in what was probably some private quarrel, in the Franciscan Church of Dumfries. The date was February 10, 1306. Edward, of course, immediately claimed the right of justice as King of Scotland. It was clear that there would be resistance.

And is crowned King of Scots.—The most obvious line for a man in Bruce's position, with his hereditary claims, his great wealth, and in the then state of the Scottish national feeling, was to put himself at the head of the latter, and deny Edward's right to interfere in Scottish affairs. Edward was now an old man (he was sixty-eight) and his health was breaking. He owed it, perhaps, to the fine discipline of his life that he thus survived vigorous so late in an age and a social rank where perpetual over-activity in the field, with its exposures and fatigues, and the perils of combat, made life short. Yet he gathered an army in the spring, and while, or even before its leaders were assembled in London, Bruce had had himself crowned King of Scots at Scone, in March, 1306.

Edward I renews the war.—The royal writs of Edward went out summoning a concentration at Carlisle of the military tenants of the Crown. Edward himself reached Carlisle, but could go no further. The

strength of his forces, however, was such that there could be no question of real resistance at the moment —it did come later and was so astonishingly successful that it had, to contemporaries, something of the appearance of a miracle. But I think that even here, in Edward's age, and though he was so ill, what really counted in that feudal army was personality. A man who could organize and who could compel others to be accurate in their staff work, and a man who was respected for his intelligence and his will, could do with a host what a man of weaker and worse character could never do. Granted such a chief, the forces of the English Crown united were necessarily far superior to anything that a Scottish claimant could gather. But with disaffection among the nobles of England, slackness in concentration, bad or lazy staff work, the military resources of the realm could not yield the same effect. I think it is this which, if we knew all the details, would explain the breakdown which followed the death of Edward.

And once more his army overruns Scotland, 1306.— At any rate, during his campaign, if campaign it could be called, of 1306, he did what he willed. The Bruce was in flight, and before the summer was over was hiding in an island off the coast of Ireland. Sentence was pronounced by Edward at Carlisle against the rebels, and against the murderer of Comyn. Some few were even executed, including Bruce's brother. None were put to death who had not broken their oath of fealty or were not connected with the murder: and Bruce's own wife, who had fallen into the hands of the king, was treated well and given a sufficient establishment; but confined to the boundaries of the

manor which had been provided for her subsistence. Some little time after Edward's death she was set free.

And Bruce returning in 1307, has again to fly.—In the beginning of the next year, 1307, the Bruce returned, though he was still a hunted man, and caused some little annoyance to the strength of Edward—even finding strength to besiege for a moment the Castle of Ayr—but he had to leave at once on Edward's forces coming up—that was in May, and Edward's own death was at hand.

Edward's position relative to the Continent.—I said when I began this short account of Edward's attempt—successful so long as he lived—to make one united kingdom of Britain, that its ups and downs were closely connected with his entanglements upon the Continent. It seems to have been his fixed policy throughout his life and reign to throw the old idea of an Anglo-French monarchy overboard, only to defend normally existing positions on French soil; not to concentrate his energies upon the recovery of what his grandfather had lost and his father failed to restore, but to put all his weight into the British effort, and to spread throughout the island the local French culture of which the Plantagenets were the hereditary chiefs.

We, who know what history was to be, may regard this as sound judgment and good foresight. To the men of his own time there must have been something original, and even a little eccentric, about it. For not only was the political connection between both sides of the Channel strong, but the gentry and their dependants, and the lawyers and better churchmen—all the vocal part of the community—were still of the same

sort at this time in France as in England; and in mere revenue, let alone in power and European position, to be the lord of the great French fiefs (which was the Plantagenet tradition), was a far greater thing than to be overlord of the few Scottish baronies and of the wild Welsh tribes in the hills. However, to be overlord of the few Scottish baronies and of the wild Welsh tribes in the hills was Edward's fixed object; and to that he sacrificed the continental policy up to, though not beyond, the limits where that sacrifice would have weakened him at home as well as abroad.

Philip of France (Philippe le Bel) summons Edward in 1293.—In 1293, just when Baliol's revolt was beginning to threaten, Philip of France took advantage of a violent and prolonged quarrel by sea between Edward's subjects and his own to cite Edward to his court, not, of course, as the King of England, but as Duke of Aquitaine, answerable to his feudal superior, the Capetian monarch of Paris, overlord of all French provincial chiefs. He was the more moved to act because Edward's subjects had defeated Philip's subjects on the water in a regular engagement, and it was said that among these subjects of Edward's were some from Bayonne. The height of the struggle was in the spring of 1293, the citation did not come till some months later. As feudal superior, Philip required Edward to arrest certain of the men accused of this private war. He did not do so; and Philip ordered his officer in the Périgord to seize Edward's lands in that district. He was resisted, and at the end of November Edward was cited to appear at Paris.

Even under this provocation it was not the King of England's policy to take up the challenge. He offered

compensation for those who had suffered in the sea brawls; he offered arbitration, either by an agreed arbitrator or by the Pope, the accepted moral head of Europe, before whose court issues between kings might properly be decided; he did much more—he sent his brother Edmund to offer ample terms, and Edmund being the husband of Philip's widowed mother-in-law, there was a close family connection which should have made the thing easier.

Edward's concessions to save the English policy.—But the Capetian monarchy, from its very origins down to its fatal collapse in the XVIIIth century, had for its continuous policy the recovery of all France under its direct rule. He proposed that Aquitaine, the Plantagenet's last firm and permanent possession on French soil, should be handed over in pledge for forty days to salve the honour of the feudal superior. Edward went to the very extreme of concession and accepted the proposal. It is striking proof of how clear a plan of insular policy he had in mind, and how determined he was not to sacrifice what he thought the greater thing—complete rule in Britain—for the lesser, the hold on land oversea.

But the King of France goes too far—in 1294—and Edward defies him.—The surrender was made in February, 1294. At the end of the forty days Philip of France gave judgment in his own favour, not only straining, but actually breaking feudal law; for the judgment was given on account of default of appearance, yet the citation against Edward had been withdrawn. The crisis compelled Edward to act, especially as he was again summoned to answer before Philip among his peers, the great feudatory lords of France,

for those who had risen in Gascony against the French king's officers. He wrote in July his apologies for ever having handed them over, and "defied," i.e. solemnly broke, the feudal bond between himself and the French monarch.

He meant to sail with a large army. First he was held up by the weather for nearly two months, at Portsmouth; then, on the report of his having sailed (though he had not), the Welsh rose, and were only subdued again in the campaign of the following year, as we have seen.[1]

Two attempted expeditions to France fail.—Again, in the next year (1295) he would have crossed the sea with his army to re-establish the Gascon possession, and again he was prevented, this time by the rebellion of Baliol, and we know all that followed.

Edward's position in France is saved by the Pope's quarrel with the French king.—Young Edward, the king's heir, is contracted to the French king's daughter Isabella (1303).—Before the end of his life Edward recovered his inheritance upon the Garonne by the increasing violence of the quarrel between Boniface VIII and the French king. That Pope, whose excessive pretensions we have seen in the matter of the Scotch war, excommunicated Philip. What had really happened was that the victory of the Papacy over the Empire had left it face to face with the only remaining great organized, continental force, the kingship of Paris —now extended (through the results of the old Albigensian Crusade) over the South as well as the North.

[1] There was a most amusing little incident, memorable for its picturesqueness and for its significance, in this final subjugation of Wales. The standard of the Plantagenets was planted on the summit of Snowden.

A duel had arisen between the two; it was to end by the French monarch's capturing the Papacy and rendering that institution its servant. But by the year 1303 the crisis had not yet been reached, the issue was still doubtful, and in their necessity both the King of France and the Pope needed the moral support of Edward. It was of this position that Edward took advantage. He obtained peace with Philip, was given back Guienne as his fief, sending a proxy to swear fealty for it, and contracted his heir, the Prince of Wales (who was then nineteen years old), to marry Isabella, Philip's daughter. It was the moment when, it will be remembered, the French king sacrificed Scotland for this larger issue of securing peace with Edward during his own quarrel with the Pope.

And the reign ends at peace with France and the Gascon fief retained.—When Edward's reign came to an end, therefore, four years later, it found the Plantagenets still firmly fixed in the great wine district, governing the trading wealth of the Garonne valley, and established in their court of Bordeaux, where their rule had come to be felt a native thing, popular and based upon long prescription. To the Gascons the King of France was an alien, and remained an alien, even when his forces finally marched in, 150 years later, during the days that saw the end of all feudal connection between England and the Continent.

Before leaving this great reign there are two points to be noticed: the change which it saw in the machinery of government, and the rapid failure of the Jewish financial power.

Parliament under Edward.—Of the former a great deal too much has been made in most of our textbooks.

Because, centuries later, the vastly changed descendants of what had been, in the XIIIth century, given its original name of "The Commons" came, after the breakdown of the monarchy, to be the chief political force in England, therefore each step towards the crystallization of parliamentary forms into their final shape has been given an exaggerated value by most modern writers. Edward's parliaments were, of course, no more parliaments in our modern, or in the XVIIth-century sense, than his constables were constables in our modern sense, or his sheriffs our sheriffs. A parliament in Edward I's time meant nothing more than a council for deliberation; the active initiative lay with the king, the great coadjutor of the king was the barony, including the chief prelates. But the device of representation (coming here rather late from abroad and taking, as we have seen, a firm root during the last reign on account of the new economic conditions of that great XIIIth century), made of the smaller gentry, as of the merchants of the towns and the lesser clergy, a permanent element in such councils, and their assent was beginning to be regarded as the normal condition for any very solemn and final act. Also the ritual of the thing was becoming more fixed, and precedents were arising for the fully established and very frequently summoned parliaments of the next century.

Thus the idea that the lesser gentry and even the smaller freeholders of the shires should be represented in each shire by two knights who should speak for all of them in the matter of taxes, became more or less established. Though there was not as yet anything like a fixed and settled number of towns upon which the king could impose the rather heavy duty of send-

ing councillors, yet the sending of a very great number of writs to numerous towns was now an established custom; and of those who were thus compelled to send spokesmen to the king's council, a majority always received such writs. The king could, of course, of his own will summon such councillors from any little place which he had hitherto chosen to overlook; and he continued so to act until the decline of the monarchy under the later Tudors three hundred years on. He could in theory also have chosen *not* to send for councillors from any particular towns; but it would certainly not have been worth his while to do that (when he needed money) in the case of any of the larger towns; and very soon the occasional advantage to the towns of being thus represented would have made the more important ones resist (had their exclusion been lasting) by making it difficult to gather taxes.

But though the final main form of Parliament, arisen under Henry III, was set under Edward I, yet it was still but an occasionally summoned great Council of unusual solemnity, and its representative part, knights, lower clergy, and townsmen, had no real function as yet save saying what they could or would pay by way of what were still exceptional, non-feudal aids.[1]

The expulsion of the Jews.—The fate of the Jews can be more simply explained than the many modern diatribes upon that catastrophe might lead us to think. The Jews were expelled from England because they had become poor. That is the long and the short of it.

Their community was a small one; it had risen to

[1] There were only five in all these 35 years, and the first was merely for swearing fealty on accession, while the second and third were virtually one assembly. Each was short, and ten years' interval was normal.

very rapid power through the Conquest; it was confined to certain quarters of certain few towns; its position in the State as an alien body was rigidly defined. It was peculiar to the king. He could tax it and tallage it as a lord taxed and tallaged his manorial unfree tenants; that is, at will. It had an enormously valuable monopoly of finance, because it had the monopoly of usury.

It was in the course of the XIIIth century, and especially in the second half of that century, that this very powerful body was ruined, and it was ruined through its own excess of power, which had begun indirectly to encroach upon land: its members had become indirectly, but none the less substantially, the masters of estates, and against that the whole social spirit of the time protested as an intolerable abuse. The king had absolute right to allow or disallow any such claim, and, indeed, to break any contract made between one of his Jews and another of his subjects. Since there was no appeal against a Jew in the matter of usury to the ecclesiastical courts, nor any rights against him in civil matters in the ordinary courts, the king's arbitrary power was supreme. This power was exercised for the Jews when they were at the height of their wealth, but more and more against the Jews (and in favour of his own subjects) as they lost that wealth. For the type of new economic power—that over feudal land—at which they had grasped, broke in their hands; it was precisely because they were extending their grasp over real property, the foundation of that society and the mainspring of all its political and social machinery, that they lost the chief financial security they had.

No great social phenomenon is simple: we must allow here for many other causes of the Jews' ruin in England besides this main economic cause. The XIIIth century was that in which the people of Western Europe most strongly felt their unity and in which their common religion was far the most vivid expression of that unity. In such an atmosphere the small, segregated, alien body of Jews (much smaller, and for a long time much wealthier in this country than anywhere else, in proportion to the population) was subject to grievous prejudice. The popular outcry against them had begun long before their economic position had declined. Nevertheless it is true—and there is a great lesson for the wise to learn from it—that the political ruin of Jewry in this island was preceded, and in the main caused, by their economic ruin: not the other way about. So long as the Jew was rich, he was safe—save for rare and usually heavily punished popular outbreaks. But once the Jew became poor he was in peril.

The steps of the final catastrophe were as follows: First, on the king's accession he did what nearly every king did first on his accession, if he was not a minor: that is, he made some spectacular gesture of generosity. Though his Jews were a principal source of revenue, he acceded to the strong demand which had filled the end of his father's reign, and forfeited interest on money lent. Though a man owed the Jews £1000 upon his manors and £2000 accumulated interest, the £2000 was cancelled, and he could get back his manors by paying the £1000 only. Over and above this, the Jew was not allowed to continue to hold the manors. If the original lord could not pay the loan (without

interest) the Jews were compelled to offer it to some other one prepared to pay the money. Land could not pass out of the hands of a subject of the king, even indirectly.

Such a reform could never have been enforced in the old days. It was only possible now—in the last third of the XIIIth century—because the mortgages on feudal land had been overdone and had broken down.

That ordinance was as early as July 25th, 1272, within a few weeks of Edward's accession.

Four years later, when he had returned to England and had been crowned, he published an ordinance backed by a full Council not only cancelling the old monopoly in usury, but forbidding the Jews to take interest on loans any more, yet permitting them as compensation to seek their living by what other means they could. He even allowed them to take leases of land for not more than ten years, and to buy and sell openly in the market without payment of toll.

But the change was too sudden for all parties. The small, now half ruined, segregated and hated little community, could not at a moment's notice enter into full social relations, and what was worse, competition, with the hostile society by which it was surrounded. Three years later came a terrible attack upon them, on the accusation of mutilating the currency. There was much light coin discovered, and the blame was laid at the door of the Jews, partly from the intense feeling against them, but also because the rough proof was accepted of being found in possession of such light coinage. The Jews were still the chief dealers; they were, therefore, naturally the chief victims, and something like 300 men and women were put to death.

The tragedy was not confined to the Jews; some few others also suffered; but the Jews bore the whole brunt of this dreadful business. That was in 1279. It ended in the offering of a free pardon to anyone who would come in with lighter coinage and pay a fine, and a new coinage was issued.

There followed an unsuccessful special attempt at absorption, that is, at getting the Jews, or as many of them as possible, to join the Christian community. It failed, of course. The Jew will not, in any great numbers, abandon his faith, which is his very badge of nationhood, his pride, and his cement; and in any community actively united by any other religion he cannot freely mix.

In 1287 the climax came. The Jews had resisted (in their increasing poverty) a tallage, legal, no doubt, but excessive. The whole nation of them was seized and held till they had paid a fine of £12,000, or, say, at least £300,000 in our money. And this, it must be remembered, was exacted from a community perhaps already dwindled in numbers and certainly vastly reduced in wealth.

Three years later the end came, and the whole community was exiled. The figures are significant. The total number was only 16,511. They could take with them their money and their goods; and it is further significant that there were now many of them so poor that the passage had to be paid at public expense. The sailors who had the carrying of them plundered them, and in some cases even murdered them. They were punished; but the persecution was again significant.

This exile of the small alien body, now ruined, was

immensely popular. It was appreciated that the king had given up what, in the past at least, had been a great revenue. Clergy and laity voted large sums in compensation. Some small number continued for centuries to live in this island—crypto-Jews, as the historians of their own community still call them—but of financial power in the State they no longer had any. Nor did that arise again until their return in the XVIIth century.

I left the great Edward, broken with years and ill, sending up his forces before him into Scotland to pursue once more the small, irregular bands of Robert Bruce, which had shown some strength in May, 1307, and I said that his own death was then near at hand.

Death of Edward I, July 7th, 1307.—At the opening of July he had all the army marching from the border—based on Carlisle—and would himself go with it. He could hardly sit his horse. He moved a few miles, gave up the struggle, and left this world.

"Let it be remembered" (runs the last official record attached to his reign—a Latin brief) "that on Friday, that is the seventh day of July, in the year of the Lord MCCCVII, at the orders of Him to whom life and death are but servants, Edward, King of England, of renowned memory, in the thirty-fifth year of his reign, passed out from this our light—and may his soul be gathered into Paradise."

IV

BEFORE THE BLACK DEATH

1307–1348

41 Years

A. Edward II

B. Edward III (to the Black Death)

IV

BEFORE THE BLACK DEATH

(A) Edward II

(July 7th, 1307, to September 21st, 1327)

As we approach the end of the true Middle Ages—with the turn of the century—we remark as more apparent what had long been growing throughout the English world: an increase of direct French influence—a copying of the Capetian ideas in court and public manner. The French language was penetrating further and further into the general body of the country. It had become universal in the courts of law under Edward I. It is now the common language of the schools, and even boys set to the construing of Latin in class, boys of the poorer classes or lower middle, construe into French. If they would know the language which is the language of religion and record and law, they must know it through French.

Side by side with this increase in French usage and speech goes a rapidly increasing wealth. The process continues for an active lifetime—forty years. It had begun strongly under Edward I; it proceeds uninterruptedly. The universities also are more crowded and more alive than ever, the population of the towns (and, it must be presumed, of the whole country) also increasing—when the whole process is checked and

halted in the mid-XIVth century by that awful herald of change: the Black Death.

Twin disasters of the reign.—When Edward I died, on this Friday, July 7th, 1307, his heir, young Edward, was twenty-three years old. The twenty years of his unfortunate reign are overshadowed and determined by his defects in character. Their disasters, of which the two lasting ones were the permanent loss of Scotland and the failure to continue a strong uninterrupted monarchy, cannot honestly be laid down to any other cause.

Edward II's character.—As a rule, history has tended to exaggerate the importance of personality. Even in the earlier mediæval time, when it should be justly emphasized, later historians tend to exaggerate this effect. But in the case of Edward II one can hardly be too emphatic upon it. If the man had had one quality of those several other qualities which he lacked for kingship, things would have been different. But he lacked them all. He did not lack them entirely for leadership: he lacked them for kingship.

Character of Pierre de Gabaston ("Piers Gaveston").—As a boy, what was noticeable about him was a random manner, fondness for sport, and a great devotion to the friend whom his father had picked out for him, the young son of a loyal Gascon gentleman whom Edward I had greatly regarded, one Pierre de Gabaston[1]—of whom the talk of the time and the tradition of history has made "Piers Gaveston." This lad was merry and good looking, an excellent horseman, bright, amiable, and of the sort that would have been a favour-

[1] Gabaston, of which this family were local lords, is a village on the left bank of the little river Gabas in Gascony, about 8 miles E. by N. of Pau, and where the high road to Vic crosses the stream.

ite anywhere—save among social superiors whom he unfortunately despised.

Edward I, before his death, was so annoyed by the carelessness of the two young men, and by what he thought a bad influence upon his son's character, that he sent Gaveston away oversea; and he did well, for though there does not seem to have been any particular harm in the young man, he certainly was of a stronger fibre than the heir whom he dominated. Meanwhile the boyhood of the young Edward had too much dice and gaming about it, association with grooms, the purchase of *li bel cheval* and not enough Latin. Careful as his father was in his instruction, he seems never to have learned it properly; the French in which all educated men thought and spoke was his only language, and, on his coronation, the Oath which he should have taken in Latin, had to be read to him in his own tongue. He was always in the stables, he had a passion (natural enough) for fine dress, and—what is rather amusing—he kept a tame lion. No very great harm in all these things in an heir to an estate, but great harm in an heir to a kingdom.

He was a fine, tall, strong fellow, handsome, athletic, very deft with his hands, proud of his ability in mechanical arts. He has been accused of weakness of will, and even of cowardice. The first charge is partly true. The latter does not seem to me to be true at all. He had weakness of will, just as hundreds of years later we shall find Henry VIII open to that very accusation: not weakness of will in the sense of lacking desire to attain his ends—all sensual men have that—but weakness of will in the sense of inability to control his appetite or even mere whim. Therefore, as we

shall find with Henry VIII later on—though Henry VIII was a very different character—Edward must always be an instrument, played upon by the hands of people with longer views than his own, and above all, of people less incapable of resisting immediate desire.

As to the accusation of cowardice, it is true that the military art in which his father and great-grandfather had excelled, and to which he had himself been trained with a most particular care (as a large correspondence bears witness), was distasteful to him. He had plenty of courage in personal encounter. He would have made a very good modern boxer or duellist, for instance. But the whole business of war, with its calculation and necessity for keeping a close grip for a long time on a quantity of complicated details, bored him. In fact, that Edward II was a man intent on whatever he wanted at the moment, and disgusted beyond bearing by things that he didn't, is the explanation of his reign.

One other matter must be mentioned very briefly before we enter upon that unhappy twenty years. Was he vicious?

He was accused of vice. He certainly betrayed vicious tendencies. After this great lapse of time, and considering the hostility of our witnesses, we cannot decide; but on the whole, I should think that the verdict would lie against positive and definable vice. On the other hand, he depended twice in his life upon friendships which were far too violent, and in which he was clearly the subordinate. The first with Gaveston; the second with the Despencer. Gaveston one can understand; it was a close intimacy from boyhood. The younger Despencer came as a sudden craze in something more like middle life, and is less easy to

account for. Anyhow, it is quite clear that he had not a sufficient interest in his marriage, that he excited only the anger and the contempt of his wife, and that there was something about him which made pretty well every soldier in that time of soldiers be sorry at his presence and glad of his absence. Yet, I say, we must remember through it all that he was a strong, upstanding, pleasant man, with plenty of vitality; only the particular function of kingship, under the conditions of a popular monarchy reposing upon powerful semi-independent nobles, happened to be quite unsuited to him.

I shall not give in any great detail the customary intrigue and counter-intrigue, weaving and inter-weaving, of the plotting nobles who were not conspicuously better than their king. It is the old story of feudal monarchy in this country. Unless the king were a determined man who rode his subordinates on the curb, his magnates were too much for him; and they were a great deal too much for Edward II. But apart from the causes, in which the king's character counts so much, I desire at the outset of my description of this reign to emphasize the two *results* I have just recited—the loss of Scotland and the interruption of continuity in the tradition of English monarchy. Edward II was directly responsible for both.

As to the first, Edward I had come at the end of that creative XIIIth century in which mediæval civilization reached its climax. Had he been succeeded by a man as determined as himself, England and Scotland would have been one, and (the modern Scot would regard it as a great evil, the modern Englishman is indifferent to it) there would have been one united Britain. The time was ripe for that amalgamation, parallel to

the corresponding expansion of the French realm. That it did not happen was due in part to the determination of the Scottish people to be independent of the South; but more, I think, to the character of Edward II. For popular feelings change by customs imposed, and long united rule would have united the peoples; but such a rule failed. Edward I left to his son a Scotland in which the castles were all held, especially Stirling, the key-point. His son lost them all; and at Bannockburn there went under the whole scheme for one coherent realm.

As to the second point, the breach made by Edward II in the tradition of monarchy, it is of far more moment to the history of this island.

It is not true that there was any gradual movement, any inherent tendency in the English people, towards a rejection of mediæval monarchy. On the contrary, it was the permanent ideal of the time; all accepted it; it was the defence of the weak against the strong, of the poor against the rich; and time and again it seemed to have recovered itself. But it never became unquestionably secure, as did the monarchy of France, of Aragon. When the Reformation had vastly and suddenly enriched a small class with the loot of religion they tipped the scale at last, mastered the Crown, and caused monarchy in this country ultimately to disappear.

Those who do not know what monarchy is (which is the most of our people to-day), or those who know it distantly and fear it, and even hate it, will not regret the issue. But, whether it were a good thing or a bad thing that English mediæval kingship should have wavered, Edward II was responsible for that failure. The long turmoil of mere feudal rebellion against the

Crown had reached its end when young Edward I, then Prince, had destroyed the loose Welsh levies and the small fine force of armed gentlemen round Simon de Montfort at Evesham. Edward III, by successful foreign war, would have carried on the tradition. But in between came this fatal gap of Edward II's reign, during which the Crown was a derision. It never completely recovered from such contempt. The failure of Richard II, the Lancastrian usurpation, the civil wars of the XVth century, all dependent upon many other causes, would not have had the effect they did have save for this breach in the continuity of kingly power. For twenty critical years, just when the thing might have crystallized into a powerful traditional kingship, with the people behind it, the kingship became a mockery.

For close on five years, from July 7th, 1307, to June 19th, 1312, the reign was no more than a perpetual protest against the domination of Gaveston over the king. To begin with, when Edward went over to Boulogne at the end of January, 1308, to do fealty for the county of Ponthieu and the Duchy of Aquitaine, and to marry the daughter of the King of France,[1] to whom his father had contracted him, he left Gaveston Regent of England. That was clearly an outrage. When he came back with his beautiful and imperious young wife, he scandalized all around by his extravagant greeting of the favourite. He had already made

[1] She was not yet sixteen, this Isabel of France. She was already vindictive. She whose later life was to be the scandal of Europe, between thirty-five and forty, took it upon herself to denounce and disgrace her own sisters-in-law, and from the moment she came over to England her discontent began. There was reason for it no doubt. But it was no small part of the tragedy of Edward II that he was married to such a woman.

him Earl of Cornwall, and given him all the lands which had fallen to the Crown by the murder at Viterbo of his cousin Henry, the son of that Richard who had been crowned King of the Romans.

When Edward himself was crowned, in the end of February, 1308, on his return from Boulogne, Gaveston carried the Crown and followed immediately after the king, which was a further outrage. A contemporary said that if Gaveston had appreciated his true social position, trouble would not have followed, and he was probably right. But a lack of stable judgment in the king and in his favourite was the trouble. That favourite ridiculed the great nobles of England, the great Angevin and Norman houses; he humiliated them by his superior address in the tournaments; he gave them nicknames.

Whenever the magnates chose to combine, they could still cripple the king. They never did so *completely*, save under a sense of intolerable personal injury; but they did so now. Edward had to agree in the spring to Gaveston's exile—that exile was only an assumption of deputyship in the government of so much of Ireland as the Plantagenets precariously held upon the eastern coast.

Next year, 1309, came the inevitable need for money: inevitable because the old feudal machinery had long proved insufficient. A special aid was necessary, and though such aids were continually repeated, they continually appeared as exceptions and special favours—an aid outside the old feudal framework, an aid that could only be granted by assent. Therefore to the great Council were summoned representatives: gentlemen from the shires and burgesses of the towns.

It is ridiculous to imagine that on this occasion (April, 1309) there began any new constitutional principle. It is true that there was an incident which later on could be turned into a precedent. A petition was delivered in the name of the community as a whole —not specially—by the men who had been sent up from the towns and the counties, or, rather, a complaint. The complaint was that the king's officers took things for his service on the march without immediately paying for them, and without sufficient security for certain, exact and dated payment; that the dues on wine and cloth and other imports had raised the prices outrageously; that the coinage was debased: to which sundry other lesser points were added. Of course, at such a date there was no question of demand, let alone of taking part in the government of the realm. That lay with the Council, to which people of this kind were only recently summoned, and at long intervals, with the object of assenting to unusual gifts of money. It was no more than a plaint. But it was the first of its kind,[1] and it is memorable that the small gentry from the shires, and the merchants from the towns, connected the giving of an aid with redress. The aid they gave was a nominal 4 per cent. upon their goods. I say nominal, because assessment was already conventional rather than real.

The real importance of the incident was that it gave the magnates a hold on the king. They supported the complaints, and in the autumn the king had to give way. He allowed a committee of the very rich feudal magnates, including the prelates, under the name of

[1] The complaints at Lincoln in 1301 were (*a*) asked for by the king; (*b*) not presented in a true Parliament.

"Ordainers," to control even the expenditure of his household, saving only a protest that it was to be no precedent, and in 1310 these men, twenty-one in number, with seven great churchmen among them, took over their functions. John would have made war; Henry III would have made war; Edward I would not have heard of such things; Edward II was bound to accept—because he had lost personal control of his inferiors.

Leaving these inferiors of his as real masters of the royal monies, the king went North. Gaveston had long returned to him; he went well into Scotland, and the next year Gaveston went as his deputy again into that country, while Edward stayed at Berwick. Then, in the summer of 1311, he left Gaveston in the stronghold of Bamborough, and went up to London himself to receive the long-delayed report of the Ordainers. Its four main points were the revoking of grants to Gaveston, and the control claimed by the great nobles over policy, the appointment of great officers of the Crown and of the governors of the foreign fiefs. They also demanded that a great Council should be held once a year.

It was the usual feudal pressure, with which we have become wearyingly acquainted for more than a hundred years since the rebellion against John, and the capital point was an insistence upon a second banishment of Gaveston, whose power offended the great nobles. In October, 1311, the king reluctantly accepted the report of the Ordainers; but he made a strong protest safeguarding the "just rights of the Crown," in case they should prove to be invaded.

This was not a form, vague though it was. In the

morals of the time, and, indeed, of all time, a promise given under coercion lacks value; while a protest, however general, in favour of traditional rights has weight against any such promise. Within a month Gaveston was gone; within two months he had returned, and Edward and he were together at York. New grants were made to him, and by February (1312) Edward, in the North, the great nobles against him, were at the point of war.

It must be remembered that this rebellion of the great feudatories against the king was strengthened, or even occasioned, by Edward's lack of children. After so many years of marriage he had as yet no heir, and it was thought he would have none. Such a situation probably suggested the supplanting of the king by a relative (such as Lancaster), or at least the blackmailing of Edward by the threat of such a peril.

Origin of the Lancastrian tradition.—At their head was the son of Henry III's younger son, the nephew, that is, of Edward I and the cousin of the reigning king. This was Thomas of Lancaster,[1] a man with

[1] The genealogy of Lancaster is important. It explains the Lancastrian wealth, power, and ultimate usurpation of the Crown.



vast resources, five earldoms—from one of which, Lincoln, he more commonly drew his title. His appearance is something new in the endless story of mediæval rebellion against the Crown. Here is the French "appanage": the royal younger branch endowed with great masses of land, often in one district (thus, Derby, Lincoln, Leicester make a group). The result is that into the opposition there enter claimants to the throne. The quarrels—and the fighting—get to be more and more within the royal connection, and that character in the domestic difficulties of England increases up to the final destruction of the Plantagenets at Bosworth in 1485.

It may sound strange if I trace from this point the general Lancastrian tradition which ended over fifty years later in the first moves towards seizing the Crown, and which (but not till after eighty-five years) did put the Crown upon the head of Lancaster's descendant. But there is truth in seeing it appearing even so early. Some people had foolishly gone about saying that Henry III's younger son, Edward I's younger brother, who had been given the earldom of Lancaster, was really the elder brother, rejected for deformities. The Thomas of Lancaster now in the field was a Plantagenet, and an immensely wealthy man, and he was both a coarser and a stronger character than his cousin Edward. Something of a legend had just begun to form around the word "Lancaster."

Opening of war by Lancaster (spring of 1312).—At any rate, he became the head of the now open rebellion. It was Lancaster who, in the spring of 1312, marched upon York, and then (missing the king there) upon Newcastle.

It shows the incapacity of the king through lack of military support by his military tenants that, in the face of this powerful subordinate, his own cousin and commander of a vast tenantry and the administrator of five earldoms, he had to fly. Isabella of France, his wife, already his enemy, protested. He went down by sea to Scarborough, taking Gaveston with him, and leaving her behind. At Scarborough he left Gaveston within the castle, and himself going to York, raised his standard for war.

Gaveston besieged by the lords in Scarborough.—The great lords besieged the favourite in Scarborough, and he surrendered, on May 17th (1312), to the Earl of Pembroke, whom Lancaster had given command of the siege. *But Gaveston only surrendered on condition that he should be given back the castle if there were no arrangement made before August 1st; and that he should be allowed to go to his own castle in Wallingford, though there under arrest;* and the great house of Percy went bail for the honour of the other lords in the observation of this solemn agreement. Gaveston was taken off towards Wallingford. At Deddington Castle, in Oxfordshire,[1] he was left with the servants while Pembroke, his captor, went off to his family for the night.

Murder of Gaveston, June 19th, 1312.—During that night Gaveston was wakened hurriedly and told to dress; he found Warwick at the gate with a mass of armed men in the darkness. He was taken to Warwick Castle with trumpets and shouts: Lancaster was there, and Gaveston begged for his life. It was not granted. In Lancaster's own presence, the presence of the man

[1] It is off the right bank of the Cherwell, about five or six miles south of Banbury.

responsible[1] for the solemn promise of his safeguard, Gaveston was put to death. The murder was committed on a height some two miles north of Warwick, off the Kenilworth Road, to the west, then known as Blacklow Hill, on June 19th, 1312.

Effect of the murder.—The effect of this murder was enormous—but not decisive. Many men had broken word, even word as solemn as this: but no one had thus ridiculed the power of the Crown since Hastings.

When this murder of Gaveston had taken place, on June 19th, Edward went back to London, and in the consternation which the crime and blunder had produced, managed to rally a considerable force. But he did not fight as yet. For one thing, the barons, though ashamed of what they had done, were in great force, and within a march of the capital, at Ware; for another, the Pope's Legate did all he could to interfere and enforce peace; and for a third, Edward had at last a son born to him.

Birth of Edward III.—This child, who was to be Edward III, was born at Windsor on November 13th, of that year, 1312, and the event seemed to change the king's fate. It might reconcile him with his queen; it made the succession certain; and it made the mass of the smaller gentry more content.

By the spring of the next year, 1313, there was a treaty between the king and his rebels. The actual agents of Gaveston's murder kept away from the treaty-making. All seemed arranged, and by the au-

[1] Pembroke was supposed not to have consulted the other barons when he assented to the terms for the release of Gaveston; but Lancaster was morally responsible for those terms. He could have denounced them, and he was Pembroke's commander.

tumn pardons were issued, the great barons had humbly kneeled and demanded their absolution of their king; there was a general amnesty at the middle of October.

Origin of the Norfolk title and Earl-marshaldom and subsequent semi-royal position of the Howards.— Before the end of 1312, we have to note in passing an incident, or rather a title and a name, which are to be of permanent importance in the future history of England: yet another "appanage." Edward II, now secure of an heir to the throne, nominated his half-brother,[1] Thomas of Brotherton, to the earldom of Norfolk, and created him Earl Marshal of the Realm. The boy was only 12 years old. He was the eldest son of Edward I's second marriage. The granting of the title and of the position was natural, and, as it were, insignificant. It took plenty of money with it, and established yet another Plantagenet in yet another lofty and dignified post; but a great deal was to happen from that appoint-


[1] Eleanor of Castile = Edward I = Margaret of France
Edward II
Thomas of Brotherton, Earl of Norfolk
Margaret = Segrave
Elizabeth = Mowbray
Thomas Mowbray (Duke of Norfolk), died 1399
Robert Howard = Margaret
Thomas
(Three generations follow, then extinct on death of last heiress *Anne* in 1481)
John Howard (Made Duke of Norfolk in 1483, after death of Anne, as representing Royal line of Thomas of Brotherton)

ment. Thomas of Brotherton's[1] line soon ended in an heiress. She married a middle-class man, enriched by the law, called Howard, and the Howards are thenceforward to fill English history, not so much because they enormously enriched themselves by further marriages—though that counted—but because they represented in the eyes of kings, nobles and the people a branch of the blood royal.

At this point, at the end of 1312, and with the consequent treaty of early 1313, it looked as though the chances of the reign had turned.

The loss of Scotland.—But there was a fate upon them, and the next disaster was the loss of Scotland.

I have said that mediæval warfare was necessarily in the main a capture of castles. In the open the large English forces had hitherto been able to do pretty well what they liked in Scotland. In the castles were the garrisons of the King of England: set there by Edward I. For we must remember that up to about the end of 1311 the lowlands of Scotland were in the hands of the King of England.

But the King of Scots, whom his people supported, was still King of Scots—the Bruce; and one by one he began to reduce the castles. He got Linlithgow by a ruse; he himself surprised Perth in January, 1312, Roxburgh next, and in February-March, 1313, the Castle of Edinburgh was taken on its rock, after a most daring climb by Moray and thirty men.

By this time—the opening season of 1313—the Scots

[1] He was so-called because he was born at Brotherton during his father's march north to Scotland; Brotherton near Pontefract, just north of that Castle, after crossing the river.

began in their turn to raid northern England, and the Scottish gentry who still supported the English cause were getting frightened. The English garrison of Stirling Castle, that essential strategic "knot" point of Scotland, still held out. But it was hard pressed right on into the following year (1314), and Mowbray, who was in command, had arranged to capitulate if he were not relieved before the Feast of St. John, the Midsummer's Day of Catholic culture and therefore of the Middle Ages, June 24th.

Edward set to work in this crisis with all the energy of the Plantagenet blood. He was not loyally backed up. The Earls refused to march, as they so often did when they had to decide between their private feudal advantage and the good of England. But the king got an army together at Berwick by the end of May. Wales always supported him: he brought hired foot-soldiers from thence, and he is said to have provided himself with Irish.

Edward's march from Berwick to Stirling.—The feudal rebellion was not killed, however, in spite of the treaty of the year before; it was brooding in a sullen spirit: even the clergy refused aid. Therefore it was not until June the 18th, when there were only six days to spare, that Edward could go forward from Berwick, ill-provided as he was with the best fighting personnel, though with sufficient engines. The numbers of the army we cannot tell: it may have mustered 20,000 men, but from the disloyalty of Edward's great nobles it was badly lacking in that heavy cavalry which was the deciding arm of the day, and in the chief elements of command. This not too large, and ill-organized, force marched well. It covered 94 miles in six

marching days, and arrived before Stirling on June 23rd —the eve of the fated day.

Battle of Bannockburn, St. John's Day, June 24th, 1314.—The Bruce, with perhaps a rather larger force, lay covering the castle to the south of the rock. He had defended the position with traps. There was a skirmish on St. John's Eve itself, not to the advantage of the English king, famous through the verse of Scott, in which the Bruce himself killed with his own battle axe Henry de Bohun. We do not sufficiently know the details of the battle, nor how much Bruce's defence, nor how much the lack of cavalry in Edward's command, decided it; but it was a complete failure of the invader. The name which it took, Bannockburn, is from a stream which runs north-eastward from the hills to the Forth, covering Stirling at a distance of about 2 miles. It is the name from which you may date the final separation of the two nationalities. Edward had charged with courage, but had been withdrawn from the battle by his own guardsman, who perished, and on the defeat of his army went back to Dunbar. The rout was considerable. The force broke up. The catapults and the baggage, much of the provisions, perhaps some cannon—though the date is early—were caught by the pursuers, and so was the mass of the train.

On that day, June 24th, 1314, the history of the two kingdoms changed. The Scots, after their success, proceeded to an invasion of Ireland, which need not for the moment concern us, and which was partly an attempt to carve out fortunes for themselves, and in part an effort to harass the English power.

The defeat at Bannockburn further depresses the

Crown.—The effect of Bannockburn was necessarily a further depression of the Crown. The very year of the battle had seen a famine, and the next year a worse one. There was a pestilence among the cattle as well, and a heavy mortality among men; right on till 1316 the trouble increased. During these misfortunes of England the Scotch invaded. There might yet have been a retrieving of the northern position had not the barons again disobeyed. The king tried in that same year to stop the pressure from Scotland, but his great independent tenants refused to come. Legates from the Pope arrived in the midst of this deadlock to try and set things right. Because they would not give Bruce the title of king, but only of ruler, he refused to deal with them, and postponed a reply. The Legates proclaimed a truce; the Bruce would not listen to it. In 1318 he took not only Berwick, but Wark and Midford, and got down as far as Ripon by the middle of the summer; and the next year he even attempted to surprise the queen herself in York. Nor did Edward cut Bruce off, as he attempted to do, because the great nobles would not follow him: notably did Lancaster, their chief, abandon the national cause.

There was a moment when the Papal envoys thought that they could arrange a peace, and if they had done so, that would have been the moment from which the full independence of Scotland would have been admitted by the English Crown. But it passed unused.

The new favourite, the Despencer, in 1320.—The king remained in the North until the first days of 1320, and then desperately and foolishly began again, but with another favourite, the story of Piers Gaveston. The new favourite was the younger Despencer. He was

married to a daughter of Gloucester, which gave him great wealth from Glamorganshire; and the quarrel between nobles and favourite begins again on its old terms. Once more Lancaster is in arms; once more the favourite and his family are attacked; and in 1321, in the summer, the new favourite and his father were driven out of the country.

Capture and death of Lancaster, March, 1322.—They returned in the autumn, when the king's fortunes were a little raised (such is the irony of these things) by public indignation against an insult offered to his wife, who had been refused entry to the castle of Leeds in Kent; and the long quarrel drags on, with advantage to the king upon the whole, during 1322. *In that year Edward was able to get his hands upon Lancaster and to put him to death.*

That was a great asset. Lancaster had been defeated at Boroughbridge, on March 16th, 1322. He was brought before Edward at Pontefract and, by his peers in full court, tried and condemned to death for open treason and making war on his sovereign and connivance with the Scottish enemy: all true charges. He was executed on March 22nd.

Mortimer joins the queen in France, 1325.—Edward thus increased in power; it almost looked as though he might in the next year, 1323, have confirmed his throne. He was at peace with foreign powers: he had destroyed his chief rival; but his permanent and implacable enemy was his own wife. How much she had resented the early friendship with Gaveston we know. She was already then a determined—and criminal—woman; she was now older and more determined. In the early summer of 1325 (at the end of May) she

went to France to her brother the king. One of the nobles, who had latterly been the worst thorn in Edward's side, Roger de Mortimer, a Lord of the Marches of Wales (therefore a rival to the Despencers), and Lord of the Castle of Wigmore, whom Edward had taken in the war, and had put into the Tower, and who had got away overseas, was there waiting for her. He was her lover. With her was her young son (later to be Edward III), not yet fourteen years of age, who, as Duke of Aquitaine, had gone over to swear allegiance to his feudal superior, the French king.

It is characteristic of Edward that he did not understand what was toward. He still thought himself master. He put a price upon Mortimer's head. All that summer he kept on writing, entreating his wife to return, and to bring back his son.

She returned in 1326, but not in the fashion he could have wished.

Queen Isabella invader, September 24th, 1326.—It was upon September 24th, 1326, that she landed at Orwell in Suffolk, the port of which was still open—it has long since been useless for boats of any draught, a shingle beach has destroyed it. She landed as an open enemy, with her lover at her side. It is to be noted that no one in England favoured the detestable woman. It is true she had her son with her, and that the Plantagenet line would remain; but the contempt of the king must have gone down deep into the mass of the people for his wife to be received as she was. And the magnates, of course—including the Archbishop—supplied her. Thomas of Brotherton, the Earl Marshal and Earl of Norfolk, yet another Plantagenet, ungratefully supported her: he was now twenty-six years

of age. Edward found that he had in this crisis hardly any powerful leader on his side.

Edward flies to the West.—He was in London, living in the Tower, when he heard of Isabella's landing, three days after it had taken place, on September 27th. Within a week he had fled. He went off with the two Despencers, father and son, to the West; attempted (and failed) to raise forces in South Wales; would have fled to Lundy Island—but the weather baulked him.

The Despencers are killed.—On November 16th he was captured, probably at Neath. Already the elder Despencer, caught at Bristol, had been put to death—though he was a man of over sixty. The younger one, captured just after the king, was also immediately murdered. It only remained for the woman, her lover, and the protesting boy (now declared "Guardian of England"), whom they carried about with them, to determine what should be done with the king.

All that winter, 1326–27, he was kept honourably enough at Kenilworth. Early in the new year the queen and Mortimer, controlling the Great Council, made that assembly, not without a London mob, propose the deposition of the father (in which they had no right) and acclaim the young son king.

Even so the decision was not unanimous among the handful of great people who were alone really concerned, four of the greatest prelates refusing to swear; the Archbishop of York, the Bishop of London, and the Bishops of Rochester and Carlisle.

That was on January 8th, 1327; but Edward would not resign.

Five days later articles were drawn up against him, particularly mentioning the loss of the Crown of Scot-

land. The royal boy, set up as a puppet by Isabella and her lover, was made to hear them and to accede. Next they went to Kenilworth to compel the king to accept degradation.

Edward (probably) refuses to resign.—We do not know exactly what happened at that interview, any more than we know what happened seventy-two years later at the interview between other rebels and his great-grandson, Richard II—the story of the Crown of England henceforward becomes one long series of insecure graspings and losings. It is doubtful whether he gave way.[1] For the magnates of the Council, through their proctor, Trussel, were compelled formally to give up fealty and allegiance, and the Steward of the Household broke his staff, as was done at the death of a king. They returned to the court. The heralds proclaimed that Edward had voluntarily surrendered the throne.

And his death is attempted indirectly during the summer of 1327.—Before the spring of 1327 the victim was already marked for death. He was no longer treated as he had been. He was taken from place to place, from Kenilworth to Corfe in Dorset (the scene of so many crimes), to Bristol, then to his own castle of Berkeley: and all was done to compel his death as soon as might be, short of violence. He was put in a room where it was hoped that a neighbouring pest house might end his life; he was treated as roughly as might be. His strong frame survived.

[1] Dr. Stubbs characteristically writes, "Edward yielded at once" ("Const. Hist.," Vol. II, p. 380), and (characteristically again) gives no reference: though he abounds in references on matters never disputed. Plain history is that we have contradictory accounts, and that the more probable denies Edward's resignation of the Crown.

On September 21st, 1327, Edward is murdered in Berkeley Castle.—Upon a certain night, when autumn had begun, the king yet lived. Lord Berkeley, the keeper of the castle, was away at Bradley, ill, and John de Maltravers, who was really the agent of the queen, was by accident or design away as well; and all who remained with Edward watching him were two lesser men, the chief of whom was Thomas de Gournay. In that night they murdered him, after a fashion which showed no external marks of violence. The body was exhibited, that men might know that the king was dead, and the face was agonized. They buried him in the church of St. Peter's Abbey at Gloucester; and by name his boy son, in reality the hating wife and her lover Mortimer, ruled England.

Scotland was gone. But more: the chance of a permanent strong Plantagenet monarchy in England was gone.

It might have rivalled the Capetian monarchy in France and have carried on to our own day a line from the Middle Ages. As it was—and dating from the catastrophe of Edward II—the mediæval monarchy of England wavered. The Plantagenets were to see usurpation, civil war, and extinction on Bosworth field.

(B) Edward III

To the Black Death

(September 21st, 1327, to July 7th, 1348—Nearly 21 years)

The first three years of Edward III's reign may be called indifferently the final clinching of the loss of Scotland or the fall of Mortimer.

Queen Isabella loots the country.—It was always characteristic of the attacks made against the Crown by the rich families of the Middle Ages, that they sacrificed what to-day we should call "national interests." The queen mother, fresh from the murder of her husband, took vast sums at random to pay her debts and to increase her income. She gave her lover, Mortimer, the title Earl of March,[1] and for the moment dominated young Edward, who was still a boy.

Scotland abandoned, 1327.—As for Scotland, the English claim to overlordship over that kingdom was sold. The Scots raided the North of England perpetually and heavily. The boy king was allowed to summon a great army, but it effected nothing, and in the end of 1327 the queen's lover, Mortimer, who was, in effect, governing England, agreed to a contract of marriage between Edward's young sister, Jane, and David, the only son and heir of Robert Bruce, the Scottish king. The marriage was to take place when the children were old enough, and the kernel of this abandonment of the Scottish claim was a sum of £20,000, payable within three years: nominally to young Edward, but really, of course, to the shameless and extravagant woman who was ruining England.

[1] The title remains, colouring English history for generations. It was the favourite's great-grandson, Edmund Mortimer, Earl of March (the title had been restored), who married Philippa the daughter of Lionel Duke of Clarence, son of Edward III, and this marriage left a son, who was the legitimate heir to England under Richard II.

His son and daughter, again, Edmund 5th Earl of March and Anne, were successively legitimate King and Queen of England. The first on Richard's death; the second on her brother's death in 1425. She married Cambridge, the son of Edward III's cadet, the Duke of York; and *her* son was that Duke of York, legitimate King of England, who died uncrowned, but handed on the succession to *his* son, Edward IV. In him the legitimate line was restored to the throne. (See table at foot of next page.)

In a Council or Parliament held at York on December 10th the lad who wore the Crown was made to sign his renunciation, for himself and his successors in perpetuity, of overlordship in Scotland. Next March the Scottish Parliament ratified the treaty, as did young Edward in yet another English Parliament, held at Northampton in May.

It is worthy of note that the greater barons refused to attend these Parliaments, and certainly this policy of abandonment was unpopular throughout the nation; for the raiding of the Scots had been intolerable.

Murder of the Earl of Kent.—Mortimer's own position among his fellow-rebels was as unstable as could be. He made it worse by putting to death the

TABLE


Roger Mortimer, 1st Earl of March, lover of Isabella of France
Edmund Mortimer, died immediately after his father
Roger Mortimer, Earl of March, fought at Crécy, died 1360
Edmund Mortimer, Earl of March, died 1381
= Philippa, daughter of Lionel Duke of Clarence, next eldest son (after the Black Prince) of Edward III
Roger Mortimer, Earl of March, died 1398, legitimate heir to Richard II, and acknowledged as such
Edmund Mortimer, last Earl of March, legitimate King of England, supplanted by Henry IV, died 1425
Anne, legitimate Queen of England
= Earl of Cambridge (son of the Duke of York, Edward III's younger son)
Duke of York, who struggled against Henry VI, and opened the Wars of the Roses
Edward IV

Earl of Kent, Edward II's brother and the king's uncle. This crime was committed by Mortimer as a further attempt to secure himself, and seemed almost normal to the time—so low had the Crown fallen.

But in 1330 the end came. Edward in that year reached the age of eighteen; the age of royal majority. He was already married to Philippa of Hainault. The son who was afterwards the Black Prince was already born to him, and his position of dependance had become ridiculous. Yet it shows what the time was that, though king, he could only achieve his end by plot and conspiracy.

Edward III achieves his independence, September, 1330.—Mortimer hanged, November 29th, 1330.—It was on the occasion of the Council or Parliament summoned to meet at Nottingham in the summer and autumn of 1330 that the blow was struck. The young king and his confederates entered the castle by a secret way, Mortimer was seized in spite of the entreaties of the queen, and in October (the following month) he was tried before the peers of the Council upon many counts, including the murder of Edward II and the embezzlement of that money paid over by the king of the Scots which had been the price of the loss of English overlordship. The peers condemned him to the death of a traitor, and he was hanged, drawn and quartered at Tyburn like a common traitor on November 29th, 1330. The Pope intervened just before Christmas to prevent a similar trial being held of the queen; she was spared; but her son kept her a virtual prisoner on one manor, and it is remarkable that she spent there close on thirty years: half-forgotten after the most vivid and criminal life of her time.

Edward did not wholly neglect her; he paid her ceremonial visits, but she had nothing more to do with the affairs of England, having done in her twenty years of active womanhood all the harm it was possible for her to do. Indeed, this episode of Mortimer and Isabella is so repulsive that not even those historians who, in the last generation, called any rebellion against English kingship "a constitutional movement," were ashamed to excuse it.

From this seizing of power by the young king to the beginning of the great quarrel with France there are seven years of no great moment, for they are full of an effort to recapture Scotland. That effort was abandoned in the later struggle with France, and had no effect on the future of England.

It would have had a great effect, however, had it been pursued. It would (perhaps) have made permanent long before modern times that unity of Britain which Edward I had founded. It is therefore an episode the outline of which should be known.

The attempt to recover Scotland.—We have seen how thoroughly the claim to Scotland was got rid of through the treasonable avarice of Mortimer and the queen. Moreover, Edward III's sister was affianced to the young Scotch King David to confirm the treaty of abandonment.

Nevertheless, the King of England desired to recover the old rights of his grandfather, and he desired it the more because he would, in recovering them, be undoing the work of Mortimer and his mother; and to undo their work was his immediate object in these first years. But he did not propose to do anything that would offend his own conscience or the general opinion

of Christendom. The treaty of peace with Scotland was a solemn one; a family alliance had taken place; and he would have had no excuse in renewing the claim to overlordship, nor did he do so.

Baliol in Scotland, 1332.—But it so happened that Edward Baliol (son of that John Baliol who had played fast and loose with Edward I) made, in early 1332, a bid for the Scottish Crown. Young Edward forbade his people to give any aid, and ordered the frontier to be watched, but Baliol got down to the Humber, sailed from it with 3000 men, and had a very astonishing adventure, thoroughly mediæval in its picturesqueness and rapid turn of fortunes.

Crowned and driven out.—In a few weeks he got himself crowned at Scone. He had sailed as late as August 9th, and he was king by September 24th. Before the end of the year, on December 16th, he suffered a surprise at the hands of his enemies, and had to escape to England.

The secret treaty with Baliol.—As Baliol had actually been crowned, as a number of Edward's lords had a claim to lands in Scotland, and as Baliol when he ousted Edward's young brother-in-law-to-be King David, would have been ready to submit to the old claim of overlordship of an English king, the temptation to interfere was stronger than before. But it was resisted, or, rather, hearing divided counsels, Edward said that he would not act until he had taken advice of the Pope as the moral head of Christendom, and of the King of France, the natural ally of Scotland. It was a loyal decision; but, unfortunately, there had already been secret negotiation and treaty between Edward and Baliol during the few weeks when the

latter was effectually King of Scots. Baliol had promised to acknowledge his Crown as a fief of the Crown of England, to yield the town of Berwick, and to marry Edward's sister Jane if the existing contract with his rival, David, were not proceeded with. Baliol's expulsion rendered these clauses of no effect: but there they were for future use.

Battle of Halidon Hill, March 19th, 1333.—Luckily for young Edward the Scots gave him an opportunity. They raided over the border, he took the excuse to besiege Berwick, giving Baliol the command of that operation in March, 1333. He came up himself in May, but the town held out. The Regent of Scotland came with a large army to relieve Berwick in the course of July. The town had promised to surrender if it were not relieved, and on July 19th the Scottish army came up to attack the besiegers. Edward took possession of Halidon Hill, the attack on which by his enemy was broken so thoroughly that there was a heavy massacre in pursuit. It was a complete victory, and Berwick, of course, surrendered the next day, July 20th. The Scotch sent off their young king with his affianced wife, Jane of England, for safety to France, and he was kept there at Château Gaillard in Normandy.

Baliol once more King of Scotland.—In the next year, 1334, Baliol was therefore king again, and not only accepted the English overlordship, but actually gave up the south-east of the country (everything on the north of a line lying from Dumfries to Linlithgow) to the English Crown. If there had been, as in Edward I's time, a determinate and continued policy upon these lines, a neutral observer might believe (though

a modern Scot would certainly not admit) that in the end the political unity of these islands would have been achieved. But there came in at this moment the diversion of Edward's claim to the Crown of France and the task of confirming that was so much greater than the domestic task his grandfather had set before him, that it occupied all his energies. Scotland was abandoned, Baliol's rising and falling fortunes corresponding accurately to the aid which he could get from his feudal lord over the border.

Edward III's claim to the throne of France.—The feudal rule of succession.—The claim thus advanced to the Crown of France by Edward III was perfectly sound, according to the general, if confused, traditions of feudal custom; that is, according to the rules (fixed for a very long time past in Christendom) which governed the passing from generation to generation of an hereditary fief; that mixture of property and political power which was the essential of feudalism. A fief went from father to child: first to sons in order of birth, then, failing issue of these, to daughters—not to brothers. It is our rule of succession to-day. Exceptions will be found, due to local custom, or to forcible seizure, or to the effect of a will. But in men's minds the "succession of the child" was the normal for even the greatest function as it was for the smallest farm.

It is true that *sovereigns*—that is, the chiefs of the feudal hierarchy holding of no superior—here and there came to their thrones under anomalous claims: the claim of a man who could lead in war, as against the claim of a child or woman; the claim of a man over a child or woman to govern in difficult times; the claim through mention in a will or through a solemn promise.

But even sovereigns, where monarchy was hereditary, followed the rule of father to child, daughters if sons were lacking, as that of the general European conscience. Such inheritance, and such inheritance alone, was, in popular judgment, "of right." It had been the moral support of Matilda, the decisive factor in the establishment of Henry II and the Plantagenet family in England. It had permitted Castile to swallow up Leon and Navarre. It was later to unite Castile with Aragon. Failing sons and the children of sons, the daughter inherited her father's seat as did her son after her.

The King of France, Philippe IV (Philippe le Bel), had a daughter Isabella, and a brother, Charles, who had the title of *Valois*. Failing issue by his sons, Philip's heirs were Isabella and her issue, not Valois' son, Philip. Now the eldest son of Isabella was Edward III. Therefore, *failing issue of Philip IV's sons*, Edward was certainly, according to the morals of the West in the XIVth century, heir to Philip IV and his Crown.

TABLE



The one technical point against Edward lay in this, that there did survive issue of Philip IV's sons—

the Queen of Navarre was the daughter of his eldest son. This Edward's advocates met by the assertion that though one could inherit *through* a woman, a woman could not herself inherit—at any rate, not the French Crown. It was a weak plea—little more than an assertion—but it had behind it strong realities. Joan was far off, already disposed of to a husband who was but a petty sovereign (Navarre), and no one had thought of her. The realities won, and Edward's claim alone was treated as serious.

Now it was exactly the same power of realities against theory—of a moral force stronger than the traditional rule of inheritance, that supported the Valois against the Plantagenet. An excuse was invented by Philip's lawyers to meet in legal fashion Edward's superior claim (just as Edward's lawyers had invented the bar against Joan), but what gave Philip the throne was not the lawyers, but the sense of right of his time.

Real basis of the French king's claim.—The Capetian House had reigned uninterruptedly from father to son for more than 300 years. The succession had gone from father to son without a break from 987 to 1316—and each son had been crowned in his father's lifetime. It was like a chain which we think of as one thing rather than as a number of individual links. It was by this time inconceivable to men that the premier throne of Europe, the Great Monarchy, should be in other hands than those of a Capetian and a man.

That is why Edward III failed. But his attempt was serious, and might have succeeded.

The exact position will be clear to the reader if he looks at the table on page 446.

When Charles IV of France had died, in 1328, he

had a daughter living, and his wife was about to give birth to another child. His cousin Philippe of Valois was made regent. If the child, when it came to be born, had proved to be a boy, it would, of course, have been at once accepted as King of France, and Philippe would have gone on being regent only. But when the child was born, three months after its father's death, it turned out to be a girl.

Let it be noted, therefore, that although the last king had left a living daughter, the child had not been called Queen of France; that only the birth of a boy would, in general opinion, have provided an heir; that, lacking such a male heir, Philippe was generally regarded, by the opinion of his country, as the rightful king. But by the rule of other countries Edward, or the Queen of Navarre, came before Philippe.

Edward III had sent over his ambassadors at once —two English bishops—to claim the Crown on Charles IV's death, but Philippe was crowned with the support of the French Parliament just after their arrival on May 29th.

And here it is important to follow the legal argument put up by the French lawyers in support of the new king's position, for on the consequences of that argument much of European history turns.

The "Salic Law."—They said the title to the Kingdom of France was of the same kind as a title to estate in land. Now, failing a son, the estate in land always went to a daughter, and on to the daughter's children, by old-established feudal custom, and by the general practice of Europe going back to Roman times unbrokenly. But it so happened that the little body of federate troops employed by the Roman Empire, under

their own leaders, and known as "Salian Franks,"[1] had got some one to write down their particular hereditary customs in Latin while they were still Roman soldiers and enjoying the benefits of the Empire. This document, which dates (probably) from the VIth century, is full of interesting little points of barbaric antiquity, many of them now incomprehensible. It happens to contain, among these points, one quite clear statement: a rule of inheritance which we should expect among a primitive people (all men of European race seem to have had that rule in their origins) that the representation of a family, the control of its land especially, could never pass through a woman. A woman, on marrying, became part of the family into which she married. The headship of the family to which she had belonged before her marriage could never go to her or to her children: it could only go to the nearest male descendant through males of the common ancestor: just as our family names descend to-day. This old document (the French call it the *Loi Salique*), which nobody hitherto had bothered much about, was dug out at this moment to support Philippe's claim.

Let there be no error: it was but a legal trick. Through the effect of time later generations came to give sanctity to the nonsense; by the XVIth century it was sacred—and gave the French Crown to the Bourbons.

Strength of Edward's claim.—But when it was first put forward the dependance on the "Salic Law" was absurd, and to regard it as a solemn legal decision is bad history. No one in that society had heard of such

[1] The origin of this word is unknown, but the little group of people to which it refers is known. It lived in Belgium, and was the westernmost of the Frankish tribes.

a thing as the nephew of a dead man, the sole representative of his family, son of his own sister, being ousted from his property by the first cousin once removed. On the other hand it was rather early in the day to say that a woman always had the indefeasible right by primogeniture *herself* to be crowned and to govern. Therefore Edward's claim in the general conscience of the time was sound, in spite of the existence of the Queen of Navarre, the daughter of his eldest French uncle; *for he, Edward, was, in* 1328, *on the death of his uncle, Charles IV, the nearest* MALE *representative of the last king's blood.*

I repeat, the real cause of Philip's crowning as King of France was not the absurd phantom of a "Salic Law," but the overwhelming national faith in the Capetian family and the national disgust at the idea of the Crown passing out of that family to a Plantagenet.

For nine years no action was taken. In the fourth year, 1331, Edward, who (as we have seen on p. 435) had done homage for Aquitaine long before he was of age—he had been sent over by his mother and Mortimer —did homage quite formally (the first homage had been *general*, the present one admitted the close personal bond called "liege"), and Philippe gave certain castles back to Edward at the same time.

But there was continual bickering over the French support of the Scotch during the succeeding years, and in 1337 things came to a crisis.

The various forces that worked towards the outbreak of war were the economic position of Flanders, the recent military conditions of England, the real claim of Edward III to the French throne, and the urgency of Robert d'Artois.

The economic cause of the war: Flanders and the English wool trade.—With Edward III's real claim to the throne of France we have already dealt. The economic reason was not the chief cause, as the modern writer might imagine: but it was considerable. The Count of Flanders was vassal to the French throne, but he suffered from a rebellion of its people, especially the rising middle classes of the now prosperous low-country towns. In the battle of Cassel the French king had come in to help him, and had been completely successful, destroying the revolt against the legitimate Lord of Flanders; but in doing this the French king had vastly increased his personal power over Flanders. It was for the moment not so much a vassal province as a government divided between central power in Paris and the local law, for King Philip had kept in his own hands most of the goods and lands confiscated after the crushing of the rebellion. Now with the King of France thus powerful in Flanders, there was danger to an important English export, the export of wool for the Flemish looms. It was of advantage to the English Crown to support the independence of the towns; of the merchants and lesser middle classes, even the artisans, of all that flat and wealthy land: and Edward fully felt the necessity of such a policy.

But considering the nature of the time and the strong effect of personal motives throughout the Middle Ages, it would be unhistorical to give this economic factor the first place. The first place lay with Edward's undoubted claim to a splendid union of the two Crowns, and his knowledge that he had a good military instrument to hand. For though the feudal levies available to the King of France were much larger than those

available to the King of England, the English forces, in the absence of any trouble at home (such as had weakened the last reign), were more compact, better disciplined, far more "in hand" and centralized, and now possessed that new weapon, the long bow. Further, the English fiscal system, acting from a restricted area and untrammelled by large independent fiefs, gave Edward a power of hiring troops which, once in his pay, could be treated almost like a modern soldiery; not subject to short service or the semi-independence (or disloyalty) of a feudal levy, with all its lack of cohesion.

Robert of Artois.—The last cause of the outbreak of war was the urgency of Robert d'Artois. Robert d'Artois was the great-grandson of that brother of St. Louis who had died on Crusade, and to whom St. Louis had given Artois (that is the land round Arras) as his appanage.

Upon the death of the present Robert d'Artois' father, the inheritance went by customary right of the province, which need not be detailed here, to an aunt. Robert, on that aunt's death, seized the province; but that aunt's daughter was the French king's wife: whereupon the French king took over Artois as of right and expelled Robert. Robert, who seems to have been not quite sane, counselled aid from a sort of witch, or (as we should call her to-day) a medium. How far he believed in her sorceries we do not know, but she certainly forged documents, finally confessed and was burnt. Robert fled, with great hatred against his cousin the King of France in his heart, escaped to England in disguise, and steadily stirred up the ambition of Edward.

Thus did things come towards their climax, and in 1337 three successive steps showed how fast they were moving.

First: Edward began making his alliances. The first and most obvious was with the Emperor in Germany, Louis of Bavaria, for to play the Empire against the French monarchy had been the obvious policy for more than a century, ever since the time of John and that great effort of his which failed at Bouvines.

Edward allies himself with the Emperor and certain German princes.—Edward not only got his alliance with the Emperor, but with the rulers of Brabant and of the Diocese of Cologne and of Hainault and the Middle Meuse. Edward thus made particular understandings with the people who could threaten the north-east frontier of France, and also with the Empire (of which they were nominally parts) as a whole.

It must be remembered that the forces of the latter were very doubtful, for the word "Empire" after the defeat of Frederick II by the Papacy, ninety years before, had come to have a vaguer and vaguer meaning in men's minds. Any one emperor could raise forces from his own patrimony, but how far he could count on getting other forces in Germany and the lowlands and the Rhine valley to follow him one could never tell. Such action had come to depend more and more on what each individual government of the mosaic into which the Germanies were now split up chose to think of the quarrel. That was why Edward made special agreements with the Archbishop of Cologne, for instance. The archbishop was an elector of the Empire; but his territory was not really commanded by the emperor.

And the Flemish towns.—These alliances of Edward's included a close understanding with the emancipated towns of the Low Countries. This was a very important stroke. The towns of what is now Southern Holland and Belgium were living an intense life of their own at this moment, becoming very rich through commerce and weaving, and were the great market for English wool. They were also a money market where loans could be negotiated, and they were naturally suspicious of the power of the kingdom of France; the one strongly organized thing within striking distance of their wealth, with a monarch, it must be remembered, who was the technical overlord of most of their territory.

Jacob of Arteveldt.—The chief leader of all that Flemish town movement was Jacob of Arteveldt, a brewer in Ghent, who was almost like a king of the communal federation, and stronger in men, much stronger in money, than his nominal sovereign, the Count of Flanders—the feudal vassal of the King of France.

Philip of France: his counter alliances.—The second step in the process was the corresponding group of alliances built up by Philip, King of France, to meet the danger. He bound to himself a great number of those small German princes, technically subject to the Empire, but really independent, particularly the House of Luxembourg (King of Bohemia by marriage), and he had Austria behind him and the Palatinate.

Edward "defies" Philip, his former overlord.—Thirdly, in October, in a letter to the Pope, Edward first spoke of Philip as the "so-called" King of France. On All Saints' Day, 1337, immediately after-

wards, he gave the formal defiance, that is, the formal breaking of allegiance with the man to whom he had reluctantly and with some reservation sworn fealty, nine years before at Amiens.

Origin of the 100 years' war, November 1st, 1337.— From that day, November 1st, 1337, you may fix the origin of the 100 years' war, which was to last, indeed, much more than 100 years, for the final surrenders of the last Plantagenet garrisons in Normandy and Gascony did not take place until after the middle of the next century.

The initiative of the struggle, the provocation of it, was entirely Plantagenet. We shall miss the meaning of the episode altogether if we forget two things: first, what I have already insisted upon at such length, the real claim of Edward III to the Crown of France, that enormous prize; secondly, the long, confused, but vital tradition of a possible union of all the West, from the Pyrenees northwards, and from the Rhine and North Sea westward, under one head.

The constant tradition of an Anglo-French realm.— It cannot be too often affirmed, if we are to understand the English Middle Ages, that the conception of a great Anglo-French Empire as a probable goal worth working for, and inherent in the nature of things, filled mind after mind and inspired ambition after ambition during all those 400 years. It was not only the Plantagenets who desired to absorb or defeat the Capetians. It was more than once the Capetians who desired to absorb or defeat the Plantagenets. The upper class was during much the greater part of that time of one speech and custom, and of one society; its members hardly distinguishable upon either side of the Channel,

and religion was the same. The tendency to amalgamation was continual from the time when the feudal vassal of the French Crown, Duke of Normandy, had become independent king over England until the time when the last desperate ruin of the Plantagenet house and name left it impossible to think in future of continental dominion, and the advent of a quite new usurping dynasty of low birth, the Tudors, broke with the ancient traditions of England in this as in so much else.

From the moment that one of the greatest vassals of the French Crown had also become an independent monarch beyond the Channel, the position was ambiguous and equilibrium unstable. In pure feudal theory there was no reason why the quite independent King of England should not also be enfiefed as a vassal, under the King of France, as lord of Normandy, of Maine, of Anjou, of Aquitaine, or, indeed, of the whole country —just as in our theory of property there is no reason why a rich landowner in one place should not be a leaseholder under another man in another; but in practice the position was always shaky. The continental lord feared the too great power of the vassal, the powerful vassal independent on his own English throne dreamt always of supplanting his continental lord.

Edward raises money.—In the next year, 1338, Edward raised every penny he could by tallage upon his lands, legal subsidies, and loans got from private people under pressure. He even pawned the jewels of the Regalia, and it is significant that he took dues on tin and wool (in theory seizing the whole) as of right and without consulting the Commons—who did not protest. It is one more example of that truth we must never lose sight of: that until the monarchy was de-

stroyed in the XVIIth century there was no consistent permament, accepted, theory that the Commons, the source of non-feudal grants on moveables, were also the general originators of other taxation. On the contrary, as against their claim the old traditional claim of the monarchs to take what they needed in the time of strain survived, and was on the whole the stronger.

Popularity of the war.—Edward sails from Orwell, July 16th, 1338. First act of war.—But the war was popular. England was very prosperous, and its prosperity was increasing, and instinctively the mass of men felt the economic policy underlying the campaign: the cause of the great Flemish towns, the English market, was also the cause of the merchants of England. He got the enthusiastic assent of his Council or Parliament, and on July 16th, 1338, he sailed from Orwell to Antwerp.

Siege of Cambrai.—The first campaign, 1339, fails.—But his allies were laggard. He got the emperor to make him Vicar of the Empire,[1] going specially to Coblenz with that object, but was able to begin a serious operation no earlier than the autumn of the next year, 1339, when he laid siege to Cambrai, and ravaged all the country as far as St. Quentin, and even Laon. But the allies were still reluctant. Philip of France marched out, came in contact, but refused battle. The whole thing, therefore, was wasted. Edward was not strong enough, with hesitating allies, to invade deeply and in force the territories of Philip. Philip's Council was persuaded that he had only to let Edward's forces exhaust themselves—and that

[1] Vicar-lieutenant, a title giving Edward considerable power to raise men and money in the Low Countries and on the Rhine and Moselle.

judgment was sound. On All Souls' Day, 1339, at the end of the second year of the war, the King of England was back again in Brussels with nothing accomplished, save a debt of five times the revenue.

Edward quarters the arms of France, February 1st, 1340, at Ghent.—Naval victory of Sluys, June 24th, 1340.—The Pope tried to make peace—but we must remember that the Pope was a French Pope in Avignon, Benedict XII by title (Jacques Fouriner in his private name); and though Edward negotiated he showed his real intelligence by adopting in the town of Ghent, and probably on the advice of Arteveldt, the arms of France, and taking the title of French king. This was on the eve of Candlemas, that was February 1st, 1340, and from that day and town the French lilies appeared upon the shield of England, and stayed there till George III dropped them after more than four and a half centuries. The country backed Edward up strongly. During a flying visit of his to England in February or March, he was given a very large subsidy, the equivalent of the whole clerical tithes of the country. The King of France gathered a large naval armament to cut off his return to Flanders. He mustered it in the harbour of Sluys (which means the "Sluice"): it was at the place where the waters of the marshes at the mouth of the Scheldt come out into the North Sea: it was then a deep and large harbour on that coast where everything changes from century to century: to-day it is high and dry inland just on the Dutch-Belgian frontier, a mile or two from the sea. Against the advice of his Council, Edward gained a complete victory by sea (June 24th, 1340), capturing nearly the whole of that Armada. In scale it was perhaps the greatest

naval engagement, and in character the most complete naval victory in the English seas before the wars of the French Revolution. It was effected at a heavy loss in men (though nothing like the French loss), but surprisingly cheaply in ships: of which only two were sunk.

Failure of the second land campaign, 1341.—There followed a second futile nibbling by land at Philip's frontiers, a siege of Tournai which came to nothing, and a truce which was carried on over the next year. It looked, by 1341, as though the war would end in smoke. There were very strong forces making for accommodation, the emperor withdrew from Edward his title of Vicar of the Empire, so that the English king lost those allies, and the mother of Edward's wife—Jane of Hainault—who was also the sister of Philippa the widow of the frontier Lord of Hainault—had done all she could do for peace the year before.

The Breton campaigns of 1342, 1343, also fail. Unfortunately, a Breton quarrel renewed it. Brittany was, in all save feudal theory, independent of France. There were two claimants, the legitimate heiress, who was married to the nephew of the French king, Charles of Blois, and her uncle Montfort. This last seems to have done homage to Edward as King of France in order to get his support. Philip, of course, supported his nephew. Therefore, hostilities began again, Edward himself going over in 1342, and once more the expedition was futile, and in 1343, in January, the Pope arranged yet another truce to last nearly four years; but it was not taken seriously. There was fighting in the southern Plantagenet fief on the Garonne which Philip had tried to take back, and in 1345 Edward's

cause got a heavy blow in the murder of Arteveldt, who was trying to persuade the Flemish to accept Edward as their overlord and as King of France; but the cities still supported, neutrally at least, any force which made for their virtual independence from any lord.

The campaign of Crécy, 1346.—The next year saw the end of all this first phase of the great conflict in the surprising victory of Crécy, and with that we come to the close of the true Middle Ages, for we are approaching the Black Death.

Edward gathered an army of no very great size, entirely English, provided with some very few and not destructive field pieces of that low simple sort, of small calibre, which was just coming into European warfare. He had, however, in that small force, the new tactical weapon, the long bow, and its use and success in this campaign, well known as the thing was at home, is a turning-point in the history of European war.

He gave out that he was sailing from Southampton with this army of 26,000 men for the Angevin inheritance of Guienne and for the mouth of the Garonne. It was down there in the south that the bulk of the King of France's armed force was being used.

Edward lands in Normandy, July 12th, 1346.—This announcement was probably a ruse, though the contemporary account speaks of a genuine change of plan while already at sea. At any rate, the king landed in the Cotentin on July 12th, 1346, and, after that landing, though we have no clear contemporary statement of his military intention, we can, I think fairly easily, deduce it from his actions.

The plan of campaign.—His object was to march



MAP XV

THE CAMPAIGN OF CRÉCY

across the north of France, sufficiently threatening the neighbourhood of Paris to draw the bulk of Philip's forces northwards; but, after he had thus relieved the strain on Guienne, he intended, before those enemy forces could reach the field in any great numbers, to effect his junction with the very large force of his Flemish allies—nearly double his own army—who were pressing upon the north-east of France at that moment. Having joined these, he meant, if possible, to seize Calais and keep it as a permanent gate of entrance into Northern France.

Normandy and everything north of Paris and west of the river Somme was without defence. Edward marched through it without interruption as far as Rouen, taking the wealthy towns on the way (the loot of Caen being specially great), found the passage of the Seine at Rouen guarded, got across that river at Poissy by feint of marching upon Paris,[1] and made at once very rapidly to the north-east for the Somme valley, which he intended to cross in order to effect his junction with the Flemish. It became a race between the large body which Philip of France had gathered and the small army of Edward, pelting along at 15 miles a day.

Edward is checked at the Somme.—Had the King of England been able to find a crossing of the Somme when he reached that river, he would have won the race; for he had a good two days' start. But he could find no crossing. It was only six weeks since he had landed, but already he was hampered by his enormous baggage train of loot. He had lost very few men, but unless he could get across the Somme the position was

[1] His furthest mounted scouts got into the Bois de Boulogne.

serious. He worked down the river from Amiens, beginning on August 22nd. He found every bridge broken and the passages guarded. His last chance was at a ford where the estuary was already a mile wide, and could only be crossed on a hard causeway at low tide. The story goes that he was ignorant of this ford called Blanchetaque (it is now a straight lane a mile below the village of Port crossing dry land, as all this estuary has been reclaimed) until it was pointed out by a local farmer. He had to wait for the last of the ebb, and it was a very close thing. As it was, a French detachment sent up in pursuit along this bank of the river managed to cut off the end of his baggage train.

He crosses the Somme at Blanchetaque.—But the army got across before the tide was too high for it in the morning of August 25th, 1346, breaking an insufficient force which was guarding the passage on the further side, and it is significant that the archers were the cause of that preliminary success.

The great mass of the King of France's force, three or four times that of Edward, much of it untrained but in feudal cavalry alone far superior to its opponent, lay at Abbeville. Edward marched all that day, the 25th, through the Forest of Crécy and came out through Crécy town on to the ridge just above and to the east with the early morning of Saturday, August 26th, 1346.

The Battle of Crécy, Saturday, August 26th, 1346.—Edward's strong and legitimate feeling that he was the legal heir to the French throne found frank expression in the words he used when he came on to this field:—

"Prenon cy place de terre, car nous n'irons plus

avant si aurons veu noz ennemis. Et bien y a cause que les attende, car je suis sur le droit heritage de Madame ma Mère."

Here he said that he was prepared to challenge such land "against the Valois."

The position was a defensive one, for he was vastly inferior in mere numbers to the host which the King of France was leading up against him from the south. He therefore had the horses of his armed gentlemen taken back to the wood behind the crest, since resistance of this sort could only be on foot.

This army on foot was drawn up in three "batailles," or separate groups. Upon the right, near Crécy town, the boy Prince of Wales, just able to bear arms, the Earl of Warwick, Geoffrey de Gobeghen and others, eight hundred of the armed gentry, two thousand archers (presumably with their servants), and one thousand of those Welsh irregulars, armed with long knives and including certain Cornish elements as well. Next, in the centre, the Earls of Northampton and of Arundel with a similar number of fully armed gentry, though dismounted as I have said, and one thousand two hundred archers; in the king's own corps, which may have been upon the left or may have been a reserve, seven hundred of the dismounted armed gentry and two thousand archers.

From such a list one sees at once what reliance was placed upon the new arm. Out of so small a body, more than five thousand were here set to do the principal work with the long bow. As the mass of the French feudal cavalry appeared, some hundreds of yards away, over the rolling country to the south, deploying from the Abbeville road (and, far off, in a disordered

group already perhaps, the mass of untrained followers on foot), Edward rode up and down the ranks, bidding his men eat while there was yet time and (to translate his French popular idiom) "have a good drink." The sun fell upon them between the clouds of somewhat stormy weather and the enemy was black against the light as their long parallel lines of fully armed nobility came slowly down the slight opposing slope towards the Val aux Clercs. Before this feudal cavalry of the French went a detachment of crossbowmen, who were probably mercenaries from Genoa but may possibly have been from Geneva. Before action was joined a violent storm darkened the sky and the pelting rain of it is said to have slackened the strings of their cross-bows. But whatever the reason, these mercenaries could do nothing against the sudden and awful hail of arrows from the Welsh long bow. They broke, and were ridden down by the French feudal cavalry, who cursed them for riff-raff and were eager to be at the charge. But then did it appear that even against that prime force—the heavily armed horseman, with all the tradition and pride of his rank supporting him, the type which had dominated battle for nearly a thousand years—the Welsh bow was too strong. The horse never got home. The tremendous impact of the arrows bolted down the French squires and their mounts and threw the whole of those lines into a desperate confusion, into which an ordered and regular rain of the terrible missiles continued to make havoc. There was, indeed, one moment when, probably through an attempted charge in flank to avoid the storm of shafts, the right "bataille," with the young Prince of Wales there, was pressed. Word of it was sent to Edward,

who was watching the struggle below, from the centre of the crest, where the windmill stood.[1]

"*Mon fils est-il mort ou à terre?*" asked the king. ("Is my son dead or unhorsed?")

They told him he was still mounted and alive. Then answered Edward: "*Qu'ils laissent gagner à l'enfant ses éperons.*" ("Let the child win his spurs.")

There is a curious half-comic, half-tragic contrast in this intensely chivalric feudal phrase, used in the very moment when that new weapon was beginning to destroy chivalry, and by the man who both knew the full value of the new weapon which was gaining him such glory and the high spiritual value of the old, now gradually doomed, tradition of the gentleman riding at the charge.

The feudal cavalry of King Philip was broken to pieces by this defensive before the end of the day. At what hour exactly an attempted retirement was made we do not know, probably in the late afternoon. But it could not be carried out; it became a rout. There was a vigorous pursuit by Edward's horse, which was fresh, save the small contingent on the right, and following these up were the footmen with knives, despatching the wounded or holding them for ransom far into the night.

Edward marches on Calais.—From the field of Crécy Edward marched on Calais. The victory had given him all, and more than all, that he had asked of the campaign, and was a perfect example of the truth that in military history, strategical and tactical, it is the unexpected which determines the issue: for cer-

[1] Foolishly taken down in our own time, but the mound and foundation of it still standing.

tainly Edward himself would hardly have believed on the morning of Crécy that he could have destroyed the opposing force; at the best he might have hoped to check it.

He had relieved the pressure on Guienne, whence a large French army was now retiring, and he was about to reduce Calais.

Which he takes (August 3rd, 1347).—He reduced it by famine. He sat his army down before it with plentiful supplies from his Flemish alliance, building huts, making no attack. The King of France that winter did everything he could to relieve the siege. He got together a very large army, and stood at Wissant, close by; but he failed. There was a challenge to battle more than once, but no battle; for the approaches to Calais standing in the midst of waterways were easily defended. The siege had been very long; it was nearly a year after Crécy (August 3rd, 1347), that Edward's standard could be seen above the town, and the lilies were on it. There was some danger of a massacre, but it was avoided, as the dramatic story tells, by the offering for sacrifice of the rich merchants and the prayers of the queen; as is more probable, through policy.

The fruit of Calais was not only the bridge-head or bastion beyond the Channel, which was held for more than 200 years, but also a long interruption of the war.

Truce of 1347 renewed from year to year.—The French kingdom was exhausted; the recovery of the key to the Straits of Dover save by some ruse (one was attempted, and failed in the next year) was for the moment impossible. The Papacy, to whose interest it was and whose concern it was, as the moral head of

Europe, to arrange a peace, and which had been working intermittently at that task ever since the beginning of hostilities ten years before, managed this time to achieve it. There was an armistice signed before the end of September, and it was renewed year by year for six years—but they were the six years in which that was to happen which transformed the history of Western Europe: I mean the Black Death.

. . . . . .

Battle of Neville's Cross. Capture of David of Scotland.—The Plantagenet power had never stood so high. The victory of Crécy had revealed a new tactical instrument in its hands, the long bow, a monopoly of highly-trained Welshmen and Englishmen from this island, not to be copied elsewhere: a new instrument of war the effect of which patriotic writers of our day may have exaggerated, but which certainly began to restore infantry to its place in war. The Plantagenet had relieved Guienne; he had achieved his bridge-head upon the further side of the Channel, just where it was most useful, commanding the Straits; and in the course of the campaign his commanders in England had won a very considerable victory at Neville's Cross against a Scotch invasion. That victory also was due to the long bow, and was won during the first days of the siege of Calais. The chief fruit of it was the capture of the Scotch king, David, Edward's brother-in-law; a thing in its smaller way parallel to the capture of the King of France ten years later.

These were also the days when the English Middle Ages reached the very height of their material prosperity. The heavy expenses of the campaigns in France did not check the rising tide of wealth. To what it

was due we cannot fully discover. One never can discover the sources of these sudden economic waves, and the material factor which accompanies them is never sufficient to account for them. There is always something spiritual in the affair. But at any rate such a summit of prosperity *was* reached, and the true Middle Ages ended in this country at a high water mark of well being.

The Black Death lands in Dorset.—Then came the shock. Just on the crest of the wave, just when Calais was firmly held, the King of Scotland held also, a new wealth apparently secure, a new military instrument in English hands, the abominable plague, which had half destroyed the Mediterranean ports, came creeping northward. All the summer of 1347 it ruined belt after belt of the West. It had not yet touched England, but the rain which fell incessantly from before the harvest far into the winter promised what was to come, and, on the 7th of July, 1348, it had crossed the sea. Men had fallen dead in the port which is served by Portland Roads, at the mouth of the Froom, what today we call Weymouth, and what was then known as Melcombe Regis from the township on the other side of the river.

Though the effects were to come but slowly, from that moment the story of mediæval England was changed.

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